Y2K Bibliography of Experimental Economics and Social Science
Voting and Agenda Effects

updated December 29, 1999
Charles A. Holt, cah2k@virginia.edu, suggestions and corrections welcome
(for online and personal use only)

Blais, A., and R. Young (1999) “Why Do People Vote? An Experiment in Rationality,” Public Choice, 99:1-2 (April), 39-55. Keywords: experiments, public,* voting, paradox of voting, rationality, turnout.

Bottom, William P., Cheryl L. Eavey, Gary J. Miller, and Jennifer Nicoll (1998) “The Institutional Effect on Majority Rule Instability: Bicameralism in Spatial Policy Decisions,” Washington University, Keywords: experiments, public, voting, bicameral legislature. Abstract: This experiment was designed to test the hypothesis that a bicameral legislature will exhibit more stable undominated policy choices. The results are largely supportive of this hypothesis. Email Contact: eavey@nsf.gov

Dasgupta, S., and K. C. Williams (1995) “Search Behavior of Asymmetrically Informed Voters: An Experimental Study,” Economics and Politics, 7:1 (March), 21-41. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, asymmetric information.

Eavey, Cheryl L. (1996) “Preference-Based Stability: Experiments on Competitive Solutions to Majority Rule Games,” in Collective Decision Making: Social Choice and Political Economy, edited by N. Schofield, New York: Kluwer Academic Publishing, . Keywords: experiments, public, voting, competitive solution, majority rule. Email Contact: eavey@nsf.gov

Eavey, Cheryl L., and Gary J. Miller (1984) “Fairness in Majority Rule Games with a Core,” American Journal of Political Science, 28:3 (August), 570-586. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, majority rule, fairness, core, Condorcet winner. Email Contact: ceavey@nsf.gov

Fiorina, Morris P., and Charles R. Plott (1978) “Committee Decisions under Majority Rule: An Experimental Study,” American Political Science Review, 72:2 (June), 575-598. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, committee decisions, Condorcet winner, core, incentive effects, non-monetary incentives. Abstract: Convergence to the core was observed with monetary incentives and not without. Email Contact: m_fiorina@harvard.edu**

Hoffman, Elizabeth, and Charles R. Plott (1983) “Pre-Meeting Discussions and the Possibility of Coalition-Breaking Procedures in Majority Rule Committees,” Public Choice, 4021-39. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, discussion, majority rule, institutions. Email Contact: ehoffman@uic.edu

Hung, Angela, and Charles R. Plott (1999) “Information Cascades: A Replication and Extension to Majority Rule and Grand Jury Instructions,” American Economic Review, forthcoming. Keywords: experiments, decisions, information cascades, Bayes' Rule, majority rule. Email Contact: angela@hss.caltech.edu

Isaac, R. Mark, and Charles R. Plott (1978) “Cooperative Game Models of the Influence of the Closed Rule in Three Person, Majority Rule Committees: Theory and Experiments,” in Game Theory and Political Science, edited by P. C. Ordeshook, New York: New York University Press, . Keywords: experiments, public, voting, close rule, institutions, cooperative game theory. Email Contact: misaac@bpa.arizona.edu

King, Ronald R. (1994) “An Experimental Investigation of Super Majority Voting Rules: Implications for the Financial Accounting Standard Board,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 25:2 (October), 197-217. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, super majority voting rules, accounting.

Ladha, Krishna, Gary Miller, and Joe Oppenheimer (1996) “Information Aggregation by Majority Rule: Theory and
Experiments,” University of Maryland, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, information aggregation, swing voter's curse. Email Contact: joppenhe@bss2.umd.edu

McKelvey, Richard D., and Peter C. Ordeshook (1979) “An Experimental Test of Several Theories of Committee Decision-Making under Majority Rule,” in Applied Game Theory, edited by S. J. Brams, A. Schotter and G. Schwodiauer, Wurzburg: Physica Verlag, . Keywords: experiments, public, voting, committee decisions, majority rule. Email Contact: rdm@hss.caltech.edu

McKelvey, Richard D., and Peter C. Ordeshook (1980) “Vote Trading: An Experimental Study,” Public Choice, 35:2 151-84. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, vote trading. Email Contact: rdm@hss.caltech.edu

McKelvey, Richard D., and Peter C. Ordeshook (1981) “Experiments on the Core: Some Disconcerting Results for Majority Rule Voting Games,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 25(December), 709-24. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, Condorcet winner, core, majority rule, political science. Email Contact: rdm@hss.caltech.edu

