Y2K Bibliography of Experimental Economics and Social Science
Information

updated December 29, 1999
Charles A. Holt, cah2k@virginia.edu, suggestions and corrections welcome
(for online and personal use only)

Anderson, Lisa, and Charles A. Holt (1997) “Information Cascades in the Laboratory,” American Economic Review, 87:5 (December), 847-862. Keywords: experiments, information, decisions, cascades, logit errors,. Abstract: When binary decisions are made sequentially, agents will use the information implicit in others' decisions, which will sometimes cause them to "ignore" their own information and follow the others in an information cascade. Such behavior is observed in laboratory experiments reported here. Email Contact: lrande@mail.wm.edu

Anderson, Lisa, and Charles A. Holt (1998) “Information Cascade Experiments,” in Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, edited by C. R. Plott and V. L. Smith, New York: Elsevier Press, forthcoming. Keywords: experiments, information, survey, information cascades, information, Bayes' rule. Abstract Results of information cascade experiments are summarized. Email Contact: lrande@mail.wm.edu

Banks, Jeffrey S., Colin Camerer, and David P. Porter (1994) “An Experimental Analysis of Nash Refinements in Signaling Games,” Games and Economic Behavior, 6:1 (January), 1-31. Keywords: experiments, information, signaling, Nash refinements. Abstract: Subjects play a series of randomly ordered signaling games. These games have multiple equilibria, one of which is "ruled out" by a refinement of the sequential Nash concept. For the games considered, the refinements predict well, at least up to the Divinity refinement ("refine to divine" as one coauthor remarked). Email Contact: bnks@hss.caltech.edu

Beckmann, K., and M. Werding (1996) “'Passauer Wahlborse': Information Processing in a Political Market Experiment,” Kyklos, 49:2 171-204. Keywords: experiments, information, markets, political stock markets.

Benson, Bruce L., and Robert M. Feinberg (1988) “An Experimental Investigation of Equilibrium ** Impacts of Information,” Southern Economic Journal, 54:3 (January), 546-561. Keywords: experiments, information. Email Contact: bbenson@coss.fsu.edu

Berg, Joyce E., Lane A. Daley, John W. Dickhaut, and John O'Brien (1992) “Moral Hazard and Risk Sharing: Experimental Evidence,” in Research in Experimental Economics, Vol. 5, edited by R. M. Isaac, Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1-34. Keywords: experiments, information, principal agent model, moral hazard, contracts, risk sharing, risk preference inducement, binary lottery method. Abstract In the experiments, a principal contracts with an agent who provides a costly input into the production process, and moral hazard results when contracts cannot be contingent on the agent's decision. Data support agency theory and the subgame perfect equilibrium. Risk preferences are induced with a modified binary lottery procedure. Email Contact: joyce-berg@uiowa.edu

Camerer, Colin F., and Howard Kunreuther (1989) “Experimental Markets for Insurance,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 2:3 (September), 265-300. Keywords: experiments, information, insurance, markets. Email Contact: camerer@hss.caltech.edu

Chappe, Nathalie (1999) “Hidden Quality and Arbitration Clause,” CRESE, Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1999 European Regional ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, information, game theory, quality, guarantee. Abstract: The experiment implements a duopoly market in which each firm's quality is determined exogeneously and is not observed by buyers prior to purchase. If sellers can signal quality by offering a guarantee (an "arbitration clause"), the result is that such clauses signal high quality. Email Contact: christian.at@univ-fcomte.fr

Charness, Gary, and Nuno Garoupa (1998) “Reputation and Honesty in a Market for Information,” Pompeu Fabra University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, information, mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, reputations. Abstract: Subjects placed in the role of financial advisors have a short-term incentive to provide false information when the asset value is low. Reputation effects in fixed-pairings produce a high degree of truthful advice. Email Contact: charness@upf.es

Coller, Maribeth, Julia Higgs, and Stephen Wheeler (1999) “An Experimental Market Analysis of the Determinants of Auditor Premature Sign-Off Acts,” University of South Carolina, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, information, accounting, auditor behavior. Email Contact: mbeth@darla.badm.sc.edu

