the masses would be educated through struggle. As Mao put it in 1957, "Marxism is a wrangling 'ism,' dealing as it does with contradictions and struggles." Mao's idea of a political forum was not one with guarantees of freedom of speech in the Western sense, but a forum where one had the freedom to risk his political future on the conviction that his contribution would eventually be judged a "fragrant flower" rather than a "poisonous weed." This was a risk Mao himself had often taken, and he heartily recommended it. It was, however, unrealistic to expect this kind of openness to be an adequate encouragement to creativity in a socialist state. Mao had enjoyed the practical freedom to innovate in a chaotic and fragmented China; the political and ideological consolidation of the PRC foreclosed such ventures. Revolutionary effectiveness no longer functioned as a practical criterion of truth. It became an ideological standard of truth—revolutionary effectiveness now meant Mao's idea of revolutionary effectiveness.

The independent course which China took under Mao's helmsmanship from 1957 to 1976 involved many innovations and also wide oscillations in policy, but Mao's active roles in the Great Leap Forward and in the Cultural Revolution constitute in large part the current image of Mao. The link between this image and Mao's early career as described in this book is strong: the values and methods of Mao's later politics were an affirmation of his earlier political experience. But it is important to note that in his last twenty years Mao was active in phases of ideological leadership and passive in more practical phases. The first twenty years of his politics were exactly the reverse. The last limitation of Mao's political paradigm, ironically, was its appropriateness. The practical solution of the problems of one phase could not simply be transmuted into the ideological solution of the problems of the next. The foundations of Mao Zedong's political thought held firm, but the different context produced by its own success changed its significance.

Notes

Sources

Chen Cheng, reels 1–21
A microfilm collection produced by Hoover Institute Microfilms in 1980. It comprises CCP publications captured by the KMT general Chen Cheng when he defeated the Chinese Soviet Republic in Jiangxi (the "Kiangsi Soviet") in 1934. Despite haphazard arrangement it is the most valuable resource for Western studies of the Jiangxi base area from 1930 to 1934.

Keio, reels 1–29
The Keio microfilm collection was produced at Keio University in 1965 for the Center for Chinese Studies, University of California, Berkeley. It comprises documents on Chinese politics, focusing on the CCP, from 1920 to 1932. The collection includes rare periodicals and monographs, as well as Gendai Shina no kokka [Record of modern China], a Japanese Foreign Office file of articles from Chinese newspapers on domestic politics from 1924 to 1932. The Center for Chinese Studies has prepared an excellent handbook for the materials: Guide to Early Chinese Historical Materials: The Keio Collection (Berkeley: Center for Chinese Studies, 1972).

MZZ 1–10
Mao Zedong II (Collected works of Mao Zedong), 10 vols., ed. Takakuni Minouru et al. (Tokyo: Hokusohsha, 1971–73). Not only an exhaustive collection of Mao's pre-1949 writings, but a varius edition showing divergences among available texts. The 1920 newspaper articles on Hunan self-government are the only important writings of Mao analyzed here which are not in MZZ. For the post-1949 period, see John Starr and Nancy Dyer, comps., Post Liberation Works of Mao Zedong: A Bibliography and Index (Berkeley: Center for Chinese Studies, 1976).

SR
Mao Zedong, Selected Readings from the Works of Mao Tse-tung (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1971). Compiled in 1965, SR is primarily a collection of highlights from SW, but some works, including "Oppose Book Worship" (1930), first appeared here.
Chapter 1: Mao before Marxism

3. The source for these statements is Mao’s autobiographical interview with Edgar Snow in Snow’s Red Star over China (New York: Grove Press, 1961), pp. 121–188. Although the scholarly studies provide additional information and perspectives, this account remains the most readable and stimulating resource for Mao’s early career.
6. A marginal comment on Friedrich Paulsen’s System der Ethik recorded by Li Rui, Mao, p. 43.
7. The best-known incident is related by Mao: “When I was about thirteen my father invited many guests to his home, and while they were present a dispute arose between the two of us. My father denounced me before the whole group, calling me lazy and useless. This infuriated me. I cursed him and left the house. My mother ran after me and tried to persuade me to return. My father also pursued me, cursing at the same time he demanded me to come back. I reached the edge of a pond and threatened to jump in if he came any nearer. In this situation demands and counter-demands were presented for the cessation of the ‘civil war.’ My father insisted that I apologize and kowtow as a sign of submission. I agreed to give a one-kneel kowtow if he would promise not to beat me. Thus the ‘war’ ended, and from it I learned that when I defended my rights by open rebellion my father relented, but when I remained meek and submissive he only cursed and beat me the more.” See Snow, Red Star, p. 126.
9. An instance of this is recalled by Mao in Snow, Red Star, p. 130.
10. Ibid., p. 125.
12. I will not attempt to specify in detail the various intellectual influences on Mao because little improvement could be made on Wakeman’s treatment of this subject in *History and Will*.


15. With the exception of Taiwan.


23. There is a tantalizing eleven-page description of this work in *Periodicals of the May Fourth Period*, vol. 1, pp. 151–161.

24. My reference edition of this work is the two-volume third edition (Berlin: Wilhelm Hertz, 1894). Some chapters were retitled in the third edition, and Cai's translation of the titles indicates that he used the later ones. From Li’s manner of citation and the pagination given, I suspect that Cai's translation does not include much more than "Book Two: Basic Concepts and Questions of Principles" (vol. 1, pp. 445–429); however, I have not seen the Chinese translation. An overview of Paulsen’s philosophy is available in Wakeman’s *History and Will*, pp. 195–206, and in Paul Fritsch, *Friedrich Paulsen’s Philosophisches Standpunkt*, vol. 17 of *Abhandlungen zur Philosophie und ihrer Geschichte*, ed. R. Falckenberg (Leipzig: Quelle und Meyer, 1911).


26. *MZJ* 1:53–55. The *Xiang River Review* published only four regular issues. The fifth was suppressed by Zhang Jingyao, the Hunan warlord.


31. Mao’s marginal comments run to 12,100 words (the book is 100,000 words), and underlining abounds. Mao said in 1950, "At that time we were all a bunch of idealists. Happening upon the idealist theories of books like this, I felt a very deep interest and received a revolution which really caused my mind to incline toward it despite its imperfections and idealistic dualism." See Zhou Shizhao, "Di yi shifu shidai di Mao zhuxi" [Chairman Mao at the First Normal School, Xiu Guanci No. 2] (25 January 1951): 12. It might be remembered that Marx indicates a similar respect for idealism in the first "Thesis on Feuerbach."

32. Li, Mao, p. 42.

33. Ibid., p. 43.

34. Mao's efforts at physical education were gratified in an appropriate manner: the First Normal won more than sixty medals in the 1917 provincial competitions.

