Y2K Bibliography of Experimental Economics and Social Science
Voluntary Contributions Mechanism

updated December 29, 1999
Charles A. Holt, cah2k@virginia.edu, suggestions and corrections welcome
(for online and personal use only)

Alfano, Geraldine, and Gerald Marwell (1980) “Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods by Groups III: Nondivisibility and Free Riding in 'Real' Groups,” Social Psychology Quarterly, 43300-309. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions.

Alston, R. M., and C. Nowell (1996) “Implementing the Voluntary Contribution Game: A Field Experiment,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 31:3 (December), 357-368. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, field experiments.

Alston, Richard M., and Clifford Nowell (1996) “Implementing the Voluntary Contribution Game: A Field Experiment,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 31:3 (December), 357-368. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, field experiment, methodology. Abstract: The field experiment involved the funding of a lobbyist from voluntary contributions. Comparisons with laboratory experiments are discussed.

Anderson, Simon P., Jacob K. Goeree, and Charles A. Holt (1998) “A Theoretical Analysis of Altruism and Decision Error in Public Goods Games,” Journal of Public Economics, 70:2 (November), 297-323. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, nonlinear public goods games, game theory, logit equilibrium, altruism, quantal response, numbers effects. Abstract: This paper formalizes an equilibrium model in which altruism and decision error parameters determine the distribution of contributions in public goods games. The authors prove existence of a unique symmetric equilibrium density of contributions and show that 1) contributions increase with the marginal value of the public good, 2) total contributions increase with the number of participants if there is altruism, and 3) mean contributions lie between the Nash predictions and half of the endowment. These predictions, which are not implied by a standard Nash analysis, are roughly consistent with laboratory tests. Email Contact: holt@virginia.edu

Andreoni, James (1988) “Why Free Ride? Strategies and Learning in Public Goods Experiments,” Journal of Public Economics, 37:3 (December), 291-304. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, learning. Email Contact: andreoni@facstaff.wisc.edu

Andreoni, James (1989) “Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian Equivalence,” Journal of Political Economy, 97:6 (December), 1447-1458. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, altruism. Email Contact: andreoni@facstaff.wisc.edu

Andreoni, James (1990) “Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving?,” Economic Journal, 100:401 (June), 464-477. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, warm glow altruism. Abstract: This paper elaborates a model of impure altruism that is based on social pressure, guilt, sympathy, or a simple desire for a "warm glow" from the act of giving. The theorietical implications of models of impure altruism are explored. Email Contact: andreoni@facstaff.wisc.edu

Andreoni, James (1993) “An Experimental Test of the Public Goods Crowding-Out Hypothesis,” American Economic Review, 83:5 (December), 1317-1327. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, crowding out, altruism. Email Contact: andreoni@facstaff.wisc.edu

Andreoni, James (1995) “Cooperation in Public Goods Experiments: Kindness or Confusion?,” American Economic Review, 85:4 (September), 891-904. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, altruism, decision errors. Abstract: A tournament payoff design is used to eliminate altruistic motives for contribution to a public good. The experimental results indicate that about half of contribution behavior is due to altruism and half to noisy behavior. Email Contact: andreoni@facstaff.wisc.edu

Andreoni, James (1995) “Warm-Glow Versus Cold-Prickle: The Effects of Positive and Negative Framing on Cooperation in Experiments,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110:1 (February), 1-21. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, framing effects, warm glow altruism. Email Contact: andreoni@facstaff.wisc.edu

Andreoni, James, and Rachel Croson (1999) “Partners Versus Strangers: The Effect of Random Rematching in Public
Goods Experiments,” in Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, edited by C. R. Plott and V. L. Smith, New York: Elsevier Press, forthcoming. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, random matching, strangers, partners. Abstract This paper surveys the mixed experimental results on whether random matching (strangers) produces more cooperative play than fixed matchings (partners). The divergent results in the literature are attributed to the higher variance of behavior in the random matching treatment. Email Contact: andreoni@facstaff.wisc.edu

Asch, P., G. Gigliotti, and J Polito (1993) “Free Riding with Discrete and Continuous Public Goods: Some Experimental Evidence,” Public Choice, 77293-305. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, linear public goods, step-level public goods. Abstract: The experiment provides a comparison of contributions in continuous and step-level public goods games.

Bagnoli, Mark, and Michael McKee (1991) “Voluntary Contribution Games: Efficient Private Provision of Public Goods,” Economic Inquiry, 29:2 (April), 351-366. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, provision points, reimbursement mechanism. Abstract: The experiment is focused on the effects of value heterogeneity and group size on contributions to a step-level public good. Email Contact: mbagnoli@indiana.edu

Bagnoli, Mark, S. Ben-David, and Michael McKee (1992) “Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: The Multiple Unit Case,” Journal of Public Economics, 47:1 (February), 85-106. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions. Email Contact: mbagnoli@indiana.edu

Bolton, Gary E. (1998) “Bargaining and Dilemma Games: From Laboratory Data Towards Theoretical Synthesis,” Experimental Economics, 1:3 257-281. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, bounded rationality, motivation, reciprocity, altruism, dilemma games, voluntary contributions, learning. Email Contact: geb3@psu.edu

Bolton, Gary E., and Elena Katok (1998) “An Experimental Test of the Crowding Out Hypothesis: The Nature of Beneficent Behavior,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 37:3 (November), 315-331. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, altruism, crowding out, other-regarding preferences, dictator game. Abstract: This experiment is motivated by the standard theoretical result that government donations to charity crowd out private donations dollar for dollar. The less-than-full crowding out observed in the experiment is attributed to an incorrect specification of preferences in the standard theoretical model. Email Contact: geb3@psu.edu

Bolton, Gary E., and Axel Ockenfels (1998) “A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition,” American Economic Review, forthcoming. Keywords: experiments, game theory, bargaining, public, voluntary contributions, fairness, equity, inequality aversion, prisoner's dilemmas. Abstract: This paper presents a model of other-regarding preferences that based on the idea that people are motivated by their own money payoff and by their relative payoff standing. The theory explains behavior in a variety of laboratory situations that include market competition, public goods, and bargaining. Email Contact: axel.ockenfels@ww.uni-magdeburg.de

Bornstein, Gary, and Amnon Rapoport (1988) “Intergroup Competition for the Provision of Step-Level Public Goods: Effects of Preplay Communication,” European Journal of Social Psychology, 18125-142. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, step-level public goods, intergroup competition, groups. Email Contact: arapoport@bpa.arizona.edu

