Y2K Bibliography of Experimental Economics and Social Science
Public Goods Experiments and Voting

updated December 29, 1999
Charles A. Holt, cah2k@virginia.edu, suggestions and corrections welcome
(for online and personal use only)



Alfano, Geraldine, and Gerald Marwell (1980) “Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods by Groups III: Nondivisibility and Free Riding in 'Real' Groups,” Social Psychology Quarterly, 43300-309. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions.

Alm, J., B. R. Jackson, and Michael McKee (1993) “Fiscal Exchange, Collective Decsion Institutions, and Tax Compliance,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 22:3 (December), 285-303. Keywords: experiments, public goods, tax compliance. Abstract: Tax compliance in laboratory experiments is increased when individuals approve of the expenditures and when they are actively involved in expenditure decisions.

Alston, R. M., and C. Nowell (1996) “Implementing the Voluntary Contribution Game: A Field Experiment,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 31:3 (December), 357-368. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, field experiments.

Alston, Richard M., and Clifford Nowell (1996) “Implementing the Voluntary Contribution Game: A Field Experiment,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 31:3 (December), 357-368. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, field experiment, methodology. Abstract: The field experiment involved the funding of a lobbyist from voluntary contributions. Comparisons with laboratory experiments are discussed.

Altfeld, Michael, and Gary J. Miller (1984) “Sources of Bureaucratic Influence: Expertise and Agenda Control,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 28(December), 701-30. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, agenda effects **.

Anderson, Simon P., Jacob K. Goeree, and Charles A. Holt (1998) “A Theoretical Analysis of Altruism and Decision Error in Public Goods Games,” Journal of Public Economics, 70:2 (November), 297-323. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, nonlinear public goods games, game theory, logit equilibrium, altruism, quantal response, numbers effects. Abstract: This paper formalizes an equilibrium model in which altruism and decision error parameters determine the distribution of contributions in public goods games. The authors prove existence of a unique symmetric equilibrium density of contributions and show that 1) contributions increase with the marginal value of the public good, 2) total contributions increase with the number of participants if there is altruism, and 3) mean contributions lie between the Nash predictions and half of the endowment. These predictions, which are not implied by a standard Nash analysis, are roughly consistent with laboratory tests. Email Contact: holt@virginia.edu

Andreoni, James (1988) “Why Free Ride? Strategies and Learning in Public Goods Experiments,” Journal of Public Economics, 37:3 (December), 291-304. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, learning. Email Contact: andreoni@facstaff.wisc.edu

Andreoni, James (1989) “Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian Equivalence,” Journal of Political Economy, 97:6 (December), 1447-1458. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, altruism. Email Contact: andreoni@facstaff.wisc.edu

Andreoni, James (1990) “Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving?,” Economic Journal, 100:401 (June), 464-477. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, warm glow altruism. Abstract: This paper elaborates a model of impure altruism that is based on social pressure, guilt, sympathy, or a simple desire for a "warm glow" from the act of giving. The theorietical implications of models of impure altruism are explored. Email Contact: andreoni@facstaff.wisc.edu

Andreoni, James (1993) “An Experimental Test of the Public Goods Crowding-Out Hypothesis,” American Economic Review, 83:5 (December), 1317-1327. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, crowding out, altruism. Email Contact: andreoni@facstaff.wisc.edu

Andreoni, James (1995) “Cooperation in Public Goods Experiments: Kindness or Confusion?,” American Economic Review, 85:4 (September), 891-904. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, altruism, decision errors. Abstract: A tournament payoff design is used to eliminate altruistic motives for contribution to a public good. The experimental results indicate that about half of contribution behavior is due to altruism and half to noisy behavior. Email Contact: andreoni@facstaff.wisc.edu

Andreoni, James (1995) “Warm-Glow Versus Cold-Prickle: The Effects of Positive and Negative Framing on Cooperation in Experiments,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110:1 (February), 1-21. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, framing effects, warm glow altruism. Email Contact: andreoni@facstaff.wisc.edu

Andreoni, Janes, Paul Brown, and Lise Vesterlund (1999) “What Produces Fairness? Some Experimental Evidence,” Iowa State University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1999 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, public goods, fairness, Nash equilibrium, best shot game, sequential public goods game, punishments. Abstract: The experiment compares behavior in related two-person public goods games: one with simultaneous play and summation-based payoffs, one with sequential play and summation-based payoffs, and one with sequential play and maximum (best shot) payoffs. All three have a subgame perfect equilibrium where one player contributes and the other doesn't. In the experiment, cooperation is highest in the simultaneous game and lowest in the best-shot game. In the sequential games, selfish initial choices are not punished as much in the best-shot game. Email Contact: andreoni@facstaff.wisc.edu

Andreoni, James, and Lise Vesterlund (1999) “Which is the Fair Sex? Gender Differences in Altruism,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, forthcoming. Keywords: experiments, public, income distribution, division games, dictator games, altruism, gender effects. Abstract: Gender differences are analyzed using data from dictator games with different prices for transfering earnings to the other person. Men are more altruistic when it is cheap to transfer money to the other person, whereas women are more altruistic when it is expensive. Women are more likely to choose equal division, and men are more likely to be at the extremes (selfish or selfless). These differences may explain why other studies reach conflicting conclusions about gender effects on contributions to a public good. Email Contact: andreoni@facstaff.wisc.edu, vester@iastate.edu

Andreoni, James, and John H. Miller (1999) “Analyzing Choice with Revealed Preference: Is Altruism Rational?,” in Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, edited by C. R. Plott and V. L. Smith, New York: Elsevier Press, forthcoming. Keywords: experiments, public, altruism, revealed preference, survey. Abstract This is a brief survey of the use of revealed preference techniques in experiments. Email Contact: andreoni@facstaff.wisc.edu

Andreoni, James, and Rachel Croson (1999) “Partners Versus Strangers: The Effect of Random Rematching in Public Goods Experiments,” in Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, edited by C. R. Plott and V. L. Smith, New York: Elsevier Press, forthcoming. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, random matching, strangers, partners. Abstract This paper surveys the mixed experimental results on whether random matching (strangers) produces more cooperative play than fixed matchings (partners). The divergent results in the literature are attributed to the higher variance of behavior in the random matching treatment. Email Contact: andreoni@facstaff.wisc.edu

Asch, P., G. Gigliotti, and J Polito (1993) “Free Riding with Discrete and Continuous Public Goods: Some Experimental Evidence,” Public Choice, 77293-305. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, linear public goods, step-level public goods. Abstract: The experiment provides a comparison of contributions in continuous and step-level public goods games.

Attiyeh, Greg, Robert Franciosi, and R. Mark Isaac (2000) “Experiments with the Pivot Process for Providing Public Goods,” Public Choice, 102:1-2 (January), 93-112. Keywords: experiments, public, mechanisms, pivot process. Email Contact: misaac@bpa.arizona.edu

Bagnoli, Mark, and Michael McKee (1991) “Voluntary Contribution Games: Efficient Private Provision of Public Goods,” Economic Inquiry, 29:2 (April), 351-366. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, provision points, reimbursement mechanism. Abstract: The experiment is focused on the effects of value heterogeneity and group size on contributions to a step-level public good. Email Contact: mbagnoli@indiana.edu

Bagnoli, Mark, S. Ben-David, and Michael McKee (1992) “Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: The Multiple Unit Case,” Journal of Public Economics, 47:1 (February), 85-106. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions. Email Contact: mbagnoli@indiana.edu

Banks, Jeffrey S., Charles R. Plott, and David P. Porter (1988) “An Experimental Analysis of Unanimity in Public Goods Provision Mechanisms,” Review of Economic Studies, 55:2 (April), 301-322. Keywords: experiments, public goods, mechanisms. Email Contact: bnks@hss.caltech.edu

Banks, Jeffrey S., John O. Ledyard, and David P. Porter (1989) “Allocating Uncertain and Unresponsive Resources: An Experimental Approach,” Rand Journal of Economics, 20:1 (Spring), 1-25. Keywords: experiments, public goods, mechanism design. Email Contact: bnks@hss.caltech.edu

Beckenkamp, Martin, and Axel Ostmann (1998) “Designing Multi-Agent Models for Common Property Resources,” University of Karlsruhe, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, public goods, game theory, common pool resource, computer simulation, bounded rationality, psychology. Abstract: The paper presents a comparison of simulated and human data in common-pool resource games. The simulations incorporate bounded rationality and psychological reactions like anger, greed, and fear. Email Contact: axel@cops.uni-sb.de

Beckenkamp, Martin, and Beate Wojtyniak (1998) “Optimizing Fines in Commons Dilemmas?,” University of Karlsruhe, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, public goods, common pool resources, efficient exclusion. Abstract: The paper resports commons dilemma experiments with penalties (sanctions) for excess resource depletion. The sanctions did not increase efficiency in two out of three sanction levels used. Email Contact: bwo@vwl3.wiwi.uni-karlsruhe.de

Berl, Janet E., Richard D. McKelvey, Peter C. Ordeshook, and Mark Winer (1976) “An Experimental Test of the Core in a Simple N-Person Cooperative Non-Sidepayment Game,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 20(September), 453-479. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, committee voting, Condorcet winner, core. Email Contact: rdm@hss.caltech.edu

Blais, A., and R. Young (1999) “Why Do People Vote? An Experiment in Rationality,” Public Choice, 99:1-2 (April), 39-55. Keywords: experiments, public,* voting, paradox of voting, rationality, turnout.

Bohm, Peter (1971) “An Approach to the Problem of Estimating Demand for Public Goods,” Swedish Journal of Economics, 73:1 (March), 55-66. Keywords: experiments, public goods. Email Contact: pb@ne.su.se

Bohm, Peter (1972) “Estimating Demand for Public Goods: An Experiment,” European Economic Review, 3:2 111-130. Keywords: experiments, public goods. Email Contact: pb@ne.su.se

Bohm, Peter (1998) “Experimental Approaches to Analyzing International Climate Change Policies,” Stockholm University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, public goods, externalities, climate change, risk, expert subjects. Abstract: This paper uses "expert subjects" in two experiments designed to evaluate emissions trading among countries. In one experiment, a cost sharing rule is used to divide the burden among the "rich" countries in proportion to GDP. Email Contact: pb@ne.su.se

Bohm, Peter, and Bjorn Carle**n (1999) “Emission Quota Trade Among the Few: Laboratory Evidence of Joint Implementation Among Committed Countries,” Resource Energy Economics, 21:1 (January), 43-66. Keywords: experiments, public, emissions trading. Email Contact: pb@ne.su.se

Bolton, Gary E., and Elena Katok (1998) “An Experimental Test of the Crowding Out Hypothesis: The Nature of Beneficent Behavior,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 37:3 (November), 315-331. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, altruism, crowding out, other-regarding preferences, dictator game. Abstract: This experiment is motivated by the standard theoretical result that government donations to charity crowd out private donations dollar for dollar. The less-than-full crowding out observed in the experiment is attributed to an incorrect specification of preferences in the standard theoretical model. Email Contact: geb3@psu.edu

Bornstein, Gary, and Amnon Rapoport (1988) “Intergroup Competition for the Provision of Step-Level Public Goods: Effects of Preplay Communication,” European Journal of Social Psychology, 18125-142. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, step-level public goods, intergroup competition, groups. Email Contact: arapoport@bpa.arizona.edu

Bornstein, Gary, Amnon Rapoport, L. Kerpel, and T. Katz (1989) “Within- and Between-Group Communication in Intergroup Competition for Public Goods,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 25422-436. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, communication, intergroup competition, groups. Email Contact: arapoport@bpa.arizona.edu

Bornstein, Gary (1992) “The Free-Rider Problem in Intergroup Conflicts over Step-Level and Continuous Public Goods,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 62597-606. Keywords: experiments, public, step-level public goods, free riding, communication.

Bottom, William P., Cheryl L. Eavey, and Gary J. Miller (1996) “Getting to the Core: Coalitional Integrity as a Constraint on the Power of Agenda Setters in Decision-Making Groups,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2(June), 298-319. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, core, coalitions, agenda effects. Email Contact: eavey@nsf.gov

Bottom, William P., Cheryl L. Eavey, Gary J. Miller, and Jennifer Nicoll (1998) “The Institutional Effect on Majority Rule Instability: Bicameralism in Spatial Policy Decisions,” Washington University, Keywords: experiments, public, voting, bicameral legislature. Abstract: This experiment was designed to test the hypothesis that a bicameral legislature will exhibit more stable undominated policy choices. The results are largely supportive of this hypothesis. Email Contact: eavey@nsf.gov

Bowles, Samuel, Jeffrey P. Carpenter, and Herbert Gintis (1999) “Alchian & Allen Revisited: Examining the Effects of Mutual Monitoring, Reciprocity, and Residual Clainancy on Team Production,” University of Massachusetts, Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1999 European Regional ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, public, team production, reciprocity, monitoring, information. Abstract: The experiment is designed to shed light on the effects of mutual monitoring and reciprocity/punishment in a team production setting. A reciprocity-based model provides a good explanation of data patterns, as the residual claim structure and information about others' efforts are altered. Email Contact: jpc@econs.umass.edu

Boylan, Richard, John Ledyard, Arthur Lupia, Richard D. McKelvey, and Peter C. Ordeshook (1991) “Political Competition in a Model of Economic Growth: An Experimental Study,” in Laboratory Research in Political Economy, edited by T. R. Palfrey, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 33-68. Keywords: experiments, public*. Email

Brandts, Jordi, Takatoshi Saijo, and Arthur Schram (1998) “A Four Country Comparison of Spite and Cooperation in Voluntary Contribution Mechanisms,” Institute of Economic Analysis, Barcelona, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributins, spite, cooperation, international comparisons, subject pool effects, Japan, Netherlands, Spain. Abstract: A four country comparison of behavior in a voluntary contributions experiment provides little evidence for cross-country differences. In contrast, there is not much observed spiteful behavior among Japanese subjects. Email Contact: brandts@cc.uab.es

Brewer, Paul J., and Charles R. Plott (1996) “A Binary Conflict Ascending Price (BICAP) Mechanism for the Decentralized Allocation of the Right to Use Railroad Tracks,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 14857-887. Keywords: experiments, public, mechanisms, railroad track assignment, transportation economics, policy. Email Contact: pjbrewer@ust.hk

Brewer, Stephanie (1999) “Group Size Effects for One-Shot Provison Point Public Goods,” Indiana University-Pennsylvania, Discussion Paper, presented at the 1999 Southern Economic Association Meeting. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, provision point public goods, one shot game, step level, numbers effects, extra credit incentives, methodology. Abstract: Extra credit points were used to motivate subjects in a one-shot step level public goods experiment. Group size was varied from 4 to 10 to 40. Contributions were generally increasing in MPCR, but not in group size.