35. The text is reprinted in *MZJ* 1:35–47. A photostat of the original is printed with Stuart Schram's French translation. This photostat is more useful than the *MZJ* version because it preserves Mao's profuse emphases. Professor Schram's English and French translations were of great help in rendering the quotations from this work, and his introduction to the French translation contains much relevant background information.


40. These activities are described by Xiao Sun and Li Rui.


43. *MZJ* 1:49–51.

44. *MZJ* 1:53.

45. According to *Periodicals of the May Fourth Period*, the review had a tremendous impact on the Hunan revolutionary movement and a significant effect on the whole country. Two thousand copies were printed of the first issue, and it was sold out the same day. Five thousand copies were printed of subsequent issues. Zhang Guotao, a great admirer of Mao, writes, "This paper, which advocated the precepts of the New Culture Movement, ranked high in prestige among the various little provincial..."
NOTES TO PAGES 15–23

69. Quoted in *Periodicals of the May Fourth Period*, vol. 1, p. 156, from *Collected Correspondence of the New Citizens Study Society Members*, vol. 2.


72. "Wenhua shuishi shewu baoguo, di er qi" [Report of the affairs of the Cultural Book Society, second period], *MZZ* 1:77. The first-period report concerned the founding of the society. The printing department published the three-volume *Collected Correspondence of the New Citizens Study Society Members* which Mao edited.


75. *MZZ* 1:81.


77. *MZZ* 1:84.

78. A counterattack is indicated in Li, *Mao*, p. 154.


80. The term is also used in "Great Union" (*MZZ* 1:58–59), but only generally.

81. *MZZ* 1:83. The same notion of class as an excluding and oppressing group is echoed in Mao's 1964 reference to a "class of bureaucratic officials." This flexible and noneconomic notion of class became central to the political analysis of the Gang of Four. See Tang Tuou, "Mao Tse-tung Thought, the Last Struggle for Succession, and the Post Mao Era," *China Quarterly* 71 (September 1977): 498–527, especially pp. 506–510.

82. By "exclusive" I mean defining itself as opposed to a larger group. The closest Mao comes to an exclusive reference group is in the Workers' Night School advertisements. There he explains the motives of "us students" to potential enrollees. However, Mao does his best to identify the project with the workers' idea of their own interests by using a question-answer format. Moreover, the night school was directed at eliminating the main barrier between workers and students—that of literacy.


84. Quoted in *Periodicals of the May Fourth Period*, vol. 1, p. 152.


86. Quoted in *Periodicals of the May Fourth Period*, vol. 1, p. 152.


2. "Wu-si shiji Hunan renmin fan di fan feng yundong baoan jixu jilu zhi san" [Hunan anticolonial, antifeudal popular movement periodicals of
the May Fourth period, third collection], *Hunan Lisih Chiao* 4(1959): 76-77.
2. This was an intentional organizational strategy on Mao's part. See Li Wei-
3. Ibid., p. 18.
4. For an interesting justification of the founding of a Russian Study Club, see Yin Bo (Peng Huang), "Duiyi faqi Elusi yanjihui di ganyan" [Thoughts on the founding of a Russian Study Club], *Hunan Diaogong Bao*, 27 August 1920, in *Hunan Historical Materials* 4(1959):57-90.
10. This comparison is made in Sun Duo, "Past and Future," p. 2.
11. Symptomatic of a perfunctory grasp of Marxism in the early issues of *Communist* is that "Engels" is spelled in the text "Engedes" after the characters for his name—incidentally, in the same article "Kropotkin" is spelled correctly (no. 4, p. 14). The current social structure of China is described as capitalist (p. 28).
19. "Beijing zhengbian, yang shangren" [The Beijing coup and the merchants], MZJ:87-90. Every article in this issue of *Guide Weekly* (no. 31) begins "Beijing zhengbian..." (The Beijing coup and...).
20. The mechanism of this enforcement is the subject of another article, "Zhi-
yan shui" [The cigarette tax], *Guide Weekly* 38(29 August 1923), MZJ:97-98.
22. Ibid.
24. "Zichan jieyi di geming yu geming di zichan jieyi" [The capitalist revolution and revolutionary capitalism], *Guide Weekly* 22(25 March 1923). In his book *Guanyu Mao Zedong tongzhai zai di yi ci guoqie geming zhuanheng shiqi di liang pian zhuzuo* [On Comrade Mao's two essays from the period of the First Revolutionary Civil War] (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1953), Zhang Ruxin compares Chen's essay to Mao's "Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society" and the "Hunan Report" to illustrate the difference between Chen's opportunism and Mao's revolutionary Marxist thinking. This is of course tremendously unfair to Chen since his article was written three years earlier. But compared to Mao's articles on the same question, Chen's style involves a more rigid, compartmental class analysis and the moderation or control of mass activities.
26. For instances it was shared by Feng Yuxiang's Guomin Jun (National Army) and by the anticomunist Western Hills group of old KMT members. On the antiimperialism of the Western Hills group see MZJ 1:140 and also Tang Leang-li, *The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution* (New York: Dutton, 1930), pp. 230-231.
27. "The Capitalist Revolution and Revolutionary Capitalists," p. 164. What Chen is trying to say here could be much better said in terms of principal and secondary contradictions.
30. Chen fails to note that because of imperialist penetration the proletariat can grow faster than the native bourgeoisie in a dependent country. The Vietnamese justify the early proletarian leadership of their national revo-
31. "Wang Chen lianhe Guo-Gong hezuo dao di" [Joint declaration of Wang and Chen of kmt-ctx cooperation to the end], *Chenbao* (6 April 1921); in *Gendai Shinsu no kiroku* [Selected items of record on contemporary China], April 1927. Keio reel 13.


36. "Zhengzhi Zhubao fagan zhi liyou" [The reason for publishing Political Weekly], *Political Weekly* 11(2 December 1925); *MZJ* 1:111.

37. "Xiang zuo haishi xiang you?" [To the left or to the right?], *Political Weekly* 2(13 December 1925); *MZJ* 1:127–128.

38. A major upsurge of anti-imperialist sentiment and organization which originated with the killing of demonstrators by the International Settlement police in Shanghai on 30 May 1925 and culminated in the great Hong Kong strike of 1925–1926.

39. Perhaps the second phase would be a bit more complex, since it could be expected that Wu Peifu and Sun Quanfang would quarrel over the spoils. See "Anti-Feng Propaganda Outline," *MZJ* 1:102.

40. *MZJ* 1:105.

41. "San-san-san-yi zhi" [The 3-3-3-1 policy], *Political Weekly* 1(5 December 1925); *MZJ* 1:113.

42. "You pai di zi zu da benling" [The greatest ability of the rightist faction], *Political Weekly* 3(20 December 1925); *MZJ* 1:140.

