Y2K Bibliography of Experimental Economics and Social Science
Game Theory Experiments
(excluding bargaining, public goods, and auctions)

Charles A. Holt, cah2k@virginia.edu, suggestions and corrections welcome
(for online and personal use only)

Abbink, Klaus, Joachim Buchta, Abdolkarim Sadrieh, and Reinhard Selten (1998) “How to Play 3x3-Games,” University of Bonn, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, game theory, matrix games. Abstract: Subjects submitted strategies for playing 3x3 matrix games, which were translated into computer programs. The programs were randomly matched in a computer tournament. Behavior converged toward the predictions of a pure-strategy equilibrium. Email Contact: selten@lab.econ1.uni-bonn.de, abbink@lab.econ1.uni-bonn.de

Abbink, Klaus (1999) “Staff Rotation: A Powerful Weapon Against Corruption?,” University of Bonn, Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1999 European Regional ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, game theory, bribery, corruption, rotation. Abstract: Subjects have the role of a public official or a potential briber. Random rematching of official/briber pairings reduces the extent of "corrupt" behavior in the experiment. Email Contact: abbink@lab.econ1.uni-bonn.de

Abbink, Klaus, Bernd Irlenbusch, and Elke Renner (1999) “An Experimental Bribery Game,” University of Bonn, Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1999 European Regional ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, game theory, bribery game, reciprocity, externalities. Abstract: The experiment implements bribery in terms of a reciprocal, ongoing relationship between two participants that is socially inefficient due to negative external effects. Reciprocal bribery relationships develop, and their frequency is independent of whether or not negative externalities accrue to others. Bribery activity is reduced by the introduction of a small chance of detection and earnings confiscation. Email Contact: abbink@lab.econ1.uni-bonn.de

Abbink, Klaus, Bernd Irlenbusch, and Elke Renner (2000) “The Moonlighting Game - An Experimental Study of Reciprocity and Retibution,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, forthcoming. Keywords: experiments, game theory, reciprocity. Email Contact: abbink@lab.econ1.uni-bonn.de

Ahn, Toh-Kyeong, Elinor Ostrom, and James Walker (1998) “Trust and Reciprocity; Experimental Evidence from PD Games,” Indiana University, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, game theory, prisoner's dilemma, cooperation, trust, reciprocity. Email Contact: walkerj@indiana.edu

Ahn, Toh-Kyeong, Elinor Ostrom, David Schmidt, Robert Shupp, and James Walker (1999) “Dilemma Games: Game Parameters and Matching Protocols,” Indiana University, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, game theory, prisoner's dilemma, cooperation, matching protocols. Email Contact: walkerj@indiana.edu

Ahn, Toh-Kyeong, Elinor Ostrom, David Schmidt, Robert Shupp, and James Walker (1999) “Cooperation in PD Games: Fear, Greed, and History of Play,” Public Choice, forthcoming. Keywords: experiments, game theory, prisoner's dilemma, cooperation. Email Contact: walkerj@indiana.edu

Anderhub, Vital, Simon Gächter, and Manfred Königstein (1998) “Efficient Contracting and Fair Play in a Simple Principal-Agent Experiment,” Humboldt University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, game theory, principal agent model, contracts, linear contracts, inequality aversion, fairness. Abstract: The principals in the experiment tend to use contracts that provide the agent with 100% of the returns, i.e. selling the firm. The sale price (negative fixed wage) is not high enough to capture all surplus for the principal, as predicted in a subgame perfect equilibrium with an ultimatum contract offer. Instead, the fixed payment tends to be adjusted to provide an equal split of the surplus. Email Contact: mkoenig@wiwi.hu-berlin.de

Anderhub, Vital, Manfred Königstein, and Dorothea Kuebler (1999) “Long-Term Contracts Versus Sequential Spot Markets: Experimental Analysis,” University of Zurich, Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1999 European Regional ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, game theory, contracts, investment. Abstract: The experiment implements a two-period game in which the agent makes an investment decision, under the protection of a long-term contract in one treatment, and without that protection in the other treatment. Contract length is correlated with the amount of investment, which conflicts with the game-theoretic prediction. Email Contact: mkoenig@wiwi.hu-berlin.de

Anderson, Simon P., Jacob K. Goeree, and Charles A. Holt (1997) “Stochastic Game Theory: Adjustment and Equilibrium with Bounded Rationality,” University of Virginia, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, game theory, evolution, logit equilibrium, potential games, quantal response. Abstract: This paper specifies an evolutionary model in which agents adjust their decisions in the direction of higher expected payoff, subject to random error (Brownian motion). The process produces a probability distribution of players' decisions that evolves over time according to the Fokker-Planck equation. The evolutionary process is stable for all potential games, and the steady state is a logit equilibrium, so the analysis provides a dynamic justification for the use of this one-parameter generalization of a Nash equilibrium. The evolutionary paths and steady state are sensitive to payoff differences that do not affect the Nash equilibrium, so the stochastic game theory approach can be used to explain intuitive results of laboratory experiments that are "anomalous" when viewed from the perfect rationality perspective of a Nash equilibrium. Email Contact: sa9w@virginia.edu

Anderson, Simon P., Jacob K. Goeree, and Charles A. Holt (1998) “Rent Seeking with Bounded Rationality: An Analysis of the All Pay Auction,” Journal of Political Economy, 106:4 (August), 828-853. Keywords: rent seeking, experiments, game theory, logit equilibrium, bounded rationality, quantal response. Abstract: A (logit) model of bounded rationality is used to explain why the extent of rent dissipation in an all-pay auction may is increasing in the number of competitors, effort costs, and other factors that have no effect in a Nash analysis. The paper derives existence, uniqueness, and intuitive comparative statics results for the logit equilibrium model. Email Contact: sa9w@virginia.edu

Anderson, Simon P., Jacob K. Goeree, and Charles A. Holt (1998) “Logit Equilibrium Models of Anomalous Behavior: What to Do when the Nash Equilibrium Says One Thing and the Data Say Something Else,” in Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, edited by C. R. Plott and V. L. Smith, New York: Elsevier Press, forthcoming. Keywords: experiments, game theory, survey, bounded rationality, logit equilibrium, quantal response equilibrium, traveler's dilemma, decision error. Abstract This paper shows how the logit equilibrium can be used to explain anomalous data patterns in a variety of games. Email Contact: sa9w@virginia.edu

Anderson, Chris, Colin Camerer, and Tech H. Ho (1998) “Learning and Logic-Based Refinements in Signaling Games,” University of Pennsylvania, Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1998 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, game theory, refinements, learning. Abstract: Experience-weighted attraction models of learning are adapted to explain patterns of adjustment in signaling games with many periods. Email Contact: camerer@hss.caltech.edu

Anderson, Simon P., Jacob Goeree, and Charles A. Holt (1998) “Control Costs and Equilibria in Games with Bounded Rationality,” University of Virginia, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, game theory, control costs, quantal response equilibrium. Abstract: Van Damme's notion of control costs is that it is more costly to implement decisions more precisely. This paper derives the relationship between control costs and noisy approaches to equilibrium in games. In two-by-two games, quantal response equilibria are equivalent to Nash equilibria with control costs. Extensions to N-person matrix games are also discussed. Email Contact: jg2n@virginia.edu

Anderson, Simon P., Jacob K. Goeree, and Charles A. Holt (1999) “Properties of Logit Equilibria in Games with Rank-Based Payoffs,” University of Virginia, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, game theory, logit equilibrium, existence, uniqueness, symmetry, comparative statics, minimum effort coordination, order statistic coordination games, Bertrand price competition, traveler's dilemma, best shot game, all-pay auction. Abstract: The paper characterizes the logit equilibria for a class of games with payoffs that depend on the ranking of players' decisions, including Bertrand price competition, the all-pay auction, Hotelling's location game, the traveler's dilemma, and many variants of coordination games. General existence, uniqueness, and comparative proofs are presented and applied. Email Contact: holt@virginia.edu

Anderson, Simon P., Jacob K. Goeree, and Charles A. Holt (2000) “Minimum Effort Coordination Games: An Equilibrium Analysis of Bounded Rationality,” Games and Economic Behavior, forthcoming. Keywords: experiments, game theory, logit equilibrium, coordination, learning, potential games, stochastic potential, evolution, quantal response. Abstract: This paper considers minimum-effort coordination games with a continuum of Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria. The introduction of noise yields a unique probability distribution of effort decisions that maximizes a stochastic potential function (expected value of the potential of the game plus entrophy). As the noise vanishes, the limiting distribution converges to an outcome that is analogous to the risk-dominant outcome in two-by-two games. In accordance with experimental evidence and economic intuition, the theory predicts that effort distributions decrease with increases in effort cost and the number of players, even though these parameters do not affect the set of Nash equilibria. Email Contact: sa9w@virginia.edu

Andreoni, James, and John H. Miller (1993) “Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: Experimental Evidence,” Economic Journal, 103:418 (May), 570-585. Keywords: experiments, games, prisoner's dilemma, cooperation, backward induction. Email Contact: andreoni@facstaff.wisc.edu

Andreoni, James, and Hal Varian (1999) “Pre-Play Contracting in the Prisoner's Dilemma,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 96(September), 10933-10938. Keywords: experiments, game theory, prisoner's dilemma, contracting. Abstract: The prisoner's dilemma is modified by adding an initial stage in which players can precommit to reward the other one for a cooperative decision in the second stage. This modification greatly increases the rate of cooperation. Email Contact: andreoni@facstaff.wisc.edu, hal@sims.berkeley.edu

Atkinson, Richard C., and Patrick Suppes (1958) “An Analysis of Two-Person Game Situations in Terms of Statistical Learning Theory,” Journal of Experimental Psychology, 55369-378. Keywords: experiments, game theory, learning, statistical learning theory.

Axelrod, Robert (1970) Conflict of Interest, Chicago: Markham. Keywords: experiments, game theory, prisoner's dilemma, cooperation, evolution.

Axelrod, Robert (1984) The Evolution of Cooperation, New York: Basic Books. Keywords: experiments, game theory, prisoner's dilemma, cooperation, evolution.

Axelrod, Robert (1986) “An Evolutionary Approach to Norms,” American Political Science Review, 80:4 (December), 1095-1111. Keywords: experiments, game theory, prisoner's dilemma, cooperation, tit-for-tat strategies.

Bacharach, M., and Michele Bernasconi (1995) “The Variable Frame Theory of Focal Points: An Experimental Study,” Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, game theory, focal points.

Battalio, Raymond C., Larry Samuelson, and John Van Huyck (1997) “Risk Dominance, Payoff Dominance, and Probabilistic Choice Learning,” Texas A&M University, Keywords: experiments, game theory, probabilistic choice, learning, risk dominance. Email Contact: rcb@esl1.tamu.edu

Beard, T. Randolph, and Richard O. Beil Jr. (1994) “Do People Rely on the Self-Interested Utility Maximization of Others? An Experimental Test,” Management Science, 40252-262. Keywords: experiments, game theory, sequential games, two-stage games, bounded rationality, errors. Abstract: The experiments involve two stage games in which one player chooses between a safe (punishment proof) and a risky strategy. The second player sees the decision and decides whether to deliver a costly punishment. The frequency of the subgame perfect equilibrium (risky, not punish) depends on changes in payoff parameters that do not alter the equilibrium. Email Contact: rbeard@business.auburn.edu

Beckman, Steven R. (1990) “Producer's Dilemma Experiments,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 27-46. Keywords: experiments, game theory, producer's dilemma. Email Contact: sbeckman@castle.cudenver.edu

Beckman, Steven R. (1990) “Producer's Dilemma Experiments: Reply,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 14:2 (October), 287. Keywords: experiments, game theory, producer's dilemma. Email Contact: sbeckman@castle.cudenver.edu

Beil, Richard, T. Randolph Beard, and Yoshiharu Mataga (1998) “Cultural Determinants of Economic Success: Trust and Cooperation in the U.S. and Japan,” Auburn University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, game theory, trust, cooperation, cultural comparisons, international comparisons, Japan. Abstract: The experiment provides a comparison of the behavior of Japanese and U.S. business students in a game where an initial move may involve some element of trust. The setting is a two-stage game with perfect information. The authors conclude that Japanese students are less trusting in this context. Email Contact: RBEIL@business.auburn.edu

Belda, Carles Sola (1999) “Punishment in Sequential Games: Experimental Evidence,” in , Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, . Keywords: experiments, game theory, punishments, sequential games. Email

Bennett, J. W. (1987) “Strategic Behavior: Some Experimental Evidence,” Journal of Public Economics, 32:3 (April), 355-368. Keywords: experiments, game theory.

Berg, Joyce E., John. W. Dickhaut, and Kevin. A. McCabe (1995) “Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History,” Games and Economic Behavior, 10:1 (July), 122-142. Keywords: experiments, game theory, trust game, fairness, social history. Email Contact: joyce-berg@uiowa.edu

Berninghaus, Siegfried K., and Karl-Martin Ehrhart (1998) “Time Horizon and Equilibrium Selection in Tacit Coordination Games: Experimental Results,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 37:2 (October), 231-248. Keywords: experiments, game theory, coordination, repetition, learning direction theory, equilibrium selections. Abstract: Repeated play of coordination games results in the selection of the Pareto dominant equilibrium. Results are consistent with learning direction theory. Email Contact: sbe@vwl3.wiwi.uni-karlsruhe.de

Berninghaus, Siegfried K., Karl-Martin Ehrart, and Claudia Keser (1999) “Continuous-Time Strategy Selection in Linear Population Games,” Experimental Economics, 2:1 41-57. Keywords: experiments, game theory, population games, continuous time,. Email Contact: sbe@vwl3.wiwi.uni-karlsruhe.de

Berninghaus, Siegfried, Karl-Martin Ehrhart, and Claudia Keser (1999) “The Invisible Hand: Experiments on Strategy Selection in Population Games,” Karlsruhe University, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, game theory, incomplete information, population game, evolution. Abstract: In an experimental evolutionary game, subjects spend more time near the socially efficient state if it is an equilibrium and if there is incomplete payoff information. Email Contact: sbe@vwl3.wiwi.uni-karlsruhe.de

Bienert, Horst, and Alexander Karmann (1998) “The Subscriber's Dilemma: Excess Demand in Experimental Stock Issuing,” Dresden, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, game theory, asset markets, stock issue, transactions costs, beauty contest guessing game. Abstract: Investors participating in an "oversubscribed" initital stock offering may have an incentive to overstate their intrinsic demands in order to obtain more shares if allocations are rationed in proportion to demand. The absence of a unique Nash equilibrium in this context is the motivation for the subscriber's dilemma experiments. Email Contact: karmann@rcs.urz.tu-dresden.de, horst.bienert@t-online.de

Binmore, Kenneth (1987) “Why Game Theory 'Doesn't Work',” in Analyzing Conflict and Its Resolution: Some Mathematical Contributions, edited by P. Bennett, Oxford: Clarendon Press, ***. Keywords: experiments, game theory, Nash equilibrium. Email Contact: k.binmore@ucl.ac.uk

Binmore, Kenneth, Avner Shaked, and John Sutton (1989) “An Outside Option Experiment,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104:4 (November), 753-770. Keywords: experiments, game theory, outside option. Email Contact: k.binmore@ucl.ac.uk

Bixenstine, E., C. Levitt, and K. Wilson (1966) “Collaboration Among Six Persons in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 10488-496. Keywords: experiments, game theory, prisoner's dilemma, cooperation.

Bloomfield, Robert J. (1994) “Learning a Mixed Strategy Equilibrium in the Laboratory,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 25:3 (December), 411-436. Keywords: experiments, game theory, mixed equilibrium, learning. Email Contact: rjb9@cornell.edu

Blume, Andreus, and Uri Gneezy (1998) “An Experimental Study of Optimal Learning in Games,” University of Iowa, Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1998 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, game theory, learning. Email Contact: ablume@blue.weeg.uiowa.edu

Blume, Andreas, Douglas DeJong, George R. Neumann, and N.E. Savin (1998) “Learning in Sender-Receiver Games,” University of Iowa, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, game theory, signaling games, belief learning, reinforcement learning, econometrics. Abstract: This paper compares the explanatory power of belief and reinforcement learning models in the context of signaling games. Email Contact: ablume@blue.weeg.uiowa.edu

Blume, Andreas, Douglas DeJong, Y.-G. Kim, and G. Sprinkle (1998) “Experimental Evidence on the Evolution of Meaning of Messages in Sender-Receiver Games,” American Economic Review, 88:5 (December), 1323-1340. Keywords: experiments, game theory, information, signaling games, learning.