Bornstein, Gary, Amnon Rapoport, L. Kerpel, and T. Katz (1989) “Within- and Between-Group Communication in Intergroup Competition for Public Goods,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 25422-436. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, communication, intergroup competition, groups. Email Contact: arapoport@bpa.arizona.edu

Brandts, Jordi, Takatoshi Saijo, and Arthur Schram (1998) “A Four Country Comparison of Spite and Cooperation in Voluntary Contribution Mechanisms,” Institute of Economic Analysis, Barcelona, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributins, spite, cooperation, international comparisons, subject pool effects, Japan, Netherlands, Spain. Abstract: A four country comparison of behavior in a voluntary contributions experiment provides little evidence for cross-country differences. In contrast, there is not much observed spiteful behavior among Japanese subjects. Email Contact: brandts@cc.uab.es

Brewer, Stephanie (1999) “Group Size Effects for One-Shot Provison Point Public Goods,” Indiana University-Pennsylvania, Discussion Paper, presented at the 1999 Southern Economic Association Meeting. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, provision point public goods, one shot game, step level, numbers effects, extra credit incentives, methodology. Abstract: Extra credit points were used to motivate subjects in a one-shot step level public goods experiment. Group size was varied from 4 to 10 to 40. Contributions were generally increasing in MPCR, but not in group size.

Brock, John R. (1991) “Teaching Tools: A Public Goods Experiment for the Classroom,” Economic Inquiry, 29:2 (April), 395-401. Keywords: experiments, classroom games, public, voluntary contributions.

Brown-Kruse, Jamie, and David Hummels (1993) “Gender Effects in Laboratory Public Goods Contribution: Do Individuals Put Their Money Where Their Mouth Is?,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 22:3 (December), 255-267. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, gender effects. Email Contact: jamie.kruse@ttu.edu

Buchanan, L., Catherine C. Eckel, and Philip Grossman (1998) “To Give or Not to Give: Effects of Altruism and Recognition on Philanthropic Gifts,” Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Discussion Paper, presented at the 1998 Public Choice Meetings. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, altruism, social distance. Email Contact: eckelc@vt.edu

Budh, Erika, and Jan-Eric Nilsson (1998) “Public Goods versus Public Bads - Are There Fundamental Differences? An Experimental Investigation,” Dalarna University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, public bads. Abstract: This paper compares voluntary contributions in two cases, one with a public good and the other with a public bad. Email Contact: ebu@cts.du.se

Burton, A. C., Susan M. Chilton, and W. G. Hutchinson (1999) “An Experimental Investigation on the Effect of Income Distribution on Contributions to a Public Good,” University of Newcastle, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1999 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, income distributions, inequality aversion, income inequality effects on contributions. Email Contact: a.c.burton@ncl.ac.uk

Cadsby, Charles B., and Elizabeth Maynes (1998) “Choosing Between a Socially Efficient and Free-Riding Equilibrium: Nurses Versus Economics and Business Students,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 37:2 (October), 183-192. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, subject pool effects, methodology, step-level public goods game. Abstract: This step-level public goods game has equilibria at both provision and non-provision. The students converged to the free riding equilibrium, whereas the nurses cycled around the cooperative equilibrium.

Cadsby, Charles B., and Elizabeth Maynes (1998) “Gender and Free Riding in a Threshold Public Goods Game: Experimental Evidence,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 34:4 (March), 603-620. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, methodology, subject pool effects, gender effects, step-level public goods game. Abstract: This step-level public goods game has equilibria at both provision and non-provision. The initial tendency for females to contribute more than males tends to vanish over time. Female groups showed a stronger uniformity in convergence to the equilibrium selected.

Cadsby, Charles B., and Elizabeth Maynes (1999) “Voluntary Contribution of Threshold Public Goods with Continuous Provisions: Experimental Evidence,” Journal of Public Economics, 71:1 (January), 53-73. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, threshold public goods, step-level public goods. Abstract: The experiment allows a continuous division of assets between private and a threshold public good. This non-binary structure raises contributions, which also increase with 1) a reduced threshold, 2) a money-back guarantee, and 3) high rewards.

Calvert, R., and R. Wilson (1984) “Comment on van de Kragt, Orbell, and Dawes,” American Political Science Review, 78496-497. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, minimal contributing set.

Carter, John R., and Michael D. Irons (1991) “Are Economists Different, and if So, Why?,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5171-177. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, methodology, subject pool effects. Email Contact: jcarter@holycross.edu

Carter, John R., Brian J. Drainville, and Rob P. Poulin (1992) “A Test for Rational Altruism in a Public Goods Experiment,” College of Holy Cross, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, internal return, external return. Abstract: The public goods experiment reported here is based on a clever design that decomposes the marginal per capita return into an internal return (to oneself) and an external return (to each other person). Contributions are increasing in the internal and external returns when they are varied independently, and a joint change in both produces the standard "MPCR effect." Email Contact: jcarter@holycross.edu

Cason, Timothy N., and Fisal U. Kahn (1999) “A Laboratory Study of Voluntary Public Goods Provision with Imperfect Monitoring and Communication,” Journal of Development Economics, 58:2 (April), 533-552. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, monitoring, communication. Abstract: In the monitoring treatment, subjects learn each others' aggregate contributions every six periods. This imperfect monitoring does not raise contributions, but face-to-face verbal communication has a strong upward effect on contributions, with and without monitoring. Email Contact: cason@mgmt.purdue.edu

Cason, Timothy, Tatsuyoshi Saijo, and Takehiko Yamato (1999) “Voluntary Participation and Spite in Public Good Provision Experiments: An International Comparison,” Purdue University, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, spite, entry, international comparison, subject pool effects, Japan. Email Contact: cason@mgmt.purdue.edu

Cason, Timothy, Tatsuyoshi Saijo, Takehiko Yamato, and Konomu Yokotani (1999) “Voluntary Participation Game Experiments with a Non-Excludable Public Good: Is Spitefulness a Source of Cooperation?,” Purdue University, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, non-excludable public good, spite, participation game, cooperation. Email Contact: cason@mgmt.purdue.edu

Chamberlin, J. (1974) “Provision of Collective Goods as a Function of Group Size,” American Political Science Review, 68707-716. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, group size.