43. *MZJ* 1:139.


50. Ibid., p. 3.


54. *Peasant Movement in the First Civil War*, pp. 20–32. See also Wang Shoudao, "Cradle of the Revolution."


56. *MZJ* 1:156.


58. We can assume that the foundation of warlord military power on landlord economic power is a chief theme of a lost Mao pamphlet from this period, *The Class Basis of Zhao Hengti and the Tasks before Us*, referred to in Snow, *Red Star*, p. 161.


60. The relevant page of this manifesto is as follows: "In China today, from north to south, from the commercial centers to the villages and hamlets, poor peasants and overworked laborers are to be found everywhere. Because of the sufferings which they have undergone and their aspirations for liberation, there is in both of them a powerful will to revolt against imperialism. Therefore the success of the national revolution depends upon the participation of the peasants and the laborers of the whole country. The Kuomintang is now engaged upon a determined struggle against militarism and imperialism, against the classes opposed to the interests of the peasants and laborers. It is a struggle for the peasants and laborers, one in which the peasants and laborers also struggle for themselves." See *KMT Documents*, pp. 81–82.


63. Ibid.

64. "Guomin genxing yu nongmin yumeng" [The national revolution and the peasant movement], written as the foreword for *Nongmin wenzi* [The peasant question]; also published in *Nongmin yundong* [The peasant movement] 8(21 September 1926); *MZJ* 1:175–179.

65. *MZJ* 1:175.


67. The first instance of this pattern of argument is in "A Study of Physical Education," where Mao argues that moral, intellectual, and physical education are interrelated but physical education is basic. The pattern dominates Mao's 1956 speech on "The Ten Major Relationships." SW 5:284–307.

68. Originally the source of the book was to have been even broader, including both the problem of oppression caused by people (imperialism, landlords, and such) and the problem of oppression caused by nature (drought, sickness, insects, and the like). Even though problems of the second sort were eventually excluded, Mao emphasizes that they deserve active attention even before the first type of problem is solved.
69. *MZJ* 1:177.
71. *MZJ* 1:177.
73. According to Tang Leang-li, this measure was introduced in Guangdong as early as 1921 (Inner History, p. 139). As late as November 1926, however, the Human peasant movement had not suggested election of county magistrates (*MZJ* 1:193).
74. *KMT Documents*, p. 131.
75. From the “Readers’ Voices” column of *Guide Weekly* 184(21 January 1927):21975.
76. Ironically, this comment is taken from a short article by Chen on the 1923 setback in Peng Pai’s Hailung efforts: “Guangdong nongmin yu Hunan nongmin” (Guangdong peasants and Hunan peasants). *Guide Weekly* 48(12 December 1923):368.
78. Zhang’s description of Borodin’s vacillation regarding peasant policy is instructive in this regard: “The views that Borodin expressed on the peasant land problem generally changed with China’s political climate. Early in 1924 he had proposed to Dr. Sun Yat-sen such plans as confiscation of the property of landlords and nationalization of land, but they were not accepted by Sun. In 1925, following establishment of the National Government, Borodin’s efforts were directed toward close cooperation of the KMT with the Nanking, to consolidate the revolutionary dictatorship in Guangdong, and so he stopped talking about the land revolution. On May 15, 1926, after the Second Plenum of the KMT, he was no longer optimistic over the future of the KMT–CCP cooperation, and so he again stressed the land revolution. The view of the Guangdong District Committee [opposing the CCP agrarian resolution of July 1926 as too mild]... had his support. Toward the end of 1926, after his arrival at Wuhan, his attention was devoted to developing the anti-Chiang front, and once more he ceased to attach importance to the peasant land problem.” See *Autobiography*, vol. 1, pp. 600–601.
82. Ibid., pp. 17–19.
84. Since 21 May is called the “Day of the Horse,” this is known as the “Horse Day Incident.” See “Da geming shiup Mao zhuxi zai Wuhun” (Chairman Mao in Wuhan at the time of the great revolution), *Liushi Yangjiu* 5(1977):24.
85. The institute had over 800 students in its first and only class (180 peasants, 40 “responsible persons from peasant militias,” 140 experienced movement workers, 40 workers, and 400 students). The class started on 7 March 1927 and graduated on 18 June 1927. See “Central Peasant Movement Institute”.
87. *MZJ* 1:205.
88. SW 1:29.
89. *MZJ* 1:205.
95. *MZJ* 1:207–208. I follow the translation of SW as closely as the original text will allow.
96. It should be noted, however, that Mao does not assume omniscience in peasant matters. Although he evidently expects the spread of cooperatives to be a basic part of rural reconstruction, he does no more than indicate their potential because experimentation with them was just beginning.
97. This phrase and the general lack of historical references in the report is an interesting contrast to Li Dazhao’s “Tudi yu nongmin” [Land and the peasants] of early 1926. There the emphasis is on the continuity of present unrest with Chinese peasant rebellions and with the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom. See *Selected Works* of Li Dazhao, pp. 523–536.
98. *MZJ* 1:212.
100. A “riffraff theory” of the peasant associations is provided by the respected historian and member of the KMT left, Tang Leang-li: “In order to understand the agrarian problem in China, an analysis of the social groupings in the countryside is necessary. As elsewhere, the rural population in China consists, briefly speaking, of landlords, farmers, and vagabonds without any occupation. Owing to the peculiar character of the Chinese family system, both the very rich and the very poor are found in the self-same households, the rich members being landlords and the poor leading a vagrant life. There is an obligation on the part of the richer members of the family to support their poorer brothers, who, however, only get a bare livelihood. It is these poorer brothers of the landlords who mainly compose the class of the vagabonds. They have much the same ideas and outlook as their richer brothers. The Communist agrarian policy now [1927–1930] merely works in the inter-
ests of these vagabonds, not of the peasant-cultivators, the farmers. For the latter are on the whole unable to read and to understand the meaning of Communist agitation. The vagabonds, on the other hand, are more literate, being gentry-to-be, and to them the policy of land seizure had a special appeal. Not so to the majority of the bona fide farmers, who cannot gain anything by it but who are bound to suffer on account of the disorganization of the whole system.” See *Inner History*, pp. 272–273.


103. *MZ* 1:249. “As told by Lin Xiang (77–78 ac) in his *Xin Xu*, Lord She was so fond of dragons that he adorned his whole palace with drawings and carvings of them. But when a real dragon heard of his infatuation and paid him a visit, he was frightened out of his wits.” See SW 1:59, n. 35.