Blume, Andreas, and Andreas Ortmann (1999) “The Effects of Costless Pre-play Communication: Experimental Evidence from a Game with Pareto-ranked Equilibria,” University of Iowa, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1999 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, game theory, coordination games, cheap talk. Abstract: The experiment introduces costless preplay communication into a multi-player coordination game with multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria. This communication results in immediate convergence to the Pareto-efficient outcome. Email Contact: ablume@blue.weeg.uiowa.edu

Bohnet, Iris, and Dorothea Küebler (1999) “If Only We Could Choose the World We Want to Live in: Sorting in the Prisoner's Dilemma,” Harvard University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1999 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, game theory, psychology, prisoner's dilemma, incentive to defect, choice of games. Email Contact: iris_bohnet@harvard.edu

Bohnet, Iris, and B. S. Frey (1999) “The Sound of Silence in Prisoner's Dilemma and Dictator Games,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 38:1 (January), 43-57. Keywords: experiments, game theory, bargaining, prisoner's dilemma, dictator game, social distance, identification, information. Abstract: The paper examines the effects of relaxing the strict anonymity conditions that are standard in most prisoner's dilemma and dictator experiments, Knowing the other player's identity increases cooperative behavior, even in the absence of cooperation. Email Contact: iris_bohnet@harvard.edu

Bolle, Friedel, and P. Ockenfels (1990) “Prisoners' Dilemma as a Game with Incomplete Information,” Journal of Economic Psychology, 11:1 (March), 69-84. Keywords: experiments, game theory, prisoner's dilemma, incomplete information. Email Contact: bolle@euv-frankfurt-o.de

Bolle, Friedel (1994) “Team Selection--An Experimental Investigation,” Journal of Economic Psychology, 15:3 (September), 511-536. Keywords: experiments, game theory. Email Contact: bolle@euv-frankfurt-o.de

Bolle, Friedel, and Alexander Kritikos (1998) “On the Existence of Reciprocity and Altruism: Contradictions to ERC and FCC,” Europa-University, Viadrina, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, game theory, altruism, reciprocity, distributional preferences. Abstract: The paper reports experiments which indicate that subjects' preferences exhibit reciprocity, altruism, and concern for distribution of payoffs among others. Some of the results are inconsistent with recent theories of inequity aversion. Email Contact: bolle@euv-frankfurt-o.de

Bolton, Gary E., Jordi Brandts, and Axel Ockenfels (1998) “Measuring Motivations for the Reciprocal Responses Observed in a Simple Dilemma Game,” Experimental Economics, 1:3 207-219. Keywords: experiments, game theory, dilemma game, reciprocity. Email Contact: geb3@psu.edu

Bolton, Gary E., and Axel Ockenfels (1998) “A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition,” American Economic Review, forthcoming. Keywords: experiments, game theory, bargaining, public, voluntary contributions, fairness, equity, inequality aversion, prisoner's dilemmas. Abstract: This paper presents a model of other-regarding preferences that based on the idea that people are motivated by their own money payoff and by their relative payoff standing. The theory explains behavior in a variety of laboratory situations that include market competition, public goods, and bargaining. Email Contact: axel.ockenfels@ww.uni-magdeburg.de

Bonacich, Phillip (1970) “Putting the Dilemma Back into Prisoner's Dilemma,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 14379-387. Keywords: experiments, game theory, prisoner's dilemma.

Bornstein, Gary, Ido Erev, and Green H. (1994) “Learning Processes and Reciprocity in Intergroup Conflicts,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 38690-707. Keywords: experiments, game theory, learning.

Bornstein, Gary, and Meyrav Ben-Yossef (1995**) “Competition in Inter-Group and Single-Group Social Dilemmas,” European Journal of Social Psychology, . Keywords: experiments, game theory, social dilemmas, intergroup competition, groups.

Bornstein, Gary, Ido Erev, and Harel Green (1995**) “The Effect of Repeated Play in the PG and IPD Team Games,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, . Keywords: experiments, game theory, prisoner's dilemma, intergroup competition, groups.

Bornstein, Gary, Uri Gneezy, and Rosmarie Nagel (1999) “The Effect of Intergrouup Competition on Group Coordination: An Experimental Study,” Hebrew University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1999 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, game theory, coordination, minimum effort game, intergroup competition. Email Contact: nagel@upf.es

Bosch-Domenech, Antoni, Rosemarie Nagel, and Albert Satorra (1998) “One, Two, (Three), ... Infinity: Iterated Reasoning in Newspaper Beauty-Contest Experiments,” Pompeu Fabra University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, game theory, beauty contest game, iterated introspection. Abstract: Each subject in the game chooses a number, with a prize going to the person whose choice is closest to two-thirds of the average of all chosen numbers. The results obtained from running a field experiment through the newspaper are similar to those obtained in the laboratory, where student subjects seldom engage in more than three iterations of introspective guessing. Email Contact: nagel@upf.es, bosch@upf.es

Bouchez, Nichole Marie (1999) “Learning Models in a Three by Three Bimatrix World,” University of California at Santa Cruz, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1999 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, game theory, learning, 3x3 matrix games, belief learning, reinforcement learning. Email Contact: bouchez@cats.ucsc.edu

Bower, Joseph L. (1965) “The Role of Conflict in Economic Decision Making Groups: Some Empirical Results,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 79:2 (May), 263-277. Keywords: experiments, game theory.

Boylan, Richard T., and Mahmoud A. El-Gamal (1993) “Ficticious Play: A Statistical Study of Multiple Economic Experiments,” Games and Economic Behavior, 5205-222. Keywords: experiments, game theory, learning, ficticious play. Email Contact: melgamal@1.wisc.edu

Bracht, Juergen, Christian Lebiere, and Dieter Wallach (1998) “A Comparison of ACT-R and Reinforcement Based Learning in Experimental Games with Unique Mixed Strategy Equilibria,” University of Basel, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, game theory, learning, reinforcement learning, ACT-R. Abstract: An ACT-R theory is applied to strategic behavior in normal form games with unique mixed strategies. The simulations converge to the Nash equilibrium and follow adjustment observed patterns in experimental data. Reinforcement learning models are discussed. Email Contact: wallachd@ubaclu.unibas.ch

Brandts, Jordi, and Charles A. Holt (1992) “An Experimental Test of Equilibrium Dominance in Signaling Games,” American Economic Review, 82:5 (December), 1350-1365. Keywords: experiments, game theory, signaling games, equilibrium dominance, intuitive criterion, refinements. Abstract: Behavior in sender-receiver signaling games converges to the "more refined" equilibrium in games that are based on the "beer-quiche" example. However, behavior does not converge to the more refined equilibrium when the payoffs are manipulated in a way so that decisions in initial matchings conform to "out of equilibrium" beliefs that are ruled out by the refinements. The conclusion is that beliefs are determined by experience in the process of adjustment, not by deductive logic that begins with players in equilibrium and then considers what can be inferred if a player deviates. Email Contact: brandts@cc.uab.es

Brandts, Jordi, and Charles A. Holt (1992) “Forward Induction: Experimental Evidence from Two-stage Games with Complete Information,” in Research in Experimental Economics, Vol. 5, edited by R. M. Isaac, Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 119-136. Keywords: experiments, game theory, forward induction, matrix games, two-stage games. Abstract Forward induction formalizes the idea that actions taken in an early stage of a game can restrict reasonable beliefs about play off of the equilibrium path, which in turn can rule out equilibria that satisfy backward induction rationality. Observed play tends to converge to the equilibrium that is not ruled out by forward induction arguments. Email Contact: brandts@cc.uab.es

Brandts, Jordi, and Charles A. Holt (1993) “Adjustment Patterns and Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Signaling Games,” International Journal of Game Theory, 22:3 279-302. Keywords: experiments, game theory, signaling games, refinements, equilibrium selection, learning, equilibrium dominance, intuitive criterion. Abstract: Signaling games with "reverse type dependence" lead to behavior in the laboratory that violates all of the standard refinements of the Nash equilibrium (intuitive criterion, divinity, strategic stability, etc.) The history of the adjustment path seems to determine out-of-equilibrium beliefs that are ruled out by these refinements. Email Contact: brandts@cc.uab.es

Brandts, Jordi, and Charles A. Holt (1995) “Limitations of Dominance and Forward Induction: Experimental Evidence,” Economic Letters, 49:4 (October), 391-395. Keywords: experiments, game theory, forward induction, iterated elimination of dominated strategies. Email Contact: brandts@cc.uab.es

Brandts, Jordi, and W. B. MacLeod (1995) “Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Games with Recommended Play,” Games and Economic Behavior, 11:1 (October), 36-63. Keywords: experiments, game theory, equilibrium selection, recommended play. Email Contact: brandts@cc.uab.es

Brandts, Jordi, Jacob K. Goeree, and Charles A. Holt (1996, revised 1999) “Naive Bayesian Learning and Adjustment to Equilibrium in Signaling Games,” University of Virginia, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, game theory, signaling games, learning, simulation, refinements. Abstract: A logit learning model is used to explain dynamic adjustment patterns in signaling games. Simulations with the estimated learning and error parameters reproduce the qualitative behavior patterns in the choices made by human subjects. For some games, these adjustment paths lead to equilibria that are ruled out by the intuitive criterion and other refinements.

Brandts, Jordi, and Gary Charness (1998) “Hot vs. Cold: Sequential Responses and Preference Stability in Experimental Games,” Institute of Economic Analysis, Barcelona, Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1998 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, game theory, motives, psychology, fairness. Email Contact: brandts@cc.uab.es

Brandts, Jordi, and Enrique Fatas (1998) “Social Information as a Reference Point in an Experimental Social Dilemma,” Institute of Economic Analysis, Barcelona, Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1998 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, game theory, social dilemma, information. Email Contact: brandts@cc.uab.es

Brandts, Jordi, and Carles Sola (1998) “Reference Points and Negative Reciprocity in Simple Sequential Games,” University of Barcelona, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, game theory, sequential games, reference points, reciprocity. Abstract: The exeriments involves sequential two-person with ultimatum and best-shot structures. Punishments in the experiments seem to be explained in terms of fairness relative to reference points. Email Contact: csola@idea.uab.es

Brayer, A. R. (1964) “An Experimental Analysis of Some Variables of Minimax Theory,” Behavioral Science, 933-44. Keywords: experiments, game theory, minimax theory.

Broseta, Bruno, Miguel Costa-Gomes, and Vincent P. Crawford (1999) “Cognition and Behavior in Normal Form Games: An Experimental Study,” University of California at San Diego, Discussion Paper, presented at the Spring 1999 Public Choice Meetings. Keywords: experiments, game theory, normal form games, cognition, psychology. Abstract: The computer software used in these normal-form game experiments allows researchers to study cognitive processes by tracking the parts of the game tree that are examined by subjects. Email Contact: mgomes@weber.ucsd.edu, bbroseta@bpa.arizona.edu

Brown, J. N., and Robert W. Rosenthal (1990) “Testing the Minimax Hypothesis: A Re-examination of O'Neill's Game Experiment,” Econometrica, 58:5 (September), 1065-1081. Keywords: experiments, game theory, mixed strategies, matrix games.

Budescu, David V.*, and Amnon Rapoport (1994) “Subjective Randomization in One- and Two-Person Games,” Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 7261-278. Keywords: experiments, game theory, decisions, randomization. Email Contact: dbudescu@s.psych.uiuc.edu

Bull, Clive, Andrew Schotter, and Keith Weigelt (1987) “Tournaments and Piece Rates: An Experimental Study,” Journal of Political Economy, 95:1 (February), 1-33. Keywords: experiments, game theory, tournaments, contests, incentives.

Burnham, Terence C., Kevin A. McCabe, and Vernon L. Smith (2000) “Friend-or-Foe: Intentionality Priming in an Extensive Form Trust Game,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, forthcoming. Keywords: experiments, game theory, extensive form game, trust, intentionality. Email Contact: terence_burnham@harvard.edu

Burton, R. M., and B. Obel (1988) “Opportunism, Incentives, and the M-Form Hypothesis: A Laboratory Study,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 10:1 (July), 99-119. Keywords: experiments, game theory, opportunism.

Cachon, Gerard P., and Colin F. Camerer (1996) “Loss-Avoidance and Forward Induction in Experimental Coordination Games,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111:1 (February), 165-194. Keywords: experiments, game theory, coordination, forward induction, loss avoidance, biases.

Cadsby, Charles B., Murray Frank, and Vojislav Maksimovic (1992) “Equilibrium Dominance in Experimental Financial Markets,” University of Guelph, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, game theory, equilibrium dominance, asset markets.

Cain, Michael (1999) “An Experimental Test of Rational Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game,” University of Mississippi, Discussion Paper, presented at the Spring 1999 Public Choice Meetings. Keywords: experiments, game theory, prisoner's dilemma, cooperation.

Caldwell, M. (1976) “Communication and Sex Differences in a Five-Person and Prisoner's Dilemma Game,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 33273-280. Keywords: experiments, game theory, prisoner's dilemma, communication, gender effects.

Camerer, Colin F., and Keith Weigelt (1988) “Experimental Tests of a Sequential Equilibrium Reputation Model,” Econometrica, 56:1 (January), 1-36. Keywords: experiments, game theory, sequential games, reputation. Email Contact: camerer@hss.caltech.edu

Camerer, Colin F. (1990) “Behavioral Game Theory,” in Insights in Decision Making: Theory and Applications, edited by R. Hogarth, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 311-336. Keywords: experiments, game theory, behavioral game theory, biases, bounded rationality, psychology. Email Contact: camerer@hss.caltech.edu

Camerer, Colin F., M. Knez, and Roberto A. Weber (1996) “Timing and Virtual Observability in Ultimatum Bargaining and `Weak-Link' Coordination Games,” California Institute of Technology, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, game theory, ultimatum bargaining, minimum effort coordination, virtual observability. Email Contact: camerer@hss.caltech.edu

Camerer, Colin F. (1997) “Progress in Behavioral Game Theory,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 114(Fall), 167-188. Keywords: experiments, game theory, psychology, biases. Email Contact: camerer@hss.caltech.edu

Camerer, Colin F., and Teck-Hua Ho (1999) “Experience Weighted Attraction Learning in Normal-Form Games,” Econometrica, 67827-874. Keywords: experiments, game theory, learning, reinforcement learning. Abstract: This paper presents a general model of learning that nests the standard belief and reinforcement learning specifications. Many extensions are discussed and incorporated, and the estimated parameters support the use of a hybrid model. Email Contact: camerer@hss.caltech.edu

Camerer, Colin (1999) “Behavioral Economics: Reunifying Psychology and Economics,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 96(September), 10575-10577. Keywords: experiments, game theory, decisions, psychology, behavioral economics. Abstract: The theme of this brief survey is that behavioral economics, which reunites psychology and economics, will provide a better basis for making realistic assumptions about human decision making and economic interaction. The behavioral economics approach: 1) incorporates nonlinear probability weighting and reference points into an expected utility framework, 2) adds psychologically-based learning processes to the standard equilibrium analysis, and 3) revives Adam Smith's concern with other-regarding preferences as a way of explaining results of recent anomalous laboratory experiments. Email Contact: camerer@hss.caltech.edu

Capra, C. Monica, Jacob K. Goeree, Rosario Gomez, and Charles A. Holt (1998) “Learning and Noisy Equilibrium Behavior in an Experimental Study of Imperfect Price Competition,” University of Virginia, Discussion Paper, presented at the Conference of Experimental Economics in Osaka, 1999. Keywords: experiments, game theory, markets, logit equilibrium, simulation, bounded rationality, quantal response. Abstract: The experiments implement a model of imperfect price competition in which the high-price seller is allowed to match the lower price, but the resulting market share is less than one half. The Nash-Bertrand prediction is unaffected by the market share of the high-price seller, but the data respond sharply to changes in this treatment parameter, a response that is consistent with dynamic and equilibrium logit models of noisy behavior. Email Contact: jg2n@virginia.edu

Capra, C. Monica (1998) “An Experimental Investigation on the Effects of Entry Costs on the Probability of Entry,” University of Arkansas, Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1998 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, game theory, introspection, chicken game, Nash equilibrium. Abstract: This paper develops and tests a model of iterated noisy introspection in which expectations about what others think are determined endogenously by the payoff structure of the game. Data from two-person games of chicken are consistent with the qualitative predictions of the theory.