Brookshire, David S., Donald L. Coursey, and Howard Kunreuther (1991) “Compensation Schemes for Negative Externalities: A Field Experiment,” in Research in Experimental Economics, Vol. 4, edited by R. M. Isaac, Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 81-106. Keywords: experiments, public, externalities, field experiment, compensation schemes, contingent valuation, willingness to pay, WTA/WTP, auctions. Email Contact: brookshi@unm.edu

Brown, Steven R. (1970) “Consistency and the Persistence of Ideology: Some Experimental Results,” Public Opinion Quarterly, 34:1 (Spring), 1970. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, political science.

Brown, Paul M., and S. Stewart (1999) “Avoiding Severe Environmental Consequences: Evidence on the Role of Loss Avoidance and Risk Aversion,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 38:2 (February), 179-198. Keywords: experiments, public, externalities, social dilemmas, risk aversion, loss aversion.

Brown-Kruse, Jamie, and David Hummels (1993) “Gender Effects in Laboratory Public Goods Contribution: Do Individuals Put Their Money Where Their Mouth Is?,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 22:3 (December), 255-267. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, gender effects. Email Contact: jamie.kruse@ttu.edu

Brubaker, Earl R., and Dante Assisted by Gumucio (1982) “Sixty-Eight Percent Free Revelation and Thirty-Two Percent Free Ride? Demand Disclosures Under Varying Conditions on Exclusion,” in Research in Experimental Economics, Vol. 2, edited by V. L. Smith, Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 151-166. Keywords: experiments, public, free riding. Email

Buchanan, L., Catherine C. Eckel, and Philip Grossman (1998) “To Give or Not to Give: Effects of Altruism and Recognition on Philanthropic Gifts,” Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Discussion Paper, presented at the 1998 Public Choice Meetings. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, altruism, social distance. Email Contact: eckelc@vt.edu

Budescu, David V., Amnon Rapoport, and Ramzi Suleiman (1992) “Simultaneous vs. Sequential Requests in Resource Dilemmas with Incomplete Information,” Acta Psychologica, 80297-310. Keywords: experiments, public goods, common pool resource, incomplete information, sequential decisions. Email Contact: dbudescu@s.psych.uiuc.edu

Budescu, David V.*, Amnon Rapoport, and Ramzi Suleiman (1994) “The Role of a Player's Position in a Resource
Dilemma Game,” in Social Dilemmas and Cooperation, edited by U. Schulz, W. Albers and U. Mueller, New York: Springer-Verlag, 55-73. Keywords: experiments, public goods, common pool resource, sequential choice. Email Contact: dbudescu@s.psych.uiuc.edu

Budescu, David V., Amnon Rapoport, and Ramzi Suleiman (1995) “Common Pool Resource Dilemmas under Uncertainty: Qualitative Tests of Equilibrium Solutions,” Games and Economic Behavior, 10:1 (July), 171-201. Keywords: experiments, public goods, common pool resource, uncertainty. Email Contact: dbudescu@s.psych.uiuc.edu

Budescu, David V., Amnon Rapoport, and Ramzi Suleiman (1995) “Positional Order Effects in Social Dilemma Games with Uncertain Resources,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 61225-238. Keywords: experiments, public goods, common pool resource, uncertainty, sequential decisions. Email Contact: dbudescu@s.psych.uiuc.edu

Budescu, David V., Amnon Rapoport, and Ramzi Suleiman (1996) “Fixed Position and Property Rights in Sequential Resource Dilemmas Under Uncertainty,” Acta Psychologica, 93229-245. Keywords: experiments, public, common pool resource, uncertainty, sequential choice. Email Contact: dbudescu@s.psych.uiuc.edu

Budh, Erika, and Jan-Eric Nilsson (1998) “Public Goods versus Public Bads - Are There Fundamental Differences? An Experimental Investigation,” Dalarna University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, public bads. Abstract: This paper compares voluntary contributions in two cases, one with a public good and the other with a public bad. Email Contact: ebu@cts.du.se

Burton, A. C., Susan M. Chilton, and W. G. Hutchinson (1999) “An Experimental Investigation on the Effect of Income Distribution on Contributions to a Public Good,” University of Newcastle, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1999 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, income distributions, inequality aversion, income inequality effects on contributions. Email Contact: a.c.burton@ncl.ac.uk

Cabrales, Antonio, Gary Charness, and Luis Conchon (1999) “An Experiment on Nash Implementation,” Carlos III University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1998 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, public, game theory, mechanisms, Nash implementation.

Cadsby, Charles B., and Elizabeth Maynes (1998) “Choosing Between a Socially Efficient and Free-Riding Equilibrium: Nurses Versus Economics and Business Students,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 37:2 (October), 183-192. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, subject pool effects, methodology, step-level public goods game. Abstract: This step-level public goods game has equilibria at both provision and non-provision. The students converged to the free riding equilibrium, whereas the nurses cycled around the cooperative equilibrium.

Cadsby, Charles B., and Elizabeth Maynes (1998) “Gender and Free Riding in a Threshold Public Goods Game: Experimental Evidence,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 34:4 (March), 603-620. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, methodology, subject pool effects, gender effects, step-level public goods game. Abstract: This step-level public goods game has equilibria at both provision and non-provision. The initial tendency for females to contribute more than males tends to vanish over time. Female groups showed a stronger uniformity in convergence to the equilibrium selected.

Cadsby, Charles B., and Elizabeth Maynes (1999) “Voluntary Contribution of Threshold Public Goods with Continuous Provisions: Experimental Evidence,” Journal of Public Economics, 71:1 (January), 53-73. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, threshold public goods, step-level public goods. Abstract: The experiment allows a continuous division of assets between private and a threshold public good. This non-binary structure raises contributions, which also increase with 1) a reduced threshold, 2) a money-back guarantee, and 3) high rewards.

Calvert, R., and R. Wilson (1984) “Comment on van de Kragt, Orbell, and Dawes,” American Political Science Review, 78496-497. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, minimal contributing set.

Capra, C. Monica, Rosario Gómez, and Susana Cabrera-Yeto (1999) “A Bunch of Deviating Choices in Common Pool Resource Games with Sequential Decisions,” University of Málaga, Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1999 European Regional ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, public, common pool resource, sequential game. Abstract: Two individuals make alternating decisions in a common pool resource game. The remaining stock grows at a fixed rate for a finite number of periods. Consistent deviations from the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium are observed. Email Contact: rosgomez@uma.es

Carter, John R., and Michael D. Irons (1991) “Are Economists Different, and if So, Why?,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5171-177. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, methodology, subject pool effects. Email Contact: jcarter@holycross.edu

Carter, John R., and S. D. Guerette (1992) “An Experimental Study of Expressive Voting,” Public Choice, 73:3 (April), 251-260. Keywords: experiments, public goods, voting. Email Contact: jcarter@holycross.edu

Carter, John R., Brian J. Drainville, and Rob P. Poulin (1992) “A Test for Rational Altruism in a Public Goods Experiment,” College of Holy Cross, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, internal return, external return. Abstract: The public goods experiment reported here is based on a clever design that decomposes the marginal per capita return into an internal return (to oneself) and an external return (to each other person). Contributions are increasing in the internal and external returns when they are varied independently, and a joint change in both produces the standard "MPCR effect." Email Contact: jcarter@holycross.edu

Casari, Marco, and Charles R. Plott (1999) “Agents Monitoring Each Other in a Common Pool Resource Environment,” California Institute of Technology, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1999 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, public, common pool resource game, monitoring, punishment, cooperation. Email Contact: cplott@hss.caltech.edu

Cason, Timothy N., and Fisal U. Kahn (1999) “A Laboratory Study of Voluntary Public Goods Provision with Imperfect Monitoring and Communication,” Journal of Development Economics, 58:2 (April), 533-552. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, monitoring, communication. Abstract: In the monitoring treatment, subjects learn each others' aggregate contributions every six periods. This imperfect monitoring does not raise contributions, but face-to-face verbal communication has a strong upward effect on contributions, with and without monitoring. Email Contact: cason@mgmt.purdue.edu

Cason, Timothy, Tatsuyoshi Saijo, and Takehiko Yamato (1999) “Voluntary Participation and Spite in Public Good Provision Experiments: An International Comparison,” Purdue University, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, spite, entry, international comparison, subject pool effects, Japan. Email Contact: cason@mgmt.purdue.edu

Cason, Timothy, Tatsuyoshi Saijo, Takehiko Yamato, and Konomu Yokotani (1999) “Voluntary Participation Game Experiments with a Non-Excludable Public Good: Is Spitefulness a Source of Cooperation?,” Purdue University, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, non-excludable public good, spite, participation game, cooperation. Email Contact: cason@mgmt.purdue.edu

Castore, C., and J. Keith Murningham (1978) “Determinants of Support for Group Decisions,” Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 2275-92. Keywords: experiments, public, group decisions.

Chamberlin, J. (1974) “Provision of Collective Goods as a Function of Group Size,” American Political Science Review, 68707-716. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, group size.

Chamberlin, John R. (1978) “The Logic of Collective Action: Some Experimental Results,” Behavioral Science, 23441-445. Keywords: experiments, public goods.

Chan, Kenneth S., Stuart Mestelman, Robert Moir, and R. Andrew Muller (1996) “The Voluntary Provision of Public Goods under Varying Income Distributions,” Canadian Journal of Economics, 29:1 (February), 54-69. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, interior Nash, asymmetric endowments.

Chan, Kenneth S., Rob Godby, Stuart Mestelman, and Andrew Muller (1997) “Equity Theory and the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 32:3 349-364. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, equity.

Chan, Kenneth S., Stuart Mestelman, Rob Moir, and R. Andrew Muller (1999) “Heterogeneity and the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods,” Experimental Economics, 2(1), 5-30. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, non-linear payoffs, interior Nash, heterogeneity. Abstract: Contributions in a public good experiment are higher with increased homogeneity in preferences and incomes. Email Contact: mullera@mcmaster.ca

Chan, Kenneth S., James Chowhan, and Stuart Meltelman (1999) “The Ring Test, Value Orientations, and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods,” McMaster University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Spring 1999 Public Choice Meetings. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, altruism, ring test, psychology.