Chan, Kenneth S., Stuart Mestelman, Robert Moir, and R. Andrew Muller (1996) “The Voluntary Provision of Public Goods under Varying Income Distributions,” Canadian Journal of Economics, 29:1 (February), 54-69. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, interior Nash, asymmetric endowments.

Chan, Kenneth S., Rob Godby, Stuart Mestelman, and Andrew Muller (1997) “Equity Theory and the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 32:3 349-364. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, equity.

Chan, Kenneth S., Stuart Mestelman, Rob Moir, and R. Andrew Muller (1999) “Heterogeneity and the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods,” Experimental Economics, 2(1), 5-30. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, non-linear payoffs, interior Nash, heterogeneity. Abstract: Contributions in a public good experiment are higher with increased homogeneity in preferences and incomes. Email Contact: mullera@mcmaster.ca

Chan, Kenneth S., James Chowhan, and Stuart Meltelman (1999) “The Ring Test, Value Orientations, and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods,” McMaster University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Spring 1999 Public Choice Meetings. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, altruism, ring test, psychology.

Chewning, Eugene, Maribeth Coller, and Susan K. Laury (1999) “Voluntary Contributions to a Multiple Threshold Public Good,” in Research in Experimental Economics, Vol. 8, edited by R. M. Isaac, Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, forthcoming. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, multiple provision points, step-level public good. Email Contact: slaury@gsu.edu

Clark, Jeremy (1998) “Altruism and Public Good Mechanisms: Should We Care?,” University of Canterbury, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, altruism, numbers effects, provision mechanisms. Abstract: This paper considers the theoretical effects of altruism on the performance of public goods provision mechanisms. Email Contact: j.clark@econ.canterbury.ac.nz

Clark, Jeremy (1999) “House Money Effects in Public Good Experiments,” University of Canterbury, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1999 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, house money, endowments, psychology, methodology. Abstract: The experiment investigates house money effects by comparing voluntary contributions in two treatments: one in which subjects are provided with endowments, and another in which they have to supply their own money. Email Contact: j.clark@econ.canterbury.ac.nz

Coats, Jennifer, and William Neilson (1999) “Beliefs about Selfishness, Altruism, Fairness, and Spite: An Experimental Analysis,” Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1999 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, provision point, beliefs about others' preferences, spite, altruism, reciprocity, fairness. Email Contact: wsn@econr.tamu.edu

Cookson, Richard (1998) “Framing and Learning in a Public Goods Experiment,” University of York, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, framing effects, altruism, learning. Abstract: This paper documents the presence of framing effects in public goods experiments. Contributions increase when the incentives are presented to highlight the effect of contribution on others' earnings. Email Contact: rac11@york.ac.uk

Cooper, David J., and Carol Kraker (1998) “An Experimental Study of Fairness and Learning in Public Goods Games,” University of Pittsburgh, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, provision points, asymmetric individual provision-point requirements, fairness, errors, altruism. Abstract: The experiment has that the property that at least two of the three individuals in a group must contribute in order for the public good to be provided. The required contributions differ across individuals, which raises fairness concerns. The authors incorporate interpersonal utility considerations into a learning model to explain the data. Email Contact: djc13@guinness.som.cwru.edu

Croson, Rachel T. A. (1996) “Partners and Strangers Revisited,” Economics Letters, 53:1 (October), 25-32. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, methodology, matching protocol. Abstract: This replication of Andreoni (1988) finds that contributions to a public good are not higher under random rematching (strangers), as compared with fixed matching (partners). Email Contact: crosonr@wharton.upenn.edu

Croson, Rachel T. A., and Melanie Marks (1998) “Identifiability of Individual Contributions in a Threshold Public Goods Experiment,” Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 42167-190. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, step-level public goods, information. Abstract: This experiment examines the effects of identifying individual contributions in a threshold public goods game. Email Contact: crosonr@wharton.upenn.edu

Croson, Rachel T. A., and Melanie Marks (1999) “Step Returns in Threshold Public Goods: A Meta- and Experimental Analysis,” Experimental Economics, 2:3 forthcoming. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, step-level public goods, step return, meta analysis, communication, numbers effects, rebates, refunds. Abstract: This paper defines the step return (SR) to be the total value divided by the total cost of providing a step-level public good. A meta-analysis of previous papers and new data show that the step return is correlated with the incidence of successful provision of the public good. Email Contact: crosonr@wharton.upenn.edu

Croson, Rachel T. A., and Melanie Marks (1999) “The Effects of Heterogeneous Valuations for Threshold Public Goods: An Experimental Study,” University of Pennsylvania, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, step-level public goods, heterogeneous preferences. Email Contact: crosonr@wharton.upenn.edu

Dale, Donald J., and John Morgan (1999) “Signaling and the Private Provision of Public Goods,” Princeton University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1999 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, psychological game theory, fairness. Email Contact: dale@princeton.edu

Dawes, Robyn M., John M. Orbell, Randy T. Simmons, and Alphons J. C. van de Kragt (1986) “Organizing Groups for Collective Action,” American Political Science Review, 80:4 (December), 1171-1185. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, discrete public goods, political science, money-back option, fair share option. Abstract: The experiments assess the effects of two institutional changes in a step-level public goods game: a money-back guarantee if the group effort fails, and a fair share requirement that all pay a share if the group effort succeeds. The fair share rule was more effective in helping groups out of the social dilemma.

Dickinson, David L. (1998) “The Voluntary Contributions Mechanism with Uncertain Group Payoffs,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 35:4 517-533. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, uncertainty. Email Contact: drdave@mail.colgate.edu

Dickinson, David (1999) “The Carrot vs. the Stick in Work Team Motivation,” Utah State University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1999 European Regional ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, prizes, fines. Abstract: Voluntary contributions are rewarded with either prizes for high contributors and or fines for low contributors. Highest efficiencies are obtained by defining high or low contributions in relative terms based on the subject's endowment. Email Contact: drdave@mail.colgate.edu

Dorsey, Robert E. (1992) “The Voluntary Contributions Mechanism with Real Time Revisions,” Public Choice, 73:3 (April), 261-282. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, sequential game, real time. Email Contact: dorsey@bus.olemiss.edu

Eckel, Catherine C., and Philip J. Grossman (1999) “Rebates Versus Matching: Does How We Subsidize Charitable Contributions Matter?,” Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Spring 1999 Public Choice Meetings. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, rebates, matching contributions. Email Contact: eckelc@vt.edu

Elliott, Catherine S., and Donald M. Hayward (1998) “Institutional Framing,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 35:4 455-464. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, framing effects, methodology.

