lesson to both Eastern and Western observers, who are both overly burdened with the Stalinist stereotype.

The point of the preceding discussion has been to clarify for the reader the limits of our analysis by reviewing the strengths and weaknesses of alternative approaches. The advantage of the Western approach is that it is more familiar to most readers and that it highlights those aspects of Chinese politics that are shared by other modern governments, regardless of political system. This may be an especially advantageous approach for the appreciation of post-Mao reforms because of the boldness of the regime in pursuing modernization.

CHAPTER VIII
From Maoism to Modernization:
Socialism With Chinese Characteristics

The death of Mao Zedong was a turning point in Chinese politics, marking the end of the revolutionary era and initiating a transition to a new modernization model. By the end of 1984, that new model was in place as the guiding spirit of Deng Xiaoping's reforms. "Socialism with Chinese characteristics" remained an elusive phrase that often came across as defensive insistence that China had not abandoned socialism, yet it also suggested a growing confidence that the PRC had carved out a different developmental path that deserved a different label.

The particulars of the modernization model and the process by which it evolved have been discussed in detail. In concluding, we will raise some larger questions that surround the passing of China's revolutionary era. One set of questions deals with the fate of the Maoist model. Has it been decisively rejected in favor of a different model? What continuities or precedents link the two models and periods? And is the Maoist model still of any interest, or can it be discarded as an outdated set of policies or principles? A second set of questions concerns assessment of China's revolutionary era. If it is really over, can we now tally its successes and failures, or produce a balance sheet of its accomplishments? Finally, what issues are emerging in the 1980s that
demand attention from the student of Chinese politics, either because they threaten the stability of the present course or because they suggest consequences that may follow its continuation? Although there are no definitive answers to such broad questions, it is important to consider their significance and some of the ways they might be answered.

THE FATE OF THE MAOIST MODEL

Socialism with Chinese Characteristics. By the mid-1980s, "building socialism with Chinese characteristics" was a primary theme in definitions of the CCP's task, displacing—although not eliminating—the "readjustment" emphasis of the early 1980s and the "four modernizations" slogan of the late 1970s. If CCP history is a guide, this theme will yield in a few years to a new slogan deemed more appropriate for its time. Socialism with Chinese characteristics is nonetheless an extremely important political symbol, one whose significance far exceeds its predictably short life span as a slogan or the first vague Chinese efforts to specify its content. It is a symbol of China's separation from its recent past and of its future hopes. Reserving questions about the future for later discussion, let us examine what the symbol suggests about the Maoist past.

There is no doubt that socialism with Chinese characteristics symbolizes a decisive shift from Maoism to modernization models. The stress on socialism reveals the reformers' determination to maintain their ideological legitimacy, which might be taken as evidence of their inability to separate themselves from the Maoist path. Many foreign observers have emphasized the obstacles to reform that seemed to slow its process in the early 1980s and to restrict the extent of actual change in the system. They suggested that a combination of ideological rigidity, bureaucratic inertia, and residual leftist blocked a real breakthrough, so that Deng's legacy might be a failed or half-hearted reform effort, or even might indicate some backsliding toward Maoism. These cautions must be taken seriously as the obstacles are real and powerful. Nonetheless, the reforms have moved ahead, especially with the dramatic decisions of 1984 to expand the opening to foreign economic interests and to relax central bureaucratic controls over the urban and industrial economies. Of course, there may be reversals in the future (that is always a possibility in Chinese politics), but the policies and rhetoric that constitute socialism with Chinese characteristics mark it as a confirmed, significant departure from the Maoist model. The transition is over, with the old model discarded and the new one in place.

At the center of the new order is the idea of "integrating the basic tenets of Marxism with actual conditions in China." Like all such formulations, it permits endless variation in the proper mix of universal tenets and particular conditions. What counts is the political context and understanding of the phrase, which is unmistakable: it is a mandate for sweeping policy changes and redefinition of what socialism in contemporary China entails. The policies are those associated with the modernization model: the shift from ideological to material and market incentives; the dismantling of the commune system with a return to household farming; the expansion of opportunities for entrepreneurial activities; the freeing of some market transactions from bureaucratic controls; the new status and opportunities for intellectuals and professionals; the ever-widening opening to the international system; the ambivalent, modest, but still significant relaxation of dictatorial party controls in legal, academic, and other institutional spheres; and other related policies discussed throughout this book. These policies have overcome initial resistance, weathered a series of critical debates and compromises, and gradually acquired a measure of stability and ideological legitimacy. They are neither secure nor sacrosanct, but they have become the new orthodoxy. Future changes of whatever sort will have to deal with them on their own terms, that is, on the terms that the modernization model has prescribed as appropriate for the times, not on terms prescribed by the Maoist model.

Continuities and Precedents. It is one thing to say that the modernization model differs from Maoism and has freed itself from the unwanted ideological restraints of its predecessor. It is quite another thing to assume it is wholly new. In fact, the modernization model is not wholly new, for it displays many continuities with and precedents in the Maoist period. Initially, during Hua's neo-Maoist interlude and for a few years thereafter,
these links seemed quite restrictive, even inescapable. They represented policies and principles that party leaders could defy openly only at great political risk. Today, it is different. Deng and his colleagues have made their break with Maoism and have considerable latitude to accept or reject elements of the immediate past depending on their fit with the new orthodoxy. Yet, in making their choices, the current leaders have maintained some strong lines of continuity with Maoism and have drawn heavily for guidance and legitimacy on precedents from earlier periods.

Just as “socialism with Chinese characteristics” symbolizes the break with the Maoist period, so the “four principles” symbolize the link. In emphasizing the CCP’s continuing adherence to the socialist road, the people’s democratic dictatorship, party leadership, and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, the reformers have demonstrated their determination to locate themselves in the mainstream of the Communist Revolution, including its Maoist component, and excluding only those aspects of Maoism now regarded as serious errors—still said to be far outweighed by Mao’s overall contribution to the revolution. In keeping with this commitment, perhaps the strongest continuity is in the structure of political leadership where senior party elites hold a virtual monopoly of power over a vast bureaucratic machine that effectively determines the general direction of policy throughout the country. Neither party dictatorship nor the bureaucracy is likely to suffer more than modest diminution of power in any current or contemplated reforms, although there may be significant shifts of power and responsibility within the system. Also continued from the Maoist period are two important qualifications about the system’s supposedly monolithic character. One is the factional nature of elite politics, far less virulent now than it was during the Cultural Revolution but still a fact of life, which means that major political debates and decisions are carried out through behind-the-scenes maneuvering among high-level factions. The other is an element of decentralization and particularism that allows flexibility and slippage in central policies through policy modification, noncompliance, and various forms of personal favoritism at lower levels.

