Y2K Bibliography of Experimental Economics and Social Science
Fairness and Inequity Aversion

Charles A. Holt, cah2k@virginia.edu, suggestions and corrections welcome
(for online and personal use only)


Andreoni, James, Paul M. Brown, and Lise Vesterlund (1997) “Fairness, Selfishness, and Selfish Fairness; Experiments on Games with Unequal Equilibrium Payoffs,” University of Wisconsin, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, bargaining,* fairness. Email Contact: andreoni@facstaff.wisc.edu

Andreoni, James, Marco Castillo, and Ragan Petrie (1999) “New Experiments on Bargaining: The Squishy Game,” University of Wisconsin, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, fairness. Abstract: The standard ultimatum is modified by allowing the responder to choose a fraction on the unit interval to be used to scale payoffs. This includes the ultimatum as a special case in which payoffs are multiplied by 0 (rejection) or 1 (acceptance). Rabin's (1998) conjecture that this modification would reduce earnings and agreements is not supported by the experimental evidence. Average earnings are about the same in both treatments. Email Contact: andreoni@facstaff.wisc.edu

Babcock, Linda (1995) “Forming Beliefs about Adjudicated Outcomes: Perceptions of Risk and Reservation Values,” International Review of Law and Economics, 15:3 (September), 289-303. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, fairness.

Babcock, Linda, George Loewenstein, Colin F. Camerer, and Samuel Issacharoff (1995) “Biased Judgements of Fairness in Bargaining,” American Economic Review, 85:5 (December), 1337-1343. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, fairness, judgement biases.

Bethwaite, J., and P.** Thompkinson (1996) “The Ultimatum Game and Non-Selfish Utility Functions,” Journal of Economic Psychology, 17:2 (April), 259-271. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum game, non-selfish preferences, fairness.

Bethwaite, J., and P.** Tompinkson (1993) “The Ultimatum Game -- Understanding and the Taste for Fairness,” Economic Notes, 22:1 37-48. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum game, fairness.

Blount, Sally, and Max H. Bazerman (1996) “The Inconsistent Evaluation of Absolute Versus Comparative Payoffs in
Labor Supply Bargaining,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 30:2 (August), 227-240. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, fairness. Email Contact: blount@gsb.uchicago.edu

Bolton, Gary E. (1991) “A Comparative Model of Bargaining: Theory and Evidence,” American Economic Review, 81:5 (December), 1096-1136. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, fairness, equity. Abstract: Bargaining experiments are used to motivate a model in which subjects are concerned with both their own and their relative payoffs. Email Contact: geb3@psu.edu

Bolton, Gary E. (1994*) “Strong and Weak Equity Effects: Evidence, Significance and Origins,” in Games and Human Behavior: Essays in Honor of Amnon Rapoport, edited by I. E. D. Budescu, I. Erev and R. Zwick, Hillside, N. J.: Erlbaum Association, . Keywords: experiments, bargaining, equity, fairness. Email Contact: geb3@psu.edu

Bolton, Gary E. (1997) “The Rationality of Splitting Equally,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 32:3 365-381. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, fairness, equity. Email Contact: geb3@psu.edu

Bolton, Gary E., Elena Katok, and Rami Zwick (1998) “Dictator Game Giving: Rules of Fairness versus Acts of Kindness*,” International Journal of Game Theory, 27:2 (July), 269-299. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, dictator game, fairness, altruism. Email Contact: geb3@psu.edu

Bolton, Gary E., and Axel Ockenfels (1998) “Strategy and Equity: An ERC Analysis of the Gu**th-van Damme Game,” Penn. State University, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, fairness, relative payoffs, inequity aversion. Email Contact: geb3@psu.edu

Bosman, Ronald, and Frans van Winden (1998) “Behavior in a Power to Tax Game Experiment,” University of Amsterdam, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, tax game, earned endowments, methodology, emotions, ultimatum, fairness. Abstract: Each subject earns an initial income from a real effort task. Then they are paired and the one designated as the taxman sets a tax rate. The other decides how much of his/her earned income to destroy before transfering the tax on the remaining amount to the taxman. The focus is on the effects of earned endowments. Email Contact: fvwinden@fee.uva.nl, bosman@fee.uva.nl

Boyes, W. J. (1996) “Understanding, Fairness and Reputation in the Ultimatum Game,” Economic Notes, 25:1 21-32. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum game, fairness, reputation.