Erev, Ido, and Amnon Rapoport (1990) “Provision of Step-Level Public Goods: The Sequential Contribution Mechanism,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 34:3 401-425. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, step-level public goods, sequential contributions. Abstract: The experiment provides a comparison of simultaneous and sequential contributions to a step-level public good. Email Contact: erev@techunix.technion.ac.il

Erev, Ido*, and Amnon Rapoport (1994) “Provision of Step-Level Public Goods: Effects of Different Information Structures,” in Social Dilemmas and Cooperation, edited by U. Schulz, W. Albers and U. Mueller, New York: Springer-Verlag, 147-171. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, step-level public goods, information. Email Contact: arapoport@bpa.arizona.edu

Evans, M. G., and Y. C. Chang (1998) “Cheater Detection and Altruistic Behaviour: An Experimental and Methodological Exploration,” Managerial and Decision Economics, 19:7-8 (November-December), 467-480. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, altruism, cheater detection.

Falk, Armin, and Urs Fischbacher (1998) “Kindness is the Parent of Kindness: A Model of Reciprocity,” University of Zurich, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, reciprocity, psychological game theory. Abstract: The framework of psychological game theory is extended to extensive-form games. Reciprocity is used to explain behavior in a variety of sequential games. Email Contact: falk@iew.unizh.ch

Fehr, Ernst, and Simon Gächter (1998) “Cooperation and Punishment: An Experimental Analysis of Norm Formation and Norm Enforcement,” University of Zurich, Keywords: experiments, public, social norms, cooperation, punishment options, incredible punishment threats raise contributions. Abstract: A social norm is defined to be a socially shared notion of desired mode of behavior that is enforced by informal sanctions. Conditional cooperation relative to the group average is identified as a social norm in voluntary contributions experiments with punishment options. Email Contact: gaechter@iew.unizh.ch

Fehr, Ernst, and Klaus Schmidt (1999) “A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114:3 (August), 769-816. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, bargaining, auctions, altruism, fairness, reciprocity, inequity aversion. Abstract: The paper presents a model of inequity aversion that is used to explain behavior in a wide class of experimental games, including markets and bargaining. Email Contact: fehr@iew.unizh.ch

Fehr, Ernst, and Simon Gächter (1999) “Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments,” American Economic Review, forthcoming. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, punishment, social norms, emotions. Abstract: Free riding behavior in a voluntary contributions experiment is severely punished, even though the punishments are privately costly to those who impose the punishments. The resulting high levels of `cooperation' support the notion that social norms can develop and can be enforced by group behavior. Email Contact: gaechter@iew.unizh.ch

Fischbacher, Urs, Simon Gächter, and Ernst Fehr (1999) “Why Does Cooperation Unravel? The Role of Conditional
Cooperation,” University of Zurich, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1999 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, conditional cooperation, free riding, dynamic patterns in contributions, self-serving bias. Email Contact: fiba@iew.unizh.ch

Fisher, Joseph, R. Mark Isaac, Jeffrey Schatzberg, and James M. Walker (1995) “Heterogeneous Demand for Public Goods: Effects on the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism,” Public Choice, 85:3-4 249-266. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, heterogeneous values.

Frank, Robert H., Thomas Gilovich, and Dennis T. Regan (1993) “Does Studying Economics Inhibit Cooperation?,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 7159-171. Keywords: experiments, methodology, subject pool effects, public, voluntary contributions.

Gächter, Simon, and Ernst Fehr (1999) “Collective Action as a Social Exchange,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 39:4 341-369. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, approval, social norms. Abstract: Behavior in a baseline voluntary contributions game with no communication is compared with behavior in a game where statements of approval or disapproval are allowed after subjects see others' decisions in each round. The effects of such ex post social approval opportunities are insignificant, unless subjects are first allowed to generate some degree of social familiarity by shaking hands, discussing hobbies, etc. Email Contact: gaechter@iew.unizh.ch

Goeree, Jacob K., Charles A. Holt, and Susan K. Laury (1998) “Altruism and Error in Two-Person Public Goods Experiments,” University of Virginia, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, altruism, internal return, external return, MPCR effects, logit equilibrium, one shot games. Abstract: The effects of a contribution to a public good are decomposed into an internal return to the contributor and an external return to each of the others. Contributions in one-shot games are generally increasing in internal returns, external returns, and group size, and a logit model of individual behavior tracks treatment averages well, both for linear and non-linear altruism specifications. Email Contact: jg2n@virginia.edu

Haan, Marco (1999) “Free Riding and the Provision of Candy Bars,” University of Groningen, Discussion Paper, presented at the Spring 1999 Public Choice Meetings. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, incentives.

Harbaugh, William T. (1998) “The Prestige Motive for Making Charitable Transfers,” American Economic Review, 88:2 (May), 277-282. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, charity, prestige. Email Contact: harbaugh@oregon.uoregon.edu

Harbaugh, William T., and Kate Krause (1998) “Children's Contributions in Public Good Experiments: The Development of Altruistic and Free-Riding Behaviors,” University of Oregon, Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, subject pool effects, children subjects, altruism, free-riding, bargaining, dictator game. Abstract: Voluntary contributions experiments reveal that altruistic behavior in children is similar in the aggregate to that of adults. The contributions of older children decline over time, as with adults, but the contributions of younger children tend to increase. A measure of group attachment is more closely correlated with contributions than social and demographic characteristics. Email Contact: harbaugh@oregon.uoregon.edu

Harrison, Glenn W., and Jack Hirshleifer (1989) “An Experimental Evaluation of Weakest Link/Best Shot Models of Public Goods,” Journal of Political Economy, 97:1 (February), 201-225. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, game theory, best shot game, sequential games. Email Contact: harrison@darla.badm.sc.edu

Holt, Charles A., and Susan K. Laury (1997) “Classroom Games: Voluntary Provision of a Public Good,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11:4 (Fall), 209-215. Keywords: experiments, classroom games, public, voluntary contributions, altruism. Abstract: This paper offers suggestions for how to run a public goods experiment in class and how to lead the subsequent discussion. Email Contact: holt@virginia.edu, slaury@gsu.edu