A second area of continuity is in the political system’s tolerance of internal conflict and opposition. Top elites are very suspicious and erratic in their attitude toward this phenomenon, yet the party’s history, especially the ramifications of the mass line, has encouraged episodic eruptions of more or less open political conflict. Although the Gang of Four is now characterized as authoritarian or “fascist” in style, the Cultural Revolution included a remarkable outburst of popular participation in higher-level political struggles. No other ruling Communist party has encouraged or experienced such a dramatic opening of elite politics to mass intervention. The democratic reforms of more recent years are quite different in style from the violent struggles and uncontrolled movements of 1966–1976 (although there have been spontaneous popular demonstrations since 1976 as well), but they are still an institutionalized expression of the mass line. We do not know how far the democratic reforms will go or how durable they will be, but they reflect an element in CCP style that is closely associated with Mao’s thinking.

Finally, the post-1978 period continues to emphasize Chinese self-reliance, even as it violates the Cultural Revolution meaning of that phrase. At issue here is what “self-reliance” means. For Deng, it does not mean sharp restrictions on international exchanges, as it did during the 1960s; the open foreign policy has reversed that aspect of the concept. But “socialism with Chinese characteristics” is above all an assertion of Chinese independence within the Marxist-Leninist tradition, an insistence that China must follow its own socialist road that integrates Marxism with Chinese conditions. The most prominent advocate of that position was Mao Zedong; of course, in his celebrated “sinification of Marxism” in the 1930s and 1940s. Moreover, Deng advocates Maoist self-reliance in a second sense—the idea that China is an independent power—not dependent on either superpower and not tied to either of their blocs. The two themes join in an image common to both leaders of a strong, independent, socialist China pursuing its own unique developmental model.

These continuities should not be surprising given the composition of the post-Mao leadership. Although many of the current leaders were out of office for some or most of the Cultural Revolution decade, the group as a whole is very much a part of

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the post-1949 mainstream Chinese elite. Many worked in close association with Mao for substantial periods of time; others were too junior for that association but administered Maoist policies throughout the Cultural Revolution. Of course, there is great variety in the career paths and degree of closeness to Maoist policies among these people. The point is that the post-1978 leadership is obviously not a revolutionary group or even a sharply distinguished anti-Maoist opposition faction within the broader post-1949 party elite. It is a group that largely opposed or grudgingly accepted Cultural Revolution policies; however, its rise to power was neither a revolt from below nor a coup by counterreformers excluded from the ruling organization. It is legitimately called a “reformist” group, one that seeks to correct what it perceives as serious defects in the system but has no interest in overturning the system as a whole.

Given the reformers’ roots in the preceding order, one would expect their policies to draw heavily on earlier precedents. This is precisely the case, with many of the policies in question modeled on those of three earlier episodes. The first was 1971–1974, when Zhou Enlai presided over rapprochement with the United States, a rapid expansion of international contacts including trade and capital-intensive imports, and a variety of measures aimed at restoring and developing the economy. These policies provided the foundation for the “four modernizations” slogan that ushered in the post-Mao era. A second fertile source of precedents for reform was the post-Leap retrenchment of the early 1960s, which brought extensive use of material incentives, experiments with household production contracts that foreshadowed the current rural responsibility system, and a number of political debates on themes resurrected after 1976. The third period was the mid-1950s, when the emphasis on modernization, institutionalization, legalization, and expanding international contacts (including substantial Soviet aid and training of tens of thousands of Chinese students and technicians) provided numerous precedents for the recent reforms. If one were to extend this search into the pre-Communist period, there would be further precedents in the early decades of the twentieth century, a time when China learned from abroad by sending large numbers of students to Japan and the West and when the importation of foreign goods, capital, technology, and ideas was advancing rapidly. It is obvious from references in their debates that the reformers are well aware of these pre-1949 precedents, just as they are of the more recent ones. In this light, the current reform is hardly new, although it differs from Cultural Revolution Maoism and contains some novel elements.

Significance of the Maoist Model. What can we conclude about the significance of the Maoist model? That depends on what we mean by “Maoism,” which is a complicated, controversial concept. At least five versions can be considered. One refers to the entire body of Mao’s writings and actions throughout his career. Another refers to his revolutionary strategy and the extent of its differences from orthodox Marxism-Leninism. A third version (used frequently in this book) concentrates on the theory, concepts, and policy proposals that Mao advanced during what we have called the Maoist period of 1958–1976. A variation of this identifies Maoism with its most radical manifestations during the Cultural Revolution. A final version is the set of principles deduced from various Maoist statements and translated into a logically consistent developmental model that contrasts with more conventional ideas about development.

Most foreign references to the “Maoist model” have followed the latest usage, seeing Maoism as a frontal challenge to both capitalist (or Western) and Soviet developmental models. In this view, the Maoist model emphasizes national independence and self-reliance over dependence on foreign aid, trade, and technology; it advances the idea of “walking on two legs”—that is, utilizing indigenous as well as foreign methods, traditional as well as modern methods—to compensate for the abstinence from full-scale modernism. It emphasizes all-around development, particularly of the rural sector, over the specialized development of the heavy industrial, urban sector; its image of development is a push from the bottom, raising backward sectors and bringing local forces into play, rather than a pull from the top in which the leading sector forges ahead and benefits trickle down to the rest of society; its test of performance is the elimination of poverty and the wider distribution of social services rather than growth rates and increases in per capita income. It emphasizes mobilization of the population, with campaign attacks on national problems and decentralized encouragement
of local initiative over stability of bureaucratic controls and institutions. And it calls for "politics in command" in preference to "planning in command," an insistence that ideological purity and continuing revolution take precedence over technical or purely economic considerations.

The appeal of this version rested on its clear challenge to concepts that dominated global thinking about development for two decades after World War II, but then came under increasing attack. During the 1960s, there was a growing realization among students of development that the gap between advanced and underdeveloped countries was growing, that the passing of colonialism had not ended Third World economic dependence on or subordination to the core capitalist powers, that economic development was lagging in much of the world, and that even substantial gains in GNP and per capita income might conceal increasing impoverishment for large sectors of the population. The burgeoning critique of standard development ideas, with new stress on problems of poverty and dependence and calls for a new international economic order, coincided with the Cultural Revolution and the forceful presentation of the Maoist model. Indeed, the critics seized on Maoism as a countermodel of self-reliant, equitable growth and took the Cultural Revolution as evidence that it could be put into practice. Needless to say, post-Mao reforms and criticism of the Cultural Revolution have led to this version of Maoism in disarray.