Capra, C. Monica, Jacob K. Goeree, Rosario Gomez, and Charles A. Holt (1999) “Anomalous Behavior in a Traveler's Dilemma?,” American Economic Review, 89:3 (June), 678-690. Keywords: experiments, game theory, traveler's dilemma, logit equilibrium, learning, simulation, bounded rationality, quantal response. Abstract: The observed choices in a traveler's dilemma experiment are moved across the entire set of feasible decisions by changes in a treatment variable that has no effect on the unique Nash prediction. Dynamic patterns are explained by a logit learning model, and the steady state distributions are centered around the predictions of a logit equilibrium that generalizes the Nash equilibrium to allow for noisy behavior. Email Contact: jg2n@virginia.edu

Cason, Timothy N., and Vai-Lam Mui (1998) “Fairness and Sharing in Innovation Games: A Laboratory Study,” University of Southern California, Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1998 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, game theory, sequential games, fairness. Email Contact: cason@mgmt.purdue.edu

Chadhuri, A. (1998) “The Ratchet Principle in a Principal Agent Game with Unknown Costs: An Experimental Analysis,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 37:3 (November), 291-304. Keywords: experiments, game theory, principal agent model, asymmetric information, ratchet principle. Abstract: This paper reports data for a repeated principal agent game in which the principal does not know the agent's effort cost and may use observed high efforts to ratchet up standards in later rounds. There is little ratcheting observed, as agents tend to play naively.

Charness, Gary, and Ernan Haruvy (1999) “Altruism, Fairness, and Reciprocity: An Encompassing Approach,” Pompeu Fabra University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Spring 1999 Public Choice Meetings. Keywords: experiments, game theory, altruism, reciprocity, fairness. Email Contact: charness@upf.es

Chen, Hsiao-Chi, James W. Friedman, and Jacques-Francois Thisse (1996) “Boundedly Rational Nash Equilibrium: A Probabilistic Choice Approach,” Games and Economic Behavior, 1832-54. Keywords: experiments, game theory, matrix games, quantal response, bounded rationality, learning. Abstract: This paper uses the Luce probabilistic choice rule to analyze behavior in matrix games.

Cheung, Yin-Wong, and Daniel Friedman (1997) “Individual Learning in Normal Form Games: Some Laboratory Results,” Games and Economic Behavior, 19:1 (April), 46-76. Keywords: experiments, game theory, learning, normal form games. Email Contact: dan@cats.ucsc.edu

Cheung, Yin-Wong, and Daniel Friedman (1998) “A Comparison of Learning and Replicator Dynamics Using Experimental Data,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 35:3 (April), 263-280. Keywords: experiments, game theory, learning, evolution, replicator dynamics. Email Contact: dan@cats.ucsc.edu

Coleman, Andrew (1983) Game Theory and Experimental Work, London: Pergamon Press. Keywords: experiments, game theory.

Collins, Richard, and Katerina Sherstyuk (1999) “Spatial Competition with Three Firms: An Experimental Study,” Melbourne University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Spring 1999 Public Choice Meetings. Keywords: experiments, game theory, spatial competition, price competition, risk aversion.

Conlisk, John (1993) “Adaptive Tactics in Games: Further Solutions to Crawford Puzzle,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 22:1 (September), 51-68. Keywords: experiments, game theory, adaptive adjustment.

Conlisk, John (1993) “Adaptation in Games: Two Solutions to Crawford Puzzle,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 22:1 (September), 25-50. Keywords: experiments, game theory, adaptive adjustment.

Conrath, David W. (1970) “Experience as a Factor in Experimental Gaming Behavior,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 14195-202. Keywords: experiments, game theory, experience.

Cooper, Russell, Douglas V. DeJong, Robert Forsythe, and Thomas W. Ross (1989) “Communication in the Battle of the Sexes Game: Some Experimental Results,” Rand Journal of Economics, 20:4 (Winter), 568-587. Keywords: experiments, game theory, battle of sexes game, coordination, matrix games, communication. Email Contact: rcooper@bu.edu

Cooper, Russell, Douglas V. DeJong, Robert Forsythe, and Thomas W. Ross (1990) “Selection Criteria in Coordination Games: Some Experimental Results,” American Economic Review, 80:1 (March), 218-233. Keywords: experiments, game theory, matrix games, coordination games, equilibrium selection. Email Contact: rcooper@bu.edu

Cooper, Russell, Douglas V. DeJong, Robert Forsythe, and Thomas W. Ross (1992) “Communication in Coordination Games,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107:2 (May), 739-771. Keywords: experiments, game theory, matrix games, coordination game, communication. Email Contact: rcooper@bu.edu

Cooper, Russell, Douglas V. DeJong, Robert Forsythe, and Thomas W. Ross (1992) “Forward Induction in Coordination Games,” Economic Letters, 40:2 (October), 167-172. Keywords: experiments, game theory, sequential games, coordination, forward induction. Email Contact: rcooper@bu.edu

Cooper, Russell, Douglas V. DeJong, Robert Forsythe, and Thomas W. Ross (1993) “Forward Induction in the Battle-of-the-Sexes Games,” American Economic Review, 83:5 (December), 1303-1316. Keywords: experiments, game theory, battle of sexes game, forward induction. Email Contact: rcooper@bu.edu

Cooper, Russell, Douglas V. DeJong, Robert Forsythe, and Thomas W. Ross (1994) “Alternative Institutions for Evaluating Coordination Problems: Experimental Evidence on Forward Induction and Pre-Play Communication,” in Problems of Coordination in Economic Activity, edited by James W. Friedman, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 129-146. Keywords: experiments, game theory, coordination, forward induction, communication. Email Contact: rcooper@bu.edu

Cooper, Russell, Douglas V. DeJong, Robert Forsythe, and Thomas W. Ross (1996) “Cooperation without Reputation: Experimental Evidence from Prisoner's Dilemma Games,” Games and Economic Behavior, 12:2 (February), 187-218. Keywords: experiments, game theory, prisoner's dilemma, cooperation. Email Contact: rcooper@bu.edu

Cooper, David J., Susan Garvin, and John H. Kagel (1997) “Signalling and Adaptive Learning in an Entry Limit Pricing Game,” RAND Journal of Economics, 28:4 (Winter), 662-683. Keywords: experiments, game theory, signalling games, limit pricing, signaling, adaptive learning. Email Contact: djc13@guinness.som.cwru.edu

Cooper, David J., Susan Garvin, and John H. Kagel (1997) “Adaptive Learning vs. Equilibrium Refinements in an Entry Limit Pricing Game,” Economic Journal, 107:442 (May), 553-575. Keywords: experiments, game theory, refinements, learning, limit pricing, markets. Email Contact: djc13@guinness.som.cwru.edu

Cooper, Russell W. (1999) Coordination Games: Complementarities and Macroeconomics, Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press. Keywords: experiments, game theory, coordination games, macroeconomics.

Cooper, David J., John H. Kagel, Wei Lo, and Qing Liang Gu (1999) “Gaming Against Managers in Incentive Systems: Experimental Results with Chinese Students and Chinese Managers,” American Economic Review, 89:4 (September), 781-804. Keywords: experiments, game theory, signalling games, strategic behavior, subject pool effects, incentive effects, context effects, methodology. Abstract: Students and managers in China are used as subjects in strategic incentive games with asymmetric information, under varying incentive and context conditions. Play converges only incompletely to a pooling equilibrium, although large increases in financial incentives produce more strategic play. Email Contact: djc13@guinness.som.cwru.edu

Coughlin, Peter J., and Charles R. Plott (1997) “An Experimental Analysis of the Structure of Legal Fees: American Rule vs. English Rule,” California Institute of Technology, Social Science Working Paper 1025. Keywords: experiments, game theory, law, contests, English rule. Email Contact: pcoughlan@hbs.edu

Coughlin, Peter J., Richard D. McKelvey, and Thomas R. Palfrey (1999) “An Examination of Equilibrium Selection and Simultaneous vs. Sequential Decision Making in Laboratory Games,” California Institute of Technology, Discussion Paper, presented at the Spring 1999 Public Choice Meeting. Keywords: experiments, game theory, equilibrium selection, sequence of choice. Email Contact: pcoughlan@hbs.edu

Cox, James C., Jason Shachat, and Mark Walker (1995) “An Experiment to Evaluate Bayesian Learning in Normal Form Games,” University of Arizona, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, game theory, normal form games, learning. Email Contact: jcox@bpa.arizona.edu

Cox, James C., Jason Shachat, and Mark Walker (1997) “An Experiment to Evaluate Bayesian Learning of Nash Equilibrium Play,” University of Arizona, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, game theory, learning, Bayes' rule. Email Contact: jcox@bpa.arizona.edu

Crawford, Vincent P., and Hans Haller (1990) “Learning How to Cooperate: Optimal Play in Repeated Coordination Games,” Econometrica, 58:3 (May), 571-595. Keywords: experiments, game theory, coordination games, learning. Email Contact: vcrawfor@ucsd.edu

Crawford, Vincent P. (1991) “An `Evolutionary` Interpretation of Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's Experimental Results on Coordination,” Games and Economic Behavior, 3:1 (February), 25-59. Keywords: experiments, game theory, coordination games, evolution, learning. Abstract: This paper explains behavior patterns in coordination game experiments with an econometric model of adaptive best responses to the previous outcome. Email Contact: vcrawfor@ucsd.edu

Crawford, Vincent P. (1995) “Adaptive Dynamics in Coordination Games,” Econometrica, 63:1 (January), 103-143. Keywords: experiments, game theory, coordination games, learning. Email Contact: vcrawfor@ucsd.edu

Crawford, Vincent P. (1997) “Learning Dynamics, Lock-In, and Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Coordination Games,” University of California at San Diego, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, game theory, coordination games, evolution, learning, equilibrium selection. Email Contact: vcrawfor@ucsd.edu

Crawford, Vincent P. (1998) “A Survey of Experiments on Communication via Cheap Talk,” Journal of Economic Theory, 78:2 (February), 286-298. Keywords: experiments, game theory, survey, cheap talk. Email Contact: vcrawfor@ucsd.edu

Crawford, Vincent P., and Bruno Broseta (1998) “What Price Coordination? The Efficiency-Enhancing Effect of Auctioning the Right to Play,” American Economic Review, 88:1 (March), 198-225. Keywords: experiments, game theory, coordination games, entry. Email Contact: vcrawfor@ucsd.edu

Dale, Donald J., John Morgan, and Robert W. Rosenthal (1999) “Coordination Through Reputations: A Laboratory Experiment,” Boston University, Keywords: experiments, game theory, coordination, history, information, reputations. Email Contact: dale@princeton.edu

Davis, Douglas D. (1994) “Equilibrium Cooperation in Three-Person, Choice-of-Partners Games,” Games and Economic Behavior, 739-53. Keywords: experiments, game theory, sequential games, cooperation. Abstract: The game begins with a buyer choosing to purchase from one of the two sellers, who can then either deliver high quality or low quality (at a lower cost to the seller). Longer repetitions of this game with the same three subjects results in a higher incidence of cooperative, high-quality outcomes, supported by buyer switching as a punishment for the delivery of low quality. Email Contact: ddavis@busnet.bus.vcu.edu

Davis, Douglas D., and Charles A. Holt (1999) “Equilibrium Cooperation in Two-Stage Games: Experimental Evidence,” International Journal of Game Theory, 28:1 (February), 89-109. Keywords: experiments, game theory, cooperation, matrix games, two-stage games, renegotiation proofness, backward induction, punishments. Abstract: Subjects play two-stage matrix games in which cooperation in the first stage can be supported by punishments and rewards in a second-stage game that has a battle-of-sexes structure. Some cooperation is supported in this manner, even when the punishment outcome is not a Nash equilibrium. The data are inconsistent with the notion of renegotiation proofness. Email Contact: ddavis@busnet.bus.vcu.edu

Davis, Douglas D., and Robert J. Reilly (1999) “Rent-Seeking with Non-Identical Sharing Rules: An Equilibrium Rescued?,” Public Choice, 1001-8. Keywords: experiments, game theory, asymmetries, rent seeking. Email Contact: ddavis@busnet.bus.vcu.edu

Dawes, Robyn M. (1980) “Social Dilemmas,” Annual Review of Psychology, 31169-193. Keywords: experiments, game theory, prisoner's dilemma, social dilemma, psychology.

Dawes, Robyn M., and John M. Orbell (1982) “Cooperation in Social Dilemma Situations: Thinking about It Doesn't Help,” in Research in Experimental Economics, Vol. 2, edited by V. L. Smith, Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 167-173. Keywords: experiments, game theory, social dilemmas, cooperation. Email

Dawes, Robyn M., and Richard H. Thaler (1988) “Anomalies: Cooperation,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2:3 (Summer), 187-197. Keywords: experiments, game theory, social dilemmas, cooperation.

Dawes, Robyn M. (1991) “Social Dilemmas, Economic Self-Interest, and Evolutionary Theory,” in Recent Research in
Psychology: Frontiers in Mathematical Psychology: Essays in Honor of Clyde Coombs, edited by R. D. Brown and J. E. K. Smith, New York: Springer-Verlag, . Keywords: experiments, game theory, social dilemmas, evolution. Email

Day, Richard H., and Theodore Groves, eds. (1975) Adaptive Economic Models, New York and London: Harcourt Brace Jovanich, Academic Press. Keywords: experiments, game theory, adaptive behavior.

Deutsch, Morton, and Roy J. Lewicki (1970) “`Locking-In' Effects During a Game of Chicken,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 14367-378. Keywords: experiments, game theory, chicken game.

Devetag, Giovana (1999) “Collective Hill-Climbing and Coordination Success: An Experimental Test of the Critical Mass Game,” St. Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1999 European Regional ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, game theory, coordination game. Email Contact: devetag@sssup.it

Dickhaut, John W., Kevin A. McCabe, and Arijit Mukherji (1998) “Inter-temporal Cooperation in Shapley's Game,” University of Minnesota, Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1998 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, game theory, cooperation, Shapley game. Email Contact: jdickhaut@csom.umn.edu

Dickinson, David L., and R. Mark Isaac (1998) “Absolute and Relative Rewards for Individuals in Team Production Processes,” Managerial and Decision Economics, 19:4-5 (June-August), 299-310. Keywords: experiments, game theory, incentives, team production. Email Contact: drdave@mail.colgate.edu

Diekmann, Andreas**, and Peter Mitter, eds. (1986) Paradoxical Effects of Social Behavior: Essays in Honor of Anatol Rapoport, Heidelberg and Vienna: Physica-Verlag. Keywords: experiments, game theory.

Diekmann, A. (1993) “Cooperation in Asymmetric Volunteer's Dilemma Game: Theory and Experimental Evidence,” International Journal of Game Theory, 22:1 75-85. Keywords: experiments, game theory, volunteer's dilemma, cooperation, asymmetric game.

Dolbear Jr., F.T., Lester Lave, G. Bowman, A. Lieberman, Edward Prescott, F. Reuter, and Roger Sherman (1968) “Collusion in the Prisoner's Dilemma: Number of Strategies,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 13252-261. Keywords: experiments, game theory, prisoner's dilemma, number of strategies. Email Contact: rs5w@virginia.edu

Dorsey, Robert E., and Laura Razzolini (1998) “An Experimental Comparison of Behavior in Two Strategically Isomorphic Institutions: Further Results,” University of Mississippi, Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1998 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, game theory, institutions. Email Contact: dorsey@bus.olemiss.edu

Drago, R., and J. S. Heywood (1991) “Subject Response to Loss in an Experimental Tournament,” Economic Letters, 36:4 (August), 371-374. Keywords: experiments, game theory, tournaments.

Dresher, M. (1961) Games of Strategy: Theory and Applications, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. Keywords: experiments, game theory.