Holt, Charles A., and Susan K. Laury (1998) “Theoretical Explanations of Treatment Effects in Voluntary Contributions Experiments,” in Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, edited by C. R. Plott and V. L. Smith, New York: Elsevier Press, forthcoming. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, survey, altruism, error, evolution. Abstract This is a survey of the theoretical explanations for the treatments that have been shown to affect voluntary contributions in the laboratory. Email Contact: slaury@gsu.edu, holt@virginia.edu

Isaac, R. Marks, James M. Walker, and Susan H. Thomas (1984) “Divergent Evidence on Free Riding: An Experimental Examination of Possible Explanations,” Public Choice, 43:2 113-149. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, free riding. Email Contact: misaac@bpa.arizona.edu

Isaac, R. Mark, Kenneth McCue, F., and Charles R. Plott (1985) “Public Goods Provision in an Experimental Environment,” Journal of Public Economics, 26(February), 51-74. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, cooperation. Email Contact: misaac@bpa.arizona.edu

Isaac, R. Mark, and James M. Walker (1988) “Group Size Hypotheses of Public Goods Provision: The Voluntary Contributions Mechanism,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 103(February), 179-200. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, numbers effects, group size. Email Contact: misaac@bpa.arizona.edu

Isaac, R. Mark, and James M. Walker (1988) “Communication and Free-Riding Behavior: The Voluntary Contributions Mechanism,” Economic Inquiry, 26:4 585-608. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, free riding, communication, cheap talk. Email Contact: misaac@bpa.arizona.edu

Isaac, R. Mark, and James M. Walker (1991) “Costly Communication: An Experiment in a Nested Public Goods Problem,” in Laboratory Research in Political Economy, edited by T. Palfrey, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 269-286. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, communication, communication costs. Email Contact: misaac@bpa.arizona.edu

Isaac, R. Mark, and James Walker (1991) “On the Suboptimality of Voluntary Public Goods Provision: Further Experimental Evidence,” in Research in Experimental Economics, Vol. 4, edited by R. M. Isaac, Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 211-221. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, interior Nash equilibrium. Abstract The public goods game used here has the property that individual marginal values are declining functions of the amount of the public good, so that optimal provision levels are less than subject's initial token endowments. The observed suboptmal levels of contributions indicate that previously observed underprovision was not due to the fact that the socially optimal outcome required that full contribution of all endowed tokens. Email Contact: misaac@bpa.arizona.edu

Isaac, R. Mark, James M. Walker, and Arlington W. Williams (1994) “Group Size and the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence Utilizing Large Groups,” Journal of Public Economics, 54:1 (May), 1-36. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, numbers effects, incentives, grade incentives. Email Contact: misaac@bpa.arizona.edu

Isaac, R. Mark, and James M. Walker (1998) “Nash as an Organizing Principle in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence,” Experimental Economics, 1:3 191-206. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, Nash equilibrium, interior Nash equilibrium, nonlinear payoffs. Email Contact: misaac@bpa.arizona.edu

Isaac, R. Mark*, Dean Packard, and Joe Bial (1999) “Asymmetric Benefits in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism,” in Research in Experimental Economics, Vol. 8, edited by R. Mark Isaac, Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, forthcoming. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, asymmetries. Email Contact: misaac@bpa.arizona.edu

Johansen, Lief (1977) “The Theory of Public Goods: Misplaced Emphasis?,” Journal of Public Economics, 7147-152. Keywords: experiments*, public, voluntary contributions.

Keser, Claudia (1996) “Voluntary Contributions to a Public Good when Partial Contribution is a Dominant Strategy,” Economics Letters, 50359-366. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, interior Nash design, quadratic payoffs, nonlinear payoffs. Email Contact: keser@vwl3.wiwi.uni-karlsruhe.de

Keser, Claudia, and Frans van Winden (1999*) “Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods,” Scandinavian Journal of Economics, forthcoming. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, conditional cooperation, social norms. Email Contact: Keser@vwl3.wiwi.uni-karlsruhe.de

Kiesling, H. J. (1990) “Pedagogical Uses of the Public Goods Concept in Economics,” Journal of Economic Education, 21:2 (Spring), 137-147. Keywords: experiments, classroom games**, public, voluntary contributions.

Kim, Oliver, and Mark Walker (1984) “The Free Rider Problem: Experimental Evidence,” Public Choice, 43:1 3-24. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, free riding.

Koch, Bradley J. (1998) “A Public Good Experiment in Greater China: Economic Development as a Determinant of Voluntary Contributions,” University of Arizona, Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1998 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, subject pool effects, methodology, China, cross-cultural comparisons, special subjects. Email Contact: bradley@u.arizona.edu

Krishnamurthy, Sandeep (1999) “An Experimental Investigation of the Temporal Effect of Communication in Public Goods Games With and Without Provision Points,” University of Washington - Bothell, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, provision points, communication. Abstract: This paper evaluates the effect of non-binding communication in linear and threshold public goods games. Communication raises contributions, but has more of a long term effect in provision point games where the focalness of the provision point helps maintain cooperation once it is established. Email Contact: sandeep@u.washington.edu

Kurzban, Robert (1998) “Evolution Solves the Public Goods Problem: Cognitive Economics,” University of Arizona, Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1998 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, evolution, psychology. Email Contact: rkurzban@econlab.arizona.edu

Kurzban, Robert, Kevin A. McCabe, and Vernon L. Smith (1999) “The Role of Information in a Real Time Public Goods Game: Do Players Use a Simple Matching Rule?,” University of Arizona, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1999 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, real time mechanisms. Email Contact: rkurzban@econlab.arizona.edu

Laury, Susan K., James M. Walker, and Arlington W. Williams (1995) “Anonymity and the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 27:2 (July), 365-380. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, anonymity, methodology. Email Contact: slaury@gsu.edu

Laury, Susan K., and Charles A. Holt (1998) “Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: Experimental Results with Interior Nash Equilibria,” in Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, edited by C. R. Plott and V. L. Smith, New York: Elsevier Press, forthcoming. Keywords: Public goods experiments with interior Nash equilibria have been used to separate "boundary effects" from other factors like altruism or spite that may cause contributions to deviate systematically from Nash predictions. Results of public goods experiments with interior Nash equilibria are compared. Email Contact: slaury@gsu.edu

Laury, Susan K., James M. Walker, and Arlington W. Williams (1999) “The Voluntary Provision of a Pure Public Good with Diminishing Marginal Returns,” Public Choice, 99:1-2 (April), 139-160. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, diminishing marginal returns, nonlinear payoffs, interior Nash. Email Contact: slaury@gsu.edu

Ledyard, John O. (1995) “Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research,” in A Handbook of Experimental Economics, edited by A. Roth and J. Kagel, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 111-194. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, survey, mechanisms, altruism, noisy behavior, reciprocity, step-level public goods, gender effects, interior Nash, nonlinear payoffs. Email Contact: jledyard@hss.caltech.edu

Leuthold, Jane (1987) “A Public Goods Experiment for the Classroom,” Journal of Economic Education, 18:1 (Winter), 58-65. Keywords: experiments, classroom games, public, voluntary contributions.