Chen, Yan, and Charles R. Plott (1996) “The Groves-Ledyard Mechanism: An Experimental Study of Institutional Design,” Journal of Public Economics, 59:3 (March), 335-364. Keywords: experiments, public goods, mechanisms, Groves-Ledyard. Email Contact: yanchen@umich.edu

Chen, Yan, and Fang-Fang Tang (1998) “Learning and Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Public Goods Provision; An Experimental Study,” Journal of Political Economy, 106:3 (June), 633-662. Keywords: experiments, public goods, mechanisms, incentive compatibility, learning. Email Contact: yanchen@umich.edu

Chen, Yan (1998) “Asynchronicity and Learning in Cost Sharing Mechanisms,” University of Michigan, Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1998 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, public goods, mechanisms, cost-sharing, average cost pricing mechanism, serial pricing mechanism, learning, reinforcement learning. Abstract: This paper reports an a comparison of serial and average-cost pricing mechanisms. Performance is similar under complete information, but the serial mechanism performs better under limited information. Convergence to the Nash equilibrium is faster than predicted by a reinforcement learning model; other learning models are considered. Email Contact: yanchen@umich.edu

Chen, Yan (1999) “Dynamic Stability of Nash-Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms: Reconciling Theory and Experiments,” University of Michigan, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1999 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, public goods, mechanisms, Nash-efficient mechanisms, dynamic stability. Email Contact: yanchen@umich.edu

Chen, Yan, and Tayfun So**nmez (1999) “An Experimental Study of House Allocation Mechanisms,” University of
Michigan, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1999 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, public, mechanisms, allocation mechanisms for housing. Email Contact: yanchen@umich.edu

Chen, Yan (1999) “Incentive-Compatible Mechanisms for Pure Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research,” in Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, edited by C. R. Plott and V. L. Smith, New York: Elsevier, forthcoming. Keywords: experiments, public, mechanisms, survey, incentive compatibility. Email Contact: yanchen@umich.edu

Chen, Yan, and Tayfun So**nmez (1999) “Improving the Efficiency of On-Campus Housing: An Experimental Study,” University of Michigan, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, public, mechanisms, allocation mechanisms for housing. Abstract: This paper uses experiments to compare two methods of allocating on-campus housing units, one in which a person may either keep the current unit or enter a priority-based allocation procedure, and an alternative in which everybody is assigned a priority, with the current occupant being reassigned to a higher priority than an individual who requests their unit. The latter mechanism is theoretically superior because it induces full "participation." This method of dealing with "squatters' rights" yields higher efficiency in the experiments reported. Email Contact: yanchen@umich.edu

Chewning, Eugene, Maribeth Coller, and Susan K. Laury (1999) “Voluntary Contributions to a Multiple Threshold Public Good,” in Research in Experimental Economics, Vol. 8, edited by R. M. Isaac, Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, forthcoming. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, multiple provision points, step-level public good. Email Contact: slaury@gsu.edu

Clark, Jeremy (1998) “Altruism and Public Good Mechanisms: Should We Care?,” University of Canterbury, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, altruism, numbers effects, provision mechanisms. Abstract: This paper considers the theoretical effects of altruism on the performance of public goods provision mechanisms. Email Contact: j.clark@econ.canterbury.ac.nz

Clark, Jeremy (1999) “House Money Effects in Public Good Experiments,” University of Canterbury, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1999 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, house money, endowments, psychology, methodology. Abstract: The experiment investigates house money effects by comparing voluntary contributions in two treatments: one in which subjects are provided with endowments, and another in which they have to supply their own money. Email Contact: j.clark@econ.canterbury.ac.nz

Coats, Jennifer, and William Neilson (1999) “Beliefs about Selfishness, Altruism, Fairness, and Spite: An Experimental Analysis,” Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1999 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, provision point, beliefs about others' preferences, spite, altruism, reciprocity, fairness. Email Contact: wsn@econr.tamu.edu

Cohen, Linda, Michael E. Levine, and Charles R. Plott (1978) “Communication and Agenda Influence: The Chocolate Pizza Design,” in Coalition Forming Behavior: Contributions to Experimental Economics, edited by H. Sauermann, Tubingen, Germany: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 329-357. Keywords: experiments, public goods, voting, agenda influence. Email Contact: lrcohen@uci.edu

Collier, Kenneth E., Richard D. McKelvey, Peter C. Ordeshook, and Kenneth C. Williams (1987) “Retrospective Voting: An Experimental Study,” Public Choice, 53:2 101-130. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, retrospective voting. Email Contact: mbeth@darla.badm.sc.edu

Collier, K., Peter C. Ordeshook, and K. Williams (1989) “The Rationally Uninformed Electorate: Some Experimental Evidence,” Public Choice, 60:1 (January), 3-29. Keywords: experiments, public, voting. Email Contact: mbeth@darla.badm.sc.edu

Combs, J. P., and et al.*** (1993) “Matching Grants and Public Goods: A Closed-Ended Contingent Valuation Experiment,” Public Finance Quarterly, 21:2 (April), 178-195. Keywords: experiments, public, contingent valuation, matching grants.

Cook, Fay L., Tom R. Tyler, Edward G. Goetz, Margaret T. Gordon, David Protess, Donna R. Leff, and Harvey L. Molotch (1983) “Media and Agenda Setting: Effects on the Public, Interest Group Leaders, Policy Makers, and Policy,” Public Opinion Quarterly, 47:1 (Spring), 16-35. Keywords: experiments, public,* voting, agenda effects.

Cookson, Richard (1998) “Framing and Learning in a Public Goods Experiment,” University of York, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, framing effects, altruism, learning. Abstract: This paper documents the presence of framing effects in public goods experiments. Contributions increase when the incentives are presented to highlight the effect of contribution on others' earnings. Email Contact: rac11@york.ac.uk

Cooper, David J., and Carol Kraker (1998) “An Experimental Study of Fairness and Learning in Public Goods Games,” University of Pittsburgh, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, provision points, asymmetric individual provision-point requirements, fairness, errors, altruism. Abstract: The experiment has that the property that at least two of the three individuals in a group must contribute in order for the public good to be provided. The required contributions differ across individuals, which raises fairness concerns. The authors incorporate interpersonal utility considerations into a learning model to explain the data. Email Contact: djc13@guinness.som.cwru.edu

Coursey, Donald L., and Vernon L. Smith (1984) “Experimental Tests of an Allocation Mechanism for Private, Public, or Externality Goods,” Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 86:4 468-484. Keywords: experiments, public, mechanisms. Email Contact: vls@econlab.arizona.edu

Cox, James C. (1999) “Trust, Reciprocity, and Other-Regarding Preferences of Individuals and Groups,” University of Arizona, presented at the Fall 1999 European Regional ESA Meeting, Keywords: experiments, public, trust game, reciprocity, other-regarding preferences, gender effects, group decisions. Abstract: This experiment is based on a design that distinguishes reciprocity motives for transfers from other-regarding preferences. The data analysis considers gender effects and comparisons of individuals and groups. Email Contact: jcox@bpa.arizona.edu

Croson, Rachel T. A. (1996) “Partners and Strangers Revisited,” Economics Letters, 53:1 (October), 25-32. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, methodology, matching protocol. Abstract: This replication of Andreoni (1988) finds that contributions to a public good are not higher under random rematching (strangers), as compared with fixed matching (partners). Email Contact: crosonr@wharton.upenn.edu

Croson, Rachel T. A., and Ayse Onculer (1998) “Rent Seeking for a Risky Event: A Model and Experimental Investigation,” Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1998 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, public, rent seeking, risky prize, game theory. Email Contact: crosonr@wharton.upenn.edu

Croson, Rachel T. A., and Melanie Marks (1998) “Identifiability of Individual Contributions in a Threshold Public Goods
Experiment,” Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 42167-190. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, step-level public goods, information. Abstract: This experiment examines the effects of identifying individual contributions in a threshold public goods game. Email Contact: crosonr@wharton.upenn.edu

Croson, Rachel T. A., and Melanie Marks (1999) “Step Returns in Threshold Public Goods: A Meta- and Experimental Analysis,” Experimental Economics, 2:3 forthcoming. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, step-level public goods, step return, meta analysis, communication, numbers effects, rebates, refunds. Abstract: This paper defines the step return (SR) to be the total value divided by the total cost of providing a step-level public good. A meta-analysis of previous papers and new data show that the step return is correlated with the incidence of successful provision of the public good. Email Contact: crosonr@wharton.upenn.edu

Croson, Rachel T. A., and Melanie Marks (1999) “The Effects of Heterogeneous Valuations for Threshold Public Goods: An Experimental Study,” University of Pennsylvania, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, step-level public goods, heterogeneous preferences. Email Contact: crosonr@wharton.upenn.edu

Dale, Donald J., and John Morgan (1999) “Signaling and the Private Provision of Public Goods,” Princeton University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1999 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, psychological game theory, fairness. Email Contact: dale@princeton.edu

Dasgupta, S., and K. C. Williams (1995) “Search Behavior of Asymmetrically Informed Voters: An Experimental Study,” Economics and Politics, 7:1 (March), 21-41. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, asymmetric information.

Davis, Douglas D., and Robert J. Reilly (1998) “Do Too Many Cooks Always Spoil the Stew? An Experimental Analysis of Rent-Seeking and the Role of a Strategic Buyer,” Public Choice, 95:1-2 (April), 89-115. Keywords: experiments, public, rent seeking, rent defending, numbers effects. Email Contact: ddavis@busnet.bus.vcu.edu

Dawes, Robyn M., Jeanne McTavish, and Harriet Shaklee (1977) “Behavior Communication and Assumptions about Other People's Behavior in a Commons Dilemma Situation,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35:1 1-11. Keywords: experiments, public, common pool resource, communications.

Dawes, Robyn M., John M. Orbell, Randy T. Simmons, and Alphons J. C. van de Kragt (1986) “Organizing Groups for Collective Action,” American Political Science Review, 80:4 (December), 1171-1185. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, discrete public goods, political science, money-back option, fair share option. Abstract: The experiments assess the effects of two institutional changes in a step-level public goods game: a money-back guarantee if the group effort fails, and a fair share requirement that all pay a share if the group effort succeeds. The fair share rule was more effective in helping groups out of the social dilemma.

Dawes, Robyn M., Alphons J. C. van de Kragt, and John M. Orbell (1986) “Not Me or Thee but We: The Importance of Group Identity in Eliciting Cooperation in Dilemma Situations -- Experimental Manipulations,” Acta Psychologica, 6883-97. Keywords: experiments, public, social identification, group identity.

Dickinson, David L. (1998) “The Voluntary Contributions Mechanism with Uncertain Group Payoffs,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 35:4 517-533. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, uncertainty. Email Contact: drdave@mail.colgate.edu

Dickinson, David (1999) “The Carrot vs. the Stick in Work Team Motivation,” Utah State University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1999 European Regional ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, prizes, fines. Abstract: Voluntary contributions are rewarded with either prizes for high contributors and or fines for low contributors. Highest efficiencies are obtained by defining high or low contributions in relative terms based on the subject's endowment. Email Contact: drdave@mail.colgate.edu

Diekmann, A. (1986) “Volunteer's Dilemma: A Social Trap Without a Dominant Strategy and Some Empirical Results,” in Paradoxical Effects of Social Behavior: Essays in Honor of Anatol Rapoport, edited by A. Diekmann and P. Mitter, Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag, 187-197. Keywords: experiments, public, volunteer's dilemma, cooperation, group size effects, hypothetical payoffs**. Email

Dorsey, Robert E. (1992) “The Voluntary Contributions Mechanism with Real Time Revisions,” Public Choice, 73:3 (April), 261-282. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, sequential game, real time. Email Contact: dorsey@bus.olemiss.edu

Dorsey, Robert E., and Laura Razzolini (1999) “An Experimental Investigation of the Serial Cost Sharing Rule,” University of Mississippi, Discussion Paper, presented at the Spring 1999 Public Choice Meetings. Keywords: experiments, public, cost sharing rules. Email Contact: dorsey@bus.olemiss.edu

Eavey, Cheryl L., and Gary J. Miller (1984) “Fairness in Majority Rule Games with a Core,” American Journal of Political Science, 28:3 (August), 570-586. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, majority rule, fairness, core, Condorcet winner. Email Contact: ceavey@nsf.gov

Eavey, Cheryl L., and Gary J. Miller (1984) “Bureaucratic Agenda Control: Imposition or Bargaining?,” American Political Science Review, 78:3 (September), 719-33. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, agenda. Email Contact: eavey@nsf.gov

Eavey, Cheryl L., and Gary J. Miller (1984) “Experimental Evidence on the Fallability of the Core,” American Journal of Political Science, 28570-586. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, Condorcet winner, core. Email Contact: eavey@nsf.gov

Eavey, Cheryl L. (1987) “Bureaucratic Competition and Agenda Control,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 31(September), 503-524. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, agenda effects. Email Contact: eavey@nsf.gov

Eavey, Cheryl L. (1991) “Patterns of Distribution in Spatial Games,” Rationality and Society, 3(October), 450-474. Keywords: experiments, public, voting*. Email Contact: eavey@nsf.gov

Eavey, Cheryl L., and Gary J. Miller (1995) “Subcommittee Agenda Control,” Journal of Theoretical Politics, 7(March), 125-156. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, agenda effects, subcommittees. Email Contact: eavey@nsf.gov

Eavey, Cheryl L. (1996) “Preference-Based Stability: Experiments on Competitive Solutions to Majority Rule Games,” in Collective Decision Making: Social Choice and Political Economy, edited by N. Schofield, New York: Kluwer Academic Publishing, . Keywords: experiments, public, voting, competitive solution, majority rule. Email Contact: eavey@nsf.gov

Eckel, Catherine C., and Charles A. Holt (1989) “Strategic Voting Behavior in Agenda-Controlled Committee Experiments,” American Economic Review, 79:3 (September), 763-773. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, voting paradox, strategic voting, naive voting, agendas, committee voting. Email Contact: eckelc@vt.edu

Eckel, Catherine C., and Philip J. Grossman (1999) “Rebates Versus Matching: Does How We Subsidize Charitable Contributions Matter?,” Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Spring 1999 Public Choice Meetings. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, rebates, matching contributions. Email Contact: eckelc@vt.edu

Elliott, Catherine S., and Donald M. Hayward (1998) “Institutional Framing,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 35:4 455-464. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, framing effects, methodology.

Endersby, James W. (1993) “Rules of Method and Rules of Conduct: An Experimental Study on Two Types of Procedure and Committee Behavior,” Journal of Politics, 55:1 (February), 218-236. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, agenda effects.

Enelow, James M., and Melvin J. Hinich, eds. (1990) Advances in the Spatial Theory of Voting, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, spatial voting, political science.