104. SW 1:307.

105. See Peter Löhr, *Der Bolschewismus im Urteil der deutschen Sozialdemokrate* (Berlin: Colloquium Verlag, 1967), particularly pp. 260–270. Another similarity in the German and Chinese receptions was the role played by the Versailles Peace Conference: “[German] intellectuals and literati who lost their confidence in Western parliamentary democracy because of the harsh terms of peace proposed by the Entente at Versailles prepared the ground for the later Bolshevization of the German Communist Party [KPD] through their uncritical, emotional turning toward the Russian Soviet.” (Ibid., p. 272)

106. Ibid., pp. 250–257.


109. Ibid., p. 335.

110. Ibid., p. 327.

111. “A really thorough centralization of all of the strength of the Party will of itself because of its inner dynamic push the Party forward in the direction of activity and initiative.” (Ibid., p. 334)


116. The most obvious is his disapproval of violent parties in “Opening Statement of the Xiang River Review” (*MZ* 1:54) and in “The Great Union of the Popular Masses” (*MZ* 1:59) and his characterization of such views as those of the small landlords and rich owner-peasants in “Peasant Classes” (*MZ* 1:154–156). Another would be between the evaluation of the revolutionary role of the merchants in 1923 and the shift of focus toward the peasantry in 1926.


Chapter 3: Rural Revolution: 1927–1931


4. Roy Hofheinz gives an account of this in “The Autumn Harvest Uprising,” *China Quarterly* 32 (October–December 1967): 37–87; see also Li Xin, “Qinghao qiyi qianhou di pianduan huixi” [Memories of episodes surrounding the Autumn Harvest Uprising], in *Zhongguo gongchandang zai Jiangxi diqiu lingdao de shixian de li shi cailiao* [Historical materials of the revolutionary struggles led by the ccc in the Jiangxi area], vol. 1, pp. 57–61; see also *Human History*, pp. 536–540.


6. The “Ning-Han War” from October 1927 to March 1928. See *Human History*, pp. 542–544.

7. Quoted in SW 1:98.


10. This resurgence of communism was noted throughout China. See “Zhongguo gongchandang di minjun” [The fate of the ccc], in *Yanqian Da Gong Bao*, 31 May 1930. Included in the *Gendai Shina no kiroku* [Record of contemporary China], June 1930. Keito rei 21.


14. My interpretation, which emphasizes the divisions among warlords rather than those among the imperialists, differs considerably from the more imperialism-oriented view advanced by John Cattings in *The World and China*, 1922–1972 (London: Eyre Methuen, 1974), pp. 35–51. Our inter-
pretations are not completely different—for myself, Mao, and Gittings, the phenomena of warlordism and imperialism in China are closely related. But in my opinion Gittings makes a mistake by considering Mao’s 1929 viewpoint to be identical with his more nationally oriented statements of 1936. Mao’s basic problem in 1928 was surviving warlord politics, the vagaries of which were indirectly related—but not derivable from—splits among the imperialists. The territoriality of warlord politics led to Mao’s interstitial strategy of survival.

15. Given the ups and downs of factional politics, the persistence of many leaders is more remarkable than their circulation. Some examples would be Duan Qirui, Wu Peifu, Feng Yuxiang.

16. MZJ 2:54.


20. Ibid.


23. SW 1:124.


26. See the April 1930 letters supplied by Kuo, Analytical History, vol. 2, pp. 38–43. Zhang Guotao reports that the base areas were supporting Li Lisan financially at this time; see Autobiography, vol. 2, p. 166.

27. MZJ 2:129.

28. “Now, if your Majesty will institute a government whose action shall be benevolent, this will cause all the officers in the kingdom to wish to stand in your Majesty’s court, and all the farmers to wish to plough in your Majesty’s fields, and all the merchants, both traveling and stationary, to wish to store their goods in your Majesty’s marketplace, and all traveling strangers to wish to make their tours on your Majesty’s roads, and all throughout the kingdom those who feel aggrieved by their rulers to wish to come and complain to your Majesty. And when they are so bent, who will be able to keep them back?” See Mencius, bk. 1, pt. 1, chap. 7:18; trans. James Legge (New York: Dover, 1970), pp. 146–147. Maoist examples: the best propaganda to enemy soldiers is the treatment that captured and wounded soldiers receive from the Red Army (MZJ 2:44); the Red Army’s behavior and regulations are real (shuj) propaganda to the masses (MZJ 2:105).