Leuthold, Jane (1993) “A Free Rider Experiment for the Large Class,” Journal of Economic Education, 24:4 (Fall), 353-363. Keywords: experiments, classroom games, public, voluntary contributions. Abstract: This classroom experiment lets students divide their endowments between a private investment and a social investment with a lower individual return but a higher social return to the class as a whole. Applications to public goods and free riding behavior are discussed.

Levati, Maria Vittoria (1998) “An Experimental Study on the Role Played by 'Persuasive Behavior' in Public Good Experiments,” University of York, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, persuasion, fairness, signaling. Abstract: Subjects may contribute to a public good in an effort to persuade or signal others to do so in the future. The reported experiment provides support for the persuasion hypothesis. Email Contact: mvl2@york.ac.uk

Levati, Maria Vittoria (1999) “Rationality, Altruism, Persuasion and their Connection in a Social Dilemma Experiment,” University of York, Discussion Paper, presented at the Spring 1999 Public Choice Meetings. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, altruism, social dilemma, game theory. Email Contact: mvl2@york.ac.uk

Levine, David K. (1998) “Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments,” Review of Economic Dynamics, I:3 (July), 593-622. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, altruism, spite. Email Contact: dlevine@ucla.edu

Marks, Melanie B., and Rachel T. A. Croson (1998) “Alternative Rebate Rules in the Provision of a Threshold Public Good: An Experimental Investigation,” Journal of Public Economics, 67195-220. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, threshold public good, step-level public good, rebate rules. Abstract: This experiment is designed to determine the effect of rebate rules on contributions to a step-level public good. Email Contact: crosonr@wharton.upenn.edu, mmarks@longwood.lwc.edu

Marks, Melanie B., and Rachel T. A. Croson (1999) “The Effect of Incomplete Information in a Threshold Public Good Experiment,” Public Choice, 99:1-2 (April), 103-118. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, threshold public good, step-level public good, incomplete information, asymmetric information. Abstract: This experiment is designed to determine the effect of asymmetric information on contributions to a step-level public good. Email Contact: mmarks@longwood.lwc.edu

Marwell, Gerald, and Ruth E. Ames (1979) “Experiments on the Provision of the Public Goods I: Resources, Interest, Group Size, and the Free-Rider Problem,” American Journal of Sociology, 84(May), 1335-1360. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, endowments, group size, free riding, sociology. Email Contact: marwell@ssc.wisc.edu

Marwell, Gerald, and Ruth E. Ames (1980) “Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods II: Provision Points, Stakes, Experience and the Free-Rider Problem,” American Journal of Sociology, 85(January), 926-937. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, provision points, incentives, experience, sociology. Email Contact: marwell@ssc.wisc.edu

Marwell, Gerald, and Ruth E. Ames (1981) “Economists Free Ride, Does Anyone Else?*,” Journal of Public Economics, 15:3 (June), 295-310. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, subject pool effects. Email Contact: marwell@ssc.wisc.edu

Marwell, Gerald (1982) “Altruism and the Problem of Collective Action,” in Cooperation and Helping Behavior: Theories and Research, edited by Valerian J. Derlega and Januse Grzelak, New York: Academic Press, . Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, altruism, cooperation. Email Contact: marwell@ssc.wisc.edu

Mestelman, Stuart, and D. H. Feeny (1988) “Does Ideology Matter?: Anecdotal Experimental Evidence on the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods,” Public Choice, 57281-286. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, ideology. Email Contact: mestelma@mcmaster.ca

Miller, John H., and James Andreoni (1991) “Can Evolutionary Dynamics Explain Free Riding in Experiments?,” Economic Letters, 36:1 (May), 9-15. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, evolution, free riding, replicator dynamic, evolution. Email Contact: miller@zia.hss.cmu.edu

Morgan, John, and Martin Sefton (1996) “Funding Public Goods with Lotteries: An Experiment,” Penn State, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, lotteries. Abstract: The experiment compares two mechanisms for raising money for a public good: lotteries and voluntary contributions. Even though voluntary contributions exceed the Nash (free-riding) prediction, the lottery garners a higher percentage of the endowment, even after controlling for the cost of the prize used in the lottery. Lottery ticket purchases are well explained by Nash predictions. Email Contact: jmorgan@princeton.edu

Mysker, M., P. Olson, and Arlington Williams (1999) “The Voluntary Provision of a Threshold Public Good: Further Experimental Results,” in Research in Experimental Economics, edited by R. M. Isaac, Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, forthcoming. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, step-level public goods, methodology, replication. Abstract The experiment is, in part, a replication the Bagnoli and McKee (1991) homogeneous values experiments with a step-level public good. The new study is also designed to assess the effects of providing a record sheet and isolating groups. Email Contact: williama@indiana.edu

Neveu, Matthieu (1999) “The Asymmetric Endowment Effect on the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods,” GATE, Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1999 European Regional ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, asymmetries, asymmetric endowments. Abstract: The paper investigates the relationship between voluntary contributions and accumulated earnings in a setting with asymmetric endowments. There is some tendency for subjects with relatively low earnings to increase free riding behavior. Email Contact: neveu@gate.cnrs.fr

Ockenfels, Axel, and J. Weimann (1999) “Types and Patterns: An Experimental East-West-German Comparison of Cooperation and Solidarity,” Journal of Public Economics, 71:2 (February), 275-287. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, solidarity, cross cultural comparison, subject pool effects, Germany, culture. Abstract: East German subjects exhibit more selfishness than West German subjects in a cross-cultural comparison of behavior in public goods and solidarity game experiments. Email Contact: axel.ockenfels@ww.uni-magdeburg.de