Erev, Ido, and Amnon Rapoport (1990) “Provision of Step-Level Public Goods: The Sequential Contribution Mechanism,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 34:3 401-425. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, step-level public goods, sequential contributions. Abstract: The experiment provides a comparison of simultaneous and sequential contributions to a step-level public good. Email Contact: erev@techunix.technion.ac.il

Erev, Ido*, and Amnon Rapoport (1994) “Provision of Step-Level Public Goods: Effects of Different Information Structures,” in Social Dilemmas and Cooperation, edited by U. Schulz, W. Albers and U. Mueller, New York: Springer-Verlag, 147-171. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, step-level public goods, information. Email Contact: arapoport@bpa.arizona.edu

Evans, M. G., and Y. C. Chang (1998) “Cheater Detection and Altruistic Behaviour: An Experimental and Methodological Exploration,” Managerial and Decision Economics, 19:7-8 (November-December), 467-480. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, altruism, cheater detection.

Falk, Armin, and Urs Fischbacher (1998) “Kindness is the Parent of Kindness: A Model of Reciprocity,” University of Zurich, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, reciprocity, psychological game theory. Abstract: The framework of psychological game theory is extended to extensive-form games. Reciprocity is used to explain behavior in a variety of sequential games. Email Contact: falk@iew.unizh.ch

Falkinger, J., Ernst Fehr, S. Gächter, and R. Winter-Ebmer (1999) “A Simple Mechanism for the Efficient Provision of Public Goods - Experimental Evidence,” American Economic Review, forthcoming. Keywords: experiments, public, mechanism design, Falkinger mechanism.

Fehr, Ernst, and Simon Gächter (1998) “Cooperation and Punishment: An Experimental Analysis of Norm Formation and Norm Enforcement,” University of Zurich, Keywords: experiments, public, social norms, cooperation, punishment options, incredible punishment threats raise contributions. Abstract: A social norm is defined to be a socially shared notion of desired mode of behavior that is enforced by informal sanctions. Conditional cooperation relative to the group average is identified as a social norm in voluntary contributions experiments with punishment options. Email Contact: gaechter@iew.unizh.ch

Fehr, Ernst, and Klaus Schmidt (1999) “A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114:3 (August), 769-816. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, bargaining, auctions, altruism, fairness, reciprocity, inequity aversion. Abstract: The paper presents a model of inequity aversion that is used to explain behavior in a wide class of experimental games, including markets and bargaining. Email Contact: fehr@iew.unizh.ch

Fehr, Ernst, and Simon Gächter (1999) “Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments,” American Economic Review, forthcoming. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, punishment, social norms, emotions. Abstract: Free riding behavior in a voluntary contributions experiment is severely punished, even though the punishments are privately costly to those who impose the punishments. The resulting high levels of `cooperation' support the notion that social norms can develop and can be enforced by group behavior. Email Contact: gaechter@iew.unizh.ch

Felsenthal, Dan S.*, Zeev Maoz, and Amnon Rapoport (1993) “Does It Really Make a Difference: An Empirical Evaluation of Five Voting Procedures,” British Journal of Political Science, 231-27. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, institutions, political science. Email Contact: arapoport@bpa.arizona.edu

Ferejohn, John A., and Roger G. Noll (1976) “An Experimental Market for Public Goods: The PBS Station Program Cooperative,” American Economic Review, 66:2 (May), 267-273. Keywords: experiments, public, mechanisms.

Ferejohn, John A., Robert Forsythe, and Roger G. Noll (1979) “An Experimental Analysis of Decision Making Procedures for Discrete Public Goods: A Case Study in a Problem in Institutional Design,” in Research in Experimental Economics, Vol. 1, edited by V. L. Smith, Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1-58. Keywords: experiments, public, mechanisms, discrete public goods. Email Contact: robert_forsythe@uiowa.edu

Ferejohn, John A., Robert Forsythe, and Roger G. Noll (1979) “Practical Aspects of the Construction of Decentralized Decisionmaking Systems for Public Goods,” in Collective Decision Making: Applications from Public Choice Theory, edited by C. S. Russell, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press for Resources for the Future, 173-188. Keywords: experiments, public, mechanism design. Email

Ferejohn, John A., Robert Forsythe, Roger G. Noll, and Thomas R. Palfrey (1982) “An Experimental Examination of Auction Mechanisms for Discrete Public Goods,” in Research in Experimental Economics, Vol. 2, edited by V. L. Smith, Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 175-199. Keywords: experiments, public, mechanisms, auctions. Email

Fiorina, Morris P., and Charles R. Plott (1978) “Committee Decisions under Majority Rule: An Experimental Study,” American Political Science Review, 72:2 (June), 575-598. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, committee decisions, Condorcet winner, core, incentive effects, non-monetary incentives. Abstract: Convergence to the core was observed with monetary incentives and not without. Email Contact: m_fiorina@harvard.edu**

Fischbacher, Urs, Simon Gächter, and Ernst Fehr (1999) “Why Does Cooperation Unravel? The Role of Conditional Cooperation,” University of Zurich, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1999 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, conditional cooperation, free riding, dynamic patterns in contributions, self-serving bias. Email Contact: fiba@iew.unizh.ch

Fischer, A. J. (1996) “A Further Experimental Study of Expressive Voting,” Public Choice, 88:1-2 (July), 171-184.
Keywords: experiments, public, voting.

Fischer, A. J. (1996) “A Further Experimental Study of Expressive Voting,” Public Choice, 88:1/2 171-184. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, expressive voting.

Fischer, Alastair (1998) “Vaccination,” University of London, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, public, externalities, health, vaccination. Abstract: A model of individual purchase of a vaccination is used to evaluate externalities in a context that motivates a pilot laboratory experiment. Email Contact: ajf29@cam.ac.uk

Fisher, Joseph, R. Mark Isaac, Jeffrey Schatzberg, and James M. Walker (1995) “Heterogeneous Demand for Public Goods: Effects on the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism,” Public Choice, 85:3-4 249-266. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, heterogeneous values.

Forsythe, Robert, and R. Mark Isaac (1982) “Demand-Revealing Mechanisms for Private Good Auctions,” in Research in Experimental Economics, Vol. 2, edited by V. L. Smith, Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 45-61*. Keywords: experiments, public, mechanisms, incentive compatibility. Email Contact: robert_forsythe@uiowa.edu

Forsythe, Robert, Robert Myerson, Thomas Rietz, and Robert Weber (1993) “An Experiment on Coordination in Multi-Candidate Elections: The Importance of Polls and Election History,” Social Choice and Welfare, 10223-247. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, polls, history, political science, coordination. Email Contact: robert_forsythe@uiowa.edu

Forsythe, Robert, Robert Myerson, Thomas Rietz, and Robert Weber (1996) “An Experimental Study of Voting Rules and Polls in Three-Candidate Elections,” International Journal of Game Theory, 25:3 355-383. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, polls. Email Contact: robert_forsythe@uiowa.edu

Forsythe, Robert, Thomas Rietz, and Thomas W. Ross (1999) “Wishes, Expectations and Actions: A Survey on Price Formation in Election Markets,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 39:1 83-110. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, polls, political stock markets, expectations. Email Contact: robert_forsythe@uiowa.edu

Fox, J., and M. Guyer (1978) “`Public Choice' and Cooperation in n-Person Prisoner's Dilemma,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 22:3 469-481. Keywords: experiments, public, cooperation, prisoner's dilemma. Abstract: experiments, game theory, n-person prisoner's dilemma, cooperation, information

Franzen, A. (1995) “Group Size and One Shot Collective Action,” Rationality and Society, 7183-200. Keywords: experiments, public, volunteer dilemma, group size effects. Abstract: The volunteer dilemma is a game in which all players enjoy a benefit B if at least one incurs the cost C < B by "volunteering" to help. The Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies has the counter intuitive property that the probability that at least one person will volunteer is a decreasing function of group size, and this prediction is not borne out in an experiment with hypothetical payoffs.

Frey, Bruno S., and R. Eichenberger (1991) “Anomalies in Political Economy,” Public Choice, 68:1-3 (January), 71-89. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, anomalies.

Frohlich, Norman, Joe A. Oppenheimer, and Cheryl L. Eavey (1987) “Choices of Principles of Distributive Justice in Experimental Groups,” American Journal of Political Science, 31:3 (August), 606-636. Keywords: experiments, public, income distribution, fairness, political science. Email Contact: frohlic@antares.cc.umanitoba.ca

Frohlich, Norman, Joe A. Oppenheimer, and Cheryl L. Eavey (1987) “Laboratory Results on Rawls's Distributive Justice,” British Journal of Political Science, 17(January), 1-21. Keywords: experiments, public, income distribution, fairness, political science. Email Contact: frohlic@antares.cc.umanitoba.ca

Frohlich, Norman, and Joe A. Oppenheimer (1989) “Participation, Productivity and Stability: Experiments on Fair Democratic Income Policy Decisions,” in Operational Research and the Social Sciences, edited by P. K. Cropper, S. A. Cropper and M. C.** Jackson, London: Plenum, . Keywords: experiments, public, voting, income distribution, fairness. Email Contact: frohlic@antares.cc.umanitoba.ca

Frohlich, Norman, and Joe A. Oppenheimer (1992) Choosing Justice: An Experimental Approach to Ethical Theory, Berkeley and Oxford: University of California Press. Keywords: experiments, public, income distribution, fairness. Email Contact: frohlic@antares.cc.umanitoba.ca

Fullerton, Richard L., Bruce G. Linster, Michel McKee, and Stephen Slate (1998) “Rent-Seeking Contests for Public Goods: Experimental Results,” USAF Academy, Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1998 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, public, rent seeking. Email Contact: fullertonrl.dfeg@ysafa,af,mil

Gardner, Roy, Elinor Ostrom, and James M. Walker (1990) “The Nature of Common Pool Resource Problems,” Rationality and Society, 2335-358. Keywords: experiments, public, common pool resources. Email Contact: gardner@ucs.indiana.edu

Gardner, Roy, Michael Moore, and James Walker (1997) “Governing a Groundwater Commons: A Strategic and Laboratory Analysis of Western Water Law,” Economic Inquiry, 35(April), 218-234. Keywords: experiments, public, common pool resource, water resources, environmental, law. Email Contact: gardner@ucs.indiana.edu

Gardner, Roy, Andrew Herr, Elinor Ostrom, and James Walker (1999) “The Power and Limitations of Proportional Cutbacks in Common-Pool Resources,” Indiana University, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, public, common pool resources, proportional cutbacks. Email Contact: gardner@ucs.indiana.edu

Gardner, Roy, Andrew Herr, Elinor Ostrom, and James Walker (1999) “Voting on Allocation Rules in Commons Without Face-to-Face Communication; Theoretical Issues and Experimental Results,” Economic Journal, forthcoming. Keywords: experiments, public, common pool resources, voting. Email Contact: walkerj@indiana.edu

Gächter, Simon, Ernst Fehr, and C. Kment (1996) “Does Social Exchange Increase Voluntary Cooperation?,” Kyklos, 49:4 541-554. Keywords: experiments, public, social exchange, cooperation.

Gächter, Simon, and Ernst Fehr (1997) “Social Norms as a Social Exchange,” Schweiz. Z. Volkswirtsch. Statist./ Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics, 133:2 (June), 275-292. Keywords: experiments, public, social norms. Email Contact: gaechter@iew.unizh.ch

Gächter, Simon, and Ernst Fehr (1999) “Collective Action as a Social Exchange,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 39:4 341-369. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, approval, social norms. Abstract: Behavior in a baseline voluntary contributions game with no communication is compared with behavior in a game where statements of approval or disapproval are allowed after subjects see others' decisions in each round. The effects of such ex post social approval opportunities are insignificant, unless subjects are first allowed to generate some degree of social familiarity by shaking hands, discussing hobbies, etc. Email Contact: gaechter@iew.unizh.ch

Gneezy, Uri, Werner Güth, and Frank Verboven (1998) “Presents or Investments? An Experimental Analysis,” Tilburg University, Keywords: experiments, public,* altruism. Email Contact: gneezy@econ.haifa.ac.il

Goeree, Jacob K., Charles A. Holt, and Susan K. Laury (1998) “Altruism and Error in Two-Person Public Goods
Experiments,” University of Virginia, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, altruism, internal return, external return, MPCR effects, logit equilibrium, one shot games. Abstract: The effects of a contribution to a public good are decomposed into an internal return to the contributor and an external return to each of the others. Contributions in one-shot games are generally increasing in internal returns, external returns, and group size, and a logit model of individual behavior tracks treatment averages well, both for linear and non-linear altruism specifications. Email Contact: jg2n@virginia.edu

Goidel, Robert K., and Todd G. Shields (1994) “The Vanishing Marginals, the Bandwagon, and the Mass Media,” Journal of Politics, 56:3 (August), 802-810. Keywords: experiments, public,* voting.

Grelak, Eric, and Koford Koford (1997) “A Re-Examination of the Fiorina-Plott and Eavey Voting Experiments: How Much Do Cardinal Payoffs Influence Outcomes?,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 32:4 571-589. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, agenda effects, methodology, core. Abstract: The results of this voting experiment indicate that outcomes seem to be affected by both the core and by cardinal payoffs.

Güth, Werner, and Hannelore Weck-Hannemann (1997) “Do People Care About Democracy? An Experiment Exploring the Value of Voting Rights,” Public Choice, 91:1 (April), 27-47. Keywords: experiments, public, voting. Email Contact: gueth@wiwi.hu-berlin.de

Haan, Marco (1999) “Free Riding and the Provision of Candy Bars,” University of Groningen, Discussion Paper, presented at the Spring 1999 Public Choice Meetings. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, incentives.