29. MZJ 2:130.

30. MZJ 2:132.
56. MZJ 2:145.
57. I would not have been struck by the significance of Lijiafang had Mao not pointed it out in the introduction.
58. MZJ 2:155-160.
59. “Xingguo diaocha” [Xingguo investigation]. MZJ 2:185-252. This lengthy investigation is probably the most important of Mao’s untranslated works from the pre-1935 period. A summary is available in Brandy Womack, “The Foundations of Mao Tse-tung’s Political Thought” (Ph.D. dissertation in Political Science, University of Chicago, 1977), chap. 3.
60. MZJ 2:185.
61. MZJ 2:185. The pattern I am referring to can best be illustrated from Confucius: “The ancients who wished to illustrate illustrious virtue throughout the kingdom first ordered well their own states. Wishing to order well their own states, they first regulated their families. Wishing to regulate their families, they first cultivated their persons. Wishing to cultivate their persons...” (The Great Learning 1:4; Legge, Analects, Great Learning, and Doctrine of the Mean [New York: Dover, 1971], pp. 357-358). Mao’s argumentation concerns similarity rather than moral causality, but the insignificance of the problem of scale for the model function (empirical or moral) is analogous.
62. “Fandui benben zhouyi.” This interesting piece first appeared in Selected Readings from the Works of Mao Tse-tung (SR) (pp. 40-50 of the English edition) in the mid-sixties. It may well be more reliable than many of the post-1949 versions, which means that it is quite reliable for our purposes. My optimistic view of its authenticity is based on several factors. First is the generally high principles of editing evident in post-1949 editions. Second is the nature of the localizing references in the work. And third, the nonobjective attitude which leads to pushtchum and opportunism is called “idealism” in line with the original text of the Guilan Resolution (MZJ 2:86-87), rather than “subjectivism,” the (more accurate) amendment of the 1951 SW text (SW 1:111-112). The frustrating problem with “Oppose Book Worship” is the absence of any indication of its intended audience.
63. “Nongyuun diaocha yangyun” [MZJ 7:299-300; SW 3:11-13] and “Nongyuun diaocha ba” [MZJ 7:297-300; SW 3:14-16]. Rural Surveys was a 1941 collection of Mao’s Jiangxi surveys, including all the ones considered here, published for the cadre study campaign of the Zhengfeng (Rectification) Movement. It was reprinted for general distribution in 1947, presumably to aid rural work in the civil war period by emphasizing investigation and giving models for it. Since these short pieces are Mao’s generalizations and comments on the material just considered, they seem appropriate here.
64. “Bu zhuo diaocha meiyou fayuan quan, bu zhuo zhengque de diaocha tongyang meiyou fayuan quan.” MZJ 2:255-257.
65. SR, p. 40.
66. SR, p. 49. The dialectical concept of leadership adumbrated here can be traced from Mao’s articles on self-government for Hunan written in 1919 to the recognition of a problematic relationship between leader and led in “On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People” (1957), SR, p. 434, and on to the Cultural Revolution as an attempt to revitalize this relationship.
67. SR, pp. 47, 43.
68. SR, p. 42.
69. Ibid.
70. SR, p. 47.
71. SW 3:12; SR, p. 195; MZJ 7:290.
72. SR, p. 44.
73. SR, p. 45.
74. SR, p. 46.
75. MZJ 2:255.
76. MZJ 2:256.
77. In “How to Analyze Classes” (June 1933), MZJ 3:285-289, and “On Resolving Certain Problems in the Land Struggle” (10 October 1933), MZJ 4:93-95.
78. “Zhejiang sheng zhi nongmin zhengzhi jingji zhuanguang” [The political-economic circumstances of the peasantry of Zhejiang province, by the party department of Zhejiang, in Chinese Peasant 9(September 1926):60.
81. Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire (1852), sec. 7.
82. Huang, “Xingguo County.”
83. MZJ 2:204.
84. Hanza Alavi, “Peasants and Revolution,” Socialist Register (1965):241-277, defines a rich peasant as a capitalist farmer (p. 244)—that is, someone who hires labor for production. A broader definition was used by Mao at this time; see Tsuangf, The Land Revolution in China, 1930-1934 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969), pp. 152-153. I think that Alavi is correct in identifying the rich peasants as the protocapitalist elements in the village, but rural entrepreneurial opportunities were manifold, and taking advantage of opportunities is more capitalist than even production itself.
86. MZJ 2:52, 161-163, 217.
88. MZJ 2:46-50.
89. MZJ 2:202-222.
90. MZJ 2:222-225.
91. MZJ 2:172; Hsiao, Land Revolution, p. 152.
92. It seems inappropriate to me to call these people lumpenproletarians because they have no relation to the urban proletariat and are no closer to the village wage workers than they are to other classes. “Lumpenproletariat” is merely the closest orthodox Marxist category. Marx’s best-known use of the term is in The Eighteenth Brumaire, where it is used to designate the riffraff who composed Louis Napoleon’s Parisian gendarmes.
93. MZJ 2:46. See also Huang, “The Case of Xingguo.”
94. Praetorianism, derived from the example of the Praetorian Guards of im-
perial Rome, refers to military domination of political leaders because of the
time’s physical superiority. In Rome the emperor surrounded himself with armed men, and then discovered that he was surrounded by
armed men.
95. Document in Kuo, Analytical History, vol. 1, p. 455. This does not imply
that Qu relied entirely on spontaneity. The next item of the circular is this:
"The peasant’s insurrection in Hubei and Hunan must begin on 10 Sep-
tember." But the circular is dated 14 September.
97. MJZ 2:58, 244-246.
98. MJZ 2:53-55, 246.
99. Stinchcombe, "Agricultural Enterprise and Rural Class Structure."
100. Alavi, "Peasants and Revolution," and Eric Wolf, Peasant Wars of the
102. MJZ 2:162.
104. MJZ 2:48.
105. Trygve Løvstein, Chinese Communism, 1931-1934 (Lund: Studentenlitter-
106. Huang, "The Case of Xingguo."
109. See "Resolution on the Peasant Movement," in Brandt, Schwartz, and
Fairbank, A Documentary History, pp. 158-185.
111. See Hisiao, Land Revolution, pp. 5-11; also Hisiao, Power Relations, vol. 1,
p. 21.
113. Document in Hisiao, Land Revolution, pp. 152-170; see also his com-
mentary, pp. 34-37.
115. This tendency is clearest in "Gan-xi tudi fenpei qingxing" [The situation of
land distribution in western Jiangxi], a survey of twelve localities; MJZ
2:155-160.
116. It is evident from the earlier discussion of the stages of land redistribution
that this "concession" was quite tenuous and hard fought. But the prop-
erty-tied families who stayed in the village must have expected redistribution.
117. Mao estimates (MJZ 2:170) that only 25 percent of the rural population
were capable of full labor, 37 percent capable of half-labor, and 37 percent
could not contribute to production. If a family had a high percentage of
laborers it could, all else being equal, accumulate a surplus. But a per
capita land redistribution would make it overstaffed for its own land.
119. For a particularly bad example of this type of interpretation, see Jen Chuo-
huaan, "An Analysis of the Thought of Mao Tse-Tung," in Collected Docu-
ments of the First Sino-American Conference on Mainland China (Taiwan:

120. MJZ 2:51. For a critical view of the effectiveness of parliamentary democracy
in protecting the interests of the rural poor in England, see J. L. and
Barbara Hammond, The Village Labourer, 1760-1832 (New York:

CHAPTER 4: GOVERNING THE CHINESE SOVIET REPUBLIC: 1931-1934
1. The early difficulties of coordinated leadership of the base areas are indi-
cated by Zhang Guotao’s claim that he was “not able to get any reliable
news about the Party Central Committee until the Spring of 1932” (Auto-
bioa, vol. 2, p. 262). This was five months after Zhang had been
elected vice-chairman of the csr. Establishing effective central coordina-
tion among Soviets was a major goal of the Second National Soviet Con-
gress in 1934.
2. See the map and explanation provided by Trygve Løvstein in Chinese Com-
munism, 1931-1934, pp. 8-9.
3. Mao made the observation in 1958 that although several hundred Chinese
had studied in Russia, there were only 28½ Bolsheviks. He gave the follow-
ing explanation for this group: “It was because they [the 28½] were so
terrifyingly ‘left’ that they became self-restricting and isolated, thus reduc-
ing the Party’s contacts.” From “March 10 Talk at the Chengtu Confer-
sence,” in Schram, Chairman Mao Talks to the People, p. 97.
4. William Dorrill attacks the “power struggle” thesis in "Rewriting History to
Further Maoism: The Ningpo Conference of 1932," in Huang, Logic of
Maism, pp. 62-85. However, his assumption that any divergence of opin-
ion was insignificant is even more misleading. Hsiung’s view in Chi-
nese Communism is much more balanced. He maintains that differences
of opinion between Mao and the Twenty-eight Bolsheviks were not funda-
mental enough to prevent a working division of responsibility.
5. Since this group was in opposition to the Twenty-eight Bolsheviks, the sus-
picion was voiced immediately that they had been betrayed. This was
countered with the claim that other rightist oppositionists had betrayed
their brethren in order to create confusion. Warren Kuo, who is closer to
the sources than most, says that the group attracted policy attention by
meeting in a Shanghai hotel for two days in a row and thus "had only their
9. Suwetsai shengquan [Soviet power] edited by the General Political Depart-
ment of the Chinese Worker’s and Peasant’s Red Army, p. 13 of the first
edition (January 1932), which is the third copy of the pamphlet on reel 10
of the Chen Cheng microfilm collection.
11. In the Stalinist purges, to have compromised was a far greater offense than
to have been unrealistic.
12. See Carl Dorris, "Peasant Mobilization in North China and the Origins of


15. In 1958, Mao recalled the following difference of policy: “Because the number of rich peasants was very small we decided in principle to leave them alone, and to make concessions to them. But the ‘leftists’ did not agree. They advocated giving the rich peasants bad land, and giving the landlords no land.” As a result the landlords had nothing to eat, and some of them fled to the mountains and formed guerrilla bands.” From Schram, *Chairman Mao Speaks*, p. 97.