Duffy, John, and Rosemarie Nagel (1997) “On the Robustness of Behavior in Experimental 'Beauty Contest' Games,” Economic Journal, 107:445 (November), 1687-1700*. Keywords: experiments, game theory, guessing games. Email Contact: jduffy+@pitt.edu

Duffy, John, and Nick Feltovich (1999) “Do Actions Speak Louder Than Words? Observations vs. Cheap Talk as Coordination Devices,” University of Houston, Discussion Paper, presented at the Spring 1999 Public Choice Meetings. Keywords: experiments, game theory, coordination, cheap talk. Abstract: This experiment compares the effects of cheap talk and observed prior actions of others in coordination games. Email Contact: nfelt@bayou.uh.edu, jduffy+@pitt.edu

Duffy, John, and Nick Feltovich (1999) “Does Observation of Others Affect Learning in Strategic Environments? An Experimental Study,” International Journal of Game Theory, 28:1 (February), 131-152. Keywords: experiments, game theory, learning, social learning. Email Contact: jduffy+@pitt.edu

Duffy, John, and Nick Feltovich (1999) “Words, Deeds, and Lies,” University of Houston, Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1999 European Regional ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, game theory, coordination, matrix games, cheap talk, reputations. Abstract: Subjects are randomly matched in 2x2 coordination games, and the subject designated as a "sender" sends a message about intended play, which is read by the "receiver" prior to the point at which both make their decisions. Messages are more effective in the treatment where the receiver also sees that sender's message/action decisions from the most recent matching, as compared with a baseline treatment where only the sender's previous action is revealed. Email Contact: nfelt@bayou.uh.edu

Dufwenberg, Martin, and Georg Kirchsteiger (1998) “A Theory of Sequential Reciprocity,” Tilburg University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, game theory, reciprocity, extensive form games, intentions, psychological game theory. Email Contact: g.kirchsteiger@kub.nl

Durham, Yavonne, Jack Hirshleifer, and Vernon L. Smith (1998) “Do the Rich Get Richer and the Poor Get Poorer? Experimental Tests of a Model of Power,” American Economic Review, 88:4 (September), 970-983. Keywords: experiments, game theory, power, endowments. Email Contact: ydurham@comp.uark.edu

Eckel, Catherine C., and Philip J. Grossman (1996) “The Relative Price of Fairness: Gender Differences in a Punishment Game,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 30:2 (August), 143-158. Keywords: experiments, game theory, gender effects, fairness. Email Contact: eckelc@vt.edu

Eckel, Catherine C., and Sheryl Ball (1998) “The Economic Value of Status,” Journal of Socio-Economics, 27:4 495-514. Keywords: experiments, game theory,* status. Email Contact: eckelc@vt.edu

Eckel, Catherine C., and Rick K. Wilson (1999) “The Human Face of Game Theory: Trust and Reciprocity in Sequential Games,” Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1997 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, game theory, sequential games, trust, reciprocity. Email Contact: eckelc@vt.edu

El-Gamal, Mahmoud A., Richard D. McKelvey, and Thomas R. Palfrey (1993) “A Bayesian Sequential Experimental Study of Learning in Games,” Journal of the American Statistical Association, 88:442 (June), 428-435. Keywords: experiments, game theory, learning, Bayes' rule. Email Contact: melgamal@1.wisc.edu

El-Gamal, Mahmoud A., Richard D. McKelvey, and Thomas R. Palfrey (1994) “Learning in Experimental Games,” Economic Theory, 901-922. Keywords: experiments, game theory, learning. Email Contact: melgamal@1.wisc.edu

El-Gamal, Mahmoud A., and Thomas R. Palfrey (1995) “Vertigo: Comparing Structural Models of Imperfect Behavior in Experimental Games,” Games and Economic Behavior, 8:2 (February), 322-348. Keywords: experiments, game theory, bounded rationality, noisy behavior, estimation. Email Contact: melgamal@1.wisc.edu

Emerson, Richard M. (1964) “Power-Dependence Relations: Two Experiments,” Sociometry, 27282-298. Keywords: experiments, game theory, power.

Erev, Ido, and Alvin E. Roth (1998) “Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria,” American Economic Review, 88:4 (September), 848-881. Keywords: experiments, game theory, learning, reinforcement learning. Abstract: Models of reinforcement learning are used to explain dynamic behavior patterns in previously published experiments with unique mixed strategy equilibria. The simplest one-parameter learning model (with a parameter estimated from other experiments) produces simulations that outperform Nash predictions. The fit is improved by adding parameters that represent "forgetting" and "experimentation." Email Contact: erev@techunix.technion.ac.il

Erev, Ido, and Amnon Rapoport (1998) “Coordination, "Magic," and Reinforcement Learning in a Market Entry Game,” Games and Economic Behavior, 23:2 (May), 146-175. Keywords: experiments, game theory, entry game, coordination, reinforcement learning. Email Contact: erev@techunix.technion.ac.il

Erev, Ido*, Amnon Rapoport, Darryl A. Seale, and James A. Sundali (1998) “Equilibrium Play in Large Market Entry Games,” Management Science, 44119-141. Keywords: experiments, game theory, entry, coordination. Email Contact: arapoport@bpa.arizona.edu

Erev, Ido, and Alvin E. Roth (1999) “On the Role of Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games; The Cognitive Game Theory Approach,” in Games and Human Behavior: Essays in Honor of Amnon Rapoport, edited by D. Budescu, I. Erev and R. Zwick, Erlbaum, 53-77. Keywords: experiments, game theory, reinforcement learning. Email Contact: aroth@hbs.edu

Erev, Ido, Yoella Bereby-Meyer, and Alvin E. Roth (1999) “The Effect of Adding a Constant to All Payoffs: Experimental Investigation, and a Reinforcement Learning Model with Self-Adjusting Speed of Learning,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 39:1 (May), 111-128. Keywords: experiments, game theory, reinforcement learning, incentives. Abstract: The paper reports a nonlinear effect of adding a constant to all payoffs, and discusses the implications for reinforcement learning models. Email Contact: aroth@hbs.edu

Faith, Thomas, and Charles Noussair (1996) “A Laboratory Study of Mixed Strategy Play,” Purdue University, working paper. Keywords: experiments, game theory, mixed strategies.

Farrell, J., and Matthew Rabin (1996) “Cheap Talk,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10:3 (Summer), 103-118. Keywords: experiments, game theory, cheap talk.

Fehr, Ernst, Simon Gächter, and Georg Kirchsteiger (1996) “Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device,” Econometrica, 65833-860. Keywords: experiments, game theory, reciprocity, contracts, bounded rationality. Email Contact: fehr@iew.unizh.ch

Fehr, Ernst, and Simon Gächter (1998) “Reciprocity and Economics: The Economic Implication of Homo Reciprocans,” European Economic Review, 42:3-5 (May), 845-859. Keywords: experiments, game theory, reciprocity. Email Contact: fehr@iew.unizh.ch

Fehr, Ernst, and Bettina Rockenbach-Kuon (1999) “The Hidden Costs of Economic Incentives: Contractual Contingencies Crowd Out Voluntary Cooperation and Reciprocity,” University of Bonn, Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1999 European Regional ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, game theory, trust game, reciprocity, contracts. Abstract: In the baseline trust game, the money provided by the investor is increased and given to the recipient, who may pay back all or part of the investment returns to the original investor in the final stage. The investor also specifies a "desired payback" in one treatment, and a desired payback combined with a noncompliance fine in the other treatment. Using a contractually specified punishment reduces reciprocity and trust, and reduces the investor's earnings relative to the case where only a desired payback specified. The highest investor earnings are observed in cases where the punishment opportunity is available but not used, in a show of trust by the investor. Email Contact: rockenbach@lab.econ1.uni-bonn.de

Feltovich, Nick (1998) “Reinforcement-Based Versus Belief-Based Learning in Experimental Asymmetric-Information Games,” University of Houston, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, game theory, learning, reinforcment, belief learning. Email Contact: nfelt@bayou.uh.edu

Fey, M., Richard D. McKelvey, and Thomas R. Palfrey (1996) “An Experimental Study of Constant-Sum Centipede Games,” International Journal of Game Theory, 25:3 269-287. Keywords: experiments, game theory, centipede games, constant-sum games. Email Contact: mfey@princeton.edu

Fischbacher, Urs, and Christian Thöni (1999) “Over-Entry in a Winner-Takes-All Market - An Experimental Study,” University of Zurich, Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1999 European Regional ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, game theory, entry, rent seeking. Abstract: Each subject in a group decides whether to enter, with the prize being awarded to randomly selected entrant. In a Nash equilibrium, the number of entries is independent of group size. Overentry was observed, and it was more severe for larger group sizes. Email Contact: fiba@iew.unizh.ch

Flood, Merrill M. (1952) “Some Experimental Games,” RAND Corporation, Discussion Paper, Rand Memorandum RM-789. Keywords: experiments, game theory, prisoner's dilemma.

Flood, Merrill M. (1954) “On Game-Learning Theory and Some Decision-Making Experiments,” in Decision Processes, edited by R. M. Thrall, C. H. Coombs and R. L. Davis, New York: Wiley, 139-158. Keywords: experiments, game theory, prisoner's dilemma. Email

Flood, Merrill M. (1954) “Environmental Non-Stationarity in a Decision-Making Experiment,” in Decision Processes, edited by R. M. Thrall, C. H. Coombs and R. L. Davis, New York: Wiley, 287-299. Keywords: experiments, game theory. Email

Foddy, Margaret, Michael Smithson, Sherry Schneider, and Michael Hogg, eds. (1999) Resolving Social Dilemmas, Philadelphia: Psychology Press. Keywords: experiments, game theory, public, social dilemmas.

Fox, J. (1972) “The Learning of Strategies in a Simple, Two-Person Zero-Sum Game Without Saddlepoint,” Behavioral Science, 17300-308. Keywords: experiments, game theory, zero-sum games.

Friedman, James W. (1986) Game Theory with Applications to Economics, Oxford, U. K.: Oxford University Press. Keywords: experiments, game theory, markets, oligopoly. Email Contact: friedman@email.unc.edu

Friedman, Daniel (1996) “Equilibrium in Evolutionary Games: Some Experimental Results,” Economic Journal, 106:434 (January), 1-25. Keywords: experiments, game theory, evolution. Email Contact: dan@cats.ucsc.edu

Friedman, Daniel, and Joel Yellin (1997) “Evolving Landscapes for Population Games,” University of California at Santa Cruz, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, game theory, population games, evolution. Email Contact: dan@cats.ucsc.edu

Frohlich, Norman, and Joe A. Oppenheimer (1996) “Experiencing Impartiality to Invoke Fairness in the n-PD: Some Experimental Results,” Public Choice, 86:1-2 (January), 117-135. Keywords: experiments, game theory, fairness. Email Contact: frohlic@antares.cc.umanitoba.ca

Frohlich, Norman, and Joe A. Oppenheimer (1996) “When Is Universal Contribution Best for the Group? Characterizing Optimality in the Prisoners' Dilemma,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 40:3 (September), 502-516. Keywords: experiments, game theory, prisoner's dilemma. Email Contact: frohlic@antares.cc.umanitoba.ca

Fudenberg, Drew, and David K. Levine (1995*) “How Irrational Are Subjects in Extensive-Form Games?,” American Economic Review, 85****. Keywords: experiments, game theory, extensive form games. Email Contact: dlevine@ucla.edu, fudenber@husc.harvard.edu

Fudenberg, Drew, and David K. Levine (1998) Learning in Games, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Keywords: experiments, game theory, learning. Abstract: This book surveys and develops models of learning and dynamic adjustment in economic games. Email Contact: fudenber@husc.harvard.edu

Fullerton, Richard L., Bruce G. Linster, Michael McKee, and Stephen Slate (1999) “An Experimental Investigation of Research Tournaments,” Economic Inquiry, forthcoming. Keywords: experiments, game theory, tournaments, research and development, procurement. Email Contact: fullertonrl.dfeg@ysafa,af,mil

Gallo, P. S., and C. G. McClintock (1965) “Cooperative and Competitive Behavior in Mixed-Motive Games,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 968-78. Keywords: experiments, game theory.

Gallo Jr., Philip S., and John P. Sheposh (1972) “Indeterminacy of Outcome and the Prisoner's Dilemma Game,” in Contributions to Experimental Economics, Vol. 3, edited by Heinz Sauermann, Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 635-655. Keywords: experiments, game theory, prisoner's dilemma. Email

Gantner, Anitita, Robert Montgomery, and Giovanni Ponti (1998) “Solomon's Dilemma: An Experimental Study on Dynamic Implementation,” University of California at Santa Barbara, Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1998 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, game theory, implementation. Email Contact: giuba@econ.ucsb.edu

Garapin, Alexis, and Michel Hollard (1998) “Learning to Coordinate in Competitive Contexts,” University Pierre Mendes France, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, game theory, coordination, competition. Abstract: The experiments implements the card game, "Target the Two." The focus is on the effects of competition and time-based incentives on coordination behavior. Email Contact: Alexis.Garapin@upmf-grenoble.fr

Gardner, Roy, Elinor Ostrom, and James Walker (1994) “Social Capital and Cooperation: Communication, Bounded Rationality, and Behavioral Heuristics,” in Social Dilemmas and Cooperation, edited by U. Schulz, W. Albers and U. Mueller, Berlin: Springer-Verlag, . Keywords: experiments, game theory, cooperation, communication, social capital, bounded rationality. Email Contact: gardner@ucs.indiana.edu

Genakoplos, John, David Pearce, and Ennio Stacchetti (1989) “Psychological Games and Sequential Rationality,” Games and Economic Behavior, 160-79. Keywords: experiments, game theory, psychological game theory.

Goeree, Jacob K., Simon P. Anderson, and Charles A. Holt (1998) “The War of Attrition with Noisy Players,” in Advances in Applied Microeconomics, Volume 7, edited by M. R. Baye, Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 15-29. Keywords: experiments, game theory, bounded rationality, quantal response equilibrium, logit equilibrium, war of attrition. Abstract The authors show that the Nash equilibria for the two-player normal-form war of attrition with asymmetric values involve one player choosing zero effort (conceding immediately). Non-degenerate mixed equilibria are only possible if there is no maximum effort. These equilibria have perverse comparative-statics properties: an increase in one player's value leaves that player's effort distribution unaffected and raises the other player's efforts. In contrast, the logit equilibrium predicts that the player with the higher prize value exerts more effort. Email Contact: jg2n@virginia.edu

Goeree, Jacob K., and Charles A. Holt (1999) “An Experimental Study of Costly Coordination,” University of Virginia, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, game theory, coordination games, logit equilibrium, bounded rationality, learning, simulation, quantal response, stochastic potential. Abstract: The authors present and test a unified view of behavior in coordination games with a continuum of Nash equilibria that are not affected by non-critical changes in effort costs and numbers of players. The theory is a generalization of risk dominance and maximum potential; the maximization of (stochastic) potential explains steady state effort levels in a series of minimum- and median-effort coordination experiments. In both types of coordination games considered, observed effort distributions are inversely related to effort costs, an intuitive experimental result that is not explained by the perfect-rationality Nash model. Email Contact: jg2n@virginia.edu

Goeree, Jacob K., and Charles A. Holt (1999) “A Model of Noisy Introspection,” University of Virginia, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, game theory, introspection, logit equilibrium. Abstract: The paper presents a theoretical model of noisy iterated introspection designed to explain behavior in games played only once. The model determines layers of beliefs (about others' decisions, others' beliefs, beliefs about beliefs...), but relaxes the Nash-like requirement that belief distributions coincide with distributions of decisions, i.e. it allows for systematic surprises in the absence of learning and repetition. The introspective solution exists and nests standard Nash and quantal response equilibrium theories, which are rejected on the basis of maximum likelihood estimates of noise and introspection parameters for laboratory data from thirty-seven variations of 2x2 games played once. Email Contact: jg2n@virginia.edu

Goeree, Jacob K., and Charles A. Holt (1999) “Stochastic Game Theory: For Playing Games, Not Just for Doing Theory,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 96(September), 10564-10567. Keywords: experiments, game theory, Nash equilibrium, logit equilibrium, quantal response equilibrium, introspection, coordination, traveler's dilemma, evolution, learning. Abstract: This paper argues that noisy models of introspection, learning, and equilibrium can explain the salient behavior patterns in game experiments, patterns that are not predicted by the Nash equilibrium or its refinements. Models of iterated noisy introspection are used to explain initial choices, models of noisy learning and evolution are used to predict dynamic adjustment paths, and logit equilibrium models explain Nash-invariant treatment effects in steady-state distributions of decisions. Email Contact: jg2n@virginia.edu

Goeree, Jacob K., and Charles A. Holt (1999) “Ten Little Treasures of Game Theory, and Ten Intuitive Contradictions,” University of Virginia, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, game theory, bargaining, matching pennies, traveler's dilemma, coordination, Kreps game, auctions, signaling, extensive form games, backward induction, Nash equilibrium, logit equilibrium, introspection, one shot games. Abstract: The "treasures" are ten static and dynamic games where behavior matches the Nash equilibrium or relevant refinement, and the contradictions are variations of the same game that produces anomalous behavior patterns. In some games, Nash seems to work only by coincidence, e.g. if deviation losses are symmetric or very high. In other games the data are repelled from the Nash prediction and pile up on the opposite side of the set of feasible decisions. Email Contact: jg2n@virginia.edu

Goeree, Jacob K., and Charles A. Holt (1999) “Explaining Anomalous Behavior in Binary-Choice Games: Entry, Voting, Public Goods, and the Volunteer's Dilemma,” University of Virginia, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, game theory, quantal response, binary choice games, volunteer's dilemma, step-level public goods, participation games, voting, market entry, coordination. Abstract: This paper characterizes quantal response equilibria for a general class of N-person binary-choice games: participation, entry, voting, step-level public goods, coordination, and volunteer's dilemma games. The quantal response equilibrium tracks deviations from Nash predictions reported in previous laboratory experiments. Email Contact: jg2n@virginia.edu

Green, Leonard, Paul C. Price, and Merle E. Hamburger (1995) “Prisoner's Dilemma and the Pigeon Control by Immediate Consequences,” Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 641-17. Keywords: experiments, game theory, animal subjects, prisoner's dilemma, pigeons.