Buchan, Nancy, Eric Johnson, and Rachel Croson (1999) “Understanding What's Fair: Contrasting Perceptions of Fairness in Ultimatum Bargaining in Japan and the U.S.,” University of Pennsylvania, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1999 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum games, fairness, cultural comparisons, international comparisons. Email Contact: crosonr@wharton.upenn.edu

Camerer, Colin F., and Richard H. Thaler (1995) “Anomalies: Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9:2 (Spring), 209-219. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum game, dictator game, fairness. Email Contact: camerer@hss.caltech.edu

Clark, Jeremy (1998) “Fairness Preferences and Optimization Skills, Are They Substitutes? An Experimental Investigation,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 34:4 541-557. Keywords: experiments, bargaining*, fairness, inequity aversion. Abstract: The experiment shows no evidence that subjects with higher inequity aversion are also more prone to making heuristic errors in decision tasks.

Cooper, David, Nicholas Feltovich, Alvin Roth, and Rami Zwick (1998) “Learning in Ultimatum Games,” University of Pittsburgh, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum games, reinforcement learning, fairness, inequality aversion. Abstract: Changes in behavior over time in ultimatum games lead the authors to consider learning models. The simple reinforcement model does not provide a good explanation of dynamic patterns unless reciprocity and autocorrelation factors are incorporated. Email Contact: djc13@guinness.som.cwru.edu

Eckel, Catherine C., and Rob* Gilles (1995) “Fairness in Ultimatum Bargaining with Outside Options: Experimental Evidence,” Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Discussion Paper presented at the 1995 Public Choice Meetings. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, outside options, fairness. Email Contact: eckelc@vt.edu

Eckel, Catherine C., and Philip J. Grossman (1996) “Equity and Fairness in Economic Decisions: Evidence from Bargaining Experiments,” in Advances in Economic Psychology, edited by G. Antonides, W. F. van Raaij and S. Maital, Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, **. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, survey, equity, fairness. Email Contact: eckelc@vt.edu

Eckel, Catherine C., and Rick K. Wilson (1999) “Reciprocal Fairness and Social Signaling: Experiments with Limited Reputations,” Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Discussion Paper, presented at the 1999 ASSA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, fairness, signaling. Email Contact: eckelc@vt.edu

Forsythe, Robert, Joel L. Horowitz, N. E.* Savin, and Martin Sefton (1988) “Fairness in Simple Bargaining Games,” Games and Economic Behavior, 6347-369. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, dictator games, ultimatum games. Abstract: The data reported in this paper allow a comparison of behavior in one-shot ultimatum and dictator games.

Forsythe, Robert, Joel L. Horowitz, N. E. Savin, and Martin Sefton (1994) “Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments*,” Games and Economic Behavior, 6:3 (May), 347-369. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, fairness. Email Contact: robert_forsythe@uiowa.edu

Frey, Bruno S., and Iris Bohnet (1995) “Institutions Affect Fairness: Experimental Investigations,” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 151:2 (June), 286-303. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, fairness, institutions.

Gevers, L., H. Glejser, and J. Rouyer (1979) “Professed Inequality Aversion and Its Error Component,” Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 81:2 238-243. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, fairness, inequality aversion.

Goeree, Jacob K., and Charles A. Holt (1999) “Asymmetric Inequality Aversion and Noisy Behavior in Alternating-Offer Bargaining Games,” European Economic Review, forthcoming. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, alternating offer bargaining games, fairness, inequality aversion, logit equilibrium, asymmetric endowments, one-shot games. Abstract: The experiment involves a two-stage, alternating-offer bargaining game in which players receive asymmetric fixed money payments in addition to what they earn by bargaining. The endowments do not affect the perfect positive correlation between the initial subgame perfect offers and the remaining pie size. Endowments, however, are varied to produce a perfect negative relationship between the remaining pie size and the first stage offer that would equalize players' total payoffs. The negative relationship is apparent in the data, which indicates the importance of fairness considerations. An equilibrium model of noisy behavior and inequity aversion is used to provide estimates of utility and logit error parameters. Email Contact: jg2n@virginia.edu

Güth, Werner (1988) “On the Behavioral Approach to Distributive Justice: A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation,” in Applied Behavioral Economics, edited by S. Maital, New York: New York University Press, 703-717. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, fairness. Email Contact: gueth@wiwi.hu-berlin.de

