SIMULATION I
RESPONDING TO TERRORISM


I. The Setting

July 4, 1998 - The White House Situation Room. A meeting of the President of the United States and five senior foreign policy advisers.


II. The Players

(1) the President [chair]; (2) the Secretary of State; (3) the Director of Central Intelligence; (4) the National Security Adviser; and (5) the Secretary of Defense (who will be prepared to offer the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.).


III. The Scenario

On July 4, 1998, an airplane carrying four U.S. Senators was hijacked by a "terrorist" organization and flown to Tunis. The Islamic fundamentalist group is threatening to kill the Senators unless Israel immediately releases an imprisoned Lebanese Shiite cleric. As time passes, more intelligence will become available. The group must address two questions:


IV. The Format

A. The President will call the meeting to order.

B. The Director of Central Intelligence will provide a short briefing on the situation.

C. The President will solicit the advice of the group on the question of a rescue attempt. The group will begin this discussion with a briefing by the Secretary of Defense on the military options for executing this action.

D. The President will then coordinate a discussion on the prospects of retaliatory action.

E. After 50 minutes, the President will close the meeting. Before doing so, he will explain his decision to the group.

F. The President will then hold a public press conference to explain the situation and to answer questions. (15 minutes)




SIMULATION II
U.N. INTERVENTION IN CIVIL CONFLICT - A NEW PROPOSAL


I. The Setting

March 1998. United Nations Headquarters, New York. A meeting of the PERM5 of the UNSC.


II. The Players

One representative of foreign minister rank from each of the U.N. Security Council's five permanent member states: (1) the United States; (2) Britain; (3) France; (4) Russia [chair]; and (5) the PRC.


III. The Scenario

The U.N. Secretary-General has recently been advocating a proposal by a former U.N. official to create an independent United Nations "information intervention unit." The U.N. unit would seek to combat "domestic incendiary communications" of the sort that have fostered genocidal practices in the Balkans and Africa. The new unit would serve three basic functions: to monitor communications; to engage in "peace broadcasting;" and to block (i.e. "jam") when appropriate, radio and television broadcasts. To facilitate its task, this new U.N. unit would have access to the major radio translation services and NGO input.


This meeting will consider the general merits of the "information intervention unit" proposal and three more specific issues:


IV. The Format

A. The Russian Foreign Minister (chair) will call the meeting to order and will introduce the discussion. He will begin by explaining the meeting's rationale, then make an opening statement on behalf of his state's government. (4 minutes)

B. The Foreign Ministers of the United States, Britain, France, and the PRC will each have three minutes to make an opening statement. (15 minutes)

C. The group will attempt: (a) to reach agreement on whether the UNSC should make any public response to the Secretary-General's advocacy; and (b) if it decides to make a public response, to draft an "agreed statement." The Chair will be responsible for recognizing the delegates and for controlling the discussion.

D. The Chair will close the meeting: when deliberations have been concluded; or (b) after 50 minutes have elapsed. In the latter case, Secretary Albright will summarize the status of the negotiation.

E. The diplomats will then submit to a press conference to explain their positions. (15 minutes)


SIMULATION III
NATO ENLARGEMENT AFTER THE COLD WAR


I. The Setting

Spring 1998. Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate. Hearing on the U.S. ratification of the NATO Accession Protocols of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.


II. The Players

Committee members: (1) Senator Jesse Helms (R-North Carolina), the Committee Chair; and (2) Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (D-Delaware), the ranking Democrat on the Committee. Four witnesses: (3) U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Korbel Albright; (4) General Andrew J. Goodpaster (USA, ret.), Co-Chair of The Atlantic Council; (5) former Georgia Democratic Senator, Sam Nunn; and (6) Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-Texas), of the Senate Armed Services Committee.


III. The Scenario

The North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 established NATO as an Alliance of independent states with a common interest in maintaining peace and defending their freedom through political solidarity and adequate collective defense. Over the next several decades, in accordance with Article 10 of the Treaty, four states joined the initial twelve signatories, raising the total number of NATO Allies to the current sixteen. The Alliance plans once again to take in new members in 1999, the year of NATO's 50th anniversary, in accordance with the decisions of Allied Heads of State and Government at the Summit Meeting in Madrid in July 1997.