The simplest resolution would be to say that the model failed, that it caused China great damage and that it was rejected by the Chinese, who have now committed themselves enthusiastically to development through interdependence with the capitalist world. The problem with this conclusion is that the Maoist model, as described, was a distorted representation of Mao's ideas and even further removed from the realities of Cultural Revolution China. In other words, this version of the model was not really practiced in China, so there is no way to say if it succeeded or failed. It remains useful as an abstract concept of self-reliant development, which can draw on Chinese experience and Mao's writings for illustrations of how elements in the model might be debated or practiced in a specific case. The most important lesson, however, seems to be that complex issues of national security, bureaucratic power, social conflict, and the like would make it difficult for any state to pursue this pure form of the Maoist model.

The other versions of the model all have empirical reference points in Mao's works or contemporary Chinese history and hence are more appropriate subjects for judgments about significance. The verdict on Cultural Revolution Maoism, the actual practice of policies associated with Mao's name in that turbulent decade, is clear: it was, on balance, a damaging episode that has been condemned by the Chinese leadership and cannot really be viewed as a model at all because it was a product of such disparate and spontaneous political phenomena. It is the first three versions of Maoism that constitute the heart of the issue in searching for its significance. Although the passage of time and the accumulation of new data and scholarship are making possible a fuller appreciation of Mao's career and its historical significance, it is impossible to fully explain here. However, one general observation on the Maoist model of 1958-1976, which has been the primary reference in this study, can be made.

Whether or not the 1958-1976 model was a success or failure depends on one's perspectives and expectations. Despite the disruptions, there was considerable national development in these two decades. Rates of growth were less than in Japan, South Korea, or Taiwan, for example, but higher than in most Third World countries. Growth was strongest in the industrial sector, while the rural standard of living stagnated (note the contrast to the foreign image of the model); yet there were important advances in agricultural production and modernization. Distribution was less egalitarian than many observers claimed; yet Chinese society was relatively egalitarian, extremely so in some respects. In evaluating such issues, of which these are only a small sample, we must ask what the alternatives and trade-offs were. The decisions facing Mao in 1958 were different from those faced by elites elsewhere at the time, or those faced by Deng in 1978. Before establishing the significance of the Maoist model, we must set it in its historical context and ask what problems it addressed. This is still no simple matter, and there is

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one aspect of the model's context that demands particular attention.

We suggest that the Maoist model is best viewed as a strategy for sustaining socialist development, while establishing China's economic, political, and strategic independence from the Soviet Union. By the mid-1950s, the PRC was developing rapidly in close association with the USSR. Although not a satellite, as were many of the Eastern European states, it relied heavily on Soviet trade, technology, and strategic protection, and it was subordinate politically to Soviet leadership of the socialist camp. By 1976, China had established full independence from the Soviet Union, had maintained a socialist system with relatively high growth rates, and had developed vastly improved relations with capitalist countries. Severe problems emerged in the course of this transition, which discredited some (not all) features of the model. But what were the alternatives? Should China have kept its semidependent relationship with the USSR, hoping that it would not sacrifice Chinese to Russian interests? Should it have made an abrupt shift to the other side, risking Soviet reprisals or intervention? Should it have attempted something like the modernization model at a time when it had support from neither bloc and very few resources of its own to mount a self-reliant rapid modernization drive? Or should it have pushed for self-reliant development that seemed to capitalize on what the CCP regarded as its strengths—which is what Mao thought his model was doing? However, one answers such questions, it was in fact the Maoist model that guided China through this transition, and that tells us a great deal about the questions that must be asked in evaluating its significance.

ASSESSING THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA

Viewing the Maoist model as a strategy for negotiating the transition from semidependence on the Soviet Union to autonomous growth based on an independent place in the global order leads to a larger set of questions. If abandonment of that model signified transition to international equality as well as the end of the revolutionary era, can we say the revolution has accomplished its mission? To what extent have the revolutionary objectives described in Chapter 2 been attained? This section assesses some accomplishments and shortcomings of CCP efforts to realize national independence and unification, economic and social development, and national integration.

National Independence and Unification. Challenges to the national independence and unification of modern China have taken three forms: foreign influence in Chinese affairs; the removal of Chinese territory from the control of the central government; and the existence within the political system of rival claimants to political authority. At issue here is state building in its most fundamental sense, that is, maintaining unchallenged central control over what is regarded as national territory. Chinese governments from the mid-nineteenth century through the 1940s were unable to accomplish this task. The defeat of Japan and CCP victory in the Civil war of 1946-1949 gave the new Communist government a greater measure of national control than had prevailed for several decades. Nonetheless, a vigorous expansion of its power was required to complete and secure its gains.

The defeat of Japan, postwar weakness of Europe, and American preoccupation with cold war issues facilitated the PRC's eradication of foreign penetration. Only the Soviet Union retained significant influence in Chinese affairs. Its aid program brought Soviet advisers into the Chinese government, established Russian language study and books in Chinese schools, and created a substantial Chinese debt to and economic dependence on the Soviet Union. The PRC also granted the Russians special privileges in Manchuria and Xinjiang (Sinkiang) that bore strong similarities to the foreign concessions extracted from China in earlier decades. However, the privileges were relinquished in the mid-1950s, aid ended in 1960, and the debt was repaid a few years later. There was a strong revival of foreign contacts in the late 1970s, with a resumption of foreign economic activity in and loans to China, but these contacts were diversified among a large number of countries, none likely to match earlier Soviet influence. The PRC entered into these relationships on its own terms, with much greater resources than in the past for resisting foreign pressure. As emphasized in our discussion of the Maoist model, the goal of independence has been fully attained.