Offerman, Theo, Joep Sonnemans, and Arthur Schram (1996) “Value Orientations, Expectations and Voluntary Contributions in Public Goods,” Economic Journal, 106:437 (July), 817-845. Keywords: experiments, public, step-level public good, numbers effects, value orientations, altruism. Abstract: The experiment implements a step-level public good, with variations in the number of players and the value of the public good. Email Contact: theoo@fee.uva.nl

Offerman, Theo (1997) Beliefs and Decision Rules in Public Goods Games: Theory and Experiments, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Press. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, psychology, methodology, learning. Email Contact: theoo@fee.uva.nl

Offerman, Theo, Joep Sonnemans, and Arthur Schram (1997) “Expectation Formation in Public Good Games,” University of Amsterdam, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, step-level public good, expectations. Email Contact: theoo@fee.uva.nl

Offerman, Theo, Arthur Schram, and Joep Sonnemans (1998) “Quantal Response Models in Step-Level Public Goods Games,” European Journal of Political Economy, 1489-100. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, step-level public goods, quantal response, bounded rationality. Email Contact: theoo@fee.uva.nl

Offerman, Theo, Joep Sonnemans, and Arthur Schram (1999) “Belief Learning in Public Good Games,” Economic Inquiry, forthcoming. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, belief learning, belief elicitation, errors. Email Contact: theoo@fee.uva.nl

Palfrey, Thomas R., and Howard Rosenthal (1988) “Private Incentives in Social Dilemmas: The Effects of Incomplete Information and Altruism,” Journal of Public Economics, 35:3 (April), 309-332. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, altruism, information. Email Contact: trp@hss.caltech.edu

Palfrey, Thomas R., and Howard Rosenthal (1991) “Testing for Effects of Cheap Talk in a Public Goods Game with Private Information,” Games and Economic Behavior, 3:2 (May), 183-220. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, cheap talk, private information. Email Contact: trp@hss.caltech.edu

Palfrey, Thomas R., and Howard Rosenthal (1991) “Testing Game-Theoretic Models of Free Riding: New Evidence on Probability Bias and Learning,” in Laboratory Research in Political Economy, edited by T. R. Palfrey, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 239-268. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, free riding, probability bias, learning.
Email Contact: trp@hss.caltech.edu

Palfrey, Thomas R., and Jeffrey E. Prisbrey (1996) “Altruism, Reputation and Noise in Linear Public Goods Experiments,” Journal of Public Economics, 61:3 (September), 409-427. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, altruism, noise, reputation. Email Contact: trp@hss.caltech.edu

Palfrey, Thomas, and Jeff Prisbrey (1998**) “Anomalous Behavior in Linear Public Goods Experiments: How Much and Why?,” American Economic Review, . Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, warm glow altruism, noisy behavior.

Parks, C. D., and A. D. Vu (1994) “Social Dilemma Behavior of Individuals from Highly Individualist and Collectivist Cultures,” Journal of Conflict and Resolution, 38:4 (December), 708-718. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, social dilemma, subject pool effects, culture.

Peters, H. Elizabeth, Sinan Umir, Jeremy Clark, and William D. Schulze (1999) “Free Riding and the Provision of Public Goods in the Family: An Experimental Test of the Rotten Kid Theorem,” Cornell University, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, altruism, family members, subject pool effects.

Rapoport, Amnon (1985) “Public Goods and the MCS Experimental Paradigm,” American Political Science Review, 79:1 (March), 148-155. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, public goods. Email Contact: arapoport@bpa.arizona.edu

Rapoport, Amnon (1987) “Research Paradigms and Expected Utility Models for the Provision of Step Level Public Goods,” Psychological Review, 94:1 74-83. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, step-level public goods, provision points. Email Contact: arapoport@bpa.arizona.edu

Rapoport, Amnon, and Gary Bornstein (1987) “Intergroup Competition for the Provision of Binary Public Goods,” Psychological Review, 94:3 291-299. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, binary contributions, group competition. Email Contact: arapoport@bpa.arizona.edu

Rapoport, Amnon (1988) “Provision of Step-Level Public Goods: Effects of Inequality in Resources,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 54:3 432-440. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, step-level public goods, asymmetric endowments. Abstract: This experiment implements a step-level public good and introduces asymmetries in initial individual endowments, which are either low, medium, or high. Email Contact: arapoport@bpa.arizona.edu

Rapoport, Amnon, and Gary Bornstein (1989) “Solving Public Good Problems in Competition between Equal and Unequal Size Groups,” Journal Conflict Resolution, 33:3 (September), 460-479. Keywords: experiments, game theory, group size, free riding, public, voluntary contributions. Email Contact: arapoport@bpa.arizona.edu

Rapoport, Amnon, and D. Eshed-Levy (1989) “Provision of Step-Level Public Goods: Effects of Greed and Fear of Being Gypped,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 44325-344. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, step-level public goods, rebate. Abstract: The experiment demonstrates that a money-back guarantee increases the incidence of the successful provision of a step-level public good. Email Contact: arapoport@bpa.arizona.edu

Rapoport, Amnon, and Ramzi Suleiman (1992) “Provision of Step-Level Public Goods with Continuous Contribution,” Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 5133-153. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, step-level public goods. Email Contact: arapoport@bpa.arizona.edu

Rapoport, Amnon, and Ramzi Suleiman (1993) “Incremental Contribution in Step-Level Public Goods Games with Asymmetric Players,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 55171-194. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, step-level public goods, asymmetric endowments. Abstract: The experiment implements a step-level public goods game with asymmetric endowments. The incidence of successful provision is an decreasing function of the contribution level needed for provision. Email Contact: arapoport@bpa.arizona.edu

Roelofs, Matthew R., and Tracey H. Sigler (1998) “Individualism, Collectivism, and the Public Good: Examining Cultural Values in a Public Goods Experiment,” Western Washington University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, culture, collectivism. Abstract: Survey instruments are used to measure individual/collectivism orientations, and the results are compared with voluntary contributions in a public goods experiment. Email Contact: mroelofs@cbe.wwu.edu

Roelofs, Matthew R., and Tracey H. Sigler (1999) “Group Composition in a Public Goods Experiment,” Western Washington University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1999 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, group composition. Email Contact: mroelofs@cbe.wwu.edu

Saijo, T. , and H. Nakamura (1995) “The "Spite" Dilemma in Voluntary Contribution Mechanism Experiments,” Journal of Conflict and Resolution, 39:3 (September), 535-360. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, spite. Email Contact: saijo@iser.osaka-u.ac.jp

Schneider, Friedrich, and Werner W. Pommerehne** (1981) “Free Riding and Collective Action: An Experiment in Public Microeconomics,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 96:4 (November), 689-704. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, free riding.