19. *MZJ* 3:44.


21. William Dorrill maintains that Mao’s cooperative attitude toward the Fujian rebels was an invention of later Maoist “official history.” The weight of evidence, however, clearly favors the official view. When Mao criticized the handling of the Fujian affair at the Zunyi Conference, one year after the event, he was not strong enough politically to fabricate an “official history” for an audience of recent participants. See William Dorrill, “The Fujian Rebellion and the CCP: A Case of Maoist Revisionism,” *China Quarterly* 37 (January 1969): 31–53.


29. “Guanyu jixu gaizao difang suwei ai zhengfu wenti” [On the problem of continuously reforming local soviet government], *Hengguo Zhonghua* [Red China] 35 (27 September 1932); *MZJ* 3:131–133.

30. *MZJ* 3:132. This is the first occurrence in Mao’s works of the important rectification trope “zhaohua...xinxu” [wash out...breathe in].

31. “Guanyu zhanzheng jinji douyuan” [On urgent mobilization for war], *Red China* 38 (16 October 1932); *MZJ* 3:143–148.

32. “Guanyu ge ji xuanju yundong di jiancha” [On the inspection of the election movement at all levels], *Red China* 43 (5 December 1932); *MZJ* 3:169–172.


34. “Guanyu zhanzheng douyuan yu gongzuo fangshi” [On mobilization for war and work style], *Red China* 43 (5 December 1932); *MZJ* 3:163–168.

35. *MZJ* 3:166.


37. *MZJ* 3:168. “Gongzuo fandan” and “zhao pining” are used in this article for the first time in Mao’s works.

38. See *Honghan wenji jueyuan* [Resolution on Red Army problems] passed by the First Congress of the Soviet Area Party and made available by the Soviet Area Central Bureau in October 1931; Chen Cheng reel 16. The same approach is evident in Zhang Wentian’s essay on district soviets from April 1934 (Chen Cheng reel 10).

39. It should not be assumed that the party leadership in Jiangxi was in favor of bureaucratism. In fact, most of the principles of Mao’s redirection of the election and mobilization movements can be found in a campaign for a “new leadership style” in the Jiangxi Party in June 1932. Bureaucratism, commandism, formalism, and so forth are all criticized in detail. See *Dang di farsen* [Party reconstruction], published by the Organizational Department of the Central Bureau, especially the articles in the first issue by Deng Yingchao (Teng Ying-ch’ao) and Chang Sheng, in *Chen Cheng* reel 17.

40. Judging from a February 1933 *Red China* investigation of district-level soviets in Ruijin, the reelection movement had no great success in revitalizing local government. See Yeu Lin, “Ruijin ge qi jianju gongzuo di tedian” [Weakness of inspection work in the districts of Ruijin County], *Red China* 52:4; Chen Cheng reel 17.

41. This campaign, “Jiesheng jingji bingju zhanzheng” (Save in Economics to Help the War), can be viewed as a direct ancestor of the Yanan “Better Troops and Simpler Administration” drive. See *Red China* 55 (22 February 1933): 3; 60 (12 March 1933): 6; both in Chen Cheng reel 17.

42. “Wei tiqian zhonggong jingshi shiying qianren ding ji chu jiangxu shi” [Plant early in order to gather strength to defeat the enemy’s big offensive], *Red China* 46 (7 January 1933); Chen Cheng reel 17; *MZJ* 3:179–180.

43. See *MZJ* 3:213–214, 241–242. However, the combined harvests of 1933 were considerably better than those of 1932.

44. See Bo Gu (Qin Bangxian), “Weizhe Buansjiweike di chungeng er douzheng” [Fight for a Bolshevik spring planting], *Red China* 51 (10 February 1933): 1; Chen Cheng reel 17. Some of these policies were already in use in the autumn. “Revolutionary competition” is mentioned in *Ruijin Hongqi* [Red Flag of Ruijin] 7 (7 November 1931): 2, and some weeks later there was a call for inspection of land division. See *Ruijin Hongqi* 10 (28 November 1931): 1; Chen Cheng reel 1.

45. There had been cases reported in which the landlords retained their advantages; the poor peasants did not benefit and therefore did not actively participate in soviet work. See “Zhongyang zhenzheng dui Huichang gongzuo di zhishi” [Central government directive on work in Huichang], *Red China* 30 (4 August 1932): 4; Chen Cheng reel 16.

46. “Quanzhong laodong reqing zuzhi qilai” [Organize the work enthusiasm of the masses], *Red Flag* 67 (8 April 1933): 2.
NOTES TO PAGES 162–168

47. This is based on the account of the well-informed editors of Chihfei fandong wenjian lubian [A collection of Red Bandit reactionary documents], 6 vols. (1935), vol. 3, p. 952. It is claimed by the former communist general Gong Chu that the initial stimulus came from the Comintern. See Lötvirt, Chinese Communism 1931–1934, p. 155.


49. This does not mean that the party leadership originated these ideas. The resolution starts: "Having heard the report of Mao Zedong and Hu Hai..."

50. "Shixing guangjian shenru di chatian yundong" [Execute a broad and deep Land Investigation Movement], Red China 87(20 June 1933); MZJ 3:223–226.

51. Actually the phrase used is "extremely important" (ji zhongyao di), but no other mass organizations are mentioned. Mao probably used "extremely" instead of "most" out of deference to the labor-oriented party leadership, since "most" is far more characteristic of his style.

52. See, for example, "Chatian yundong zong Xiaoxiao yu Ruijin xianwei de guanzhao" [The bureaucratism of the Xiaoxiao District Committee (in Ruijin county) and the Ruijin County Committee in the Land Investigation Movement], Red China 95 (23 July 1933) 5; Chen Cheng reed 17.

53. "Report," Red China 86(17 June 1933); MZJ 3:243–244. Note the similarities of this framework of analysis to the one within which William Hinton's work team operated in Fanxian.

54. "Zenyang fenjie jieli" [How to differentiate classes], Red China 89(29 June 1933); MZJ 3:265–268.