The unification of national territory has proved to be a more enduring problem. The new central government quickly incor-
porated all significant areas of the mainland, occupying Tibet and erasing the last serious KMT resistance by the end of 1950. Territorial issues remained, however, in border areas, foreign colonies, and islands off the China coast. The key border disputes were with India and the USSR, and more recently with Vietnam. All involved armed clashes, demonstrating their seriousness in terms of PRC national security, but the areas in question are not integral to China's sense of national identity and unity. The two remaining colonies are Portuguese Macao and British Hong Kong, both being small areas that were part of Guangdong province before their seizure in the sixteenth (Macao) and mid-nineteenth (Hong Kong) centuries. Macao has been under de facto Chinese control since 1967, and a 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration specifies that Hong Kong will revert to Chinese sovereignty in 1997, while maintaining for fifty years after that date its current economic and social system and autonomous status within the PRC as a Special Administrative Region—this being a special provision of the 1982 constitution designed expressly to allow the reincorporation of Hong Kong and Taiwan. Many questions remain about the implementation of this agreement. Some observers doubt that Hong Kong will be able to maintain its present character, including its international role as a free port and commercial/financial center, once it passes under PRC sovereignty. Nonetheless, the Joint Declaration appears to resolve the unification issue from the PRC point of view. The island claims are groups in the East and South China Seas, with many countries of the region advancing competing claims. Like the border issues, these claims carry the potential for international conflict and should not be taken lightly—possible oil reserves and control of shipping lanes make the islands very important—but their removal from PRC control is not really a problem of territorial unity.

The major problem, of course, is Taiwan. In one sense, Taiwan, too, is peripheral to the territorial integrity of China. It has never been well integrated into the mainland system, despite formal administrative ties before the Japanese annexation of 1895 and during a brief period of rule from Nanjing (Nanking) during 1945–1949; there is no loss of established relationships in its separation from the mainland. However, that perspective overlooks the multiple political considerations that make Taiwan the last major obstacle to complete national unification. Both governments regard the island as Chinese territory and reject the possibility of an independent Taiwan. The population, save for a few aborigines, is wholly Chinese ethnically, culturally, and linguistically. The Taiwanese, who constitute around 80 percent of the total population (about 19 million in 1984), are Chinese who emigrated from the southeastern provinces of the mainland over the past three centuries. Although distinct as a social group from the mainlanders who came to Taiwan with the Nationalist government in the postwar period, they are no less Chinese than those mainlanders or other distinctive groups among the Han Chinese under PRC control. Moreover, Taiwan received international recognition as Chinese territory during World War II and probably would have fallen to a Communist invasion in the early 1950s had not American intervention prevented the attempt.

Taiwan's role as an obstacle to unification is heightened by the Nationalists' claim to be the government of China. This is not simply a case of national territory removed from central control but a direct challenge as well to the PRC's authority over the mainland. In recent years, the PRC has mounted a persistent diplomatic campaign, with occasional veiled threats, to persuade the Republic of China on Taiwan to give up its claims to be the government of China and accept Peking's sovereignty, in return for autonomous status much like that now offered Hong Kong. Although PRC leaders have specified greater autonomy for Taiwan than for Hong Kong under this "one country, two systems" formula, including maintenance of internal security forces and some de facto foreign relations under Taipei's control, the authorities on Taiwan have consistently rejected the offer and refused to negotiate. At present, there are essentially no incentives for Taiwan to accept mainland offers, whereas powerful incentives exist for the PRC to avoid damaging its open foreign policy by resorting to force. Hence there is no immediate prospect of resolving this last major barrier to China's unification. Taiwan's unusual political status is not easily maintained, however, so there is some possibility that internal political changes in the future might encourage a different response to mainland over-
interests, development has been most rapid in heavy industry, military and space technology, and the infrastructure serving these sectors. Agriculture and light industry have also advanced, although much less impressively than heavy industry in the three decades prior to 1978. Before that date, gains in agricultural production were only slightly ahead of population growth, whereas light industrial development fell far short of satisfying consumer needs or rapid export expansion. There were some gains in living standards, primarily in the cities where state subsidies kept housing, food, and transportation costs quite low. Rural areas paid the bill for state extraction, which largely served urbanites and the state itself, with little increase in rural income after the mid-1950s. The economic crisis that followed the Great Leap brought extreme hardship and some famine to the countryside; other campaigns or natural disasters caused more localized difficulties. Since 1978, the rural responsibility system has brought dramatic increases in rural income. Production and availability of consumer goods has also expanded significantly in the same period, so the population has finally begun to claim a greater share of the growing national product.

The social change that has accompanied economic development has mixed ramifications. To some extent, it has compensated for the imbalance in economic distribution by expanded delivery of social services, principally education and health care. There are many shortcomings in these services; however, for the country as a whole, they are greatly improved over 1949 and very impressive for a country with limited resources. Revolutionary movements to equalize social status, to expropriate concentrated wealth, and to establish minimal income and services for the dispossessed have provided social opportunity and psychic gains for the poor, women, youth, and some minorities, while reducing the gap between the very rich and the very poor. Even though the social revolution has fallen short of its goals with respect to all these population groups, it has brought some improvements in their social status. On the other hand, policies and campaigns associated with the social revolution have had severe consequences for many Chinese citizens, particularly those identified as its enemies. New forms of stratification have emerged, leaving the bulk of the population in a distinctly lower-class status. In any case, the harsh realities of economics have made it impossible to

Economic and Social Development. Details of PRC economic and social development have been analyzed at several points in the text and are summarized in the appendices. What follows is a general assessment, coupled with a few reflections on the political correlates of this development. PRC socioeconomic development has been erratic but cumulatively impressive, establishing one of the better records among Third World countries. The primary beneficiary has been the state, which has strengthened greatly its internal power and international status. In keeping with state
provide equal economic benefits and social opportunities for different strata and regions.

The overall picture is thus a complicated one. If one compares the Chinese socioeconomic revolution with the development of other revolutionary and nonrevolutionary systems and includes the consumer gains of the post-Mao period, the Chinese record looks comparatively good. However, this is a detached judgment that ignores the political correlates of the revolution, which emerge more clearly if two questions are posed. One such question is: are the people, or different social groups, satisfied with the changes the socioeconomic revolution has brought them? A reasonable generalization might be that the public acknowledges substantial socioeconomic progress but believes it could have been stronger, fairer, or freer. In fact, wherever there has been an opening in Chinese public life for expression of grievances—in the mid-1950s, the early 1960s, 1966–1967 (and episodically throughout the Cultural Revolution decade), 1978–1979, and to a lesser extent to the present—various groups have made known their displeasure with some aspects of PRC development. Intellectuals and poor peasants, disaffected youth and demobilized soldiers, women and factory workers, religious groups and minorities, local cadres and politically labelled "enemies"—virtually all major social strata have found ways, on rare occasion to be sure, to challenge or resist the course of the revolution. Because most such demands could not be met by Mao's continuing revolution, they now generate even stronger demands on the modernization model. We return to this issue in a later section.

