Y2K Bibliography of Experimental Economics and Social Science
Step Level Public Goods Experiments

updated December 29, 1999
Charles A. Holt, cah2k@virginia.edu, suggestions and corrections welcome
(for online and personal use only)

Bagnoli, Mark, and Michael McKee (1991) “Voluntary Contribution Games: Efficient Private Provision of Public Goods,” Economic Inquiry, 29:2 (April), 351-366. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, provision points, reimbursement mechanism. Abstract: The experiment is focused on the effects of value heterogeneity and group size on contributions to a step-level public good. Email Contact: mbagnoli@indiana.edu

Brewer, Stephanie (1999) “Group Size Effects for One-Shot Provison Point Public Goods,” Indiana University-Pennsylvania, Discussion Paper, presented at the 1999 Southern Economic Association Meeting. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, provision point public goods, one shot game, step level, numbers effects, extra credit incentives, methodology. Abstract: Extra credit points were used to motivate subjects in a one-shot step level public goods experiment. Group size was varied from 4 to 10 to 40. Contributions were generally increasing in MPCR, but not in group size.

Cadsby, Charles B., and Elizabeth Maynes (1998) “Gender and Free Riding in a Threshold Public Goods Game: Experimental Evidence,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 34:4 (March), 603-620. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, methodology, subject pool effects, gender effects, step-level public goods game. Abstract: This step-level public goods game has equilibria at both provision and non-provision. The initial tendency for females to contribute more than males tends to vanish over time. Female groups showed a stronger uniformity in convergence to the equilibrium selected.

Cadsby, Charles B., and Elizabeth Maynes (1999) “Voluntary Contribution of Threshold Public Goods with Continuous Provisions: Experimental Evidence,” Journal of Public Economics, 71:1 (January), 53-73. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, threshold public goods, step-level public goods. Abstract: The experiment allows a continuous division of assets between private and a threshold public good. This non-binary structure raises contributions, which also increase with 1) a reduced threshold, 2) a money-back guarantee, and 3) high rewards.

Chewning, Eugene, Maribeth Coller, and Susan K. Laury (1999) “Voluntary Contributions to a Multiple Threshold Public Good,” in Research in Experimental Economics, Vol. 8, edited by R. M. Isaac, Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, forthcoming. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, multiple provision points, step-level public good. Email Contact: slaury@gsu.edu

Coats, Jennifer, and William Neilson (1999) “Beliefs about Selfishness, Altruism, Fairness, and Spite: An Experimental Analysis,” Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1999 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, provision point, beliefs about others' preferences, spite, altruism, reciprocity, fairness. Email Contact: wsn@econr.tamu.edu

Cooper, David J., and Carol Kraker (1998) “An Experimental Study of Fairness and Learning in Public Goods Games,” University of Pittsburgh, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, provision points, asymmetric individual provision-point requirements, fairness, errors, altruism. Abstract: The experiment has that the property that at least two of the three individuals in a group must contribute in order for the public good to be provided. The required contributions differ across individuals, which raises fairness concerns. The authors incorporate interpersonal utility considerations into a learning model to explain the data. Email Contact: djc13@guinness.som.cwru.edu

Croson, Rachel T. A., and Melanie Marks (1998) “Identifiability of Individual Contributions in a Threshold Public Goods Experiment,” Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 42167-190. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, step-level public goods, information. Abstract: This experiment examines the effects of identifying individual contributions in a threshold public goods game. Email Contact: crosonr@wharton.upenn.edu

Croson, Rachel T. A., and Melanie Marks (1999) “The Effects of Heterogeneous Valuations for Threshold Public Goods: An Experimental Study,” University of Pennsylvania, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, step-level public goods, heterogeneous preferences. Email Contact: crosonr@wharton.upenn.edu