Hackett, Steven, Edella Schlager, and James Walker (1994) “The Role of Communication in Resolving Commons Dilemmas: Experimental Evidence with Heterogeneous Appropriators,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 2799-126. Keywords: experiments, public, common pool resource, communication. Email Contact: walkerj@indiana.edu

Harbaugh, William T. (1998) “The Prestige Motive for Making Charitable Transfers,” American Economic Review, 88:2 (May), 277-282. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, charity, prestige. Email Contact: harbaugh@oregon.uoregon.edu

Harbaugh, William T., and Kate Krause (1998) “Children's Contributions in Public Good Experiments: The Development of Altruistic and Free-Riding Behaviors,” University of Oregon, Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, subject pool effects, children subjects, altruism, free-riding, bargaining, dictator game. Abstract: Voluntary contributions experiments reveal that altruistic behavior in children is similar in the aggregate to that of adults. The contributions of older children decline over time, as with adults, but the contributions of younger children tend to increase. A measure of group attachment is more closely correlated with contributions than social and demographic characteristics. Email Contact: harbaugh@oregon.uoregon.edu

Harrison, Glenn W., Elizabeth Hoffman, E. Elisabet Rutström, and Matthew L. Spitzer (1987) “Coasian Solutions to the Externality Problem in Experimental Markets,” Economic Journal, 97:386 (June), 388-402. Keywords: experiments, public, externalities, bargaining, Coase. Email Contact: harrison@darla.badm.sc.edu

Harrison, Glenn W., and Jack Hirshleifer (1989) “An Experimental Evaluation of Weakest Link/Best Shot Models of Public Goods,” Journal of Political Economy, 97:1 (February), 201-225. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, game theory, best shot game, sequential games. Email Contact: harrison@darla.badm.sc.edu

Harstad, Ronald M., and Michael Marrese (1981) “Implementation of Mechanisms by Processes: Public Good Allocation Experiments,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2129-151. Keywords: experiments, public, mechanisms. Email Contact: harstad@rutcor.rutgers.edu

Harstad, Ronald M., and Michael Marrese (1981) “Behavioral Explanations of Efficient Public Good Allocations,” Journal of Public Economics, 19 **367-383. Keywords: experiments, public goods, mechanisms. Email Contact: harstad@rutcor.rutgers.edu

Herr, Andrew, Roy Gardner, and James Walker (1997) “An Experimental Study of Time-Independent and Time-Dependent Externalities in the Commons,” Games and Economic Behavior, 1977-96. Keywords: experiments, public, common pool resources, externalities, time dependent externalities. Email Contact: walkerj@indiana.edu

Herzberg, Roberta Q., and Rick K. Wilson (1988) “Results on Sophisticated Voting in an Experimental Setting,” Journal of Politics, 50:2 (May), 471-486. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, sophisticated voting, committee decisions. Email Contact: rkw@rice.edu

Herzberg, Roberta, and Rick K. Wilson (1991) “Costly Agendas and Spatial Voting Games: Theory and Experiments on Agenda Access Costs,” in Laboratory Research in Political Economy, edited by T. R. Palfrey, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 169-200. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, spatial voting, agenda effects. Email Contact: rkw@rice.edu

Hoffman, Elizabeth, and Charles R. Plott (1983) “Pre-Meeting Discussions and the Possibility of Coalition-Breaking Procedures in Majority Rule Committees,” Public Choice, 4021-39. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, discussion, majority rule, institutions. Email Contact: ehoffman@uic.edu

Hoffman, Elizabeth, and Matthew L. Spitzer (1985) “Experimental Law and Economics: An Introduction,” Columbia Law Review, 85(June), 991-1036. Keywords: experiments, public, law, survey, bargaining, Coase theorem. Email Contact: ehoffman@uic.edu

Holt, Charles A., and Susan K. Laury (1998) “Theoretical Explanations of Treatment Effects in Voluntary Contributions Experiments,” in Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, edited by C. R. Plott and V. L. Smith, New York: Elsevier Press, forthcoming. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, survey, altruism, error, evolution. Abstract This is a survey of the theoretical explanations for the treatments that have been shown to affect voluntary contributions in the laboratory. Email Contact: slaury@gsu.edu, holt@virginia.edu

Iritani, J., and S. Saito (1977) “An Experiment of a Tatonnement Process in Public Goods Economy. (In Japanese. With English summary),” Osaka Economic Papers, 27:2-3 (December), 117-128. Keywords: experiments, public, tatonnement.

Isaac, R. Mark, and Charles R. Plott (1978) “Cooperative Game Models of the Influence of the Closed Rule in Three Person, Majority Rule Committees: Theory and Experiments,” in Game Theory and Political Science, edited by P. C. Ordeshook, New York: New York University Press, . Keywords: experiments, public, voting, close rule, institutions, cooperative game theory. Email Contact: misaac@bpa.arizona.edu

Isaac, R. Marks, James M. Walker, and Susan H. Thomas (1984) “Divergent Evidence on Free Riding: An
Experimental Examination of Possible Explanations,” Public Choice, 43:2 113-149. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, free riding. Email Contact: misaac@bpa.arizona.edu

Isaac, R. Mark, Kenneth McCue, F., and Charles R. Plott (1985) “Public Goods Provision in an Experimental Environment,” Journal of Public Economics, 26(February), 51-74. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, cooperation. Email Contact: misaac@bpa.arizona.edu

Isaac, R. Mark, and James M. Walker (1988) “Group Size Hypotheses of Public Goods Provision: The Voluntary Contributions Mechanism,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 103(February), 179-200. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, numbers effects, group size. Email Contact: misaac@bpa.arizona.edu

Isaac, R. Mark, and James M. Walker (1988) “Communication and Free-Riding Behavior: The Voluntary Contributions Mechanism,” Economic Inquiry, 26:4 585-608. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, free riding, communication, cheap talk. Email Contact: misaac@bpa.arizona.edu

Isaac, R. Mark, David Schmidtz, and James M. Walker (1989) “The Assurance Problem in a Laboratory Market,” Public Choice, 62:3 (September), 217-236. Keywords: experiments, public, step-level public goods, rebates. Abstract: This paper considers the effects of rebates and changes in the size of the provision point in step-level public goods. Email Contact: misaac@bpa.arizona.edu

Isaac, R. Mark, and James M. Walker (1991) “Costly Communication: An Experiment in a Nested Public Goods Problem,” in Laboratory Research in Political Economy, edited by T. Palfrey, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 269-286. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, communication, communication costs. Email Contact: misaac@bpa.arizona.edu

Isaac, R. Mark, and James Walker (1991) “On the Suboptimality of Voluntary Public Goods Provision: Further Experimental Evidence,” in Research in Experimental Economics, Vol. 4, edited by R. M. Isaac, Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 211-221. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, interior Nash equilibrium. Abstract The public goods game used here has the property that individual marginal values are declining functions of the amount of the public good, so that optimal provision levels are less than subject's initial token endowments. The observed suboptmal levels of contributions indicate that previously observed underprovision was not due to the fact that the socially optimal outcome required that full contribution of all endowed tokens. Email Contact: misaac@bpa.arizona.edu

Isaac, R. Mark, James M. Walker, and Arlington W. Williams (1994) “Group Size and the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence Utilizing Large Groups,” Journal of Public Economics, 54:1 (May), 1-36. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, numbers effects, incentives, grade incentives. Email Contact: misaac@bpa.arizona.edu

Isaac, R. Mark, and James M. Walker (1998) “Nash as an Organizing Principle in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence,” Experimental Economics, 1:3 191-206. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, Nash equilibrium, interior Nash equilibrium, nonlinear payoffs. Email Contact: misaac@bpa.arizona.edu

Isaac, R. Mark*, Dean Packard, and Joe Bial (1999) “Asymmetric Benefits in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism,” in Research in Experimental Economics, Vol. 8, edited by R. Mark Isaac, Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, forthcoming. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, asymmetries. Email Contact: misaac@bpa.arizona.edu

Ito, Massaru, Tatsuyoshi Saijo, and Masashi Une (1995) “The Tragedy of the Commons Revisited,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 28:3 311-335. Keywords: experiments, public, commons. Email Contact: saijo@iser.osaka-u.ac.jp

Iyengar, Shanto, Mark D. Peters, and Donald Kinder (1982) “Experimental Demonstrations of the "Not-So-Minimal" Consequences of Television News Programs,” American Political Science Review, 76848-858. Keywords: experiments, public, public opinion, television, political science. Abstract: The experiment manipulated the content of evening news programs, demonstrating that problems prominently featured in television news are given greater attention by viewers. The programming affects which problems are thought to be important.

Kahn, Kim F. (1994) “Does Gender Make a Difference? An Experimental Examination of Sex Stereotypes and Press Patterns in Statewide Campaigns,” American Journal of Political Science, 38:1 (February), 162-195. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, gender effects.

Kahneman, Daniel, and Jack L. Knetsch (1992) “Valuing Public Goods: The Purchase of Moral Satisfaction,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 22:1 (January), 57-70. Keywords: experiments, public, psychology. Email Contact: kahneman@wws.princeton.edu

Keser, Claudia (1996) “Voluntary Contributions to a Public Good when Partial Contribution is a Dominant Strategy,” Economics Letters, 50359-366. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, interior Nash design, quadratic payoffs, nonlinear payoffs. Email Contact: keser@vwl3.wiwi.uni-karlsruhe.de

Keser, Claudia, and Frans van Winden (1999*) “Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods,” Scandinavian Journal of Economics, forthcoming. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, conditional cooperation, social norms. Email Contact: Keser@vwl3.wiwi.uni-karlsruhe.de

Kim, Oliver, and Mark Walker (1984) “The Free Rider Problem: Experimental Evidence,” Public Choice, 43:1 3-24. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, free riding.

Kinder, Donald R., and Thomas R. Palfrey, eds. (1993) Experimental Foundations of Political Science, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, rational choice, public goods, agendas, information, political science. Abstract: This is an collection of papers that spans the applications of experimental methods to political science. Email Contact: trp@hss.caltech.edu

Kinder, Donald R., and Thomas R. Palfrey (1993) “On Behalf of an Experimental Political Science,” in Experimental Foundations of Political Science, edited by D. R. Kinder and T. R. Palfrey, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1-39. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, political science, survey, methodology. Abstract This essay surveys the advantages and limitations of experimental methods for the study of politics. The authors conclude that experimentation should supplement, not replace, traditional empirical methods in political science. Email Contact: trp@hss.caltech.edu

Kinder, Donald R. (1993) “Coming to Grips with the Holy Ghost,” in Experimental Foundations of Political Science, edited by D. R. Kinder and T. R. Palfrey, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 43-51. Keywords: experiments, public, public opinion, political science, survey. Abstract This paper surveys the use of experimental methods to evaluate survey research about public opinion, e.g. whether apparent changes in public opinion are due to changes in the way questions are worded. Email

King, Ronald R. (1994) “An Experimental Investigation of Super Majority Voting Rules: Implications for the Financial
Accounting Standard Board,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 25:2 (October), 197-217. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, super majority voting rules, accounting.

Koch, Bradley J. (1998) “A Public Good Experiment in Greater China: Economic Development as a Determinant of Voluntary Contributions,” University of Arizona, Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1998 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, subject pool effects, methodology, China, cross-cultural comparisons, special subjects. Email Contact: bradley@u.arizona.edu

Kormendi, Roger C., and Charles R. Plott (1982) “Committee Decisions under Alternative Procedural Rules: An Experimental Study Applying a New Nonmonetary Method of Preference Inducement,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 3175-195. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, methodology, incentives.

Krehbiel, Keith (1986) “Sophisticated and Myopic Behavior in Legislative Committees: An Experimental Study,” American Journal of Political Science, 30:3 (August), 542-561. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, committee decisions, sophisticated voting.

Krishnamurthy, Sandeep (1999) “An Experimental Investigation of the Temporal Effect of Communication in Public Goods Games With and Without Provision Points,” University of Washington - Bothell, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, provision points, communication. Abstract: This paper evaluates the effect of non-binding communication in linear and threshold public goods games. Communication raises contributions, but has more of a long term effect in provision point games where the focalness of the provision point helps maintain cooperation once it is established. Email Contact: sandeep@u.washington.edu

Kuklinski, James H., Ellen Riggle, Victor Ottati, Norbert Schwarz, and Robert S. Jr. Wyer (1991) “The Cognitive and Affective Bases of Political Tolerance Judgments,” American Journal of Political Science, 35:1 (February), 1-27. Keywords: experiments, public,* political science.