Griesinger, Donald W., and James W. Livingston Jr. (1973) “Towards a Model of Interpersonal Motivation in Experimental Games,” Behavioral Science, 18173-188. Keywords: experiments, game theory, non-selfish preferences.

Guttman, J. M (1986) “Matching Behavior and Collective Action: Some Experimental Evidence,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 7:2 (June), 171-198. Keywords: experiments, game theory.

Guyer, M., and M. Zabner (1969) “Experimental Games: A Bibliography (1965-1969),” University of Michigan, Discussion Paper: Mental Health Research Institute Communication No. 258. Keywords: experiments, game theory.

Guyer, Melvin, and Anatol Rapoport (1969) “Information Effects in Two Mixed-Motive Games,” Behavioral Science, 14467-482. Keywords: experiments, game theory.

Guyer, M., and M. Zabner (1970) “Experimental Games: A Bibliography (1945-1964),” University of Michigan, Discussion Paper: Mental Health Research Institute Communication No. 265. Keywords: experiments, game theory.

Güth, Werner (1994) “On the Scientific Work of John C. Harsanyi, John F. Nash, and Reinhard Selten,” Ifo-Studien, 40:4 251-281. Keywords: experiments, game theory, survey. Email Contact: gueth@wiwi.hu-berlin.de

Güth, Werner, and H. Kliemt (1996) “One Person--Many Players? On Björn Frank's 'The Use of Internal Games: The Case of Addiction': Response,” Journal of Economic Psychology, 17:5 (November), 661-668. Keywords: experiments, game theory, psychology. Email Contact: gueth@wiwi.hu-berlin.de

Güth, Werner, Peter Ockenfels, and M. Wendel (1997) “Cooperation Based on Trust: An Experimental Investigation,” Journal of Economic Psychology, 18:1 (January), 15-43. Keywords: experiments, game theory, cooperation, trust. Email Contact: gueth@wiwi.hu-berlin.de

Güth, Werner, Nadage Marchand, and J. L. Rulliere (1997) “On the Reliability of Reciprocal Fairness - An Experimental Study,” Humboldt University, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, games, reciprocity, fairness. Email Contact: gueth@wiwi.hu-berlin.de

Güth, Werner, Theo Offerman, Jan Potters, Martin Strobel, and Harrie Verbon (1998) “An Experimental Study of Inter- and Intra-Generational Transfers in a Model with Multiple Families,” Humboldt University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1998 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, game theory, altruism, inter-generational transfers. Email Contact: gueth@wiwi.hu-berlin.de

Güth, Werner, R. Ivanova, Manfred Königstein, and Martin Strobel (1998) “Robust Learning Behavior Adaptation in a Variety of Games,” Humboldt University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, game theory, learning, multiple games. Abstract: Subjects are confronted with a variety of different bidding tasks in order to study how learning depends on game complexity. Email Contact: gueth@wiwi.hu-berlin.de

Güth, Werner, and et al. (1998) “An Experimental Study of a Dynamic Principal Agent Relationship,” Managerial Decision and Economics, 19:4-5 (June-August), 327-341. Keywords: experiments, game theory, principal agent model. Email Contact: gueth@wiwi.hu-berlin.de

Güth, Werner, Steffen Huck, and Amnon Rapoport (1998) “The Limits of Positional Order Effect. Can It Support Threats and Non-Equilibrium Behavior?,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 34:2 313-325. Keywords: experiments, game theory, order effects, threats. Email Contact: arapoport@bpa.arizona.edu

Hackett, Steven, Dean Dudley, and James Walker (1994) “Heterogeneities, Information and Conflict Resolution: Experimental Evidence on Sharing Contracts,” Journal of Theoretical Politics, 6:4 (October), 495-525. Keywords: experiments, game theory, contracts, information. Email Contact: walkerj@indiana.edu

Halpin, Stanley M., and Marc Pilisuk (1970) “Prediction and Choice in the Prisoner's Dilemma,” Behavioral Science, 15141-153. Keywords: experiments, game theory, prisoner's dilemma.

Hardin, Russell (1971) “Collective Action as an Agreeable n-Prisoner's Dilemma,” Behavioral Science, 16472-481. Keywords: experiments, game theory, prisoner's dilemma.

Harless, David W., and Colin F. Camerer (1995) “An Error Rate Analysis of Experimental Data Testing Nash Refinements,” European Economic Review, 39:3-4 (April), 649-660. Keywords: experiments, game theory, sequential
games, Nash refinements, error rates, bounded rationality. Email Contact: dwharless@vcu.edu

Harrison, Glenn W., and Kevin McCabe (1996) “Stability and Preference Distortion in Resource Matching: An Experimental Study of the Marriage Problem,” in Research in Experimental Economics, Vol. 6, edited by R. M. Isaac, Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 53-129. Keywords: experiments, game theory, marriage problem, matching. Email Contact: harrison@darla.badm.sc.edu

Harsanyi, John C., and Reinhard Selten (1988) A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Keywords: experiments, game theory, equilibrium selection, introspection.

Haruvy, Ernan, and Dale O. Stahl (1998) “Can Adaptive Dynamics Resolve Multiplicity,” University of Texas, Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1998 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, game theory, learning, dynamics, equilibrium selection. Email Contact: stahl@eco.utexas.edu

Haruvy, Ernan, and Dale O. Stahl (1998) “Risk Dominance Revisited,” University of Texas, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, game theory, coordination, risk dominance. Email Contact: stahl@eco.utexas.edu

Haruvy, Ernan, and Dale O. Stahl (1999) “Empirical Tests of Equilibrium Selection Based on Player Hetergeneity,” University of Texas, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, game theory, heterogeneity, equilibrium selection. Email Contact: stahl@eco.utexas.edu

Haruvy, Ernan, Dale O. Stahl, and P. W. Wilson (1999) “Evidence for Optimistic and Pessimistic Behavior in Normal-Form Games,” Economics Letters, 63255-259. Keywords: experiments, game theory, normal-form games. Email Contact: stahl@eco.utexas.edu

Haruvy, Ernan, Dale O. Stahl, and P. W. Wilson (1999) “Modeling and Testing for Heterogeneity in Observed Strategic Behavior,” University of Texas, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, game theory, heterogeneity. Email Contact: stahl@eco.utexas.edu

Hauk, Esther (1998) “Discriminating to Learn to Discriminate,” Pompeu Fabra University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, game theory, prisoner's dilemma, strategy search, learning, choice of whether to play. Abstract: Subjects play several finite prisoner's dilemma games simultaneously, which allows rejection of the common notion that players can be categorized into distinct "types." Behavior can be characterized as a search for an acceptable strategy. Email Contact: esther.huak@econ.upf.es

Ho, Tech-Hua, and Keith Weigelt (1994) “Task Complexity, Equilibrium Selection, and Learning: An Experimental Study,” Management Science?**, . Keywords: experiments, game theory, equilibrium selection, learning, task complexity. Email Contact: hoteck@marketing.wharton.upenn.edu

Ho, Teck-Hua, Colin F. Camerer, and Keith Weigelt (1998) “Iterated Dominance and Iterated Best Response in Experimental "p-Beauty Contests",” American Economic Review, 1998:88 (September), 4. Keywords: experiments, game theory, guessing game, iterated dominance, iterated best response, introspection. Email Contact: hoteck@marketing.wharton.upenn.edu

Hoffman, Elizabeth, Kevin A. McCabe, and Vernon L. Smith (1998) “Behavioral Foundations of Reciprocity: Experimental Economics and Evolutionary Psychology,” Economic Inquiry, 36:3 (July), 335-352. Keywords: experiments, game theory, sequential games, reciprocity, psychology. Email Contact: ehoffman@uic.edu

Hoffman, Elizabeth, Kevin A. McCabe, and Vernon L. Smith (1999) “What Makes Trade Possible?,” University of Arizona, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, game theory, sequential games, reciprocity, psychology, trust, exchange. Email Contact: ehoffman@uic.edu

Hoggatt, Austin C. (1969) “Response of Paid Student Subjects to Differential Behaviour of Robots in Bifurcated Duopoly Games,” Review of Economic Studies, 36:4 (October), 417-432. Keywords: experiments, game theory, duopoly markets, simulated players.

Holm, H. J. (1995) “The Prisoners' Dilemma or the Jury's Dilemma? A Popular Story with Dubious Name,” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 151:4 (December), 699-702. Keywords: experiments, game theory, prisoner's dilemma, jury's dilemma.

Holm, Håkan (1999) “Culture and Discrimination in Experimental Behavior,” Lund University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Spring 1999 Public Choice Meetings. Keywords: experiments, game theory,* culture, discrimination.

Holt, Charles A., and Fernando Solis-Soberon (1992) “The Calculation of Equilibrium Mixed Strategies in Posted-Offer Auctions,” in Research in Experimental Economics, Vol. 5, edited by R. M. Isaac, Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 189-229. Keywords: experiments, game theory, mixed strategies, posted offer auctions, markets, risk aversion, capacity constraints, cost asymmetries. Abstract The "how-to" for calculating equilibrium mixed strategies in the complicated step-function and capacity constrained environments often used in laboratory experiments. The paper discusses ways to deal with multiple steps, cost and capacity asymmetries, risk aversion, etc. Email Contact: holt@virginia.edu

Huck, Steffen, and Wieland Mueller (1998) “Perfect versus Imperfect Observability -- An Experimental Test of Bagwell's Result,” Humboldt University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, game theory, two-stage game, sequential game, imperfectly observed first move. Abstract: The experiment provides little support for Bagwell's claim that the first-mover advantage vanishes if this action is only imperfectly observed by the second-mover. The first-mover advantage is not always fully exploited when it is perfectly observable, and the Stackelberg outcome has a lot of drawing power even when the first move is not perfectly observed. Email Contact: wmueller@wiwi.hu-berlin.de

Huck, Steffen, and Iris Bohnet (1999) “More Order and Less Law,” Humboldt University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1999 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, game theory, contract theory, enforceability, reciprocity. Email Contact: huck@wiwi.hu-berlin.de

Hurley, Terrance M., and Jason F. Shogren (1998) “Asymmetric Information Contests,” European Journal of Political Economy, 14:4 (November), 645-665. Keywords: experiments, game theory, contests, asymmetric information. Email Contact: tmhurley@iastate.edu

Kahan, James P., and Amnon Rapoport (1974) “Decisions of Timing in Bipolarized Conflict Situations with Incomplete Information,” Acta Psychologica, 38183-203. Keywords: experiments, game theory, continuous time games, duels. Abstract: Pairs of subjects interacted in games of timing (duels) with symmetric accuracy functions and varying numbers of "bullets." Email Contact: arapoport@bpa.arizona.edu

Kahn, Laurence M., and J. Keith Murnighan (1993) “Conjecture, Uncertainty, and Cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma Games: Some Experimental Evidence,” Journal of Economic behavior and Organization, 22:1 (September), 91-117. Keywords: experiments, game theory, prisoner's dilemma, cooperation.

Kahneman, Daniel (1988) “Experimental Economics: A Psychological Perspective,” in Bounded Rational Behavior in Experimental Games and Markets, edited by Reinhard Tietz, Wulf Albers and Reinhard Selten, New York: Springer-Verlag, 11-18. Keywords: experiments, game theory, market entry, psychology. Email Contact: kahneman@wws.princeton.edu

Kalisch, Gerhard K, J. W. Millnor, John F. Nash, and E. D. Nering (1954) “Some Experimental n-Person Games,” in Decision Processes, edited by R. M. Thrall, C. H. Coombs and R. L. Davis, New York: Wiley, 513-518. Keywords: experiments, game theory. Email

Keser, Claudia, Karl-Martin Erhart, and Siegfried K. Berninghaus (1998) “Coordination and Local Interaction: Local Interaction,” Economics Letters, 58269-275. Keywords: experiments, game theory, coordination, local interaction, numbers effects. Abstract: The experiment involves repeated coordination games with local interaction. Subjects who interact with two neighbors around a circle tend to coordinate on the payoff dominant equilibrium, whereas this outcome is less prevalent when subjects interact with four neighbors. Email Contact: Keser@vwl3.wiwi.uni-karlsruhe.de

Kim, Y. G. (1996) “Evolutionary Analysis of Tacit Communication in Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's Game Experiments,” Games and Economic Behavior, 16:2 (October), 218-237. Keywords: experiments, game theory, coordination game, tacit collusion, evolution.

Kirchkamp, Oliver, Rosemarie Nagel, and Avner Shaked (1998) “Local Interacting Prisoners' Dilemmas,” Manheim University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, game theory, prisoner's dilemma, local interaction, learning. Abstract: The experiment considers how behavior of subjects in repeated prisoner's dilemma games is affected by the nature of local interaction. Subjects who interact with their neighbors on a circle (in a series of overlapping local neighborhoods) coordinate less frequently on the Pareto efficient outcome than those who interact in fixed non-overlapping groups. Email Contact: oliver@kirchkamp.de

Kirchkamp, Oliver (1999) “Simultaneous Evolution of Learning Rules and Strategies,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 40:3 295-312. Keywords: experiments, game theory, learning. Email Contact: oliver@kirchkamp.de

Knapp, Robert, and Andreas Ortmann (1998) “On the Use of Evolutionary Models in Experimental Economics,” Bowdoin
College, Keywords: experiments, game theory, evolution, replicator dynamics, learning, matrix game. Abstract: Data from a bargaining experiment in matrix form are used to evaluate a variety of evolutionary models. There is no clear winner.

Knez, Marc, and Colin F. Camerer (1994) “Creating Experimental Assets in the Laboratory: Coordination in `Weakest-Link` Games,” Strategic Management Journal, 15101-119. Keywords: experiments, game theory, minimum effort game, coordination, asset markets.

Knez, Marc (1998) “Precedent Transfer in Experimental Conflict-of-Interest Games,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 34:2 239-249. Keywords: experiments, game theory, precedent.

Komorita, Samuel S. (1972) “Tacit Communication and Cooperation in a Mixed-Motive Game,” in Contributions to Experimental Economics, Vol. 3, edited by Heinz Sauermann, Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 395-417. Keywords: experiments, game theory, tacit collusion. Email

Komorita, S. S., J. A. Hilty, and C. D. Parks (1991) “Reciprocity and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 35:3 (September), 494-518. Keywords: experiments, game theory, social dilemmas, cooperation, reciprocity.

Lave, Lester B. (1962) “An Empirical Approach to the Prisoner's Dilemma,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 76424-436. Keywords: experiments, game theory, prisoner's dilemma, cooperation.

Lave, Lester B. (1965) “Factors Affecting Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma,” Behavioral Science, 1026-38. Keywords: experiments, game theory, prisoner's dilemma, cooperation.

Lichbach, Mark Irving (1996) The Cooperator's Dilemma, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Keywords: experiments, game theory, cooperation, social dilemmas, psychology.

