Y2K Bibliography of Experimental Economics and Social Science
Learning in Games

updated December 29, 1999
Charles A. Holt, cah2k@virginia.edu, suggestions and corrections welcome
(for online and personal use only)


Anderson, Chris, Colin Camerer, and Tech H. Ho (1998) “Learning and Logic-Based Refinements in Signaling Games,” University of Pennsylvania, Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1998 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, game theory, refinements, learning. Abstract: Experience-weighted attraction models of learning are adapted to explain patterns of adjustment in signaling games with many periods. Email Contact: camerer@hss.caltech.edu

Anderson, Simon P., Jacob K. Goeree, and Charles A. Holt (2000) “Minimum Effort Coordination Games: An Equilibrium Analysis of Bounded Rationality,” Games and Economic Behavior, forthcoming. Keywords: experiments, game theory, logit equilibrium, coordination, learning, potential games, stochastic potential, evolution, quantal response. Abstract: This paper considers minimum-effort coordination games with a continuum of Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria. The introduction of noise yields a unique probability distribution of effort decisions that maximizes a stochastic potential function (expected value of the potential of the game plus entrophy). As the noise vanishes, the limiting distribution converges to an outcome that is analogous to the risk-dominant outcome in two-by-two games. In accordance with experimental evidence and economic intuition, the theory predicts that effort distributions decrease with increases in effort cost and the number of players, even though these parameters do not affect the set of Nash equilibria. Email Contact: sa9w@virginia.edu

Atkinson, Richard C., and Patrick Suppes (1958) “An Analysis of Two-Person Game Situations in Terms of Statistical Learning Theory,” Journal of Experimental Psychology, 55369-378. Keywords: experiments, game theory, learning, statistical learning theory.

Battalio, Raymond C., Larry Samuelson, and John Van Huyck (1997) “Risk Dominance, Payoff Dominance, and Probabilistic Choice Learning,” Texas A&M University, Keywords: experiments, game theory, probabilistic choice, learning, risk dominance. Email Contact: rcb@esl1.tamu.edu

Berninghaus, Siegfried K., and Karl-Martin Ehrhart (1998) “Time Horizon and Equilibrium Selection in Tacit Coordination Games: Experimental Results,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 37:2 (October), 231-248. Keywords: experiments, game theory, coordination, repetition, learning direction theory, equilibrium selections. Abstract: Repeated play of coordination games results in the selection of the Pareto dominant equilibrium. Results are consistent with learning direction theory. Email Contact: sbe@vwl3.wiwi.uni-karlsruhe.de

Bloomfield, Robert J. (1994) “Learning a Mixed Strategy Equilibrium in the Laboratory,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 25:3 (December), 411-436. Keywords: experiments, game theory, mixed equilibrium, learning. Email Contact: rjb9@cornell.edu

Blume, Andreas, Douglas DeJong, Y.-G. Kim, and G. Sprinkle (1998) “Experimental Evidence on the Evolution of Meaning of Messages in Sender-Receiver Games,” American Economic Review, 88:5 (December), 1323-1340. Keywords: experiments, game theory, information, signaling games, learning.

Blume, Andreas, Douglas DeJong, George R. Neumann, and N.E. Savin (1998) “Learning in Sender-Receiver Games,” University of Iowa, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, game theory, signaling games, belief learning, reinforcement learning, econometrics. Abstract: This paper compares the explanatory power of belief and reinforcement learning models in the context of signaling games. Email Contact: ablume@blue.weeg.uiowa.edu

Blume, Andreus, and Uri Gneezy (1998) “An Experimental Study of Optimal Learning in Games,” University of Iowa, Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1998 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, game theory, learning. Email Contact: ablume@blue.weeg.uiowa.edu

Bornstein, Gary, Ido Erev, and Green H. (1994) “Learning Processes and Reciprocity in Intergroup Conflicts,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 38690-707. Keywords: experiments, game theory, learning.