Coricelli, Giorgio, and Luigi Luini (1998) “Double Moral Hazard: An Experiment on Warranties,” University of Arizona, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, information, warranties, markets, quality. Abstract: Sellers in the experimental markets choose quality and buyers choose care, creating a double moral hazard problem that is not solved by warranties alone. The effects of signals and reputations in an intertemporal model depend on whether quality and consumer care are complements or substitutes. Email Contact: coricelli@econlab.arizona.edu

de Marcellis, Nathalie (1998) “The Impact of Ambiguity on Insurance Supply,” Cachan, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, information, ambiguity aversion, insurance. Email Contact: marcelli@grid.ens-cachan.fr

DeJong, Douglas V., Robert Forsythe, and Russell Lundholm (1985) “Ripoffs, Lemons, and Reputation Formation in Agency Relationships: A Laboratory Market Study,” Journal of Finance, 40(July), 809-823. Keywords: experiments, information, markets, posted offer, quality, asymmetric information, lemons markets. Email Contact: dejong@blue.weeg.uiowa.edu

DeJong, Douglas V., Robert Forsythe, Russell Lundholm, and Wilfred C. Uecker (1985) “A Laboratory Investigation of the Moral Hazard Problem in an Agency Relationship,” Journal of Accounting Research, 23:supplement 81-120. Keywords: experiments, information, principal agent, moral hazard. Email Contact: dejong@blue.weeg.uiowa.edu

DeJong, Douglas V., Robert Forsythe, and Wilfred C. Uecker (1985) “The Relevance of Laboratory Markets for Examining Policy Issues in the Market for Audit Services,” The Accounting Forum, (December), 27-41. Keywords: experiments, information, markets, audit services, accounting. Email Contact: dejong@blue.weeg.uiowa.edu

DeJong, Douglas, Robert Forsythe, and J. Schatzberg (1986) “An Empirical Examination of Agency Costs in Laboratory Markets,” in Laboratory Market Research, edited by S. Moriarty, Norman, Ok.: University of Oklahoma Press, 86-116. Keywords: experiments, information, agency costs, accounting. Email Contact: dejong@blue.weeg.uiowa.edu

DeJong, Douglas V., Robert Forsythe, J. Kim, and Wilfred C. Uecker (1989) “A Laboratory Investigation of Alternative Transfer Pricing Mechanisms,” Accounting, Organizations and Society, 1441-64. Keywords: experiments, information, transfer pricing, accounting. Email Contact: dejong@blue.weeg.uiowa.edu

DeJong, Douglas V., and Robert Forsythe (1992) “A Perspective on the Use of Experimental Economics in Auditing Research,” Accounting Review, 67157-171. Keywords: experiments, information, auditing, accounting. Email Contact: dejong@blue.weeg.uiowa.edu

Dickhaut, John W., Kevin A. McCabe, and Arijit Mukherji (1995) “An Experimental Study of Strategic Information Transmission,” Economic Theory, 6:3 (November), 389-403. Keywords: experiments, information. Email Contact: jdickhaut@csom.umn.edu

Dickhaut, John, Arijit Mukherji, and Haresh Sapra (1998) “Information Management and Valuation: An Experimental Investigation,” University of Minnesota, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, information. Abstract: Some subjects are placed in the roles of information managers for firms who decide which information to disclose to other subjects who are investors. Favorable information is more likely to be released, and therefore is discounted to some extent by investors. Email Contact: jdickhaut@csom.umn.edu

Dopuch, Nicholas, Ronald R. King, and David E. Wallin (1989) “The Use of Experimental Markets in Auditing Research: Some Initial Findings,” Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 8:Supp. 98-127. Keywords: experiments, information, disclosure, asset markets, asymmetric information. Abstract: Seller verification and buyer report mechanisms tend to increase efficiency in laboratory markets with asymmetric information.