Schneider, Friedrich, and Werner W. Pommerehne (1981) “On the Rationality of Free Riding: An Experiment,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 96(November), 689-704. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, free riding.

Schram, Arthur, Theo Offerman, and Joep Sonnemans (1999) “Explaining Comparative Statics on Step-Level Public Goods Games,” in Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, edited by C. R. Plott and V. L. Smith, Amsterdam: Elsevier, forthcoming. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, step-level public goods, comparative statics, participation games. Email Contact: arthurs@fee.uva.nl

Sefton, Martin, and Richard Steinberg (1996) “Reward Structure in Public Good Experiments,” Journal of Public Economics, 61:2 (August), 263-287. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, interior Nash, nonlinear payoffs. Email Contact: martin.sefton@ncl.ac.uk

Sonnemans, Joep, Arthur Schram, and Theo Offerman (1999) “Strategic Behavior in Public Good Games: When Partners Drift Apart,” Economics Letters, 62:1 (January), 35-41. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, strategic behavior. Abstract: The experimental design replaces one member of each group with a new member in a prespecified rotation scheme. Observed behavior is both history-dependent and strategic in the sense of reduced contributions near the final period of one's participation in a given group. Email Contact: joeps@fee.uva.edu

Sonnemans, Joep, Arthur Schram, and Theo Offerman (1999) “Public Good Provision and Public Bad Prevention: The Effect of Framing,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 34:1 143-161. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, public bad, framing effects. Email Contact: joeps@fee.uva.edu

Stewart, Steven, and Michael McKee (1998) “How Warm is Thy Glow? Experimental Tests of Altruism,” University of New Mexico, Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1998 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, altruism, warm glow altruism. Email Contact: sstewar6@utk.edu

Sugden, Robert (1985) “Consistent Conjectures and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods: Why the Conventional Theory Does Not Work,” Journal of Public Economics, 27117-124. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, consistent conjectures. Email Contact: r.sugden@uea.ac.uk

Suleiman, Ramzi, and Amnon Rapoport (1992) “Provision of Step-Level Public Goods with Continuous Contribution,” Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 5133-153. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, step-level public goods, continuous contribution levels. Abstract: The experiment is designed to evaluate the effects of allowing non-binary ("continuous") contributions to a step-level public good. The incidence of successful provision is an increasing function of the ratio of the total value of the public good (to all participants) to the minimum total cost of providing it. Email Contact: arapoport@bpa.arizona.edu

Suleiman, Ramzi, and Keren Or-Chen (1999) “Providing Step Level Public Goods Under Uncertainty: The Case of Probable External Supply,” in Resolving Social Dilemmas, edited by Margaret Foddy, Michael Smithson, Schneider Sherry and Michael Hogg, Philadelphia: Psychology Press, 149-164. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, step-level public goods, risk aversion. Email

Unur, A. Sinan (1998) “Parents' Altruism and Transfers to Children: An Experimental Analysis of Incentives,” Cornell University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1998 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, altruism, children subjects. Email Contact: sinan.unur@cornell.edu

van de Kragt, Alphons, John M. Orbell, and Robyn M. Dawes (1983) “The Minimal Contributing Set as a Solution to Public Goods Problems,” American Political Science Review, 77(March), 112-122. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, step-level public good, binary contributions, minimal contributing set, communications. Abstract: The experiment is based on a step-level public good with binary contributions. Increasing the required number of contributors reduces the incidence of successful provision. When communication is introduced, successful provision is universal is all treatments.

van de Kragt, Alphons J. C., Robyn M. Dawes, and John M. Orbell (1988) “Are People Who Cooperate "Rational Altruists?",” Public Choice, 56:3 (March), 233-247. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, rational altruism, altruism, cooperation.

van Dijk, E., and M. Grodzka (1992) “The Influence of Endowments Asymmetry and Information Level on the Contribution to a Public Step Good,” Journal of Economics and Psychology, 13:2 (June), 329-342. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, endowments, asymmetric endowments, information.

van Dijk, F., Joep Sonnemans, and Frans van Winden (1999) “Social Ties in a Public Good Experiment,” University of Amsterdam, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, social ties. Abstract: The experiment begins with a value orientation measurement of concern for others' payoffs, which is followed by a 25 period voluntary contributions experiment. Then post-experiment measures of attitudes toward one's partner are obtained and compared with initial value orientations. This comparison produces evidence that social ties were formed during the experiment. Email Contact: fvwinden@fee.uva.nl

Weimann, Joachim (1994) “Individual Behaviour in a Free-Riding Experiment,” Journal of Public Economics, 54185-200. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, individual behavior. Email Contact: joachim.weimann@ww.uni-magdeburg.de

Wendt, Dirk (1991) “Altruism in Social Dilemmas: Failure to Catch it in a Parameter,” in Game Equilibrium Models IV: Social and Political Interaction, edited by Reinhard Selten, Berlin: Springer-Verlag, . Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, social dilemmas, altruism, hypothetical incentives. Email

Williams, Arlington W., and James M. Walker (1993) “Computerized Laboratory Exercises for Microeconomics Education: Three Applications Motivated by Experimental Economics,” Journal of Economic Education, 24:4 (Fall), 291-315. Keywords: experiments, classroom games, markets, public, voluntary contributions. Email Contact: williama@indiana.edu

Willinger, Marc, and Anthony Zielelmeyer (1999) “Incentives to Cooperate in Public Good Games with an Interior Solution: Experimental Evidence,” University Louis Pasteur, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1999 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, nonlinear payoffs, interior Nash, cooperation. Email Contact: willma@cournot.u-strasbg.fr

Zaleski, P. A., and C. E. Zech (1996) “Group Size and the Free-Rider Hypothesis: A Re-examination of Old Evidence from Churches: Comment,” Public Choice, 88:3-4 (September), 407-411. Keywords: experiments**, public, voluntary contributions, group size, field data, church contributions.