The second question deals directly with the problem of political development: to what extent has the revolution developed China's political capacity to provide for the needs and desires of its people? In general, it has greatly expanded state capabilities ("state" referring to the complex of party, state, and military institutions), whereas its record in expanding popular political resources and benefits is mixed. The expansion of state capabilities was most noticeable in the 1950s, as the new institutional order steadily increased its regulatory and extractive activities, developed new symbolic appeals, and carried out a major redistribution of national resources. The Maoist period placed even greater emphasis on symbolic and distributive powers, while further advancing state penetration of all social organizations, but the effort produced virulent conflicts that ultimately sapped the state's morale and its capacity to control the processes it had set in motion. The post-Mao state has shifted to a new form of state building that emphasizes legal regulation, institutionalization, development of new modernization-oriented symbolic appeals, and broader distribution based on market mechanisms. Overall, especially in light of this renewed state development after the Cultural Revolution, the record of state development is a strong one.

Unfortunately, at times, state development has been politically expensive to the people, because the authoritarian system and the disruptive, threatening consequences of campaigns have denied citizens significant influence over the state, while exposing them directly to its extractive powers and its erratically oppressive actions. This is not to deny that there has been some development of popular political resources. PRC institutions have increased opportunities for political participation, relative to the past, and have expanded the educational and ideological supports for such participation. For some groups, at some times, the political system has dispensed justice that was lacking in the past, has brought greater regularity and security, and has stimulated feelings of national or communal pride. The problem is obvious from the analysis of preceding chapters: these indicators of political development have been at the mercy of an arbitrary and erratic performance by the state, which has often denied or subverted its own institutions for providing political goods to its people. This, too, is an issue that calls for further analysis.

National Integration. The unification of modern China required not simply the consolidation of rival forces into a unitary national government but also the reintegration of society and polity. Once the revolution had begun, reintegration could only be on terms that would, in effect, create a new form of political community within the Chinese tradition. The leaders of the Communist movement understood well the integrative requirements of national unification. They came to power determined to break down the barriers that divided Chinese society within itself and the political system from society as a whole. Their objective was the creation of a modern, socialist nation-state that would eliminate cleavages between nationalities,
From Maoism to Modernization

Chinese pressures for integration are so great and the current prospects for resistance so futile. Modernization probably will bring the minority nationalities ever more firmly into the Chinese system, and yet it may also encourage or revive a strong sense of community among them. Separatism is a doubtful alternative now or in the future, but the terms of integration will remain open and fluid for decades to come.

Communal cleavages are those within the major nationalities or ethnic groups. Our concern here is with subethnic groupings among the Han, the vertical lines of cleavage that have for centuries divided Chinese society into myriad smaller communities. The pattern of communal differentiation in pre-Communist society was rich and varied, but three general types of community were particularly important. One was the kinship group, which identified itself on lines of descent from common ancestors. Best known, of course, were the great clans and lineages, particularly dominant in southeastern China, which were social organizations of considerable power in local settings.

Second, local territorial communities, based on an economic unit that tended to supply most of its residents' needs and to mark the effective limits of their activities and concerns, were extremely important throughout China. Exactly what this unit most commonly was and what determined its extent is a difficult question. Some have assumed that it was the natural village, others that it was a supravillage marketing area. Almost all Chinese had strong community attachments to a local territorial unit centered on the cellular network of peasant villages and market towns. They also might identify with the larger territorial units in which they lived or from which they came—county, large city, province, region—but the intensity or identification tended to decline with increasing size of the unit. Finally, there were distinct linguistic and cultural groupings among the Han Chinese, which surpassed both kinship and territorial communities in scale. Most commonly identified by their different spoken dialects (Cantonese, Hakka, Hokkien, Shanghai, provincial variants of Mandarin, and so forth), they frequently produced

sharp economic, social, and cultural rivalry when brought into contact with each other.

These various communal cleavages were a source of much suspicion, prejudice, rivalry, and even violent conflict in Qing China, and they tended to focus individual loyalties on localized or distinctive segments of the larger society. Nationalism had no significant claim on the population in this context, except for those elites whose activities and ambitions brought them into direct association with the imperial political system. One of the most fascinating problems of modern China is the way in which foreign penetration, economic change, and revolutionary movements began to disrupt these communities, bring them into closer contact with each other, and create new lines of cleavage and identification.

Chinese Communism has accelerated this redefinition of community, trying to eradicate the inherited lines of division and to create a universal sense of membership in a national community defined in political terms. It has assaulted directly some of the organizational supports for traditional communalism, most notably in the destruction of lineage organization and property holdings. Through its formal educational system and its multiple instruments of socialization, it has made Mandarin or putonghua a national language¹ and has promoted new orientations toward the political system. Increased travel and mobility and a more extensive communication system have spread knowledge about the country as a whole among its citizens. Economic modernization has enlarged the basic territorial communities, bringing rural areas into the sphere of larger towns and creating new metropolitan and regional systems.

Although these efforts have not eradicated the old particularism—the preference for association with insiders of one's own group and the suspicion or resentment of outsiders—China has developed a vigorous and growing mass nationalism. Limiting the growth of nationalism is the fact that most Chinese experience political activity mainly within their primary units. So long as this is the case, it will be difficult to tell exactly how

the development of loyalties to the national system affects orientations toward local communities. Localism has been a recurring problem in the PRC, usually identified with cadres who are, after all, the only ones in a position to show much effective favoritism for their own kin, locality, or dialect group. How problems of localism will be affected by recent reforms is not clear. The dismantling of communes, creation of new elected county and township governments, and expansion of rural marketing all support fragmentation of existing local communities and the emergence of new, possibly larger ones. Yet the reforms also throw households back on their own resources and permit traditional forms of organization (e.g., kinship groups) to reassert their role. In fact, there is evidence that the reforms have encouraged revival of many pre-socialist ties—religious groups as well as lineages—while weakening organizations based on the state-defined collective.

Traditional China's third main kind of social cleavage, along with nationality and communal divisions, was of a class character.¹ The basic horizontal division of society was between elites and masses, between the gentry (in the broadest sense) and the peasantry. We will not attempt to unravel the question of whether class or community was the most powerful determinant of social conflict in imperial China. Both found modes of expression, and their interrelationship was exceedingly complex. Suffice it to say that the Chinese Communists made class cleavage their initial point of attack and that they succeeded in destroying the social and economic base of the pre-Communist elite. The question that concerns us is whether the PRC has developed new lines of class distinction and, if so, what implications that has for the integration of society and polity.