56. This course of events is well described in Lötvirt, Chinese Communism 1931–1934, pp. 172–184.


59. MZJ 3:348. Such errors were not necessarily the sign of excessive enthusiasm, nor was the problem unique to the Land Investigation Movement. In an article from 1932 which reads like one of Mao's, "Central Government Directive on Work in Huichang," Huichang is criticized both for the lack of a deeply penetrating land struggle (landlords were still charging rents) and also for treating rich peasants like landlords and middle peasants like rich peasants.

60. "Guanyu tudi douzheng zhong yie xie wenti di juedui" [Resolution on some questions in the land struggle], MZJ 4:43–45.

61. Moreover, those who had uncovered large numbers of class enemies were well rewarded with favorable publicity, and the participating masses shared the confiscated goods.

62. MZJ 4:49.

NOTES TO PAGES 168–176

63. "Guanyu jia kuaizhuan chatian yundong di wenti" [On the problem of continuing to develop the Land Investigation Movement], Red China 164(20 March 1934) 1; Chen Cheng reed 17.


65. "Guanyu 1933 liang ge wenjian di juedui" [Decision on two 1933 articles], MZJ 10:151–182. See also Hinton, Fanxian.


67. MZJ 3:335.


69. MZJ 4:125–126.

70. MZJ 4:154.


72. Mao was probably thinking of places like Caiyi when he later referred to "sprouts of socialism" in Jiangxi. See Schram, Chairman Mao Speaks, p. 117.

73. Red China 92(8 July 1933)6.


75. See Waller, Kiangsi Soviet Republic, pp. 53–110.

76. See "Pimnin yuan zuzhi yu gongzuozuo dagang" [Organizational and work outline for the poor peasant associations], in Chatian yundong zhinan [Compass for the Land Investigation Movement], MZJ 3:283–289.


78. Qu xiang suweizi zengyang gongzuo [How district and township soviets should work], April 1934; Chen Cheng reed 10. The first part of this pamphlet, on the township soviet (pp. 1–39), was written by Mao and appears in MZJ 4:397–398. The second part, on the district soviet (pp. 41–53), is by Zhang Wenti.

79. "Difang suweizi zhengfu zhengzheng zuzhi xiaoci" [Preliminary articles on local soviet government], passed by the Central Executive Committee in November 1931; Reactionary Documents, vol. 3, pp. 705–725. Of seventy-two articles, numbers 5 through 17 deal with township soviets.


81. This is the first mention of this technique in Mao's writings, but it was suggested for party meetings in June 1932 by Deng Yingchao in the first issue of Party Reconstruction.

82. MZJ 3:364.

83. "How District Soviets Should Be Governed." An example of Zhang's approach: "The basic principle is, in making the district chair committee become the leader and organizer of all work in the district, make the resolution of every important problem pass through the chair committee,
and at the same time have the chair committee maintain appropriate relations with every department, and let the centralized leadership of the chair committee help rather than hinder the establishment of the various departments" (p. 42).

84. This summary is derived from Mao's announcement of the Second National Congress, Red China 101 (13 August 1933); MZJ 3:303–305.


86. Waller provides a detailed description of the report in Klungsi Soviet Republic, pp. 87–90.

87. MZJ 4:236.

88. MZJ 4:238–239.

89. MZJ 4:250–251.

90. "Guanyu zhongdun liangshi hexuoshi wenti" [On the problems of initiating food cooperatives], Red China 94 (14 July 1933); MZJ 3:269–270.

91. MZJ 4:253.

92. Included in SW (and in SF) as "Be Concerned with the Well-Being of the Masses, Pay Attention to Methods of Work," SW 1:147–148.


96. The reason for this delay is given in SW 1:155n. "However, as that meeting [the Zunyi Conference] took place during the Red Army's Long March, it had to confine itself to decisions on the most urgent military problems and on the organization of the Secretariat and the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Central Committee. Only when the Red Army had reached Northern Shanxi after the Long March was it possible for the Central Committee of the party to deal systematically with the various problems of tactics in the political sphere."


98. The first two points are made in MZJ 5:35–36; the last occurs throughout the "Resolution" and the "Report."


100. MZJ 5:156–157; SW 1:244.


102. Compare for instance Waller's Klungsi Soviet Republic and Dorrill's "Re-

writing History." Kim's thesis of a division of responsibilities is more accurate, but it tends to minimize the seriousness and chronological pattern of the disagreements.


Chapter 5: The Foundations of Mao Zedong's Political Thought


2. See "Zhonghua Suweai Gongheguo de zhongyang zhiheng weiyuanhui pingming de di er hao" [Order no. 2 of the Central Executive Committee of the CCP], 15 December 1935; MZJ 5:13–14. See also "Guanyu tudi zhengce de zhishi" [Directive on land policy], 22 July 1936; MZJ 5:63–65. It should be remembered that Mao's post-1935 land policy tended somewhat in this direction and that he attributed the anti-rich peasant line to the Twenty-eight Bolsheviks. See Schram, Chairman Mao Speaks, p. 97.


4. See Dorris, "Peasant Mobilization in North China."


6. MZJ 1:173. See also Chapter 2.

7. Bauer, China und die Hoffnung auf Glaub, pp. 537–572. Since Bauer's theme is transcultural, his treatment of Mao is sensitive to Marxist influences. In my opinion, however, the analysis does not sufficiently take into account the changed practical context of Mao's thought.