Bouchez, Nichole Marie (1999) “Learning Models in a Three by Three Bimatrix World,” University of California at Santa Cruz, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1999 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, game theory, learning, 3x3 matrix games, belief learning, reinforcement learning. Email Contact: bouchez@cats.ucsc.edu

Boylan, Richard T., and Mahmoud A. El-Gamal (1993) “Ficticious Play: A Statistical Study of Multiple Economic Experiments,” Games and Economic Behavior, 5205-222. Keywords: experiments, game theory, learning, ficticious play. Email Contact: melgamal@1.wisc.edu

Bracht, Juergen, Christian Lebiere, and Dieter Wallach (1998) “A Comparison of ACT-R and Reinforcement Based Learning in Experimental Games with Unique Mixed Strategy Equilibria,” University of Basel, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, game theory, learning, reinforcement learning, ACT-R. Abstract: An ACT-R theory is applied to strategic behavior in normal form games with unique mixed strategies. The simulations converge to the Nash equilibrium and follow adjustment observed patterns in experimental data. Reinforcement learning models are discussed. Email Contact: wallachd@ubaclu.unibas.ch

Brandts, Jordi, Jacob K. Goeree, and Charles A. Holt (1996, revised 1999) “Naive Bayesian Learning and Adjustment
to Equilibrium in Signaling Games,” University of Virginia, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, game theory, signaling games, learning, simulation, refinements. Abstract: A logit learning model is used to explain dynamic adjustment patterns in signaling games. Simulations with the estimated learning and error parameters reproduce the qualitative behavior patterns in the choices made by human subjects. For some games, these adjustment paths lead to equilibria that are ruled out by the intuitive criterion and other refinements.

Brandts, Jordi, and Charles A. Holt (1993) “Adjustment Patterns and Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Signaling Games,” International Journal of Game Theory, 22:3 279-302. Keywords: experiments, game theory, signaling games, refinements, equilibrium selection, learning, equilibrium dominance, intuitive criterion. Abstract: Signaling games with "reverse type dependence" lead to behavior in the laboratory that violates all of the standard refinements of the Nash equilibrium (intuitive criterion, divinity, strategic stability, etc.) The history of the adjustment path seems to determine out-of-equilibrium beliefs that are ruled out by these refinements. Email Contact: brandts@cc.uab.es

Camerer, Colin (1999) “Behavioral Economics: Reunifying Psychology and Economics,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 96(September), 10575-10577. Keywords: experiments, game theory, decisions, psychology, behavioral economics. Abstract: The theme of this brief survey is that behavioral economics, which reunites psychology and economics, will provide a better basis for making realistic assumptions about human decision making and economic interaction. The behavioral economics approach: 1) incorporates nonlinear probability weighting and reference points into an expected utility framework, 2) adds psychologically-based learning processes to the standard equilibrium analysis, and 3) revives Adam Smith's concern with other-regarding preferences as a way of explaining results of recent anomalous laboratory experiments. Email Contact: camerer@hss.caltech.edu

Camerer, Colin F., and Teck-Hua Ho (1999) “Experience Weighted Attraction Learning in Normal-Form Games,” Econometrica, 67827-874. Keywords: experiments, game theory, learning, reinforcement learning. Abstract: This paper presents a general model of learning that nests the standard belief and reinforcement learning specifications. Many extensions are discussed and incorporated, and the estimated parameters support the use of a hybrid model. Email Contact: camerer@hss.caltech.edu

Capra, C. Monica, Jacob K. Goeree, Rosario Gomez, and Charles A. Holt (1998) “Learning and Noisy Equilibrium Behavior in an Experimental Study of Imperfect Price Competition,” University of Virginia, Discussion Paper, presented at the Conference of Experimental Economics in Osaka, 1999. Keywords: experiments, game theory, markets, logit equilibrium, simulation, bounded rationality, quantal response. Abstract: The experiments implement a model of imperfect price competition in which the high-price seller is allowed to match the lower price, but the resulting market share is less than one half. The Nash-Bertrand prediction is unaffected by the market share of the high-price seller, but the data respond sharply to changes in this treatment parameter, a response that is consistent with dynamic and equilibrium logit models of noisy behavior. Email Contact: jg2n@virginia.edu