In order for the prospective new member states of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to gain admission to "the Organization," however, all current NATO Allies must first sign Accession Protocols -- ones subject to national ratification procedures in each Alliance member country. [Once the ratification procedures are complete, prospective new members will be invited, in accordance with their own national procedures, to deposit their instruments of accession.] For the United States to become a party to the Accession Protocols to the NATO Treaty, the U.S. Senate must provide its "advice and consent." Thus, the Senate has begun a series of hearings to consider whether to support the planned expansion of NATO.


IV. The Format

A. The Chair will call the hearing to order and will introduce the discussion. (2 minutes).

B. Each witness will then have five minutes to offer testimony. (20 minutes)

C. The Chair and Senator Biden will have five minutes each to offer their own remarks. (10 minutes)

D. The three Senators (Helms, Biden, Hutchison) will then be permitted to address specific questions to hearing participants Albright, Goodpaster and Nunn. The Chair will be responsible for controlling the question-and-answer process. (18 minutes)

E. After 50 minutes have elapsed, the Chair will allow questions to be asked of all the hearing participants by those in the hearing room audience. (25 minutes)


SIMULATION IV
RESPONDING TO THE THREAT OF WMD


I. The Setting

April 1, 1998. United Nations Headquarters, New York. A meeting of the PERM5 of the UNSC.


II. The Players

One representative of foreign minister rank from each of the U.N. Security Council's five permanent member states: (1) the United States; (2) Britain; (3) France; (4) Russia; and (5) the PRC; and (6) UNSCOM Executive Chairman, Richard Butler.

III. The Scenario

By its Resolution 687 (April 3, 1991), the U.N. Security Council established the terms and conditions for a formal cease-fire between Iraq and the coalition of Member States cooperating with Kuwait. Among other issues, Section C of Resolution 687 deals with the elimination, under international supervision, of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. It also calls for measures to ensure that the acquisition and production of prohibited items are not resumed. The United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) was set up as subsidiary organ of the Security Council to implement the non-nuclear provisions of the resolution and to assist the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the nuclear areas.

UNSCOM's mandate includes the following:


By the end of March 1998, approximately 200 inspection missions in Iraq had been fielded by the Commission and IAEA. Of these missions, over 100 were related to chemical or biological matters. Now, the U.N. Security Council has just received very disturbing news from UNSCOM's Executive Chairman, Richard William Butler. Here, Butler has announced UNSCOM's discovery of:

IV. The Format

A. The U.S. Secretary of State [chair] will call the meeting to order and will introduce the discussion.  (2 minutes)

B. Ambassador Butler will then present a report on:

C. Each representative will then have three minutes to make an opening statement.

D. The group will attempt to reach agreement on how best to respond to these new circumstances. The Chair will be responsible for recognizing the permanent representatives and for controlling the discussion.  Ambassador Butler may be called upon by the representatives to provide information and technical advice.

E. The Chair will close the meeting: (a) when a consensus position has been reached; or (b) after 50 minutes have elapsed and no consensus appears possible.

F. The meeting participants will then submit to a press conference to explain their respective positions. (15 minutes)


SIMULATION V
U.S.-JAPAN TRADE: THE KODAK-FUJI DISPUTE




I. The Setting

Spring 1998. ABC News "Nightline" Special Broadcast of a live policy debate.

II. The Players

Ted Koppel (moderator); the USTR; Japanese Ambassador Saito; and the corporate counsels of Kodak and Fuji.

III. The Scenario

A three-member WTO dispute settlement panel recently addressed one of the most prominent contemporary U.S.-Japan trade-related disputes. In the Kodak-Fuji "film case," originally filed in June of 1996, the United States Government contended, inter alia, that barriers in Japan had denied Kodak equal market access there and that the Japanese Government had caused these barriers. WTO panelists from Brazil, New Zealand and Switzerland reviewed and assessed more than 20,000 pages of evidence from the U.S. and Japanese Governments, as well as supporting documentation from the European Union and Mexico. In its December 1997 decision, the panel never ruled on whether the Japanese film market was "open" per se. Nevertheless it did conclude that the Japanese Government had not "caused" market barriers for Kodak. [Private actions by corporations are not actionable under the GATT.]