Epstein, Seth (1992) “Testing Principal-Agent Theory,” in Research in Experimental Economics, Vol. 5, edited by R. M. Isaac, Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 35-60. Keywords: experiments, information, game theory, principal agent model, contracts, reservation wage, moral hazard, complexity. Abstract The basic principal agent model is specified to include a wage alternative available to the agent if the contract is rejected. Results are sensitive to compelxity and visual stimuli, and provide only mixed support for the predictions of principal agent models. Email

Forsythe, Robert, and Russell Lundholm (1990) “Information Aggregation in an Experimental Market,” Econometrica, 58:2 (March), 309-347. Keywords: experiments, information, asset markets, information aggregation. Email Contact: robert_forsythe@uiowa.edu

Holt, Charles A., and Roger Sherman (1994) “The Loser's Curse,” American Economic Review, 84:3 642-652. Keywords: experiments, information, winner's curse, loser's curse, naive bidding, auctions, bargaining, asymmetric information. Abstract: In bilateral bargaining with asymmetric information, the uninformed agent bids too high and loses money in the winner's curse treatment and bids too low in the loser's curse treatment. The winner's curse is due to a failure to realize that an accepted bid puts an upper bound on the seller's value, and the loser's curse is due to a failure to realize that in increase in one's bid picks up relatively high-value items at the margin. Email Contact: holt@virginia.edu

Hurley, Terrance M., and Jason F. Shogren (1998) “An Experimental Investigation of Incomplete Information,” University of Wyoming, Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1998 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, information. Email Contact: tmhurley@iastate.edu

Keser, Claudia, and Mark** Willinger (2000) “Cooperation in Symmetric Duopolies with Demand Inertia,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 18:1 (January), 163-185*. Keywords: experiments, information, principal/agent models. Email Contact: Keser@vwl3.wiwi.uni-karlsruhe.de

King, Ronald R., and David E. Wallin (***) “Market-Induced Information Disclosures: An Experimental Markets Investigation,” Contemporary Accounting Research, 8:1 170-197. Keywords: experiments, information, disclosure, unraveling effect, asymmetric information. Abstract: The experiments test the theoretical "unraveling" proposition that sellers with private information will fully disclose private information about their products, due to adverse inferences that buyers will draw from non-disclosure. The outcomes converge towards full disclosure when buyers know the range of seller disclosure options and then the number of such options is large.

King, Ronald R., and David E. Wallin (***) “The Effects of Antifraud Rules and Ex Post Verifiability on Managerial Disclosures,” Contemporary Accounting Research, 6:2 859-892. Keywords: experiments, information, disclosure, unraveling effect, asymmetric information.

King, Ronald R., and David E. Wallin (1991) “Voluntary Disclosures When Seller's Level of Information is Unknown,” Journal of Accounting Research, 29:1 (Spring), 96-108. Keywords: experiments, information, markets, disclosure, asymmetric information. Abstract: The paper reports market experiments in which buyers did not know whether or not sellers were informed, and sellers could voluntarily disclose information. Results are qualitatively consistent with theoretical predictions that sellers will not fully disclose information in this environment. Deviations from point predictions of the theory are discussed.

Kraemer, Carlo, and Markus Nöth (1999) “Information Aggregation with Costly Signals and Random Ordering: Experimental Evidence,” University of Manheim, Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1999 European Regional ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, information, cascades, probability judgement, Bayes' rule. Abstract: Subjects are selected in a random order to make a decision on the basis of others' previous decisions and on a costly signal if it is purchased. About half of the subjects overestimate the value of a private signal, which results in excessive information purchases and reduced conformity. Email Contact: kraemer@bank.bwl.uni-mannheim.de

Lynch, Michael, Ross M. Miller, Charles R. Plott, and Russell Porter (1991) “Product Quality, Informational Efficiency, and Regulations in Experimental Markets,” in Research in Experimental Economics, Vol. 4, edited by R. M. Isaac, Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 269-318. Keywords: experiments, information, markets, quality, information, regulation. Email

Madies, Philippe (1999) “Self-Fulfilling Bank Panics: How to Avoid Them? An Experimental Study,” University of Lyon, Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1999 European Regional ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, information, bank runs. Abstract: The experiment sets up a situation in which bank runs are persistent. Such runs may be diminished by partial or total suspension of deposit convertibility. Email Contact: madies@gate.cnrs.fr

Mayhew, Brian, Galen Sevcik, and Jeffrey Schatzberg (1999) “The Effect of Accounting Uncertainty and Auditor Reputation on Auditor Independence,” University of Arizona, presented at the Fall 1999 European Regional ESA Meetings, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, information, auditor behavior, accounting. Abstract: Subjects with auditor roles must choose an accounting treatment under conditions where the client's preferred treatment differs from the treatment that seems best on the basis of the auditor's own information. The paper considers the relationship between uncertainty and auditor reputation for independence. Email Contact: jschatzberg@bpa.arizona.edu