Lieberman, Bernhardt (1960) “Human Behavior in a Strictly Determined 3x3 Matrix Game,” Behavioral Science, 4317-322. Keywords: experiments, game theory, matrix game.

Lieberman, Bernhardt (1962) “Experimental Studies of Conflict in Some Two-Person and Three-Person Games,” in Mathematical Models in Small Group Processes, edited by J. H. Criswell, H. Solomon and P. Suppes, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 203-220. Keywords: experiments, game theory, matrix game. Email

Lieberman, Bernhardt (1971) “Not an Artifact,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 15113-120. Keywords: experiments, game theory*.

Lohmann, C., J. C. Usunier, and Marc Willinger (1999) “A Comparison of Trust and Reciprocity Between France and Germany: An Experimental Investigation Based on the Investment Game,” Universite Louis Pasteur, presented at the Fall 1999 European Regional ESA Meetings, Keywords: experiments, game theory, trust game, reciprocity, subject pool effects, international comparisons, France, Germany. Abstract: In this game, any investment by player A gets tripled and passed to Player B, who can keep it or return part to player A. Investment was about 50% higher among German subjects, but rates of reciprocal return were similar for the two countries. Email Contact: willma@cournot.u-strasbg.fr

Lopez, Gladys (1995) “Quantal Response Equilibria for Models of Price Competition,” Ph.D, Dissertation, University of Virginia, Keywords: experiments, game theory, quantal response equilibrium, Bertrand games, markets, bounded rationality, logit equilibrium, probabilistic choice.

Luce, R. Duncan, and Howard Raiffa (1957) Games and Decisions, New York: John Wiley & Sons. Keywords:
experiments, game theory, decisions.

Lupfer, Michael, Mark Jones, and Lionel Spaulding (1971) “Risk-Taking in Cooperative and Competitive Dyads,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 15385-392. Keywords: experiments, game theory, risk aversion.

Mailath, George J. (1998) “Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons from Evolutionary Game Theory,” Journal of Economic Literature, 36:3 (September), 1347-1374. Keywords: experiments, game theory, bounded rationality, Nash equilibrium, evolutionary game theory.

Marwell, Gerald, and David R. Schmitt (1968) “Are `Trivial' Games the Most Interesting Psychologically?,” Behavioral Science, 13125-128. Keywords: experiments, game theory, psychology.

Marwell, Gerald, Kathryn Ratcliff, and David R. Schmitt (1969) “Minimizing Differences in a Maximizing Difference Game,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 12158-163. Keywords: experiments, game theory.

Marwell, Gerald, David R. Schmitt, and Robert Shotola (1970) “Sex Differences in a Cooperative Task,” Behavioral Science, 15184-186. Keywords: experiments, game theory, gender effects.

Mayer, T. F. (1993-1994**) “**Game Theory: An Exchange: Six Comments on Rationality,” Science and Society, 57:4 (Winter), 446-53. Keywords: experiments, game theory, bounded rationality.

McCabe, Kevin A., Stephen J. Rassenti, and Vernon L. Smith (1996) “Game Theory and Reciprocity in Some Extensive Form Experimental Games,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 9313421-13428. Keywords: experiments, game theory, reciprocity, trust, extensive form game. Email Contact: kmcabe@econlab.arizona.edu

McCabe, Kevin A., Stephen J. Rassenti, and Vernon L. Smith (1998) “Reciprocity, Trust, and Payoff Privacy in Extensive Form Bargaining,” Games and Economic Behavior, 24:1-2 (July-August), 10-24. Keywords: experiments, game theory, reciprocity, trust, extensive form game, payoff privacy, methodology. Email Contact: kmcabe@econlab.arizona.edu

McCabe, Kevin A., Vernon L. Smith, and M. LePore (1998) “Intentionality, Detection, and `Mindreading': Why Does Game Form Matter?,” University of Arizona, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, game theory, intentionality. Email Contact: kmcabe@econlab.arizona.edu

McCabe, Kevin A., and Vernon L. Smith (1999) “Strategic Analysis by Players in Games: What Information Do They Use?,” University of Arizona, Discussion Paper, presented at the Spring 1999 Public Choice Meetings. Keywords: experiments, game theory, information. Email Contact: kmcabe@econlab.arizona.edu

McCabe, Kevin A., and Vernon L. Smith (1999) “Goodwill Accounting in Economic Exchange,” in The Adaptive Toolbox, edited by G. Gigerenzer and R. Selten, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 305-326. Keywords: experiments, game theory, reciprocity, trust, extensive form game, good will. Email Contact: kmcabe@econlab.arizona.edu

McClintock, Charles G., Josef M. Nuttin, and Steven P. McNeel (1970) “Sociometric Choice, Visual Presence, and Game-Playing Behavior,” Behavioral Science, 15124-131. Keywords: experiments, game theory.

McKelvey, Richard D., and Peter C. Ordeshook (1982) “An Experimental Test of Cooperative Solution Theory for Normal Form Games,” in Political Equilibrium, edited by P. C. Ordeshook and K. A. Shepsle, Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff, 118-130. Keywords: experiments, game theory, cooperative games. Email Contact: rdm@hss.caltech.edu

McKelvey, Richard D., and Thomas R. Palfrey (1992) “An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game,” Econometrica, 60:4 (July), 803-836. Keywords: experiments, game theory, centipede game, backward induction, altruism. Email Contact: rdm@hss.caltech.edu

McKelvey, Richard D., and Thomas R. Palfrey (1995) “Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games,” Games and Economic Behavior, 10:1 (July), 6-38. Keywords: experiments, game theory, quantal response, bounded rationality, logit equilibrium. Email Contact: rdm@hss.caltech.edu

McKelvey, Richard D., and Thomas R. Palfrey (1996) “A Statistical Theory of Equilibrium in Games,” Japanese Economic Review, 47:2 (June), 186-209. Keywords: experiments, game theory, logit equilibrium, quantal response equilibrium, experiments, bounded rationality. Email Contact: rdm@hss.caltech.edu

McKelvey, Richard D., Thomas R. Palfrey, and Roberto Weber (1997) “The Effects of Payoff Magnitude and Heterogeneity on Behavior in 2x2 Games with Unique Mixed Strategy Equilibria,” California Institute of Technology, working paper. Keywords: experiments, game theory, mixed strategies, quantal response equilibrium, logit equilibrium, payoffs, incentives. Email Contact: rdm@hss.caltech.edu

McKelvey, Richard D., and Thomas R. Palfrey (1998) “Quantal Response Equilibria for Extensive Form Games,” Experimental Economics, 1:1 9-41. Keywords: experiments, game theory, backward induction, extensive form, quantal response, logit equilibrium, bounded rationality. Email Contact: rdm@hss.caltech.edu

McKelvey, Richard, and John Patty (1999) “Quantal Response Voting,” California Institute of Technology, Discussion Paper, presented at the Spring 1999 Public Choice Meetings. Keywords: experiments, game theory, voting, quantal response. Email Contact: rdm@hss.caltech.edu

McKelvey, Richard D., and Guy Riddihough (1999) “The Hard Sciences,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 96(September), 10549. Keywords: experiments, game theory, methodology. Email Contact: rdm@hss.caltech.edu

Mehta, Judith, Chris Starmer, and Robert Sugden (1994) “Focal Points in Pure Coordination Games: An Experimental Investigation,” Theory and Decision, 36163-185. Keywords: experiments, game theory, focal points, coordination. Email Contact: c.starmer@uea.ac.uk

Mehta, Judith, Chris Starmer, and Robert Sugden (1994) “The Nature of Salience: An Experimental Investigation of Pure Coordination Games,” American Economic Review, 84658-673. Keywords: experiments, game theory, coordination, salience. Email Contact: c.starmer@uea.ac.uk

Meidinger, Claude, Stephane Robin, and Bernard Ruffeiux (1998) “Repeated Game, Incomplete Information and Coordination: Experimental Results in the Investment Game,” Ecole Nationale Superieure de Genie Industriel, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, game theory, trust game, psychological game theory, fairness, intentions. Abstract: The paper uses Rabin's fairness model as a basis for explaining results of a standard trust game. Email Contact: bernard.ruffieux@inpg.fr

Mendinger, C., S. Robin, and B. Ruffieux (1999) “Trust, Reciprocity, and Cheap Talk,” Revue Economique, 50:1 (January), 5-44. Keywords: experiments, game theory, trust, reciprocity, cheap talk.

Messick, D. M. (1967) “Interdependent Decision Strategies in Zero-Sum Games: A Computer Controlled Study,” Behavioral Science, 1233-48. Keywords: experiments, game theory, zero sum games, methodology, computerization.

Messick, D. M., and W. B. Thorngate (1967) “Relative Gain Maximization in Experimental Games,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 385-101. Keywords: experiments, game theory, relative payoffs, rivalistic behavior.

Messick, David M., and Charles G. McClintock (1968) “Motivational Bases of Choice in Experimental Games,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 41-25. Keywords: experiments, game theory.

Messick, David M. (1972) “A Stochastic Model of Preference in Decomposed Games,” in Contributions to Experimental Economics, Vol. 3, edited by Heinz Sauermann, Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 363-394. Keywords: experiments, game theory,
stochastic choice, probabilistic choice, bounded rationality. Email

Meyer, Donald J., John B. Van Huyck, Raymond C. Battalio, and Thomas R. Saving (1992) “History's Role in Coordinating Decentralized Allocation Decisions: Laboratory Evidence on Repeated Binary Allocation Games,” Journal of
Political Economy, 100:2 (April), 292-316. Keywords: experiments, game theory, coordination, history effects.

Millner, Edward L., and Michael D. Pratt (1989) “An Experimental Investigation of Efficient Rent Seeking,” Public Choice, 62:2 (August), 139-151. Keywords: experiments, game theory, rent seeking. Email Contact: emillne@vcu.edu

Mitropoulos, A., Joachim Weimann, and Chun-Lei Yang (1998) “Rent-Seeking Experiments,” Magdeburg University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, game theory, rent seeking, first-mover advantage, best shot game, sequential games, fairness. Abstract: The experiments implement a sequential rent-seeking game. The first-mover advantage predicted in theory is not observed in the data, due to the "revealed toughness" of the second mover. Also discusssed are best-shot, ultimatum, trust, and dictator games. Email Contact: joachim.weimann@ww.uni-magdeburg.de

Mookherjee, Dilip, and Barry Sopher (1994) “Learning Behavior in an Experimental Matching Pennies Game,” Games and Economic Behavior, 7:1 (July), 62-91. Keywords: experiments, game theory, learning, matching pennies.

Mookherjee, Dilip, and Barry Sopher (1997) “Learning and Decision Costs in Experimental Constant Sum Games,” Games and Economic Behavior, 19:1 (April), 97-132. Keywords: experiments, game theory, learning, constant sum games.

Moreno, Diego, and John Wooders (1998) “Experimental Study of Communication and Coordination in Noncooperative Games,” Games and Economic Behavior, 24:1-2 (July-August), 47-76. Keywords: experiments, game theory, communication, coordination.

Morgan, John, and Martin Sefton (1998) “An Experimental Investigation of Unprofitable Games,” Princeton University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1998 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, game theory, matrix games, maxmin behavior, Nash equilibrium, quantal response equilibrium. Abstract: An unprofitable game is one in which maximin strategies do not constitute a Nash equilibrium, yet they guarantee the same payoff as players earn in a Nash equilibrium. In two-person matrix games with three strategies, the data patterns do not correspond to either Nash or maximin play. Email Contact: jmorgan@princeton.edu, martin.sefton@newcastle.ac.uk

Morgan, Dylan, Anne M. Bell, and William A. Sethares (1999) “An Experimental Study of the El Farol Problem,” University of Wisconsin, Madison, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1999 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, game theory, coordination, generalized game of chicken, mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. Email Contact: abell@mail.arc.nasa.gov

Morgenstern, Oskar (1956) “Experiment und Berechnung grob*en Umfangs in der Wirtschaftswissenschaft,” Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 76179-237. Keywords: experiments, game theory.

Morrison, William G., and E. Elisabet Ruström (1999) “Reciprocity and Psychological Equilibria in an Investment Game Experiment with Belief Elicitation,” Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1999 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, game theory, reciprocity, trust, psychology, belief elicitation, warm glow altruism. Email Contact: bmorriso@mach1.wlu.ca

Muller, Andrew, and Asha Sadanand (1998) “Virtual Observability in Two Player Games,” University of Guelph, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, game theory. Abstract: "Virtual observability" is the principle that players in sequential games with imperfect information act as if they observed earlier player's choices. Several standard games are played under three conditions: simultaneous play, sequential play with others' moves being observed, and seqential play with others' prior moves being unobserved. An analysis of individual decisions shows a tendency for decisions to shift in the direction predicted by virtual observability. Email Contact: asha@css.uoguelph.ca

Murnighan, J. Keith, and Alvin E. Roth (1977) “The Effects of Communication and Information Availability in an Experimental Study of a Three Person Game,” Management Science, 23(August), 1336-1348. Keywords: experiments, game theory, communication, information, three-person game. Email Contact: keithm@nwu.edu

Murnighan, J. Keith, and Alvin E. Roth (1983) “Expecting Continued Play in Prisoner's Dilemma Games: A Test of Three Models,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 27279-300. Keywords: experiments, game theory, prisoner's dilemma, probability of continuation. Email Contact: keithm@nwu.edu

My, K. Boun, Marc Willinger, and A. Ziegelmeyer (1998) “Local Interaction and Equilibrium Selection: An Experimental Investigation,” BETA, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, game theory, local interaction, equilibrium selection. Abstract: This experiment evaluates the effects of local versus global interaction on behavior in two-person 2x2 coordination games. Other treatment variables include the size of the local neighborhoods. Email Contact: willma@cournot.u-strasbg.fr

Nagel, Rosemarie (1995) “Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study,” American Economic Review, 85:5 (December), 1313-1326. Keywords: experiments, game theory, learning, guessing games. Email Contact: nagel@upf.es

Nagel, Rosemarie (1997) “A Survey of Experimental Beauty-Contest Games,” Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Keywords: experiments, game theory, guessing game, unraveling. Email Contact: nagel@upf.es

Nagel, Rosemarie, and Fang Fang Tang (1998) “Experimental Results on the Centipede Game in Normal Form: An Investigation of Learning,” Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 42356-384. Keywords: experiments, game theory, learning, normal-form centipede game, learning direction theory, quantal response equilibrium. Abstract: The paper specifies and estimates a noisy directional theory of learning in a game where players' payoffs are determined by the minimum decision. Email Contact: nagel@upf.es

Nalbantian, H., and Andrew Schotter (1995) “Matching and Efficiency in the Baseball Free-Agent System: An Experimental Examination,” Journal of Labor Economics, 131-31. Keywords: experiments, game theory, matching, labor economics. Email Contact: schotter@fasecon.econ.nyu.edu

Nasar, Sylvia (1998) A Beautiful Mind, New York: Simon and Schuster. Keywords: experiments, game theory, Nash equilibrium.

Nelissen, J., Jan Potters, Eline van der Heijden, and Harrie Verbon (1998) “Simple and Complex Gift Exchange in a Laboratory,” University of Tilburg, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, game theory, reciprocity, gift exchange. Abstract: The experiment implements a bilateral gift-exchange game in which gift giving is socially efficient but individually costly. Behavior is affected by changes in the information structure and matching scheme. Email Contact: h.a.a.verbon@kub.nl

Neral, John, and Jack Ochs (1992) “The Sequential Equilibrium Theory of Reputation Building: A Further Test,” Econometrica, 60:5 (September), 1151-1169. Keywords: experiments, game theory, reputation. Email Contact: j_neral@fre.fsu.und.edu

Nyarko, Yaw, and Andrew Schotter (1998) “Equilibria in Beliefs and Our Belief in Equilibria,” New York University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, game theory, beliefs, scoring rule, elicitation. Abstract: Subjects in the experiment play a game and also report beliefs about the other person's play, via a scoring rule procedure. Belief data are used to evaluate equilibrium and learning theories. Email Contact: schotter@fasecon.econ.nyu.edu

O'Neil, Barry (1987) “**Nonmetric Test of the Minimax Theory of Two-Person Zerosum Games,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 842106-2109. Keywords: experiments, game theory, mixed strategy play, minimax theorem, matrix game.

O'Neill, B. (1991) “Comments on Brown and Rosenthal's Reexamination [Testing the Minimax Hypothesis, A Reexamination of O'Neill's Game Experiment],” Econometrica, 59:2 (March), 503-507. Keywords: experiments, game theory, minimax hypothesis, mixed equilibria.