Now a review committee of U.S. federal judges is poised to assess the WTO panel's decision in the film case. [The Clinton administration was obliged to agree to the creation of such a review committee in order to persuade sovereignty-conscious members of Congress to ratify the Uruguay Round.] In anticipation of the review committee's deliberations, ABC News has decided to offer a public forum so that both sides in the film case can express their views on the WTO panel's decision in a public "debate."


IV. The Format

Introduction - 3 minutes


A. Ted Koppel will introduce the debate in three minutes, then serve as its moderator. He will explain the debate's ground rules and monitor time limits.

Opening arguments - 20 minutes

B. The USTR will make a five-minute opening argument, focusing generally on U.S.-Japanese trade relations and the WTO.

C. Ambassador Saito will make a five-minute opening argument, focusing generally on U.S.-Japanese trade relations and the WTO.

D. The Corporate Counsel of Kodak will make a five-minute opening argument, focusing specifically on Kodak's charges that Fuji has engaged in unfair business practices and that the WTO panel's decision was mistaken.

E. The Corporate Counsel of Fuji will make a five-minute opening argument, arguing that the WTO panel's decision was appropriate.

Rebuttal - 16 minutes

F. In four minutes USTR will respond (only) to the Japanese Ambassador's opening statement.

G. In four minutes Ambassador Saito will respond (only) to Ms. Barshefsky's opening statement.

H. In four minutes, Kodak's Counsel will respond (only) to the opening statement of Fuji Film's Counsel.

I. In four minutes, Fuji Film's Counsel will respond (only) to the opening statement of Kodak's Counsel.


Concluding remarks - 6 minutes

J. In three minutes, USTR will offer a closing statement.

K. In three minutes, Ambassador Saito will offer a closing statement.


Question-and-answer session - 15 minutes

J. The debate participants will then respond to the written questions submitted by the studio audience.


SIMULATION VI
SECURING U.S. SENATE SUPPORT OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL


I. The Setting

April 1998. A "closed door" meeting convened at the State Department to discuss ratification of the Kyoto Protocol by the U.S. Senate.



II. The Players

(1) Vice President Albert Gore [Chair]; (2) U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright; (3) Carol M. Browner, Administrator of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency; (4) Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., (D-Delaware) the ranking Democrat on the Foreign Relations Committee; and (5) Senator John H. Chafee (R-RI), Chair of the the Environment and Public Works Committee.



III. The Scenario

At a conference held December 1 - 11, 1997, in Kyoto, Japan, the Parties to the "UN Framework Convention on Climate Change" agreed to an historic Protocol to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The Kyoto Protocol reflects proposals advanced by the United States in certain key respects, including: emissions targets and timetables for industrialized nations; and market-based measures for meeting those targets. A central feature of the Kyoto Protocol is a set of binding emissions targets for developed nations. The specific limits vary from state to state, though those for the key industrial powers of the European Union, Japan, and the United States are similar: 8% below 1990 emissions levels for the EU, 7% for the U.S., 6% for Japan. The Kyoto Protocol will be open for signature in March 1998.


To enter into force, the Protocol must be ratified by at least 55 states, accounting for at least 55 percent of the total 1990 carbon dioxide emissions of developed states. U.S. ratification will require the advice and consent of the Senate. Thus, a meeting has been convened to discuss how Senate support for the agreement might be secured.


IV. The Format

A. Vice President Gore will call the meeting to order and explain his rationale for convening the group. (3 minutes).

B. Each of the meeting's other four participants will then be given three minutes to make an opening statement characterizing that person's policy position. (12 minutes)

C. The group will attempt to reach agreement on how to proceed, if at all.

D. The Chair will close the meeting: (a) when a consensus position has been reached; or (b) after 50 minutes have elapsed and no consensus appears possible. In the latter case, the Secretary of State will summarize the results of the discussions.

E. The meeting participants will then submit to a "background" (off-the-record) session with the press to explain their respective positions. (15 minutes)