Y2K Bibliography of Experimental Economics and Social Science
Multi-Unit Auction Experiments

updated December 29, 1999
Charles A. Holt, cah2k@virginia.edu, suggestions and corrections welcome
(for online and personal use only)

Alsemgeest, P., Charles Noussair, and Mark Olson (1998) “Experimental Comparisons of Auctions Under Single- and Multi-Unit Demand,” Economic Inquiry, 36:1 (January), 87-97. Keywords: experiments, auctions, multi-unit demand. Email Contact: noussair@mgmt.purdue.deu

Bernard, John C., and William Schulze (2000) “Teaching Marginal Cost, Supply and Efficiency with an Englis Auction Experiment,” Journal of Economic Education, 31:1 (Winter), forthcoming. Keywords: experiments, classroom games, auctions, English auction, multi-unit auction, marginal cost.

Burns, Penny (1985) “Market Structure and Behavior: Price Adjustment in a Multi-Object Progressive Oral Auction,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 6(September), 275-300. Keywords: experiments, auctions, price adjustment.

Corriveau, Marie, Claude Montemarquette, and Jacques Robert (1998) “Multiple-unit Demand Auctions: Theory and Experimental Evidences,” University of Montreal and CIRANO, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, auctions, multi-unit demand, sequential auctions. Abstract: The paper reports theoretical and experimental results for several auction institutions in which bidders have demands for multiple units, and units are sold in sequence. Email Contact: robertj@cirano.umontreal.ca

Cox, James C., Vernon L. Smith, and James M. Walker (1983) “Theory and Behavior of Heterogeneous Bidders in Multiple Unit Auction,” Economics Letters, 12207-212. Keywords: experiments, auctions, multiple unit auction, constant relative risk aversion, heterogeneity. Email Contact: jcox@bpa.arizona.edu

Cox, James C., Vernon L. Smith, and James M. Walker (1984) “The Theory and Behavior of Multiple Unit
Discriminative Auction*,” Journal of Finance, 39(September), 983-1010. Keywords: experiments, auctions, discriminative auction, multiple unit auction. Email Contact: jcox@bpa.arizona.edu

DeMartini, Christine, Anthony M. Kwasnica, and John O. Ledyard (1998) “A New and Improved Design for Multi-Object Interactive Auctions,” California Institute of Technology, Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1998 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, auctions, multi-unit auctions. Email Contact: jledyard@hss.caltech.edu

Dickhaut, John, Ann Martin, David Senkow, and Galen Sevick (1993) “The Price/Quantity Sealed Bid/Offer Auction with Pro-Rata Rationing: Experimental Evidence,” Economic Journal, 103:418 (May), 547-569. Keywords: experiments, auctions, sealed bid/offer auction, multi-unit auctions. Email Contact: jdickhaut@csom.umn.edu

Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard, John List, and David Lucking-Reiley (1999) “Demand Reduction in Multi-Unit Auctions with Varying Numbers of Bidders: Theory and Field Experiments,” Vanderbilt University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1999 European Regional ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, auctions, multi-unit auctions, uniform-price auctions, numbers effects, field experiment, market power. Abstract: The paper uses a field experiment with sports card sales to assess the extent to which buyers withhold demand in multi-unit, uniform-price auctions. The theoretical prediction is that demand reduction is greater with fewer bidders. Some support for theoretical predictions is reported. Email Contact: reiley@vanderbilt.edu

Kagel, John H., and Dan Levin (1998) “Independent Private Value Multi-Unit Demand Auctions: An Experiment Comparing Uniform Price and Vickrey Auctions,” Ohio State University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, auctions, multi-unit auctions, independent private values, uniform price auctions, Vickrey auctions, dynamic auctions, numbers effects, learning. Abstract: Subjects engage in strategic demand reduction in uniform-price auctions, a behavior that is largely eliminated with the Vickrey auction. The sealed-bid uniform price auction generates more revenue but is less efficient than the Vickrey auction in this context. Email Contact: levin.36@osu.edu

Kagel, John H., and Dan Levin (1999) “Multi-Unit Demand Auctions with Synergies: Some Initial Experimental Results,” Ohio State University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1999 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, auctions, multi-unit demand. Email Contact: levin.36@osu.edu

Linden, Jordan, Anders Lunander, and Jan-Eric Nilsson (1998) “Revenues in Multi-Unit Common Value Auctions - An Experimental Study of Three Sealed-Bid and Three Open-Bid Mechanisms,” University College of South Stockholm, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, auctions, multi-unit demand, revenue comparisons, alternative auctions. Abstract: Four auction institutions are compared in a common-value setting with variable numbers of bidders who each demand two units. Revenues are higher in the uniform-price auction than is the case with discriminatory and Vickrey auctions. Email Contact: johan.linden@sh.se

List, John A., and David Lucking-Reilly (1999) “Demand Reduction in Multi-Unit Auctions: Evidence from a Sportscard Field Experiment,” American Economic Review, forthcoming. Keywords: experiments, auctions, multi-unit auctions, field experiment, demand reduction. Email Contact: John.List@bus.ucf.edu

McCabe, Kevin A., Stephen J. Rassenti, and Vernon L. Smith (1990) “Auction Institutional Design: Theory and Behavior of Simultaneous Multiple Unit Generalizations of the Dutch and English Auctions,” American Economic Review, 80:5 (December), 1276-1283. Keywords: experiments, auctions, multiple-unit auctions, Dutch auctions, English auctions.
Email Contact: kmcabe@econlab.arizona.edu

McCabe, Kevin A., Stephen J. Rassenti, and Vernon L. Smith (1991) “Testing Vickrey's and Other Simultaneous Multiple Unit Versions of the English Auction,” in Research in Experimental Economics, Vol. 4, edited by R. M. Isaac, Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 45-79. Keywords: experiments, auctions, multiple unit auctions, independent private values, English Clock auction. Abstract This paper reports tests of a large number of multiple-unit auctions under alternative institutional rules, in an independent private values environment. Progressive auctions performed better than uniform-price, sealed-bid auctions, indicating the advantage of providing feedback. In particular, the English Clock auction produced highly efficient allocations. Email Contact: kmcabe@econlab.arizona.edu

Noussair, Charles (1995) “Equilibria in a Multi-object Uniform Price Seald Bid Auction with Multi-unit Demands,” Economic Theory, 5:2 (March), 337-351. Keywords: experiments, auctions, multi-unit auctions, uniform price auctions, sealed bids. Email Contact: noussair@mgmt.purdue.edu

Smith, Vernon. L., and James M. Walker (1993) “Rewards, Experience and Decision Costs in First Price Auctions,” Economic Inquiry, 31:2 (April), 237-245*. Keywords: experiments, auctions, methodology, incentives, first-price auctions, noisy behavior, risk aversion. Abstract: In the reported experiment, individual subjects were placed in a private-values, first-price auction, bidding against a known number of computerized bidders programmed to bid a fixed fraction of their random value draws. All earnings were multiplied by a constant that was varied from 1 to 20. Bidding was "as if risk averse," and this overbidding relative to the risk-neutral prediction was positively correlated with increases in the incentive multiplier, holding experience constant. High incentives did reduce measures of noise in bidding. Email Contact: vls@econlab.arizona.edu

Tenorio, R. (1997) “Some Evidence on Strategic Quantity Reduction in Multiple Unit Auctions.,” Economics Letters, 55:2 (August), 209-213. Keywords: experiments, auctions, market power, strategic quantity reduction, demand withholding.