Capra, C. Monica, Jacob K. Goeree, Rosario Gomez, and Charles A. Holt (1999) “Anomalous Behavior in a Traveler's Dilemma?,” American Economic Review, 89:3 (June), 678-690. Keywords: experiments, game theory, traveler's dilemma, logit equilibrium, learning, simulation, bounded rationality, quantal response. Abstract: The observed choices in a traveler's dilemma experiment are moved across the entire set of feasible decisions by changes in a treatment variable that has no effect on the unique Nash prediction. Dynamic patterns are explained by a logit learning model, and the steady state distributions are centered around the predictions of a logit equilibrium that generalizes the Nash equilibrium to allow for noisy behavior. Email Contact: jg2n@virginia.edu

Chen, Hsiao-Chi, James W. Friedman, and Jacques-Francois Thisse (1996) “Boundedly Rational Nash Equilibrium: A Probabilistic Choice Approach,” Games and Economic Behavior, 1832-54. Keywords: experiments, game theory, matrix games, quantal response, bounded rationality, learning. Abstract: This paper uses the Luce probabilistic choice rule to analyze behavior in matrix games.

Cheung, Yin-Wong, and Daniel Friedman (1997) “Individual Learning in Normal Form Games: Some Laboratory Results,”
Games and Economic Behavior, 19:1 (April), 46-76. Keywords: experiments, game theory, learning, normal form games. Email Contact: dan@cats.ucsc.edu

Cheung, Yin-Wong, and Daniel Friedman (1998) “A Comparison of Learning and Replicator Dynamics Using Experimental Data,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 35:3 (April), 263-280. Keywords: experiments, game theory, learning, evolution, replicator dynamics. Email Contact: dan@cats.ucsc.edu

Cooper, David J., Susan Garvin, and John H. Kagel (1997) “Signalling and Adaptive Learning in an Entry Limit Pricing Game,” RAND Journal of Economics, 28:4 (Winter), 662-683. Keywords: experiments, game theory, signalling games, limit pricing, signaling, adaptive learning. Email Contact: djc13@guinness.som.cwru.edu

Cooper, David J., Susan Garvin, and John H. Kagel (1997) “Adaptive Learning vs. Equilibrium Refinements in an Entry Limit Pricing Game,” Economic Journal, 107:442 (May), 553-575. Keywords: experiments, game theory, refinements, learning, limit pricing, markets. Email Contact: djc13@guinness.som.cwru.edu

Cox, James C., Jason Shachat, and Mark Walker (1995) “An Experiment to Evaluate Bayesian Learning in Normal Form Games,” University of Arizona, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, game theory, normal form games, learning. Email Contact: jcox@bpa.arizona.edu

Cox, James C., Jason Shachat, and Mark Walker (1997) “An Experiment to Evaluate Bayesian Learning of Nash Equilibrium Play,” University of Arizona, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, game theory, learning, Bayes' rule. Email Contact: jcox@bpa.arizona.edu

Crawford, Vincent P. (1991) “An `Evolutionary` Interpretation of Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's Experimental Results on Coordination,” Games and Economic Behavior, 3:1 (February), 25-59. Keywords: experiments, game theory, coordination games, evolution, learning. Abstract: This paper explains behavior patterns in coordination game experiments with an econometric model of adaptive best responses to the previous outcome. Email Contact: vcrawfor@ucsd.edu

Crawford, Vincent P. (1995) “Adaptive Dynamics in Coordination Games,” Econometrica, 63:1 (January), 103-143. Keywords: experiments, game theory, coordination games, learning. Email Contact: vcrawfor@ucsd.edu