In general, contemporary Chinese society is not marked by powerful class distinctions. There are, of course, differences in income, social status, and political influence among different strata of the population, but they have a relatively moderate character. Yet class is by no means a dead issue in the PRC. The retention throughout the Maoist period of old class labels assigned during the 1950s, and the insistence that the basic conflict within


¹Efforts to establish Mandarin as a national language began well before the Communists came to power; for non-Mandarin-speaking areas, it is a second language that does not replace the native dialect.
society and party alike was that between proletarian and bourgeois forces, making class analysis and labeling a potent weapon in Chinese politics. There was a tendency to exaggerate or even manufacture class distinctions in interpreting social conflict.

This sensitivity to class relationships will become more important in the course of modernization. During the Maoist period, the political leadership—i.e., the PRC's closest approximation of an elite class—deflected class struggle toward intellectuals, experts, and defeated factional leaders, insisting on its vanguard relationship with the working classes and portraying the PRC's image as a relatively egalitarian, if not literally classless, society. Since 1976, three important changes have occurred. One is the denial of a class distinction between mental and manual labor. Now, the regime insists that intellectuals and technicians are really workers whose different occupations represent no more than a necessary division of labor within socialist society. It has also removed most of the old class labels from landlords, rich peasants, and rich landlords. A second change is in policy toward material gain, with the state now endorsing desires to "get rich" and acknowledging that some will get rich quicker than others. The effect of this, in combination with the removal of political labels from many who are well placed to take advantage of new economic opportunities, is to encourage the emergence of real economic classes in place of the former politically defined classes.

The third change is the CCP's post-1976 effort to merge intellectual and political elite by recruiting experts into the party and insisting on more expertise from party cadres. The creation of a new technocratic elite is underway, an elite that is indeed "both red and expert" but hardly in the Maoist sense. If the old class labels weaken, if mental labor as such has no class character, and if class analysis continues to dominate Chinese political discourse, it is difficult to see how the emerging political-technocratic elite can escape identification as a politically defined new class. In contrast to ethnic and communal cleavages, which may gradually yield to a new national identity, class cleavages are likely to intensify as Chinese look anew at the distribution of power and privilege in their modernizing society.

From Maoism to Modernization

EMERGING ISSUES

The preceding discussion has identified a number of problems that have emerged in the transition from Maoist to modernization models. Although it would be foolish to attempt to predict the future course of Chinese politics, it appears that three issues will become increasingly important as China's modernization proceeds. One is the relationship between socioeconomic modernization and political participation, in particular the question of how new patterns of social stratification will affect political conflict. Another is the problem of political succession and its impact on the character of Chinese socialism. The third issue is the international implications of China's modernization.

Stratification and Political Participation. The initial thrust of Deng's reforms suggests three lines of cleavage in Chinese society that may have particular political significance in the future. The first is the primary economic division between poor individuals and those who are able to capitalize on reform policies to propel themselves into relative affluence. Although there will be an urban component to the lower class, it will be overwhelmingly rural, consisting largely of peasant families that do not have sufficient labor power, agricultural resources, or entrepreneurial skills to make a success of the responsibility system. The upper class will be urban professionals and entrepreneurs, plus many rural families that have become rich peasant families or that have succeeded as nonagricultural "specialized households."

The second division is between richer and poorer regions; the former will be largely centered on the eastern cities, especially those that have been opened for foreign trade and investment and designated as core areas for regional economic development. The gap between regions such as greater Shanghai and the hinterland of an inland province is already immense and will become wider (see Appendix A.2). The socioeconomic gap between such regions will increasingly be one of culture as well, as the modernizing cities will be centers of interaction with foreign cultures and always in the forefront of new commercial and industrial developments. The third division is between the political elite and its co-opted intellectual/technical supporters.
From Maoism to Modernization

The rubric of ultraegalitarian resistance to the new policies. The newly rich in the countryside are sometimes pressured into buying expensive items for the village; sometimes their property is vandalized; sometimes local party leaders tear up valid contracts. Such behavior is denied in press accounts, but the accounts suggest it is not uncommon. Nevertheless, such acts of protest are likely to remain localized under normal conditions. If a segment of the party took the side of resisting peasants, it would be challenging the principle of democratic centralism as well as an important policy. CCP elites have no interest in acknowledging publicly that such a fundamental conflict exists in socialist society. In a sense, they are on the side of the rich, which is where state interests currently lie, although from the beginning the effect of the responsibility system on poor households has been a matter of attention and concern. Therefore, CCP leaders will want to confine debate within inner-party circles, while taking the public position that the issue is not a fundamentally divisive one. However, if a situation of acute factionalization already existed in the party, then it might be to the advantage of one group to articulate and stir up the dissatisfaction and tensions caused by modernization. As in the case of the Cultural Revolution, uncovering such tensions would be more likely to lead to chaos among mass factions than to clear-cut support for one elite faction; however, if articulation of potentially divisive interests is not permitted within the system, then it remains potential support for a radical faction.

Debate over the distribution of resources between richer and poorer regions is more likely to become public, appearing in the press and at local congresses. In this case, acknowledgment of the issue is not quite so damaging to the top elite, and local elites in underprivileged regions have a clear interest in mobilizing popular support behind demands for equity. Counterposed to the pressure for equity from regional constituencies is the political and economic power and capacity of Peking, Shanghai, and the more developed provinces. The center’s natural proclivity is to favor the more developed areas, because their success proves the wisdom of modernization policies. Much of this conflict will be expressed in competitive regional boosterism, but the nativist aspect of the issue—inland Chinese resentment of foreign-influenced coastal cities—should not be discounted, because it is
so obvious a point of attack for the hinterland. Here, then, is an issue that might generate popular political activity in the course of normal politics.

The third issue is one between dissidents and the establishment. In substance, it may range across all the controversial topics mentioned here, but its cutting edge will be argument over the meaning of socialist democracy. What is "socialist" expression (political and artistic), and what are the proper roles governing its institutions and processes? There have been three main periods of open intellectual debate on this question in PRChistory—the hundred flowers of 1957, the early part of the Cultural Revolution, and the democratic movement (Democracy Wall) of 1978–1979—and there will certainly be more. The majority of Chinese intellectuals will probably continue to work within the system, avoiding risk of censure or imprisonment; however, the pattern of recurring intellectual dissent is well established. Dissenters can only be encouraged by expansion of socialist democracy and the open foreign policy and hence are likely to become more active, and possibly bolder, as time goes by. The sociological background of dissidents has been quite diverse and will probably become more so. The Cultural Revolution generation is fertile ground because they were deprived of the opportunity to acquire the technical skills that are now being rewarded, and they were socialized into a radical egalitarian ideology whose warnings about revisionism seem to have borne out by current developments.