Croson, Rachel T. A., and Melanie Marks (1999) “Step Returns in Threshold Public Goods: A Meta- and Experimental Analysis,” Experimental Economics, 2:3 forthcoming. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, step-level public goods, step return, meta analysis, communication, numbers effects, rebates, refunds. Abstract: This paper defines the step return (SR) to be the total value divided by the total cost of providing a step-level public good. A meta-analysis of previous papers and new data show that the step return is correlated with the incidence of successful provision of the public good. Email Contact: crosonr@wharton.upenn.edu

Isaac, R. Mark, David Schmidtz, and James M. Walker (1989) “The Assurance Problem in a Laboratory Market,” Public Choice, 62:3 (September), 217-236. Keywords: experiments, public, step-level public goods, rebates. Abstract: This paper considers the effects of rebates and changes in the size of the provision point in step-level public goods. Email Contact: misaac@bpa.arizona.edu

Krishnamurthy, Sandeep (1999) “An Experimental Investigation of the Temporal Effect of Communication in Public Goods Games With and Without Provision Points,” University of Washington - Bothell, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, provision points, communication. Abstract: This paper evaluates the effect of non-binding communication in linear and threshold public goods games. Communication raises contributions, but has more of a long term effect in provision point games where the focalness of the provision point helps maintain cooperation once it is established. Email Contact: sandeep@u.washington.edu

Marks, Melanie B., and Rachel T. A. Croson (1998) “Alternative Rebate Rules in the Provision of a Threshold Public Good: An Experimental Investigation,” Journal of Public Economics, 67195-220. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, threshold public good, step-level public good, rebate rules. Abstract: This experiment is designed to determine the effect of rebate rules on contributions to a step-level public good. Email Contact: crosonr@wharton.upenn.edu, mmarks@longwood.lwc.edu

Marks, Melanie B., and Rachel T. A. Croson (1999) “The Effect of Incomplete Information in a Threshold Public Good Experiment,” Public Choice, 99:1-2 (April), 103-118. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, threshold public good, step-level public good, incomplete information, asymmetric information. Abstract: This experiment is designed to determine the effect of asymmetric information on contributions to a step-level public good. Email Contact: mmarks@longwood.lwc.edu

Marwell, Gerald, and Ruth E. Ames (1980) “Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods II: Provision Points, Stakes, Experience and the Free-Rider Problem,” American Journal of Sociology, 85(January), 926-937. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, provision points, incentives, experience, sociology. Email Contact: marwell@ssc.wisc.edu

Mysker, M., P. Olson, and Arlington Williams (1999) “The Voluntary Provision of a Threshold Public Good: Further Experimental Results,” in Research in Experimental Economics, edited by R. M. Isaac, Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, forthcoming. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, step-level public goods, methodology, replication. Abstract The experiment is, in part, a replication the Bagnoli and McKee (1991) homogeneous values experiments with a step-level public good. The new study is also designed to assess the effects of providing a record sheet and isolating groups. Email Contact: williama@indiana.edu

Poe, Grefory, Jeremy Clark, and William Schulze (1997) “Can Hypothetical Questions Predict Actual Participation in Public Programs: A Field Validity Test Using a Provision Point Mechanism,” Cornell University, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, methodology, public goods, hypothetical bias, field experiment, provision point mechanism.

Rapoport, Amnon (1987) “Research Paradigms and Expected Utility Models for the Provision of Step Level Public Goods,” Psychological Review, 94:1 74-83. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, step-level public goods, provision points. Email Contact: arapoport@bpa.arizona.edu

Suleiman, Ramzi, and Keren Or-Chen (1999) “Providing Step Level Public Goods Under Uncertainty: The Case of Probable External Supply,” in Resolving Social Dilemmas, edited by Margaret Foddy, Michael Smithson, Schneider Sherry and Michael Hogg, Philadelphia: Psychology Press, 149-164. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, step-level public goods, risk aversion. Email

van Dijk, E., and M. Grodzka (1992) “The Influence of Endowments Asymmetry and Information Level on the Contribution to a Public Step Good,” Journal of Economics and Psychology, 13:2 (June), 329-342. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, endowments, asymmetric endowments, information.