Crawford, Vincent P. (1997) “Learning Dynamics, Lock-In, and Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Coordination Games,” University of California at San Diego, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, game theory, coordination games, evolution, learning, equilibrium selection. Email Contact: vcrawfor@ucsd.edu

Crawford, Vincent P., and Hans Haller (1990) “Learning How to Cooperate: Optimal Play in Repeated Coordination Games,” Econometrica, 58:3 (May), 571-595. Keywords: experiments, game theory, coordination games, learning. Email Contact: vcrawfor@ucsd.edu

Duffy, John, and Nick Feltovich (1999) “Does Observation of Others Affect Learning in Strategic Environments? An Experimental Study,” International Journal of Game Theory, 28:1 (February), 131-152. Keywords: experiments, game theory, learning, social learning. Email Contact: jduffy+@pitt.edu

El-Gamal, Mahmoud A., Richard D. McKelvey, and Thomas R. Palfrey (1993) “A Bayesian Sequential Experimental Study of Learning in Games,” Journal of the American Statistical Association, 88:442 (June), 428-435. Keywords: experiments, game theory, learning, Bayes' rule. Email Contact: melgamal@1.wisc.edu

El-Gamal, Mahmoud A., Richard D. McKelvey, and Thomas R. Palfrey (1994) “Learning in Experimental Games,” Economic Theory, 901-922. Keywords: experiments, game theory, learning. Email Contact: melgamal@1.wisc.edu

Erev, Ido, Yoella Bereby-Meyer, and Alvin E. Roth (1999) “The Effect of Adding a Constant to All Payoffs: Experimental Investigation, and a Reinforcement Learning Model with Self-Adjusting Speed of Learning,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 39:1 (May), 111-128. Keywords: experiments, game theory, reinforcement learning, incentives. Abstract: The paper reports a nonlinear effect of adding a constant to all payoffs, and discusses the implications for reinforcement learning models. Email Contact: aroth@hbs.edu

Erev, Ido, and Amnon Rapoport (1998) “Coordination, "Magic," and Reinforcement Learning in a Market Entry Game,” Games and Economic Behavior, 23:2 (May), 146-175. Keywords: experiments, game theory, entry game, coordination, reinforcement learning. Email Contact: erev@techunix.technion.ac.il

Erev, Ido, and Alvin E. Roth (1998) “Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria,” American Economic Review, 88:4 (September), 848-881. Keywords: experiments, game theory, learning, reinforcement learning. Abstract: Models of reinforcement learning are used to explain dynamic behavior patterns in previously published experiments with unique mixed strategy equilibria. The simplest one-parameter learning model (with a parameter estimated from other experiments) produces simulations that outperform Nash predictions. The fit is improved by adding parameters that represent "forgetting" and "experimentation." Email Contact: erev@techunix.technion.ac.il

Erev, Ido, and Alvin E. Roth (1999) “On the Role of Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games; The Cognitive Game Theory Approach,” in Games and Human Behavior: Essays in Honor of Amnon Rapoport, edited by D. Budescu, I. Erev and R. Zwick, Erlbaum, 53-77. Keywords: experiments, game theory, reinforcement learning. Email Contact: aroth@hbs.edu

Feltovich, Nick (1998) “Reinforcement-Based Versus Belief-Based Learning in Experimental Asymmetric-Information Games,” University of Houston, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, game theory, learning, reinforcment, belief learning. Email Contact: nfelt@bayou.uh.edu

Flood, Merrill M. (1954) “On Game-Learning Theory and Some Decision-Making Experiments,” in Decision Processes, edited by R. M. Thrall, C. H. Coombs and R. L. Davis, New York: Wiley, 139-158. Keywords: experiments, game theory, prisoner's dilemma. Email

Fox, J. (1972) “The Learning of Strategies in a Simple, Two-Person Zero-Sum Game Without Saddlepoint,” Behavioral Science, 17300-308. Keywords: experiments, game theory, zero-sum games.