On the other side, exposure to the West may induce political opposition from an increasingly self-confident technical elite, as it has in the Soviet Union. However, dissidents will probably remain numerically insignificant with very little if any mass following, and the authorities will continue to suppress them, as in the past, when their activities begin to show signs of an organized movement. If the first division provides some potential for mass factionalism in abnormal times, and the second is most likely to become part of normal politics, this third one is likely to take the form of episodic fringe activities that attract little mass support, and are easily suppressed, but which play an important role as a latent opposition with some access to influential people.

*Succession and Chinese Socialism.* Although pressures for popular political participation are likely to increase under the modernization model, and to find both sanctioned and unsanctioned modes of expression, the PRC will remain essentially a party dictatorship. The CCP top elite will continue to decide all major policy issues, and its character will determine the general direction of Chinese socialism. How long Deng’s leadership will last and who will succeed him are questions of utmost importance. Unfortunately, we cannot answer them, although we can suggest a few of the broader alternatives.

Despite many cautious reminders by foreign observers that Deng’s reforms might be defeated by either leftist or conservative bureaucratic forces, his leadership weathered all the challenges of the early 1980s. By the end of 1984, the reforms were firmly in place, and it seemed that Hu Yaobang’s and Zhao Ziyang’s positions were secure enough to guarantee that Deng’s immediate successors would continue his policies. In Deng Xiaoping’s personal opinion, expressed in late 1984, he the new direction of Chinese politics will hold for the indefinite future, “into the third, fourth and fifth echelons,” because the policies are popular and successful. He also expects that successful modernization will bring greater stability and unity to Chinese politics. Certainly, success in modernization will establish a momentum favoring the continuation of current policies, but just as certainly the societal impact of modernization will be diverse and will gradually give rise to new strains and forces in Chinese politics. Therefore, although the distant future is obscure, in the short-term we will probably see a continuation of the reform program.

One alternative to a reformist succession is a revival of radical or leftist influence, but this prospect is steadily decreasing. Despite the fact that about half the party members are Cultural Revolution recruits, there is no reason to assume that this category is actually a cohesive group. Even if it were, it has lost its leaders at the top, is heir to an extremely unpopular set of policies, and has been the recipient of heavy doctrinal criticism and organizational pressure from the reformers. It is implausible to see these putative Maoists regaining command of the CCP, except under two conditions. First, there would have to be a serious political or economic crisis, with renewed factional conflict of a profound,

“*A Talk by Deng Xiaoping at the Third Plenary Session of the Central Advisory Committee on October 22, 1984,*” *People’s Daily, January 1, 1984, p. 1.*
even violent character. Second, the radicals would have to formulate a new program, such as an appeal to the lower classes that combined some nostalgic revolutionary themes with a focus on contemporary issues. Short of these conditions, which could only develop gradually and which would produce a new radical movement rather than a true Maoist revival, the intraparty left will remain a declining rear guard action against the mainstream party leadership.

Within that mainstream, which will remain committed to some variant of the modernization model, there appear to be two broad alternatives. One is a conservative version that retains the current emphasis on economic construction but calls a halt to economic and political liberalization and experimentation. These leaders would represent the Chinese military-industrial complex, the old-style vested interests of the Chinese bureaucracy and command economy. They would favor continuing economic, scientific, and technological development with more emphasis on heavy industry and state controls and less emphasis on consumer demands, market mechanisms, and the open foreign policy. Chinese socialism under their leadership would resemble Soviet socialism.

The other alternative is continuation of Deng’s reformist version of modernization. The most striking fact about this alternative is that we do not yet know its limits. The reforms are still evolving, pushing against what were once thought to be their most liberal boundaries. Caution and political logic suggest they cannot go much further without encountering too much resistance from conservatives. For that reason, the most likely course of Chinese politics in the succession period is not a decisive triumph for either of these two approaches but rather a series of shifting compromises between them that will continue down the modernization road.

Even if a conservative reaction were to come to the fore, the PRC would continue to modernize along lines reminiscent of Soviet and Eastern European experience. If reformers remain in command and continue to push the policies introduced in the early 1980s, the Chinese political system will appear more singular. Its leaders will continue to refer to “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” but to many observers (socialist and nonsocialist alike) those characteristics may seem more Chinese than socialist. Whatever the name, it will be a system that underscores the unique features of the Chinese revolution and the independent path now emerging in the post-revolutionary era.

**International Implications.** Some of the international implications of China’s shift to the modernization model are already apparent. From an external perspective, the most positive are greatly expanded international contacts flowing from the open foreign policy and a general reduction of tension in the East Asian area as a result of the PRC’s evident need for a peaceful environment in which to concentrate on economic development. The open foreign policy means new markets for foreign goods and capital, and new opportunities for tourism and cultural exchange. Despite many difficulties in forging these new relationships, due partly to Chinese inexperience and partly to the unrealistic expectations of her new partners, they have been welcomed by the international community. On the security front, military tension in the Taiwan straits is at low ebb, Sino-Soviet relations are slowly warming, and the PRC seems to be exerting some moderating influence on the level of hostility between the two Koreas. None of these tendencies is secure from reversal; however, in general, it seems that China’s modernization drive has had a calming influence on the area.