Kunreuther, Howard, Paul Kleindorfer, and Peter J. Knez (1987) “A Compensation Mechanism for Siting Noxious Facilities: Theory and Experimental Design,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 14371-383. Keywords: experiments, public, externalities, pollution, mechanism. Email Contact: kunreuther@wharton.upenn.edu

Kurzban, Robert (1998) “Evolution Solves the Public Goods Problem: Cognitive Economics,” University of Arizona, Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1998 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, evolution, psychology. Email Contact: rkurzban@econlab.arizona.edu

Kurzban, Robert, Kevin A. McCabe, and Vernon L. Smith (1999) “The Role of Information in a Real Time Public Goods Game: Do Players Use a Simple Matching Rule?,” University of Arizona, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1999 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, real time mechanisms. Email Contact: rkurzban@econlab.arizona.edu

Ladha, Krishna, Gary Miller, and Joe Oppenheimer (1996) “Information Aggregation by Majority Rule: Theory and Experiments,” University of Maryland, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, information aggregation, swing voter's curse. Email Contact: joppenhe@bss2.umd.edu

Laing, James D., and Scott Olmsted (1978) “An Experimental and Game-Theoretic Study of Committees,” in Game Theory and Political Science, edited by P. C. Ordeshook, New York: New York University Press, . Keywords: experiments, public, voting, committee decisions. Email

Laponce, J. A. (1966) “An Experimental Method to Measure the Tendency to Equivalence in a Political System,” American Political Science Review, 60:4 (December), 982-993. Keywords: experiments, public,* political science.

Laury, Susan K., James M. Walker, and Arlington W. Williams (1995) “Anonymity and the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 27:2 (July), 365-380. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, anonymity, methodology. Email Contact: slaury@gsu.edu

Laury, Susan K., and Charles A. Holt (1998) “Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: Experimental Results with Interior Nash Equilibria,” in Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, edited by C. R. Plott and V. L. Smith, New York: Elsevier Press, forthcoming. Keywords: Public goods experiments with interior Nash equilibria have been used to separate "boundary effects" from other factors like altruism or spite that may cause contributions to deviate systematically from Nash predictions. Results of public goods experiments with interior Nash equilibria are compared. Email Contact: slaury@gsu.edu

Laury, Susan K., James M. Walker, and Arlington W. Williams (1999) “The Voluntary Provision of a Pure Public Good with Diminishing Marginal Returns,” Public Choice, 99:1-2 (April), 139-160. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, diminishing marginal returns, nonlinear payoffs, interior Nash. Email Contact: slaury@gsu.edu

Ledyard, John O. (1995) “Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research,” in A Handbook of Experimental Economics, edited by A. Roth and J. Kagel, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 111-194. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, survey, mechanisms, altruism, noisy behavior, reciprocity, step-level public goods, gender effects, interior Nash, nonlinear payoffs. Email Contact: jledyard@hss.caltech.edu

Ledyard, John O., David Porter, and Antonio Rangel (1998) “Experiments Testing Multiobject Allocation Mechanisms,” Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 6:3 (Fall), 639-675. Keywords: experiments, public, mechanisms. Email Contact: jledyard@hss.caltech.edu

Levati, Maria Vittoria (1998) “An Experimental Study on the Role Played by 'Persuasive Behavior' in Public Good Experiments,” University of York, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, persuasion, fairness, signaling. Abstract: Subjects may contribute to a public good in an effort to persuade or signal others to do so in the future. The reported experiment provides support for the persuasion hypothesis. Email Contact: mvl2@york.ac.uk

Levati, Maria Vittoria (1999) “Rationality, Altruism, Persuasion and their Connection in a Social Dilemma Experiment,” University of York, Discussion Paper, presented at the Spring 1999 Public Choice Meetings. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, altruism, social dilemma, game theory. Email Contact: mvl2@york.ac.uk

Levine, Michael E., and Charles R. Plott (1977) “Agenda Influence and Its Implications,” Virginia Law Review, 63:4 (May), 561-604. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, agenda effects, naive voting, strategic voting.

Levine, David K. (1998) “Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments,” Review of Economic Dynamics, I:3 (July), 593-622. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, altruism, spite. Email Contact: dlevine@ucla.edu

Liang, James D., and Benjamin Slotznick (1987) “When Anyone Can Veto: A Laboratory Study of Committees Governed by Unanimous Rule,” Behavioral Science, ***. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, committee voting, vetoes, unanimity rule.

Loehman, Edna, Fabrice N. Quesnel, and Emerson M. Babb (1996) “Free-Rider Effects in Rent-Seeking Groups Competing for Public Goods,” Public Choice, 8635-61. Keywords: experiments, public, rent seeking, free-rider effects.

Loewenstein, George F.., Leigh Thompson, and Max H. Bazerman (1989) “Social Utility and Decision Making in Interpersonal Contexts,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57:3 426-441. Keywords: experiments, public, other regarding preferences.

Lupia, A. (1994) “The Effect of Information on Voting Behavior and Electoral Outcomes: An Experimental Study of Direct Legislation,” Public Choice, 78:1 (January), 65-86. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, information, political science.

Marks, Melanie B., and Rachel T. A. Croson (1998) “Alternative Rebate Rules in the Provision of a Threshold Public Good: An Experimental Investigation,” Journal of Public Economics, 67195-220. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, threshold public good, step-level public good, rebate rules. Abstract: This experiment is designed to determine the effect of rebate rules on contributions to a step-level public good. Email Contact: crosonr@wharton.upenn.edu, mmarks@longwood.lwc.edu

Marks, Melanie B., and Rachel T. A. Croson (1999) “The Effect of Incomplete Information in a Threshold Public Good Experiment,” Public Choice, 99:1-2 (April), 103-118. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, threshold public good, step-level public good, incomplete information, asymmetric information. Abstract: This experiment is designed to determine the effect of asymmetric information on contributions to a step-level public good. Email Contact: mmarks@longwood.lwc.edu

Marwell, Gerald, and Ruth E. Ames (1979) “Experiments on the Provision of the Public Goods I: Resources, Interest, Group Size, and the Free-Rider Problem,” American Journal of Sociology, 84(May), 1335-1360. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, endowments, group size, free riding, sociology. Email Contact: marwell@ssc.wisc.edu

Marwell, Gerald, and Ruth E. Ames (1980) “Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods II: Provision Points, Stakes, Experience and the Free-Rider Problem,” American Journal of Sociology, 85(January), 926-937. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, provision points, incentives, experience, sociology. Email Contact: marwell@ssc.wisc.edu

Marwell, Gerald, and Ruth E. Ames (1981) “Economists Free Ride, Does Anyone Else?*,” Journal of Public Economics, 15:3 (June), 295-310. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, subject pool effects. Email Contact: marwell@ssc.wisc.edu

Marwell, Gerald (1982) “Altruism and the Problem of Collective Action,” in Cooperation and Helping Behavior: Theories and Research, edited by Valerian J. Derlega and Januse Grzelak, New York: Academic Press, . Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, altruism, cooperation. Email Contact: marwell@ssc.wisc.edu

McGraw, Kathleen M. (1991) “Managing Blame: An Experimental Test of the Effects of Political Accounts,” American Political Science Review, 85:4 (December), 1133-1157. Keywords: experiments, public,* blame, political science.

McKelvey, Richard D., Peter C. Ordeshook, and Mark D. Winer (1978) “The Competitive Solution for N-Person Games Without Transferable Utility, with an Application to Committee Games,” American Political Science Review, 72:2 (June), 599-615. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, committee voting, competitive solution. Email Contact: rdm@hss.caltech.edu

McKelvey, Richard D., and Peter C. Ordeshook (1978) “Competitive Coalition Theory,” in Competitive Coalition Theory, edited by P. C. Ordeshook, New York: New York University Press, 1-37. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, coalitions. Email Contact: rdm@hss.caltech.edu

McKelvey, Richard D., and Peter C. Ordeshook (1979) “An Experimental Test of Several Theories of Committee Decision-Making under Majority Rule,” in Applied Game Theory, edited by S. J. Brams, A. Schotter and G. Schwodiauer, Wurzburg: Physica Verlag, . Keywords: experiments, public, voting, committee decisions, majority rule. Email Contact: rdm@hss.caltech.edu

McKelvey, Richard D., and Peter C. Ordeshook (1980) “Vote Trading: An Experimental Study,” Public Choice, 35:2 151-84. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, vote trading. Email Contact: rdm@hss.caltech.edu

McKelvey, Richard D., and Peter C. Ordeshook (1981) “Experiments on the Core: Some Disconcerting Results for Majority Rule Voting Games,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 25(December), 709-24. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, Condorcet winner, core, majority rule, political science. Email Contact: rdm@hss.caltech.edu

McKelvey, Richard D., and Peter C. Ordeshook (1982) “Two-Candidate Elections without Majority Rule Equilibria: An Experimental Study,” Simulation and Games, 13:3 (September), 311-335. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, political science, elections. Email Contact: rdm@hss.caltech.edu

McKelvey, Richard D., and Peter C. Ordeshook (1983) “Some Experimental Results That Fail to Support the Competitive Solution,” Public Choice, 40:3 281-291. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, competitive solution. Email Contact: rdm@hss.caltech.edu

McKelvey, Richard D., and Peter C. Ordeshook (1984) “An Experimental Study of the Effects of Procedural Rules on Committee Behavior,” Journal of Politics, 46:1 (February), 182-205. Keywords: experiments, public, political science, voting, institutions, committee decisions. Email Contact: rdm@hss.caltech.edu

McKelvey, Richard D., and Peter C. Ordeshook (1984) “Rational Expectations in Elections: Some Experimental Results Based on a Multidimensional Model,” Public Choice, 4461-102. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, elections, rational expectations. Email Contact: rdm@hss.caltech.edu

McKelvey, Richard D., and Peter C. Ordeshook (1985) “Sequential Elections with Limited Information,” American Journal of Political Science, 29:3 (August), 480-512. Keywords: experiments, public, political science, voting, elections, information. Email Contact: rdm@hss.caltech.edu

McKelvey, Richard D., and Peter C. Ordeshook (1985) “Elections with Limited Information: A Fulfilled Expectations Model Using Contemporaneous Poll and Endorsement Data as Information Sources,” Journal of Economic Theory, 3655-85. Keywords: experiments, public,* political science, elections, information, poll data, endorsements. Email Contact: rdm@hss.caltech.edu

McKelvey, Richard D., and Peter C. Ordeshook (1985) “Elections with Limited Information: A Fulfilled Expectations Model Using Contemporaneous Poll and Endorsement Data as Information Sources,” Journal of Economic Theory, 3655-85. Keywords: experiments, public, voting. Email Contact: rdm@hss.caltech.edu

McKelvey, Richard D., and Peter C. Ordeshook (1990) “A Decade of Experimental Research on Spatial Models of Elections and Committees,” in Readings in the Spatial Theory of Voting, edited by J. M. Enlow and M. J. Hinich, Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 99-144. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, political science, elections, survey. Abstract This is a detailed survey of voting experiments, mostly in the context of the spatial model of voter preferences. Email Contact: rdm@hss.caltech.edu

McKelvey, Richard D., and Peter C. Ordeshook (1990) “Information and Elections; Retrospective Voting and Rational Expectations,” in Information and Democratic Processes, edited by J. Ferejohn and J. Kuklinski, Urbana-Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 281-312. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, median voter theorem, information. Abstract A series of experiments demonstrates that incomplete information does not necessarily invalidate the general predictions of the median voter theorem. Email

McKelvey, Richard D. (1991) “An Experimental Test of a Stochastic Game Model of Committee Bargaining,” in Laboratory Research in Political Economy, edited by T. R. Palfrey, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 139-168. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, committee decisions, probabilistic choice**. Email Contact: rdm@hss.caltech.edu

McKelvey, Richard D., and Thomas R. Palfrey (1998) “An Experimental Study of Jury Decisions,” California Institute of Technology, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, public, political science, law, voting, jury decisions, unanimity rule, majority rule, quantal response equilibrium, swing voter's curse, information. Abstract: The paper develops an a quantal response analysis of group and individual voting behavior in jury deliberations. The focus is on the number of voters and the number of votes needed to convict. Email Contact: rdm@hss.caltech.edu

Meinhardt, Holger, and Axel Ostmann (1998) “Resolving Commons Dilemmas by Cooperative Games,” University of Karlsruhe, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, public, common pool resource games, cooperative game theory. Abstract: The paper uses cooperative game theory to reanalyze data from a common pool dilemma experiment. Email Contact: holger@iwb.uni-sb.de, hme@vwl3sun1.wiwi.uni-karlsruhe.de

Mestelman, Stuart, and D. H. Feeny (1988) “Does Ideology Matter?: Anecdotal Experimental Evidence on the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods,” Public Choice, 57281-286. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, ideology. Email Contact: mestelma@mcmaster.ca

Miller, Gary J., and Joe A. Oppenheimer (1982) “Universalism in Experimental Committees,” American Political Science Review, 76:3 (September), 561-574. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, political science, committee decisions.

Miller, John H., and James Andreoni (1991) “Can Evolutionary Dynamics Explain Free Riding in Experiments?,” Economic Letters, 36:1 (May), 9-15. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, evolution, free riding, replicator dynamic, evolution. Email Contact: miller@zia.hss.cmu.edu

Miller, Gary, Thomas Hammond, and Charles Kile (1996) “Bicameralism and the Core: An Experimental Study of Legislative Stability,” Legislative Studies Quarterly, 21(February), 83-103. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, bicameralism, political science.