McKelvey, Richard D., and Peter C. Ordeshook (1982) “Two-Candidate Elections without Majority Rule Equilibria: An Experimental Study,” Simulation and Games, 13:3 (September), 311-335. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, political science, elections. Email Contact: rdm@hss.caltech.edu

McKelvey, Richard D., and Peter C. Ordeshook (1990) “Information and Elections; Retrospective Voting and Rational Expectations,” in Information and Democratic Processes, edited by J. Ferejohn and J. Kuklinski, Urbana-Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 281-312. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, median voter theorem, information. Abstract A series of experiments demonstrates that incomplete information does not necessarily invalidate the general predictions of the median voter theorem. Email

McKelvey, Richard D., and Peter C. Ordeshook (1990) “A Decade of Experimental Research on Spatial Models of Elections and Committees,” in Readings in the Spatial Theory of Voting, edited by J. M. Enlow and M. J. Hinich, Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 99-144. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, political science, elections, survey. Abstract This is a detailed survey of voting experiments, mostly in the context of the spatial model of voter preferences. Email Contact: rdm@hss.caltech.edu

McKelvey, Richard D., and Thomas R. Palfrey (1998) “An Experimental Study of Jury Decisions,” California Institute of Technology, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, public, political science, law, voting, jury decisions, unanimity rule, majority rule, quantal response equilibrium, swing voter's curse, information. Abstract: The paper develops an a quantal response analysis of group and individual voting behavior in jury deliberations. The focus is on the number of voters and the number of votes needed to convict. Email Contact: rdm@hss.caltech.edu

Quattrone, George A., and Amos Tversky (1988) “Contrasting Rational and Psychological Analyses of Political Choice,” American Political Science Review, 82:3 (September), 720-736. Keywords: experiments, decisions, biases, prospect theory, voting, political science, psychology. Abstract: This paper uses the insights of prospect theory and cognitive psychology to explain anomalies in voter and candidate behavior.

Rapoport, Ronald B., Kelly L. Metcalf, and Jon A. Hartman (1989) “Candidate Traits and Voter Inferences: An Experimental Study,” Journal of Politics, 51:4 (November), 917-932. Keywords: experiments, public, political science, voting, information.

Salant, S. W., and E. Goodstein (1990) “Predicting Committee Behavior in Majority Rule Voting Experiments,” Rand Journal of Economics, 21:2 (Summer), 293-313. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, committee decisions.

Schram, Arthur, and Joep Sonnemans (1996) “Why People Vote: Experimental Evidence,” Journal of Economic Psychology, 17:4 (August), 417-442. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, turnout, paradox of voting, participation game, mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, free-riding. Email Contact: arthurs@fee.uva.nl

Schram, Arthur, and Joep Sonnemans (1996) “Voter Turnout as a Participation Game: An Experimental Investigation,” International Journal of Game Theory, 25:3 385-406. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, turnout, game theory, mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, free-riding, paradox of voting. Email Contact: arthurs@fee.uva.nl

Schram, Arthur, and Frans van Winden (1991) “Why People Vote: Free Riding and the Production and Consumption of Social Pressure,” Journal of Economic Psychology, 12:4 (December), 575-620. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, paradox of voting. Email Contact: arthurs@fee.uva.nl

Sonnemans, Joep, and Arthur Schram (1999) “Participation Game Experiments; Explaining Voter Turnout,” in Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, edited by C. R. Plott and V. L. Smith, Amsterdam: Elsevier, forthcoming. Keywords: experiments, game theory, public, participation games, voter turnout. Email Contact: joeps@fee.uva.edu

Sutter, Matthias (1999) “Public Bad Prevention by Majority Voting on Redistribution - Experimental Evidence,” University of Innsbruck, Austria, Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1999 European Regional ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, public bad, externalities. Abstract: Groups of subjects vote on eliminating a public bad and on allocating the costs. Votes failed in a significant proportion of the cases. Voting is affected by changes in social distance. Email Contact: matthias.sutter@uibk.ac.at

Walker, James M., Roy Gardner, Andy Herr, and Elinor Ostrom (1999) “Collective Choice in the Commons: Experimental Results on Proposed Allocation Rules and Votes,” Economic Journal, forthcoming. Keywords: experiments, public, common pool resources, voting. Email Contact: walkerj@indiana.edu