Ochs, Jack (1990) “The Coordination Problem in Decentralized Markets: An Experiment,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 105:2 (May), 545-559. Keywords: experiments, game theory, coordination, markets, entry. Email Contact: jochs@pitt.edu

Ochs, Jack (1994) “Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria: An Experimental Study,” Games and Economic Behavior, 10:1 (July), 202-217. Keywords: experiments, game theory, mixed strategies. Email Contact: jochs@pitt.edu

Ochs, Jack (1995) “Coordination Problems,” in The Handbook of Experimental Economics, edited by J. H. Kagel and A. E. Roth, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 195-249. Keywords: experiments, games, coordination games, survey. Abstract This paper surveys the literature on coordination game experiments. Email Contact: jochs@pitt.edu

Oeschssler, J. (1997) “An Evolutionary Interpretation of Mixed-Strategy Equilibria,” Games and Economic Behavior, 21:1-2 (October-November), 203-237. Keywords: experiments, game theory, mixed strategy equilibria, evolution. Email Contact: oechsler@wiwi.hu-berlin.de

Offerman, Theo, Jan Potters, and Joep Sonnemans (1998) “Imitation and Belief Learning in an Oligopoly Experiment,” University of Amsterdam, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, game theory, learning, imitation, markets, Cournot. Abstract: The experiment consists of repeated Cournot triopoly games, under three information conditions. One condition is hypothesized to induce imitation of successful rival behavior, another is designed to induce following an "exemplary firm," and a final one is designed to promote experience based learning. These three treatments tend to result in Walrasean, collusive, and Cournot Nash outcomes respectively. Email Contact: theoo@fee.uva.nl

Offerman, Theo, and Joep Sonnemans (1998) “Learning by Experience and Learning by Imitating Successful Others,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 34:4 (March), 559-575. Keywords: experiments, game theory, learning, imitation. Abstract: Subjects make investment decisions and report expectations. The provision of information about others' expectations has an effect on behavior, even when others' had identical information ex ante. There is evidence of learning, both from one's own experience and from imitation of others. Email Contact: theoo@fee.uva.nl

Offerman, Theo, Jan Potters, and Harrie Verbon (1999) “Cooperation in an Overlapping Generations Experiment,” University of Amsterdam, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, game theory, cooperation, overlapping generations. Email Contact: theoo@fee.uva.nl

Olson, Mark, and David Porter (1994) “An Experimental Examination into the Design of Decentralized Methods to Solve the Assignment Problem with and without Money,” Economic Theory, 411-40. Keywords: experiments, game theory, public, mechanisms, assignment problem. Email Contact: molson@econlab.arizona.edu

Oppenheimer, Joe (1990) “Comment on S. Beckman's `Producer's Dilemma Experiments',” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 14:2 (October), 285-286. Keywords: experiments, game theory, producer's dilemma. Email Contact: joppenhe@bss2.umd.edu

Orbell, John M., and Robyn M. Dawes (1981) “Social Dilemmas,” in Progress in Applied Social Psychology, edited by J. M. Stephenson and J. H. Davis, New York: Wiley, 117-133. Keywords: experiments, game theory, social dilemmas. Email

Orbell, John M., Peregrine Schwartz-Shea, and Randy T. Simmons (1984) “Do Cooperators Exit More Readily than Defectors?,” American Political Science Review, 78:1 (March), 147-162. Keywords: experiments, game theory, cooperation.

Orbell, John M., Robyn M. Dawes, and Alphons J. C. van de Kragt (1988) “Explaining Discussion Induced Cooperation,” Journal of Personality and Psychology, 54811-819. Keywords: experiments, game theory, discussion, cooperation.

Ordeshook, Peter C., ed. (1978) Game Theory and Mathematical Science, New York: New York University Press for the Center for Applied Economics. Keywords: experiments, game theory, public, voting, political science. Email Contact: ordeshook@hss.caltech.edu

Ordeshook, Peter C., ed. (1989) Models of Strategic Choice in Politics, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Keywords: experiments, game theory, public, voting. Email Contact: ordeshook@hss.caltech.edu

Ortmann, Andreas, and Lisa K. Tichy (1999) “Gender Differences in the Laboratory: Evidence from Prisoner's Dilemma Games,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 39:3 227-339. Keywords: experiments, game theory, methodology, gender effects.

Palfrey, Thomas R., and Howard Rosenthal (1994) “Repeated Play, Cooperation and Coordination: An Experimental Study,” Review of Economic Studies, 61:3 (July), 545-565. Keywords: experiments, games, cooperation. Email Contact: trp@hss.caltech.edu

Peterson, B. E., D. G. Winter, and R. m. Doty (1994) “Tests of a Motivational-Perceptual Model of Conflict Escalation,” Journal of Conflict and Resolution, 38:4 (December), 719-748. Keywords: experiments, game theory, conflict resolution.

Phillips, Owen R., and Alison F.*** Del Rossi (1999) “How Legal Expenditures Influence Court Decisions: An Experimental Approach,” University of Wyoming, Discussion Paper, presented at the Spring 1999 Public Choice Meetings. Keywords: experiments, game theory, law and economics, rent seeking. Email Contact: owenphil@uwyo.edu

Potters, Jan, and Frans van Winden (1992) “Lobbying and Asymmetric Information,” Public Choice, 74:3 (October), 269-292. Keywords: experiments, game theory, public, lobbying, asymmetric information. Email Contact: j.j.m.potters@kub.nl

Potters, Jan, C. G. de Vries, and Frans van Winden (1998) “An Experimental Examination of Rational Rent-Seeking,” European Journal of Political Economy, 14:4 (November), 783-800. Keywords: experiments, game theory, public, rent seeking. Email Contact: j.j.m.potters@kub.nl

Prasnikar, Vesna, and Alvin E. Roth (1992) “Considerations of Fairness and Strategy: Experimental Data From Sequential Games,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107:3 (August), 865-888. Keywords: experiments, game theory, best shot games, multi-proposer bargaining games. Email Contact: aroth@hbs.edu

Prisbrey, Jeffrey (1991) “An Experimental Analysis of the Two-Person Reciprocity Game,” California Institute of Technology, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, game theory, battle of sexes game, repetition, reciprocity. Email Contact: jprisbre@fcc.gov

Pruitt, Dean G. (1970) “Motivational Processes in the Decomposed Prisoner's Dilemma,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 14227-238. Keywords: experiments, game theory, prisoner's dilemma.

Rabin, Matthew (1993) “Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics,” American Economic Review, 83:5 (December), 1281-1302. Keywords: experiments, game theory, fairness, psychological game theory, kindness functions. Abstract: This paper proposes a model reciprocity for normal-form games that incorporates the notion that motives matter. Motives are measured by a parametric "kindness function."

Rankin, Frederick W. (1999) “The Role of Performance Measurement, Observability, and Repeated Interaction in Organizations: An Experimental Examination,” Washington University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1999 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, game theory, organizational behavior, incentives, information. Email Contact: rankin@mail.olin.wustl.edu

Rapoport, Anatol (1959) “Critiques of Game Theory,” Behavioral Science, 449-66. Keywords: experiments, game theory, matrix games, survey.

Rapoport, Anatol, and Carol Orwant (1962) “Experimental Games: A Review,” Behavioral Science, 71-37. Keywords: experiments, game theory, matrix games, survey.

Rapoport, Anatol, and Albert M. Chammah (1965) Prisoner's Dilemma: A Study in Conflict and Cooperation, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Keywords: experiments, game theory, prisoner's dilemma, cooperation.

Rapoport, Anatol, and Albert M. Chammah (1965) “Sex Differences in Factors Contributing to the Level of Cooperation in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 2831-838. Keywords: experiments, game theory, prisoner's dilemma, cooperation, gender effects.

Rapoport, Amnon, and A. Mowshowitz (1966) “Experimental Studies of Stochastic Models for the Prisoner's Dilemma,” Behavioral Science, 11444-458. Keywords: experiments, game theory, prisoner's dilemma, stochastic behavior. Email Contact: arapoport@bpa.arizona.edu

Rapoport, Anatol, and Albert M. Chammah (1966) “The Game of Chicken,” American Behavioral Scientist, 1010-28. Keywords: experiments, game theory, chicken.

Rapoport, Anatol, and Philip Dale (1966) “Models to Prisoner's Dilemma,” Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 3269-286. Keywords: experiments, game theory, prisoner's dilemma. Abstract: experiments, game theory, prisoner's dilemma

Rapoport, Anatol*, and Nancy S. Cole (1968) “Experimental Studies of Independent Mixed-Motive Games,” Behavioral Science, 13189-204. Keywords: experiments, game theory.

Rapoport, Anatol, Melvin Guyer, and David Gordon (1971) “A Comparison of Performance of Danish and American Students in a `Threat Game',” Behavioral Science, 16456-466. Keywords: experiments, game theory, threat game, subject pool effects.

Rapoport, Amnon, James P. Kahan, and William E. Stein (1973) “Decisions of Timing in Conflict Situations of Incomplete Information,” Behavioral Science, 18:4 (July), 272-287. Keywords: experiments, game theory, continuous time games, duels. Abstract: Pairs of subjects interacted in computerized games of timing (duels) with symmetric accuracy functions and varying numbers of "bullets." The duels were silent, so that subjects did not know if the other person had fired and missed. Comparisons with previous experiments using "noisy" duels are discussed. Email Contact: arapoport@bpa.arizona.edu

Rapoport, Anatol, Melvin J. Guyer, and David G. Gordon (1976)The 2x2 Game, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Keywords: experiments, game theory, matrix games.

Rapoport, Anatol, Oded Frenkel, and Josef Perner (1977) “Experiments with Cooperative 2X2 Games,” Theory and Decision, 867-92. Keywords: experiments, game theory, 2x2 games.

Rapoport, Anatol (1988) “Experiments with N-Person Social Traps I: Prisoner's Dilemma, Weak Prisoner's Dilemma, Volunteer's Dilemma, and Largest Number,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 32:3 (September), 457-472. Keywords: experiments, game theory, social dilemmas, prisoner's dilemma, weak prisoner's dilemma, volunteer's dilemma, largest number.

Rapoport, Anatol (1988) “Experiments with N-Person Social Traps II: Tragedy of the Commons,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 32:3 (September), 473-488. Keywords: experiments, game theory, public, tragedy of the commons.

Rapoport, Amnon, and Gary Bornstein (1989) “Solving Public Good Problems in Competition between Equal and Unequal Size Groups,” Journal Conflict Resolution, 33:3 (September), 460-479. Keywords: experiments, game theory, group size, free riding, public, voluntary contributions. Email Contact: arapoport@bpa.arizona.edu

Rapoport, Amnon (1990) Experimental Studies of Interactive Decisions, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Keywords: experiments, game theory, public. Email Contact: arapoport@bpa.arizona.edu

Rapoport, Amnon, and R. B. Boebel (1992) “Mixed Strategies in Strictly Competitive Games: A Further Test of the Minimax Hypothesis,” Games and Economic Behavior, 4:2 (April), 261-283. Keywords: experiments, game theory, mixed strategies, minimax hypothesis. Email Contact: arapoport@bpa.arizona.edu

Rapoport, Amnon, David V. Budescu, Ramzi Suleiman, and Eythan Weg (1992) “Social Dilemmas with Uniformly Distributed Resources,” in Social Dilemmas: Theoretical Issues and Research Findings, edited by W. Liebrand, D. Messick and H. Wilke, New York: Pergamon Press, 43-57. Keywords: experiments, game theory, social dilemmas. Email Contact: arapoport@bpa.arizona.edu

Rapoport, Amnon, and David V. Budescu (1992) “Generation of Random Series in Two-Person Strictly Competitive Games,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 121352-363. Keywords: experiments, game theory, mixed strategies, matrix games. Email Contact: arapoport@bpa.arizona.edu

Rapoport, Amnon (1995) “Individual Strategies in a Market Entry Game,” Group Decision and Negotiation, 4:2 (March), 117-133. Keywords: experiments, game theory, entry game, individual decisions. Email Contact: arapoport@bpa.arizona.edu

Rapoport, Amnon (1997) “Order of Play in Strategically Equivalent Games in Extensive Form,” International Journal of
Game Theory, 26:1 113-136. Keywords: experiments, game theory, order of play, extensive form. Email Contact: arapoport@bpa.arizona.edu

Rapoport, Amnon, and James A. Sundali (1997) “Induction vs. Deterrence in the Chain Store Game: How Many Potential Entrants Are Needed to Deter Entry?,” in Understanding Strategic Behavior: Essays in Honor of Reinhard Selten, edited by W. Albers, Werner Gu*th, P. Hammerstein, B. Moldovanu and E. van Damme, Berlin: Springer-Verlag, . Keywords: experiments, game theory, sequential games, entry, chain store paradox. Email Contact: arapoport@bpa.arizona.edu

Rapoport, Amnon, Darryl A. Seale, Ido Erev, and James A. Sundali (1998) “Equilibrium Play in Large Group Market Entry Games,” Management Science, 44:1 (January), 129-141. Keywords: experiments, game theory, entry. Email Contact: arapoport@bpa.arizona.edu

Rapoport, Amnon, Darryl A. Seale, and Lisa Ordo**n**ez (1998) “Weighted Probabilities in Large Group Coordination: Experimental Evidence from Market Entry Games,” University of Arizona, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, game theory, entry, probability weighting. Email Contact: arapoport@bpa.arizona.edu

Rapoport, Amnon, and M. A.* Fuller (1999) “Coordination in Non-cooperative Three-Person Games Under Different Information Structures,” Group Decision and Negotiation, forthcoming. Keywords: experiments, game theory, coordination, three-person games, information. Email Contact: arapoport@bpa.arizona.edu

Riker, William H., and Richard G. Niemi (1964) “Anonymity and Rationality in the Essential Three-Person Game,” Human Relations, 17131-140. Keywords: experiments, game theory.

Rosenthal, Robert W. (1981) “Games of Perfect Information, Predatory Pricing and the Chain Store Paradox,” Journal of Economic Theory, 2592-100. Keywords: experiments, game theory, predatory pricing, backward induction, centipede game. Email Contact: rosentha@bu.edu

Rosenthal, Robert W. (1989) “A Bounded Rationality Approach to the Study of Noncooperative Games,” International Journal of Game Theory, 18:3 273-292. Keywords: experiments, game theory, bounded rationality, Luce rule. Abstract: The paper proposes a model of equilibrium noisy behavior in which choice probabilities are determined by payoff differences. Email Contact: rosentha@bu.edu

Rosenthal, Robert W. (1993) “Rules of Thumb in Games,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 22:1 (September), 1-13. Keywords: experiments, game theory, heuristics, rules of thumb. Email Contact: rosentha@bu.edu

Rossi, Alessandro, and Massimo Warglien (1999) “Fairness in Agency Relationship with Multiple Agents: An Experimental Study,” University of Trento, Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1999 European Regional ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, game theory, principal agent model, multiple agents, fairness. Abstract: This paper uses experimental techniques to assess the effects of attitudes about fairness in a situation with one principal and multiple agents in a team production process. Email Contact: arossi@cs.unitn.it

Roth, Alvin E., and J. Keith Murnighan (1978) “Equilibrium Behavior and Repeated Play of the Prisoner's Dilemma,” Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 17189-198. Keywords: experiments, game theory, prisoner's dilemma, repeated play. Email Contact: aroth@hbs.edu

Roth, Alvin E. (1991) “Game Theory as a Part of Empirical Economics,” Economic Journal, 101:404 (January), 107-114. Keywords: experiments, game theory. Email Contact: aroth@hbs.edu

Roth, Alvin E., and Ido Erev (1995) “Learning in Extensive-Form Games: Experimental Data and Simple Dynamic Models in the Intermediate Term,” Games and Economic Behavior, 8:1 (January), 164-212. Keywords: experiments, game theory, learning, reinforcement learning. Email Contact: aroth@hbs.edu

Roth, Alvin E. (1996) “Adaptive Behavior and Strategic Rationality: Evidence from the Laoboratory and the Field,” in The Rational Foundations of Economic Behavior, edited by K. Arrow, E. Colomabatto, M. Perlman and C. Schmidt, Macmillan: 255-273. Keywords: experiments, game theory, bargaining, adaptive behavior, field. Email Contact: aroth@hbs.edu

Sadiraj, Klarita, and Arthur Schram (1998) “Informed and Uninformed Investors in an Experimental Ponzi Scheme,” University of Amsterdam, Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1998 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, game theory, asymmetric information, ponzi schemes.