Moore, Michael R., Roy Gardner, and James M. Walker (1998) “Groundwater Institutions: Models and Experiments,” in Designing Institutions for Environmental and Resource Management, edited by E. T. Loehman and D. M. Kilgour, Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar, 321-328. Keywords: experiments, public, common pool resource, institutions, environmental economics, water. Email Contact: walkerj@indiana.edu

Morgan, John, and Martin Sefton (1996) “Funding Public Goods with Lotteries: An Experiment,” Penn State, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, lotteries. Abstract: The experiment compares two mechanisms for raising money for a public good: lotteries and voluntary contributions. Even though voluntary contributions exceed the Nash (free-riding) prediction, the lottery garners a higher percentage of the endowment, even after controlling for the cost of the prize used in the lottery. Lottery ticket purchases are well explained by Nash predictions. Email Contact: jmorgan@princeton.edu

Morton, Rebecca B., and Kenneth C. Williams (1999) “Informational Asymmetries and Sequential versus Simultaneous Voting,” American Political Science Review, 93:1 (March), 51-67. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, sequential voting, institutions. Email Contact: kenneth.williams@ssc.msu.edu, rebecca.morton@uiowa.edu

Moxnes, Erling (1998) “Overexploitation of Renewable Resources: The Role of Misperceptions,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 37:1 107-127. Keywords: experiments, public, commons, biases.

Murnighan, J. Keith, J. W. Kim, and A. R. Metzger (1993) “The Volunteer Dilemma,” Administrative Science Quarterly, 38515-538. Keywords: experiments, public, volunteer dilemma, group size effects. Email Contact: keithm@nwu.edu

Mysker, M., P. Olson, and Arlington Williams (1999) “The Voluntary Provision of a Threshold Public Good: Further Experimental Results,” in Research in Experimental Economics, edited by R. M. Isaac, Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, forthcoming. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, step-level public goods, methodology, replication. Abstract The experiment is, in part, a replication the Bagnoli and McKee (1991) homogeneous values experiments with a step-level public good. The new study is also designed to assess the effects of providing a record sheet and isolating groups. Email Contact: williama@indiana.edu

Navazio, Robert (1977) “An Experimental Approach to Bandwagon Research,” Public Opinion Quarterly, 41:2 (Summer), 217-225. Keywords: experiments, public, questionaires.

Neveu, Matthieu (1999) “The Asymmetric Endowment Effect on the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods,” GATE, Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1999 European Regional ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, asymmetries, asymmetric endowments. Abstract: The paper investigates the relationship between voluntary contributions and accumulated earnings in a setting with asymmetric endowments. There is some tendency for subjects with relatively low earnings to increase free riding behavior. Email Contact: neveu@gate.cnrs.fr

Nowell, Clifford, and Sarah Tinkler (1994) “The Influence of Gender on the Provision of a Public Good,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 25:1 25-36. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contribution, gender effects.

Ockenfels, Axel, and J. Weimann (1999) “Types and Patterns: An Experimental East-West-German Comparison of Cooperation and Solidarity,” Journal of Public Economics, 71:2 (February), 275-287. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, solidarity, cross cultural comparison, subject pool effects, Germany, culture. Abstract: East German subjects exhibit more selfishness than West German subjects in a cross-cultural comparison of behavior in public goods and solidarity game experiments. Email Contact: axel.ockenfels@ww.uni-magdeburg.de

Offerman, Theo, Joep Sonnemans, and Arthur Schram (1996) “Value Orientations, Expectations and Voluntary Contributions in Public Goods,” Economic Journal, 106:437 (July), 817-845. Keywords: experiments, public, step-level public good, numbers effects, value orientations, altruism. Abstract: The experiment implements a step-level public good, with variations in the number of players and the value of the public good. Email Contact: theoo@fee.uva.nl

Offerman, Theo (1997) Beliefs and Decision Rules in Public Goods Games: Theory and Experiments, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Press. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, psychology, methodology, learning. Email Contact: theoo@fee.uva.nl

Offerman, Theo, Joep Sonnemans, and Arthur Schram (1997) “Expectation Formation in Public Good Games,” University of Amsterdam, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, step-level public good, expectations. Email Contact: theoo@fee.uva.nl

Offerman, Theo, Arthur Schram, and Joep Sonnemans (1998) “Quantal Response Models in Step-Level Public Goods Games,” European Journal of Political Economy, 1489-100. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, step-level public goods, quantal response, bounded rationality. Email Contact: theoo@fee.uva.nl

Offerman, Theo, Joep Sonnemans, and Arthur Schram (1999) “Belief Learning in Public Good Games,” Economic Inquiry, forthcoming. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, belief learning, belief elicitation, errors. Email Contact: theoo@fee.uva.nl

Ordeshook, Peter C., and Mark Winer (1980) “Coalitions and Spatial Policy Outcomes in Parliamentary Systems: Some Experimental Results,” American Journal of Political Science, 24:4 (November), 730-752. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, political science, spatial preferences. Email Contact: ordeshook@hss.caltech.edu

Ordeshook, Peter (1986) Game Theory and Political Theory, London: Cambridge University Press. Keywords:
experiments, public, voting, political theory, cooperative game theory. Email Contact: ordeshook@hss.caltech.edu

Ostrom, Elinor, and James K. Walker (1991) “Communication in a Commons: Cooperation without External Enforcement,” in Laboratory Research in Political Economy, edited by T. Palfrey, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 289-322. Keywords: experiments, public, common pool resource, communication. Email Contact: ostrom@indiana.edu

Ostrom, Elinor, Roy Gardner, and James K. Walker (1994) Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Keywords: experiments, public, common pool resource. Email Contact: ostrom@indiana.edu

Ostrom, Elinor, and James K. Walker (1997) “Neither Markets Nor States: Linking Transformation Processes in Collective Action Arenas,” in Perspectives on Public Choice: A Handbook, edited by D. C. Mueller, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 35-72. Keywords: experiments, public, common pool resource. Email Contact: ostrom@indiana.edu

Palfrey, Thomas R., and Howard Rosenthal (1988) “Private Incentives in Social Dilemmas: The Effects of Incomplete Information and Altruism,” Journal of Public Economics, 35:3 (April), 309-332. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, altruism, information. Email Contact: trp@hss.caltech.edu

Palfrey, Thomas R., and Howard Rosenthal (1991) “Testing for Effects of Cheap Talk in a Public Goods Game with Private Information,” Games and Economic Behavior, 3:2 (May), 183-220. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, cheap talk, private information. Email Contact: trp@hss.caltech.edu

Palfrey, Thomas R., and Howard Rosenthal (1991) “Testing Game-Theoretic Models of Free Riding: New Evidence on Probability Bias and Learning,” in Laboratory Research in Political Economy, edited by T. R. Palfrey, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 239-268. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, free riding, probability bias, learning.
Email Contact: trp@hss.caltech.edu

Palfrey, Thomas R., and Jeffrey E. Prisbrey (1996) “Altruism, Reputation and Noise in Linear Public Goods Experiments,” Journal of Public Economics, 61:3 (September), 409-427. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, altruism, noise, reputation. Email Contact: trp@hss.caltech.edu

Palfrey, Thomas, and Jeff Prisbrey (1998**) “Anomalous Behavior in Linear Public Goods Experiments: How Much and Why?,” American Economic Review, . Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, warm glow altruism, noisy behavior.

Parks, C. D., and A. D. Vu (1994) “Social Dilemma Behavior of Individuals from Highly Individualist and Collectivist Cultures,” Journal of Conflict and Resolution, 38:4 (December), 708-718. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, social dilemma, subject pool effects, culture.

Peters, H. Elizabeth, Sinan Umir, Jeremy Clark, and William D. Schulze (1999) “Free Riding and the Provision of Public Goods in the Family: An Experimental Test of the Rotten Kid Theorem,” Cornell University, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, altruism, family members, subject pool effects.

Plott, Charles R., and Michael E. Levine (1978) “A Model of Agenda Influence on Committee Decisions,” American Economic Review, 68:1 (March), 146-160. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, agenda effects, naive voting, sophisticated voting. Email Contact: cplott@hss.caltech.edu

Plott, Charles R. (1979) “The Application of Laboratory Experimental Methods to the Public Choice,” in Collective Decision Making: Applications from Public Choice Theory, edited by C. S. Russell, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 137-160. Keywords: experiments, public, public choice, voting, Condorcet winner, core. Email Contact:
cplott@hss.caltech.edu

Plott, Charles R. (1991) “A Comparative Analysis of Direct Democracy, Two-Candidate Elections, and Three-Candidate Elections in an Experimental Environment,” in Laboratory Research in Political Economy, edited by T. R. Palfrey, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 11-31. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, elections. Email Contact: cplott@hss.caltech.edu

Rapoport, Amnon (1985) “Public Goods and the MCS Experimental Paradigm,” American Political Science Review, 79:1 (March), 148-155. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, public goods. Email Contact: arapoport@bpa.arizona.edu

Rapoport, Amnon (1987) “Research Paradigms and Expected Utility Models for the Provision of Step Level Public Goods,”
Psychological Review, 94:1 74-83. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, step-level public goods, provision points. Email Contact: arapoport@bpa.arizona.edu

Rapoport, Amnon, and Gary Bornstein (1987) “Intergroup Competition for the Provision of Binary Public Goods,” Psychological Review, 94:3 291-299. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, binary contributions, group competition. Email Contact: arapoport@bpa.arizona.edu

Rapoport, Anatol*, Dan S. Felsenthal, and Zeev Maoz (1988) “Proportional Representation: An Empirical Evaluation of Single-Stage, Non-ranked Voting Procedures,” Public Choice, 59:2 (November), 151-165. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, institutions.

Rapoport, Amnon (1988) “Provision of Step-Level Public Goods: Effects of Inequality in Resources,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 54:3 432-440. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, step-level public goods, asymmetric endowments. Abstract: This experiment implements a step-level public good and introduces asymmetries in initial individual endowments, which are either low, medium, or high. Email Contact: arapoport@bpa.arizona.edu

Rapoport, Ronald B., Kelly L. Metcalf, and Jon A. Hartman (1989) “Candidate Traits and Voter Inferences: An Experimental Study,” Journal of Politics, 51:4 (November), 917-932. Keywords: experiments, public, political science, voting, information.

Rapoport, Amnon, and D. Eshed-Levy (1989) “Provision of Step-Level Public Goods: Effects of Greed and Fear of Being Gypped,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 44325-344. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, step-level public goods, rebate. Abstract: The experiment demonstrates that a money-back guarantee increases the incidence of the successful provision of a step-level public good. Email Contact: arapoport@bpa.arizona.edu

Rapoport, Amnon, Gary Bornstein, and Ido Erev (1989) “Intergroup Competition for Public Goods: Effects of Unequal Resources and Relative Group Size,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 56:5 748-756. Keywords: experiments, public, group competition, group size, asymmetric endowments. Email Contact: arapoport@bpa.arizona.edu

Rapoport, Amnon, Dan S. Felsenthal, and Zeev Maoz (1991) “Sincere versus Strategic Voting Behavior in Small Groups,” in Laboratory Research in Political Economy, edited by T. R. Palfrey, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 201-235. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, sincere voting, strategic voting, naive voting. Email Contact: arapoport@bpa.arizona.edu

Rapoport, Amnon, and Ramzi Suleiman (1992) “Equilibrium Solutions for Resource Dilemmas,” Group Decision Making and Negotiation, 1269-294. Keywords: experiments, public, social dilemma. Email Contact: arapoport@bpa.arizona.edu

Rapoport, Amnon, and Ramzi Suleiman (1992) “Provision of Step-Level Public Goods with Continuous Contribution,” Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 5133-153. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, step-level public goods. Email Contact: arapoport@bpa.arizona.edu

Rapoport, Amnon, and Ramzi Suleiman (1993) “Incremental Contribution in Step-Level Public Goods Games with Asymmetric Players,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 55171-194. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, step-level public goods, asymmetric endowments. Abstract: The experiment implements a step-level public goods game with asymmetric endowments. The incidence of successful provision is an decreasing function of the contribution level needed for provision. Email Contact: arapoport@bpa.arizona.edu

Rapoport, Amnon, David V. Budescu, and Ramzi Suleiman (1994*) “Sequential Requests From Randomly Distributed Shared Resources,” Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 37241-265. Keywords: experiments, public goods, common pool resource, sequential decisions. Email Contact: arapoport@bpa.arizona.edu

Richardson, J., and Howard* Kunreuther (1993) “Experimental Test of a Nash-Efficient Mechanism for Collective Choice with Compensation,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 22:3 (December), 349-369. Keywords: experiments, public, mechanisms.

Rietz, Thomas, Roger Myerson, and Robert Weber (1998) “Campaign Finance Levels as Coordinating Signals in Three-Way, Experimental Elections,” Economics and Politics, 10:3 (November), 185-217. Keywords: experiments, public, elections, coordination, campaign spending, contests. Email Contact: thomas-rietz@uiowa.edu

Riker, William H., and W. J. Zavoina (1970) “Rational Behavior in Politics: Evidence from a Three-Person Game,” American Political Science Review, 64. Keywords: experiments, public, rational choice, three person game.

Riker, William H. (1971) “An Experimental Examination of Formal and Informal Rules of a Three-Person Game,” in Social Choice, edited by B. Lieberman, New York: Gordon and Breach, . Keywords: experiments, public, three-person game, institutions. Email

Roelofs, Matthew R., and Tracey H. Sigler (1998) “Individualism, Collectivism, and the Public Good: Examining Cultural Values in a Public Goods Experiment,” Western Washington University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, culture, collectivism. Abstract: Survey instruments are used to measure individual/collectivism orientations, and the results are compared with voluntary contributions in a public goods experiment. Email Contact: mroelofs@cbe.wwu.edu

Roelofs, Matthew R., and Tracey H. Sigler (1999) “Group Composition in a Public Goods Experiment,” Western Washington University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1999 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, group composition. Email Contact: mroelofs@cbe.wwu.edu

Rohrschneider, Robert (1994) “Report from the Laboratory: The Influence of Institutions on Political Elites' Democratic Values in Germany,” American Political Science Review, 88:4 (December), 927-941. Keywords: experiments, public,* institutions, political science.