There are exceptions, of course, to this benign view of China’s new course. Commitment to modernization is no guarantee that the PRC will refrain from force, as its 1979 invasion of Vietnam indicates. For Vietnam, China’s normalization of relations with the United States simply gave it the security to intervene militarily in its dispute with its southern neighbor. Neither Vietnam nor its Soviet ally can be reassured by this message and the prospect of growing Chinese strength, although apprehension in the Soviet case is mitigated by China’s clear desire to lessen Sino-Soviet tension. Taiwan also sees negative implications in Deng’s policies, which reduce the short-term military threat but increase diplomatic pressures on the Nationalist government to strike an accommodation with the Communists. Growing international participation by the PRC—in trade, formal relations, and representation in international organizations—inevitably reduces
the Republic of China’s diplomatic contacts, forcing it to rely mainly on unofficial missions to maintain trade and other international business. As China’s growing importance to other states increases its leverage on the Taiwan issue, even those unofficial relations may be difficult for Taipei to maintain. Hong Kong may be the most poignant example of the mixed consequences of China’s new policies. The PRC has long had the power to take Hong Kong but in the past refrained from doing so because of the economic benefits it derived through that territory; it was unthinkable then to relapse the territory and allow it to continue its capitalist ways. With the advent of the modernization model, relations between Hong Kong and the mainland became more intimate than ever, and the prospect of Hong Kong passing to PRC control became less disturbing to the British and most other observers than it had been in the Maoist era. Most importantly, with the opening to market mechanisms and foreign investment within China itself, it became possible to imagine a Hong Kong that was part of the PRC but still a capitalist enclave. Paradoxically, China’s adoption of policies quite favorable to and welcome in Hong Kong opened the door to a formal reassertion of sovereignty over Hong Kong—an outcome less clearly welcomed by most of the territory’s residents.

Looking further ahead, much depends on the relative success of China’s domestic modernization drive. If it fails, if an economic or political crisis ensues, China might enter a period of turmoil with very uncertain foreign policy consequences. Although foreign adventures would not necessarily follow, there might be strong pressures or incentives for Soviet intervention, and hopes for stability in Korea would be shaken. The open foreign policy would almost certainly be a casualty of political upheaval, with substantial losses for those who have banked on its long-term durability. The general conclusion of this study, however, is that the modernization model is not likely to collapse. Although its prospects are uncertain, the basic features seem likely to continue, sooner or later projecting China into a much more powerful economic, political, and military position in world affairs.

Will the emergence of China as a world power early in the twenty-first century pose a threat to its neighbors or to regional or global peace? That is the ultimate question, although it cannot be answered simply. Threats to the international community are not the responsibility of single parties, and there is plenty of time for other parties to work out their response to and relations with a newly powerful China. However, there is no denying that successful modernization in China raises some troubling questions for others. In the first place, it will mark the definitive transformation of the old world of the superpowers. The strictly bipolar world was transformed long ago by the emergence of competing economic centers in Japan and Europe, but these were not new military powers that challenged the dominance of the United States and the USSR. The ascendance of the PRC will mark the arrival of the first true candidate for third superpower status, even though China will lag behind the others in technological development for the foreseeable future. Strategic doctrine, global bargaining, and management of the world economy will be transformed.

More specifically, there will be a sharp challenge to many countries that have close or competitive relations with the PRC. Two areas of particular concern stand out, one being Japan’s response. More than any other country, Japan will face a fundamental strategic choice on the cooperation-competition spectrum. It can pursue both, to be sure—witness Japanese-American relations—but the dangers of miscalculation are great. If it appears for any reason that cooperation will not work, or that competition may get out of hand, the pressures on Japan for rearmament will be intense. On the other hand, if cooperation is to work and competition be kept within healthy limits, the relationship requires of Japan a high level of foresight, commitment, and diplomatic skill.

The other area of special concern is China’s economic impact on other East Asian countries. Already the “four little dragons” of Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea are attempting to move up the product-cycle ladder, as Chinese exports begin to swamp the lower rungs. There is good reason for these smaller economies to fear the effects of a massive, cheap labor export drive by the Chinese. The solution lies in continued technological advance and the maintenance of cooperative relations with China, but it will not be easy. The situation in
Southeast Asia is compounded by the presence of many economically powerful overseas Chinese, some of whom already have active economic interests in China. The rise of China as an economic power will have a very different impact on its "sphere of influence" than was the case with the Soviet Union. The latter's hegemony over Eastern Europe, resting on crude military and political power, is no model for the future Chinese relationship with Southeast Asia, which is likely to revolve around close economic ties in which the overseas Chinese commercial and financial network plays an important role. If China maintains its open foreign policy, it may some day begin to reverse the flow of technology and capital, or at least begin to balance the import of overseas Chinese talent and money with more exports along the same network. This is an extremely complicated and provocative question of legitimate concern to Southeast Asian leaders. Given the peculiar overseas Chinese position of economic strength and political subordination in the region as a whole—conditions vary in different countries, of course—it is clear that an expanding Chinese economy already linked to overseas Chinese economic interests will pose delicate political issues. We are not predicting a crisis in PRC-Southeast Asian relations but rather pointing to the complexity of the relationship. Just as Chinese socialism shows unique characteristics at home, so it may abroad. Socialism with Chinese characteristics may include a foreign economic policy that most observers do not associate with socialist countries.

There remains the fundamental issue of aggressive tendencies, so often associated with the rise of a new power on the world scene. Little is gained by asking this question abstractly: will China be an expansionist power bent on foreign conquest? One could list certain assumptions derived from state practice in general, China's imperial past, or the history of PRC foreign policy to argue both sides of this question. In practice, however, China's foreign policy decisions will address specific cases based on analysis of their security costs and benefits. For example, no matter how active and vigorous its foreign policy becomes, it will not launch an unprovoked assault on the USSR or attempt to conquer the Southeast Asian mainland. The risks of aggression lie in limited foreign policy objectives, where the use of force may advance highly prized goals with relatively little danger of serious damage to China. In such cases, force is rightly feared, and the Sino-Vietnamese border war points immediately to one area where that possibility remains high. As Chinese power increases, the temptation to bully Vietnam will also increase and, with it, the risk of military hostilities. So, too, with Taiwan, where we cannot discount the possibility that a future Chinese government, discouraged with rejection of all its overtures and pressed against its own announced timetable of a reunification accord in the 1980s, will bring stronger pressure to bear through economic isolation, military harassment, and the like. In these two cases, Chinese action will be restrained by its estimate of superpower reaction, so there are still limits to how far it will go. It is this kind of restraint, coupled with the PRC's long-term commitment to the peaceful environment that supports economic development and modernization, that will discourage more generalized Chinese militancy or expansionism. Nonetheless, successful modernization will increase Chinese military power and the temptation to use it when the risks seem minimal.

Whatever the merits of these speculative comments on various aspects of China's emerging international position, China's modernization will seal a global shift of power from the Atlantic to the Pacific. The further that modernization proceeds, the clearer it becomes that the twenty-first century will indeed be the "Pacific century"—provided, of course, that the world avoids self-destruction. China's place in that Pacific-centered order will be a major one, so that Chinese may once again look upon their country as at least one of the world's central kingdoms.