Sadrieh, Abdolkarim (1998) “An Intergenerational Fairness Experiment,” University of Bonn, Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1998 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, game theory, altruism. Email Contact: sadrieh@united.econ.uni-bonn.de

Salmon, Timothy C. (1999) “An Evaluation of Econometric Models of Adaptive Learning,” Caltech, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, game theory, learning, computer simulation.

Samuelson, Larry (1996) “Bounded Rationality and Game Theory,” Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 36:Special Issue 17-35. Keywords: experiments, game theory, bounded rationality. Email Contact: larrysam@ssc.wisc.edu

Sarin, Rajiv, and Farshid Vahid (1998) “Predicting Behavior in Experimental Games: A Procedurally Rational Model of Choice,” Texas A&M University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, game theory, bounded rationality, procedural rationality, coordination games, matching pennies, mixed strategies. Abstract: The paper presents a one-parameter model of boundedly rational behavior in games. Subjects simplify the choices in a game by devising non-probabilistic assessments, and the strategy with the highest assessment is selected. The model is used to explain behavior in games with unique mixed strategies. Email Contact: r-sarin@tamu.edu

Scharleman, Jorn, Catherine C. Eckel, Alex Kacelnik, and Rick K. Wilson (1999) “The Value of a Smile: Game Theory with a Human Face,” Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Discussion Paper, presented at the September 1999 American Political Science Association Annual Meetings. Keywords: experiments, game theory, bargaining, facial expressions. Email Contact: eckelc@vt.edu

Schmidt, David, Robert Shupp, James Walker, and Elinor Ostrom (1999) “Playing Safe in Coordination Games: The Role of Risk Dominance, Social History, and Reputation,” Indiana University, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, game theory, coordination, risk dominance, social history, reputation. Email Contact: walkerj@indiana.edu

Schotter, Andrew, and G. Schwodiauer (1980) “Economics and the Theory of Games: A Survey,” Journal of Economic Literature, 18:2 (June), 479-527. Keywords: experiments, game theory, survey. Email Contact: schotter@fasecon.econ.nyu.edu

Schotter, Andrew, and Keith Weigelt (1992) “Asymmetric Tournaments, Equal Opportunity Laws, and Affirmative Action: Some Experimental Results,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107:2 (May), 511-539. Keywords: experiments, game theory, tournaments, asymmetries. Email Contact: schotter@fasecon.econ.nyu.edu

Schotter, Andrew, Keith Weigelt, and Charles Wilson (1994) “A Laboratory Investigation of Multiperson Rationality and Presentation Effects,” Games and Economic Behavior, 6:3 (May), 445-468. Keywords: experiments, game theory, extensive form, presentation effects. Email Contact: schotter@fasecon.econ.nyu.edu

Schotter, Andrew (1999) “Coordination Conventions in Inter-Generation Games: An Experiment in Lamarckian Evolutionary Dynamics,” New York University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1999 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, game theory, socialization, inter-generational matchings, benevolence, social conventions, history, macroeconomics. Email
Contact: schotter@fasecon.econ.nyu.edu

Schram, Arthur, and Ingrid Seinen (1999) “Indirect Reciprocity in a Mutual Aid Experiment,” University of Amsterdam, Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1999 European Regional ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, game theory, reciprocity, help game. Abstract: Each person in a pairing is randomly designated as a potential donor or a recipient. At a small cost, the donor can raise the recipient's earnings. Donors can see the recipient's actions as a donor in earlier rounds, which allows for the development of a social norm and for punishment of deviators. The data strongly support the development of this type of social norm. Email Contact: ingrids@fee.uva.nl

Schwartz-Shea, P., and R. T. Simmons (1990) “The Layered Prisoners' Dilemma: Ingroup versus Macro-efficiency,” Public Choice, 65:1 (April), 61-83. Keywords: experiments, game theory, prisoner's dilemma.

Selten, Reinhard, and Rolf Stoecker (1986) “End Behavior in Sequences of Finite Prisoner's Dilemma Supergames: A Learning Theory Approach,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 47-70. Keywords: experiments, game theory, backward induction, learning, prisoner's dilemma games. Email Contact: selten@lab.econ1.uni-bonn.de

Selten, Reinhard, ed. (1991) Game Equilibrium Models I. Evolution and Game Dynamics, New York; Berlin; London and Tokyo: Springer. Keywords: experiments, game theory, evolution. Email Contact: selten@lab.econ1.uni-bonn.de

Selten, Reinhard, ed. (1991) Game Equilibrium Models IV. Social and Political Interaction, New York; Berlin; London and Tokyo: Springer. Keywords: experiments, game theory, public. Email Contact: selten@lab.econ1.uni-bonn.de

Selten, Reinhard (1991) “Evolution, Learning, and Economic Behavior,” Games and Economic Behavior, 3:1 (February), 3-24. Keywords: experiments, games, learning, evolution. Email Contact: selten@lab.econ1.uni-bonn.de

Selten, Reinhard (1991) “Anticipatory Learning in Games,” in Game Equilibrium Models, Vol. 1, edited by R. Selten, New York: Springer-Verlag, Chapter 3**. Keywords: experiments, game theory, anticipatory learning, introspection. Email Contact: selten@lab.econ1.uni-bonn.de

Selten, Reinhard, and J. Bucta (1994) “Experimental Sealed Bid First Price Auctions with Directly Observed Bid Functions,” in Games and Human Behavior: Essays in Honor of Amnon Rapoport, edited by I. E. D. Budescu, I.* Erev and R. Zwick, Hillside N.J.: Erlbaum Association, . Keywords: experiments, game theory, auctions, learning, direction learning theory. Abstract This paper uses the strategy method to evaluate a model of directional learning in auctions. Email Contact: selten@lab.econ1.uni-bonn.de

Selten, Reinhard, and Axel Ockenfels (1998) “An Experimental Solidarity Game,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 34:4 (March), 517-539. Keywords: experiments, game theory, solidarity game. Email Contact: selten@lab.econ1.uni-bonn.de

Shimp, Charles P. (1969) “Optimal Behavior in Free-Operant Experiments,” Psychological Review, 7697-112. Keywords: experiments, game theory*.

Shogren, Jason F., and K. H. Baik (1991) “Reexamining Efficient Rent-Seeking in Laboratory Markets,” Public Choice, 69:1 (February), 69-79. Keywords: experiments, game theory, rent seeking. Email Contact: jramses@uwyo.edu

Shogren, Jason F., and K. H. Baik (1992) “Favorites and Underdogs: Strategic Behavior in an Experimental Contest,” Public Choice, 74:2 (September), 191-205. Keywords: experiments, game theory, contests, asymmetries. Email Contact: jramses@uwyo.edu

Shubik, Martin (1996) “Why Equilibrium? A Note on the Noncooperative Equilibria of Some Matrix Games,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 29:3 (May), 537-539. Keywords: experiments, game theory, Nash equilibrium, matrix games. Email Contact: martin.shubik@yale.edu

Simon, Herbert A. (1956) “A Comparison of Game Theory and Learning Theory,” Psychometrica, 21267-272. Keywords: experiments, game theory, learning.

Smith, William P. (1968) “Reward Structure and Information in the Development of Cooperation,” Journal of Social Psychology, 4199-223. Keywords: experiments, game theory*.

Smith, Vernon L. (1992) “Game Theory and Experimental Economics: Beginnings and Early Influences,” History of Political Economy, 24:Special Issue 241-282. Keywords: experiments, game theory, history. Email Contact: vls@econlab.arizona.edu

Sonnemans, Joep, and Arthur Schram (1999) “Participation Game Experiments; Explaining Voter Turnout,” in Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, edited by C. R. Plott and V. L. Smith, Amsterdam: Elsevier, forthcoming. Keywords: experiments, game theory, public, participation games, voter turnout. Email Contact: joeps@fee.uva.edu

Stahl, Dale (1993) “Evolution of Smart Players,” Games and Economic Behavior, 5:4 (October), 604-617. Keywords: experiments, game theory, evolution. Email Contact: stahl@eco.utexas.edu

Stahl, Dale O., and Paul W. Wilson (1994) “Experimental Evidence on Players' Models of Other Players,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 25:3 (December), 309-327. Keywords: experiments, game theory, introspection, strategic foresight, bounded rationality. Email Contact: stahl@eco.utexas.edu

Stahl, Dale, and P. W. Wilson (1995) “On Players' Models of Other Players: Theory and Experimental Evidence,” Games and Economic Behavior, 10:1 (July), 218-254. Keywords: experiments, game theory, bounded rationality, introspection, strategic foresight. Email Contact: stahl@eco.utexas.edu

Stahl, Dale (1996) “Boundedly Rational Rule Learning in a Guessing Game,” Games and Economic Behavior, 16:2 (October), 303-330. Keywords: experiments, game theory, rule learning, bounded rationality, guessing game. Email Contact: stahl@eco.utexas.edu

Stahl, Dale (1999) “A Horse Race Among Reinforcement Learning Models,” University of Texas, Discussion Paper, presented at the Spring 1999 Public Choice Meetings. Keywords: experiments, game theory, learning. Email Contact: stahl@eco.utexas.edu

Stahl, Dale (1999) “Evidence-Based Rule Learning in Symmetric Normal-Form Games,” International Journal of Game Theory, 28:1 (February), 111-130. Keywords: experiments, game theory, learning, normal form games. Email Contact: stahl@eco.utexas.edu

Stahl, Dale O. (1999) “Rule-Learning in Symmetric Normal-Form Games: Theory and Evidence,” Games and Economic Behavior, forthcoming. Keywords: experiments, game theory, learning, rule learning. Email Contact: stahl@eco.utexas.edu

Straub, Paul G. (1995) “Risk Dominance and Coordination Failures in Static Games,” Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 35:4 (Winter), 339-363. Keywords: experiments, games, risk dominance, coordination games. Abstract: This paper reports a series of two-person coordination game experiments in which the outcomes are generally well organized by the notion of risk dominance.

Sundali, James A., Amnon Rapoport, and Darryl A. Seale (1995) “Coordination in Market Entry Games with Symmetric Players,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 64:2 (November), 203-218. Keywords: experiments, game theory, entry games, coordination, mixed strategies. Email Contact: arapoport@bpa.arizona.edu

Swarthout, Todd, and Mark Walker (1999) “Reinforcement, Belief Learning, and Information Processing,” University of Arizona, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1999 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, game theory, belief learning, reinforcement learning. Email Contact: swarthout@nt.econlab.arizona.edu

Tedeschi, James T., Thomas Bonoma, and Svenn Lindskold (1970) “Threatener's Reactions to Prior Announcement of Behavioral Compliance of Defiance,” Behavioral Science, 15171-179. Keywords: experiments, game theory.

Thrall, R. M., C. H. Coombs, and R. L. Davis (1954) Decision Processes, New York: Wiley. Keywords: experiments, game theory, decisions.

Tucker, A. W. (1950) “A Two-Person Dilemma,” Stanford University, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, game theory, prisoner's dilemma.

Tullock, Gordon (1999) “Non-Prisoner's Dilemma,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 39:4 455-458. Keywords: experiments, game theory, prisoner's dilemma.

van der Heijden, E. C. M. (1998) “The Poverty Game and the Pension Game: The Role of Reciprocity,” Journal of Economic Psychology, 19:1 (February), 5-41. Keywords: experiments, game theory, poverty game, pension game, reciprocity. Email Contact: vanderHeijden@kub.nl

van Dijk, F., Joep Sonnemans, and Frans van Winden (1999) “Incentive Systems in a Real Effort Experiment,” European Economic Review, forthcoming. Keywords: experiments, game theory, real effort, methodology, incentives. Email Contact: fvwinden@fee.uva.nl

Van Huyck, John B., Raymond C. Battalio, and Richard O. Beil (1990) “Tacit Coordination Games, Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordination Failure,” American Economic Review, 80:1 (March), 234-248. Keywords: experiments, game theory, coordination. Abstract: This paper shows that behavior may converge to the Pareto-inferior Nash equilibrium in multi-person coordination games with multiple decisions. Coordination failure is more prevalent with large numbers of participants. Email Contact: john.vanhuyck@tamu.edu

Van Huyck, John B., Raymond C. Battalio, and Richard O. Beil (1991) “Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106:3 (August), 885-911. Keywords: experiments, game theory, coordination, average opinion games. Email Contact: john.vanhuyck@tamu.edu

Van Huyck, John B., Anne B. Gillette, and Raymond C. Battalio (1992) “Credible Assignments in Coordination Games,” Games and Economic Behavior, 4:4 (October), 606-626. Keywords: experiments, game theory, coordination, suggested play. Email Contact: john.vanhuyck@tamu.edu

Van Huyck, John B., Raymond C. Battalio, and Richard Biel (1993) “Asset Markets as an Equilibrium Selection Mechanism: Coordination Failure, Game Form Auctions, and Forward Induction,” Games and Economic Behavior, 5485-504. Keywords: experiments, game theory, forward induction, equilibrium selection, asset markets. Email Contact: john.vanhuyck@tamu.edu

Van Huyck, John B., J. P. Cook, and Raymond C. Battalio (1994) “Selection Dynamics, Asymptotic Stability, and Adaptive Behavior,” Journal of Political Economy, 102:5 (October), 975-1005. Keywords: experiments, game theory, dynamics, adaptive behavior, evolution. Email Contact: john.vanhuyck@tamu.edu

Van Huyck, John B., Raymond C. Battalio, and M. F. Walters (1995) “Commitment versus Discretion in the Peasant-Dictator Game,” Games and Economic Behavior, 10:1 (July), 143-170. Keywords: experiments, game theory. Email Contact: john.vanhuyck@tamu.edu

Van Huyck, John B., Frederick Rankin, and Raymond C. Battalio (1997) “On the Origin of Convention: Evidence from Coordination Games,” Economic Journal, 107(May), ***. Keywords: experiments, game theory, coordination, convention. Email Contact: john.vanhuyck@tamu.edu

Van Huyck, John B., Joseph P. Cook, and Raymond C. Battalio (1997) “Adaptive Behavior and Coordination Failure,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 32:4 (April), 483-503. Keywords: experiments, game theory,
coordination, adaptive behavior. Email Contact: john.vanhuyck@tamu.edu

Vidmar, Neil, and Joseph E. McGrath (1970) “Forces Affecting Success in Negotiation Groups,” Behavioral Science, 15154-163. Keywords: experiments, game theory.

Walker, Mark, and John Wooders (1999) “Minimax Play at Wimbledon,” University of Arizona, Discussion Paper, presented at the Spring 1999 Public Choice Meetings. Keywords: experiments, game theory, field data, mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. Email Contact: mwalker@u.arizona.edu

Warnick, Jim, and Robert L. Slonim (1999) “Toward a Theory of the Development of Norms Using Finite Automata to Infer Strategies from Observed Actions in Trust Game Experiments,” Case Western Reserve University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1999 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, game theory, trust game, norms, finite automata, dynamic strategies. Email Contact: jewst46+@pitt.edu, rls18@guinness.som.cwru.edu

Weber, Roberto A. (1997) “Uncommon Knowledge: An Experimental Test of the `Dirty Faces' Game,” Carnegie Institute of Technology, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, game theory, dirty faces game.

Weber, Roberto A. (1998) “Learning with No Feedback: A Test of Belief and Choice Reinforcement Models in Games,” California Institute of Technology, Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1998 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, game theory, learning.

Weigelt, Keith, and Teck-Hua Ho (1998) “An Experimental Investigation of Mutual Trust and Trust Building,” University of Pennsylvania, Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1998 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, game theory, trust. Email Contact: weigelt@wharton.upenn.edu

Wu, J., and Robert Axelrod (1995) “How to Cope with Noise in Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma,” Journal of Conflict and Resolution, 39:1 (March), 183-189. Keywords: experiments, game theory, prisoner's dilemma, noise.

Zauner, K. G. (1999) “A Payoff Uncertainty Explanation of Results in Experimental Centipede Games,” Games and Economic Behavior, 26:1 (January), 157-185. Keywords: experiments, game theory, centipede game, random preferences. Email Contact: kzauner@agsm.unsw.edu.au