15. The series begins with an article by Ric Pfaffen in Modern China 2(4), October 1976.

16. The best description of the complexity of Mao's background is Frederic Wakeman's History and Will.

18.MZ/3.335.
21. See Mao Zedong Sizhang Wansui (Long live the thought of Mao Zedong), a Red Guard publication in three volumes reprinted in Taiwan and Hong Kong.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDEX</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human Communist Party, 26, 31, 38, 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Constitution, 40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human First Normal School, 3, 4, 6, 8, 10, 13, 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Self-Education College, 9, 12, 25-28, 30, 33, 38, 53, 81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Self-Government Movement, 9, 19, 21-23, 28, 29, 36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hundred Flowers Movement (1957), 203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy, 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James, William, 123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan, 16, 21, 152, 153, 182; anti-Feng war, 47; invasion, 174, 184, 189; Second United Front period, 183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jiang, xili, xvii, 65, 66, 84, 86-88, 99, 100, 110, 114-118, 125, 134, 146, 142-146, 152, 153, 158, 161, 173, 178, 181, 185; alliance policy, 155; base area on Fujian border, 88, 92, 99, 110, 114, 131, 144; Human-Fengjiang border area, 89, 96; Mao's beginnings, 189, 190, 201; Mao's investigations, 191, 192; Mao's land policy, 136, 143; peasant associations, 68; rural policy fluctuations, 107; pro-Likan faction, 135; transfer of Central Committee, 144, 146, 184, 192, 202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jiangxi Action Committee, 126; pro-Likan-Mao factions, 126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jiangxi Provincial Soviet Government, 114, 115, 140, 144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson, Chaunmers, 189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kang Yuwei (Datong Shu [The book of great harmony]), 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kekexili, Karl, 78, 81, 102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kropotkin, Peter, 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knorrung, xit, 31, 35, 37, 40, 43-53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krook, Peter, 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liao (Li), 110, 114, 188, 189; importance of intestinal tactics, 98; Zunyi Conference, 173, 181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lijiamiu, 116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lin Hao, xvii, 85, 88, 92, 98-100; general pessimism, 156; roving guerrilla strategy, 130; theory of genius, xvii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lin Shaoqi, 39, 202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lin Zilan, 88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lo Ming (shi), 172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long March, 29, 83, 85; 148, 185, 188; importance of intestinal tactics, 98; Zunyi Conference, 173, 181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lui Shi, 39, 202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lui Zhitian, 88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lui Zhan, 88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maa Szeung, 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macron, Anges, 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mao Ze De, anarcho-syndicalist, 30, 14, 31, 37, 193;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
chairman, Chinese Soviet Republic, 89, 146–148; Chinese political culture, 195–197; collective wisdom, xvi, xvii; first example of Maoist ideological rectification, 110; Great Helmsman, xv; guerrilla tactics, 96–98; involvement in peasant movement (1920–1927), 34, 50–52; policy, 136–138; law and mobilization, 153; May Fourth politics and articles, 29, 30, 37, 40, 53–59, 62, 77, 80; May Fourth views, 14–17, 33, 40, 43–44, 77, 81, 189–190; paradigm, initial revolutionary, 92; paradigm, Marxist political, 188; paradigm, political, 84, 85; Marxist period, 1, 7, 17, 20, 21, 28, 30, 36–38, 81, 90, 129–131, 141; pre-Pearl Period, 2, 7, 31, 81, political thought (cn period), 185–187


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>150</td>
<td>personal hegemony, 151; retention of state, 186, 189; &quot;socialism in one country,&quot; 146; strains with proletariat (Korch), 79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>131</td>
<td>Sun Quandong (Zhili Clique), 47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>Sun Yat-sen, 35, 54, 67; death, 50; &quot;land to the tillers.&quot; 135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>144</td>
<td>Sun Yat-sen University (Moscow), 144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86</td>
<td>Tan Pingshan, 86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>Tan Yankai, 49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>197</td>
<td>Tang Jusui, 197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49, 58</td>
<td>Tang Shengzhi, 49, 58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>115</td>
<td>Three Dot Secret Society, 115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44, 49</td>
<td>Three People's Principles, 44, 49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Tongshan Upper Primary School, 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>United Front, 11, 50, 68, 84, 85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>&quot;Urgent Mobilization for War,&quot; 157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Versailles Peace Conference, 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Wakeman, Frederic, I, 2: History and Will, 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>118</td>
<td>Wanan (county), 118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91</td>
<td>Wang Jiqiwei, 45, 46, 52; reorganization efforts, 91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>181-184</td>
<td>Wayarban Conference, 181-184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155, 166, 173, 176, 186</td>
<td>Weber, Max; authority, 155, 160, 173, 176; bureaucratic structure, 186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Weihaiwei, 40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>116</td>
<td>West Jiangxi Action Committee, 116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90, 91, 94, 105, 109, 116, 125, 132, 154, 158, 174; overrun Jiangxiangshan base, 90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92</td>
<td>Widen, Woodrow, 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>107</td>
<td>Winkler, Edwin (compliance model), 107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>197</td>
<td>Wittfogel, Karl, 197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13, 14, 16, 43</td>
<td>Workers Night School, 13, 14, 16, 43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86, 97</td>
<td>World War I, 8, 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>Wu Peifu, 38, 65; Zhili Clique, 47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Wu Yuzhang, 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65-67</td>
<td>Wuhan, 65-67, 59, 76, 86, 88, 100; Central Peasant Movement Institute, 66; xmt, 65, 67, 76, 86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>154, 155</td>
<td>Wuning (county), 154, 155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98</td>
<td>Xian (Sian) Incident (1936), 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Xiang River Middle School, 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14, 15, 17, 21</td>
<td>Xiang River Review, 14, 15, 17, 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>148</td>
<td>Xiang Ying (cochairman, Cam, 148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30, 40, 42, 64, 65</td>
<td>Xiangsuo (The Guide Weekly), 30, 40, 42, 64, 65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69</td>
<td>Xiangtian, 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Xiao, San (Comrade Mao Zedong's Boyhood and Youth), 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36, 37</td>
<td>Xiao, Zhiheng, 36, 37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4, 6, 8, 10</td>
<td>Xin Qinghai (New Youth), 4, 6, 8, 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>117, 118, 126, 127, 134, 201; concentration of landlordship, 126; reoccupation by the xmt (April 1931), 134; land law application, 137</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Xingyi (Sunday), 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Yan Yuan, 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>133, 143; campaigns of 1942-1945, 137, 189; Mao's writings, 148, 181; Yanan period, xii-xiii, 107, 190-192, &quot;Yanan Way,&quot; 149</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4, 5</td>
<td>Yang Changji, 4, 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>197</td>
<td>Yenching Journal of Social Studies, 197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>117, 118, 126, 128, 129, 138, 149</td>
<td>Yang Peng (border district), 117, 118, 126; artisans, 128; farm laborers, 129; landlord families, 126; middle peasants, 127; rich peasants, 126; vagrants, 129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>154</td>
<td>Yuan Guoping, 154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Yuan Shikai, 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Zeng Guofan, 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13, 28, 64, 65, 68, 85, 148, 157</td>
<td>Zhang Guotao, 13, 28, 64, 65, 68, 85; cochairman, Cam, 148; Eyuan Soviet, 157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15, 21, 23</td>
<td>Zhang Jingyao, 15, 21, 23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>166, 168, 176</td>
<td>Zhang Wentian, 166, 168, 176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47, 48, 75; suppression of Shanghai mass movements, 47</td>
<td>Zhang Zuolin (Penghui Clique), 47, 48, 75; suppression of Shanghai mass movements, 47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30, 40, 49, 50</td>
<td>Zhao Hengtai, 30, 40, 49, 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>124</td>
<td>Zhejiang (province), 124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>Zhengde Zhouba (Political Weekly), 46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>190</td>
<td>Zhenglong (Rectification) Movement, 190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47, 48</td>
<td>Zhili Clique, 47, 48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>Zhonghe Nongmin (The Chinese Peasantry), 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87, 88, 93, 110, 145</td>
<td>Zhu Da, 87, 88, 93, 110, 145</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>