Fudenberg, Drew, and David K. Levine (1998) Learning in Games, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Keywords: experiments, game theory, learning. Abstract: This book surveys and develops models of learning and dynamic adjustment in economic games. Email Contact: fudenber@husc.harvard.edu

Garapin, Alexis, and Michel Hollard (1998) “Learning to Coordinate in Competitive Contexts,” University Pierre Mendes France, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, game theory, coordination, competition. Abstract: The experiments implements the card game, "Target the Two." The focus is on the effects of competition and time-based incentives on coordination behavior. Email Contact: Alexis.Garapin@upmf-grenoble.fr

Goeree, Jacob K., and Charles A. Holt (1999) “An Experimental Study of Costly Coordination,” University of Virginia, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, game theory, coordination games, logit equilibrium, bounded rationality, learning, simulation, quantal response, stochastic potential. Abstract: The authors present and test a unified view of behavior in coordination games with a continuum of Nash equilibria that are not affected by non-critical changes in effort costs and numbers of players. The theory is a generalization of risk dominance and maximum potential; the maximization of (stochastic) potential explains steady state effort levels in a series of minimum- and median-effort coordination experiments. In both types of coordination games considered, observed effort distributions are inversely related to effort costs, an intuitive experimental result that is not explained by the perfect-rationality Nash model. Email Contact: jg2n@virginia.edu

Goeree, Jacob K., and Charles A. Holt (1999) “Stochastic Game Theory: For Playing Games, Not Just for Doing Theory,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 96(September), 10564-10567. Keywords: experiments, game theory, Nash equilibrium, logit equilibrium, quantal response equilibrium, introspection, coordination, traveler's dilemma, evolution, learning. Abstract: This paper argues that noisy models of introspection, learning, and equilibrium can explain the salient behavior patterns in game experiments, patterns that are not predicted by the Nash equilibrium or its refinements. Models of iterated noisy introspection are used to explain initial choices, models of noisy learning and evolution are used to predict dynamic adjustment paths, and logit equilibrium models explain Nash-invariant treatment effects in steady-state distributions of decisions. Email Contact: jg2n@virginia.edu

Goeree, Jacob K., and Charles A. Holt (1999) “A Model of Noisy Introspection,” University of Virginia, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, game theory, introspection, logit equilibrium. Abstract: The paper presents a theoretical model of noisy iterated introspection designed to explain behavior in games played only once. The model determines layers of beliefs (about others' decisions, others' beliefs, beliefs about beliefs...), but relaxes the Nash-like requirement that belief distributions coincide with distributions of decisions, i.e. it allows for systematic surprises in the absence of learning and repetition. The introspective solution exists and nests standard Nash and quantal response equilibrium theories, which are rejected on the basis of maximum likelihood estimates of noise and introspection parameters for laboratory data from thirty-seven variations of 2x2 games played once. Email Contact: jg2n@virginia.edu

Güth, Werner, R. Ivanova, Manfred Königstein, and Martin Strobel (1998) “Robust Learning Behavior Adaptation in a Variety of Games,” Humboldt University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, game theory, learning, multiple games. Abstract: Subjects are confronted with a variety of different bidding tasks in order to study how learning depends on game complexity. Email Contact: gueth@wiwi.hu-berlin.de

Haruvy, Ernan, and Dale O. Stahl (1998) “Can Adaptive Dynamics Resolve Multiplicity,” University of Texas, Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1998 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, game theory, learning, dynamics, equilibrium selection. Email Contact: stahl@eco.utexas.edu

Hauk, Esther (1998) “Discriminating to Learn to Discriminate,” Pompeu Fabra University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, game theory, prisoner's dilemma, strategy search, learning, choice of whether to play. Abstract: Subjects play several finite prisoner's dilemma games simultaneously, which allows rejection of the common notion that players can be categorized into distinct "types." Behavior can be characterized as a search for an acceptable strategy. Email Contact: esther.huak@econ.upf.es