Nöth, Markus (1999) “Greed and Fear: Information Aggregation with Endogenous Ordering in an Experiment,” University of Mannheim, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1999 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, information, information cascades, endogenous timing, Bayes' rule, information aggregation. Email Contact: noeth@bank.BWL.uni-mannheim.de

Oosterbeek, Hessel, Hester Sloof, and Joep Sonnemans (1999) “Up-or-Out Contracts and the Promise of Promotions: An Experiment,” University of Amsterdam, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1999 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, information, game theory, asymmetric information, up-or-out contracts, promotion, labor economics, reciprocity. Email Contact: sloof@fee.uva.nl

Philipich, Kirk, Steven Schwartz, and Richard A. Young (1999) “Contracting and Reputation Formation in a Repeated Investment Setting,” Ohio State University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1999 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, information, principal agent model, contracts, reputation. Email Contact: sschwart@mail.binghampton.edu

Posey, Lisa I., and Abdullah Yavas (1999) “Screening Equilibria in Experimental Markets,” Pennsylvania State University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1999 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, information, screening, asymmetric information, insurance. Email Contact: ayavas@psu.edu

Potters, Jan, and Frans van Winden (1996) “Comparative Statics of a Signaling Game: An Experimental Study,” International Journal of Game Theory, 25:3 329-353. Keywords: experiments, information, signaling, game theory. Email Contact: j.j.m.potters@kub.nl

Rebitzer, Jim, and Robert Slonim (1999) “Moral Hazard, Risk and Incentive Attribution in Small Groups,” Case Western Reserve University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1999 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, information, moral hazard, incentives, partnerships, contracts. Email Contact: rls18@guinness.som.cwru.edu

Sadiraj, Klarita, Arthur Schram, and Sweder van Wijnbergen (1999) “Rational Behavior Versus Herd Behavior: Theoretical and Experimental Analysis,” University of Amsterdam, Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1999 European Regional ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, information, ponzi scheme, herd behavior, asymmetric information. Abstract: The ponzi scheme setup has two types of players; the informed players have information that enables them to decide when to withdraw their investment. In the experiments, the uninformed react to the choices of the informed in a kind of herd-like behavior.

Smith, Vernon L., J. Schatzberg, and W. Waller (1987) “Experimental Economics and Auditing,” Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, (Fall), 71-93. Keywords: experiments, information, accounting, survey. Email Contact: vls@econlab.arizona.edu

Urbany, J. E. (1986) “An Experimental Examination of the Economics of Information,” Journal of Consumer Research, 13:2 (September), 257-271. Keywords: experiments, information.

van der Heijden, Eline, J. Nelissen, Jan Potters, and Harrie Verbon (1998) “Transfers and the Effect of Monitoring in an Overlapping-Generations Experiment,” European Economic Review, 421363-1391. Keywords: experiments, information, monitoring, overlapping generations. Email Contact: j.j.m.potters@kub.nl

Vogt, Bodo (1998) “The Selection Between Different Types of Agents Compared with the Structure of the Incentives if the Action of the Agent is Hidden in a Principal-Agent Problem,” University of Bielefeld, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, information, principal agent model. Email Contact: bvogt@wiwi.uni-bielefeld.de

Ziegelmeyer, Anthony* (1998) “Information Externalities and Endogenous Timing of Decisions: A New Experimental Evidence with Many Agents,” University Louis Pasteur, Strasbourg, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, information, cascades. Abstract: The subjects in the experiment must decide when to make a decision. The advantage of waiting is that it allows one to learn from others' decisions, but waiting is costly. In this setup, the timing of decisions is endogenous, and there exist asymmetric pure-strategy equilibrium in which some people go first and others wait, even though they have equally informative signals. Email Contact: sas@cournot.u-strasbg.fr

Ziegelmeyer, Anthony (1999) “Endogenous Social Learning: An Experimental Investigation,” Louis Pasteur University, Strasbourg, Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1999 European Regional ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, information, social learning. Email Contact: sas@cournot.u-strasbg.fr