Saijo, T. , and H. Nakamura (1995) “The "Spite" Dilemma in Voluntary Contribution Mechanism Experiments,” Journal of Conflict and Resolution, 39:3 (September), 535-360. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, spite. Email Contact: saijo@iser.osaka-u.ac.jp

Salant, S. W., and E. Goodstein (1990) “Predicting Committee Behavior in Majority Rule Voting Experiments,” Rand Journal of Economics, 21:2 (Summer), 293-313. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, committee decisions.

Sawyer, Jack (1966) “The Altruism Scale: A Measure of Co-operative, Individualistic, and Competitive Interpersonal Orientation,” American Journal of Sociology, 71407-416. Keywords: experiments, public, altruism, hypothetical incentives, sociology.

Scherr, B. A., and E. M. Babb (1975) “Pricing Public Goods: An Experiment with Two Proposed Pricing Systems,” Public Choice, 23(Fall), 35-48. Keywords: experiments, public, field experiments.

Schmitt, Pamela M., Kurtis J. Swope, and James Walker (1999) “Collective Action with Incomplete Commitment: Experimental Evidence,” Indiana University, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, public, commitment. Email Contact: walkerj@indiana.edu

Schneider, Friedrich, and Werner W. Pommerehne** (1981) “Free Riding and Collective Action: An Experiment in Public Microeconomics,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 96:4 (November), 689-704. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, free riding.

Schneider, Friedrich, and Werner W. Pommerehne (1981) “On the Rationality of Free Riding: An Experiment,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 96(November), 689-704. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, free riding.

Schofield, Norman, Bernard Grofman, and Scott L. Feld (1988) “The Core and the Stability of Group Choice in Spatial Voting Games,” American Political Science Review, 82:1 (March), 195-211. Keywords: experiments, public,* political science, voting.

Schotter, Andrew (1981) The Economic Theory of Social Institutions, New York; London and Sydney: Cambridge
University Press. Keywords: experiments, public, games. Email Contact: schotter@fasecon.econ.nyu.edu

Schram, Arthur, and Frans van Winden (1991) “Why People Vote: Free Riding and the Production and Consumption of Social Pressure,” Journal of Economic Psychology, 12:4 (December), 575-620. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, paradox of voting. Email Contact: arthurs@fee.uva.nl

Schram, Arthur, and Joep Sonnemans (1996) “Voter Turnout as a Participation Game: An Experimental Investigation,” International Journal of Game Theory, 25:3 385-406. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, turnout, game theory, mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, free-riding, paradox of voting. Email Contact: arthurs@fee.uva.nl

Schram, Arthur, and Joep Sonnemans (1996) “Why People Vote: Experimental Evidence,” Journal of Economic Psychology, 17:4 (August), 417-442. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, turnout, paradox of voting, participation game, mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, free-riding. Email Contact: arthurs@fee.uva.nl

Schram, Arthur, Theo Offerman, and Joep Sonnemans (1999) “Explaining Comparative Statics on Step-Level Public Goods Games,” in Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, edited by C. R. Plott and V. L. Smith, Amsterdam: Elsevier, forthcoming. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, step-level public goods, comparative statics, participation games. Email Contact: arthurs@fee.uva.nl

Sefton, Martin, and Richard Steinberg (1996) “Reward Structure in Public Good Experiments,” Journal of Public Economics, 61:2 (August), 263-287. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, interior Nash, nonlinear payoffs. Email Contact: martin.sefton@ncl.ac.uk

Shuman, H., and L. Bobo (1988) “Survey-Based Experiments on White Racial Attitudes Toward Racial Integration,” American Journal of Sociology, 94273-299. Keywords: experiments, public, surveys, political science experiments, public opinion. Abstract: The experiments involved changes in survey questions. The results helped isolate an important source of white resistance to housing integration, i.e. attitudes about the coercive power of the federal government.

Sigelman, ** Lee, Carol K. Sigelman, and Barbara J. Walkosz (1992) “The Public and the Paradox of Leadership: An Experimental Analysis,” American Journal of Political Science, 36:2 (May), 366-385. Keywords: experiments, public,* political science.

Smith, Vernon L. (1977) “The Principle of Unanimity and Voluntary Consent in Social Choice,” Journal of Political Economy, 85:6 (December), 1125-1140. Keywords: experiments, public,* unanimity. Email Contact: vls@econlab.arizona.edu

Smith, Vernon L. (1978) “Experimental Mechanisms for Public Choice,” in Game Theory and Political Science, edited by P. C. Ordeshook, New York: New York University Press, 323-355. Keywords: experiments, public, mechanisms. Email Contact: vls@econlab.arizona.edu

Smith, Vernon L. (1979) “Incentive Compatible Experimental Processes for the Provision of Public Goods,” in Research in Experimental Economics, Vol. 1, edited by V. L. Smith, Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 59-168. Keywords: experiments, public, mechanisms, incentive compatitibility. Email Contact: vls@econlab.arizona.edu

Smith, Vernon L. (1979) “An Experimental Comparison of Three Public Good Decision Mechanisms,” Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 81:2 198-215. Keywords: experiments, public, mechanisms. Email Contact: vls@econlab.arizona.edu

Smith, V. K.* (1979) “Indirect Revelation of the Demand for Public Goods: An Overview and Critique,” Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 26:2 (June), 183-189. Keywords: experiments, public, mechanisms.

Smith, Vernon L. (1980) “Experiments with a Decentralized Mechanism for Public Good Decisions,” American Economic Review, 70:4 (September), 584-599. Keywords: experiments, public, mechanisms. Email Contact: vls@econlab.arizona.edu

Sonnemans, Joep, Arthur Schram, and Theo Offerman (1999) “Strategic Behavior in Public Good Games: When Partners Drift Apart,” Economics Letters, 62:1 (January), 35-41. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, strategic behavior. Abstract: The experimental design replaces one member of each group with a new member in a prespecified rotation scheme. Observed behavior is both history-dependent and strategic in the sense of reduced contributions near the final period of one's participation in a given group. Email Contact: joeps@fee.uva.edu

Sonnemans, Joep, Arthur Schram, and Theo Offerman (1999) “Public Good Provision and Public Bad Prevention: The Effect of Framing,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 34:1 143-161. Keywords: experiments, public,
voluntary contributions, public bad, framing effects. Email Contact: joeps@fee.uva.edu

Stewart, Steven, and Michael McKee (1998) “How Warm is Thy Glow? Experimental Tests of Altruism,” University of New Mexico, Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1998 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary
contributions, altruism, warm glow altruism. Email Contact: sstewar6@utk.edu

Sugden, Robert (1985) “Consistent Conjectures and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods: Why the Conventional Theory Does Not Work,” Journal of Public Economics, 27117-124. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, consistent conjectures. Email Contact: r.sugden@uea.ac.uk

Suleiman, Ramzi, and Amnon Rapoport (1988) “Environmental and Social Uncertainty in Single Trial Resource Dilemmas,” Acta Psychologica, 6899-112. Keywords: experiments, public, common pool resource, uncertainty. Email Contact: arapoport@bpa.arizona.edu

Suleiman, Ramzi, and Amnon Rapoport (1992) “Provision of Step-Level Public Goods with Continuous Contribution,” Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 5133-153. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, step-level public goods, continuous contribution levels. Abstract: The experiment is designed to evaluate the effects of allowing non-binary ("continuous") contributions to a step-level public good. The incidence of successful provision is an increasing function of the ratio of the total value of the public good (to all participants) to the minimum total cost of providing it. Email Contact: arapoport@bpa.arizona.edu

Suleiman, Ramzi, and Keren Or-Chen (1999) “Providing Step Level Public Goods Under Uncertainty: The Case of Probable External Supply,” in Resolving Social Dilemmas, edited by Margaret Foddy, Michael Smithson, Schneider Sherry and Michael Hogg, Philadelphia: Psychology Press, 149-164. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, step-level public goods, risk aversion. Email

Sutter, Matthias (1999) “Public Bad Prevention by Majority Voting on Redistribution - Experimental Evidence,” University of Innsbruck, Austria, Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1999 European Regional ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, public bad, externalities. Abstract: Groups of subjects vote on eliminating a public bad and on allocating the costs. Votes failed in a significant proportion of the cases. Voting is affected by changes in social distance. Email Contact: matthias.sutter@uibk.ac.at

Unur, A. Sinan (1998) “Parents' Altruism and Transfers to Children: An Experimental Analysis of Incentives,” Cornell University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1998 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, altruism, children subjects. Email Contact: sinan.unur@cornell.edu

van de Kragt, Alphons, John M. Orbell, and Robyn M. Dawes (1983) “The Minimal Contributing Set as a Solution to Public Goods Problems,” American Political Science Review, 77(March), 112-122. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, step-level public good, binary contributions, minimal contributing set, communications. Abstract: The experiment is based on a step-level public good with binary contributions. Increasing the required number of contributors reduces the incidence of successful provision. When communication is introduced, successful provision is universal is all treatments.

van de Kragt, Alphons J. C., Robyn M. Dawes, and John M. Orbell (1988) “Are People Who Cooperate "Rational Altruists?",” Public Choice, 56:3 (March), 233-247. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, rational altruism, altruism, cooperation.

van Dijk, E., and M. Grodzka (1992) “The Influence of Endowments Asymmetry and Information Level on the Contribution to a Public Step Good,” Journal of Economics and Psychology, 13:2 (June), 329-342. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, endowments, asymmetric endowments, information.

van Dijk, F., Joep Sonnemans, and Frans van Winden (1999) “Social Ties in a Public Good Experiment,” University of Amsterdam, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, social ties. Abstract: The experiment begins with a value orientation measurement of concern for others' payoffs, which is followed by a 25 period voluntary contributions experiment. Then post-experiment measures of attitudes toward one's partner are obtained and compared with initial value orientations. This comparison produces evidence that social ties were formed during the experiment. Email Contact: fvwinden@fee.uva.nl

van Winden, Frans, F. van Dijk, and Joep Sonnemans (1999) “Intrinsic Motivation in a Public Good Environment,” in Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, edited by C. R. Plott and V. L. Smith, Amsterdam: Elsevier, forthcoming. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contribution, labor, motivation, methodology, effort. Email Contact: joeps@fee.uva.edu

Walker, James M., Roy Gardner, and Elinor Ostrom (1990) “Rent Dissipation in a Limited-Access Common-Pool Resource: Experimental Evidence,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 19:3 (November), 203-211. Keywords: experiments, public, game theory, common pool resource, rent dissipation. Email Contact: walkerj@indiana.edu

Walker, James M., and Roy Gardner (1992) “Probabilistic Destruction of Common-pool Resources: Experimental Evidence,” Economic Journal, 102:414 (September), 1149-1161. Keywords: experiments, public, common pool resources. Email Contact: walkerj@indiana.edu

Walker, James M., Roy Gardner, Andy Herr, and Elinor Ostrom (1999) “Collective Choice in the Commons: Experimental Results on Proposed Allocation Rules and Votes,” Economic Journal, forthcoming. Keywords: experiments, public, common pool resources, voting. Email Contact: walkerj@indiana.edu

Weimann, Joachim (1994) “Individual Behaviour in a Free-Riding Experiment,” Journal of Public Economics, 54185-200. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, individual behavior. Email Contact: joachim.weimann@ww.uni-magdeburg.de

Wendt, Dirk (1991) “Altruism in Social Dilemmas: Failure to Catch it in a Parameter,” in Game Equilibrium Models IV: Social and Political Interaction, edited by Reinhard Selten, Berlin: Springer-Verlag, . Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, social dilemmas, altruism, hypothetical incentives. Email

Williams, Kenneth C. (1991) “Candidate Convergence and Information Costs in Spatial Elections: An Experimental Analysis,” in Laboratory Research in Political Economy, edited by T. R. Palfrey, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 113-135. Keywords: experiments, public, elections, spatial voting. Email

Willinger, Marc, and Anthony Zielelmeyer (1999) “Incentives to Cooperate in Public Good Games with an Interior Solution: Experimental Evidence,” University Louis Pasteur, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1999 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, nonlinear payoffs, interior Nash, cooperation. Email Contact:
willma@cournot.u-strasbg.fr

Wilson, Rick K. (1986) “Forward and Backward Agenda Procedures: Committee Experiments on Structurally Induced Equilibrium,” Journal of Politics, 48:2 (May), 390-409. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, political science, agenda effects, committee voting. Email Contact: rkw@rice.edu

Wilson, Rick K. (1986) “Results on the Condorcet Winner: A Committee Experiment on Time Constraints,” Simulation and Games, 17217-243. Keywords: experiments, public, voting, political science, condorcet winner. Email Contact: rkw@rice.edu

Zizzo, Daniel (1999) “Cognitive Fairness and Interdependent Preferences in the Short Run: An Experimental Study,” Oxford University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Spring 1999 Public Choice Meetings. Keywords: experiments, public,* altruism, fairness, psychology. Email Contact: daniel.zizzo@hertford.ox.ac.uk