Ho, Tech-Hua, and Keith Weigelt (1994) “Task Complexity, Equilibrium Selection, and Learning: An Experimental Study,” Management Science?**, . Keywords: experiments, game theory, equilibrium selection, learning, task complexity. Email Contact: hoteck@marketing.wharton.upenn.edu

Kirchkamp, Oliver (1999) “Simultaneous Evolution of Learning Rules and Strategies,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 40:3 295-312. Keywords: experiments, game theory, learning. Email Contact: oliver@kirchkamp.de

Kirchkamp, Oliver, Rosemarie Nagel, and Avner Shaked (1998) “Local Interacting Prisoners' Dilemmas,” Manheim University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, game theory, prisoner's dilemma, local interaction, learning. Abstract: The experiment considers how behavior of subjects in repeated prisoner's dilemma games is affected by the nature of local interaction. Subjects who interact with their neighbors on a circle (in a series of overlapping local neighborhoods) coordinate less frequently on the Pareto efficient outcome than those who interact in fixed non-overlapping groups. Email Contact: oliver@kirchkamp.de

Knapp, Robert, and Andreas Ortmann (1998) “On the Use of Evolutionary Models in Experimental Economics,” Bowdoin College, Keywords: experiments, game theory, evolution, replicator dynamics, learning, matrix game. Abstract: Data from a bargaining experiment in matrix form are used to evaluate a variety of evolutionary models. There is no clear winner.

Mookherjee, Dilip, and Barry Sopher (1994) “Learning Behavior in an Experimental Matching Pennies Game,” Games and Economic Behavior, 7:1 (July), 62-91. Keywords: experiments, game theory, learning, matching pennies.

Mookherjee, Dilip, and Barry Sopher (1997) “Learning and Decision Costs in Experimental Constant Sum Games,” Games and Economic Behavior, 19:1 (April), 97-132. Keywords: experiments, game theory, learning, constant sum games.

Nagel, Rosemarie (1995) “Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study,” American Economic Review, 85:5 (December), 1313-1326. Keywords: experiments, game theory, learning, guessing games. Email Contact: nagel@upf.es

Nagel, Rosemarie, and Fang Fang Tang (1998) “Experimental Results on the Centipede Game in Normal Form: An Investigation of Learning,” Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 42356-384. Keywords: experiments, game theory, learning, normal-form centipede game, learning direction theory, quantal response equilibrium. Abstract: The paper specifies and estimates a noisy directional theory of learning in a game where players' payoffs are determined by the minimum decision. Email Contact: nagel@upf.es

Nyarko, Yaw, and Andrew Schotter (1998) “Equilibria in Beliefs and Our Belief in Equilibria,” New York University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, game theory, beliefs, scoring rule, elicitation. Abstract: Subjects in the experiment play a game and also report beliefs about the other person's play, via a scoring rule procedure. Belief data are used to evaluate equilibrium and learning theories. Email Contact: schotter@fasecon.econ.nyu.edu

Offerman, Theo, Jan Potters, and Joep Sonnemans (1998) “Imitation and Belief Learning in an Oligopoly Experiment,” University of Amsterdam, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, game theory, learning, imitation, markets, Cournot. Abstract: The experiment consists of repeated Cournot triopoly games, under three information conditions. One condition is hypothesized to induce imitation of successful rival behavior, another is designed to induce following an "exemplary firm," and a final one is designed to promote experience based learning. These three treatments tend to result in Walrasean, collusive, and Cournot Nash outcomes respectively. Email Contact: theoo@fee.uva.nl

Offerman, Theo, and Joep Sonnemans (1998) “Learning by Experience and Learning by Imitating Successful Others,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 34:4 (March), 559-575. Keywords: experiments, game theory, learning, imitation. Abstract: Subjects make investment decisions and report expectations. The provision of information about others' expectations has an effect on behavior, even when others' had identical information ex ante. There is evidence of learning, both from one's own experience and from imitation of others. Email Contact: theoo@fee.uva.nl

Roth, Alvin E., and Ido Erev (1995) “Learning in Extensive-Form Games: Experimental Data and Simple Dynamic Models in the Intermediate Term,” Games and Economic Behavior, 8:1 (January), 164-212. Keywords: experiments, game theory, learning, reinforcement learning. Email Contact: aroth@hbs.edu

Salmon, Timothy C. (1999) “An Evaluation of Econometric Models of Adaptive Learning,” Caltech, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, game theory, learning, computer simulation.

Selten, Reinhard (1991) “Anticipatory Learning in Games,” in Game Equilibrium Models, Vol. 1, edited by R. Selten, New York: Springer-Verlag, Chapter 3**. Keywords: experiments, game theory, anticipatory learning, introspection. Email Contact: selten@lab.econ1.uni-bonn.de

Selten, Reinhard (1991) “Evolution, Learning, and Economic Behavior,” Games and Economic Behavior, 3:1 (February), 3-24. Keywords: experiments, games, learning, evolution. Email Contact: selten@lab.econ1.uni-bonn.de

Selten, Reinhard, and J. Bucta (1994) “Experimental Sealed Bid First Price Auctions with Directly Observed Bid Functions,” in Games and Human Behavior: Essays in Honor of Amnon Rapoport, edited by I. E. D. Budescu, I.* Erev and R. Zwick, Hillside N.J.: Erlbaum Association, . Keywords: experiments, game theory, auctions, learning, direction learning theory. Abstract This paper uses the strategy method to evaluate a model of directional learning in auctions. Email Contact: selten@lab.econ1.uni-bonn.de

Selten, Reinhard, and Rolf Stoecker (1986) “End Behavior in Sequences of Finite Prisoner's Dilemma Supergames: A Learning Theory Approach,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 47-70. Keywords: experiments, game theory, backward induction, learning, prisoner's dilemma games. Email Contact: selten@lab.econ1.uni-bonn.de

Simon, Herbert A. (1956) “A Comparison of Game Theory and Learning Theory,” Psychometrica, 21267-272. Keywords: experiments, game theory, learning.

Stahl, Dale (1996) “Boundedly Rational Rule Learning in a Guessing Game,” Games and Economic Behavior, 16:2 (October), 303-330. Keywords: experiments, game theory, rule learning, bounded rationality, guessing game. Email Contact: stahl@eco.utexas.edu

Stahl, Dale (1999) “A Horse Race Among Reinforcement Learning Models,” University of Texas, Discussion Paper, presented at the Spring 1999 Public Choice Meetings. Keywords: experiments, game theory, learning. Email Contact: stahl@eco.utexas.edu

Stahl, Dale (1999) “Evidence-Based Rule Learning in Symmetric Normal-Form Games,” International Journal of Game Theory, 28:1 (February), 111-130. Keywords: experiments, game theory, learning, normal form games. Email Contact: stahl@eco.utexas.edu

Stahl, Dale O. (1999) “Rule-Learning in Symmetric Normal-Form Games: Theory and Evidence,” Games and Economic Behavior, forthcoming. Keywords: experiments, game theory, learning, rule learning. Email Contact: stahl@eco.utexas.edu

Swarthout, Todd, and Mark Walker (1999) “Reinforcement, Belief Learning, and Information Processing,” University of Arizona, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1999 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, game theory, belief learning, reinforcement learning. Email Contact: swarthout@nt.econlab.arizona.edu

Weber, Roberto A. (1998) “Learning with No Feedback: A Test of Belief and Choice Reinforcement Models in Games,” California Institute of Technology, Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1998 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, game theory, learning.