Güth, Werner, Peter Ockenfels, and M. Wendel (1993) “Efficiency by Trust in Fairness? Multiperiod Ultimatum Bargaining Experiments with an Increasing Cake,” International Journal of Game Theory, 22:1 51-73. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, alternating offer, increasing pie, trust game. Email Contact: gueth@wiwi.hu-berlin.de

Güth, Werner, and Eric Van Damme (1998) “Information, Strategic Behavior, and Fairness in Ultimatum Bargaining: An Experimental Study,” Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 42:2/3 (June), 227-247. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum game, fairness, information. Email Contact: gueth@wiwi.hu-berlin.de

Harrison, Glenn W., and Kevin A. McCabe (1992) “Testing Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory in Experiments,” in Research in Experimental Economics, Vol. 5, edited by R. M. Isaac, Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 137-169. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, alternating offer bargaining, fairness, backward induction. Abstract The experiments show that when subjects have prior experience in the subgames, their behavior conforms more closely to the subgame perfect Nash prediction in alternating-offer bargaining games. The authors argue that failure of subgame Nash predictions in previous experiments is due to the absence of common expectations about play in subgames, not to fairness concerns. Email Contact: harrison@darla.badm.sc.edu

Harrison, Glenn W., and Kevin A. McCabe (1996) “Expectations and Fairness in a Simple Bargaining Experiment,” International Journal of Game Theory, 25:3 303-327. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, alternating offer game, fairness, expectations. Email Contact: harrison@darla.badm.sc.edu

Hoffman, Elizabeth, Kevin A. McCabe, and Vernon L. Smith (1996) “Social Distance and Other-Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games,” American Economic Review, 86:3 (June), 653-660. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, dictator game, social distance, other-regarding behavior, fairness. Email Contact: ehoffman@uic.edu

Hoffman, Elizabeth, and Matthew L. Spitzer (1985) “Entitlements, Rights and Fairness: An Experimental Examination of Subjects' Concepts of Distributive Justice,” Journal of Legal Studies, 14:2 (June), 259-297. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, Coase theorem, entitlements, methodology, fairness, presentation effects. Email Contact: ehoffman@uic.edu

Kagel, John H., Chung Kim, and Donald Moser (1996) “Fairness in Ultimatum Games with Asymmetric Information and Asymmetric Payoffs*,” Games and Economic Behavior, 13:1 (March), 100-110. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, asymmetric information, asymmetric payoffs, fairness. Email Contact: kagel+@pitt.edu

Kagel, John H., and Katherine Wolfe (1999) “A New Three-Person Ultimatum Game,” University of Pittsburgh, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1999 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum game, multi-person bargaining, fairness, inequality aversion. Email Contact: kagel+@pitt.edu

Kahneman, Daniel, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard Thaler (1986) “Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market,” American Economic Review, 76728-741. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, fairness, psychology. Email Contact: kahneman@wws.princeton.edu

Kahneman, Daniel, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard Thaler (1986) “Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics,” Journal of Business, 59:4 (Part 2, October), S285-S300. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, methodology, psychology. Email Contact: kahneman@wws.princeton.edu

Knez, Marc J., and Colin F. Camerer (1995) “Outside Options and Social Comparison in Three-Player Ultimatum Game Experiments,” Games and Economic Behavior, 10:1 (July), 65-94. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum game, three player bargaining, outside options, fairness.

Neilson, William S. (1997) “Ultimatum Games as Auctions,” Texas A&M University, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum game, fairness. Abstract: The paper presents an auction-like model of ultimatum bargaining in which players care about fairness but view others' attitudes toward fairness as draws from a population distribution. Email Contact: wsn@econ4.tamu.edu

Oberhoizer-Gee, Felix, and Reiner Eichenberger (1998) “Fairness! What Fairness? Focusing Effects in Dictator Game Experiments,” University of Zurich, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, modified dictator game, third allocation option, fairness. Abstract: Results of a modified dictator game experiment with an extra option are the basis for the conclusion that the apparent concern for fairness in ordinary dictator games is an artifact of a "focusing effect." Email Contact: oberholf@iew.unizh.ch

Okada, Akira, and Arno Riedl (1998) “Inefficiency and Social Exclusion in a Coalition Formation Game: Experimental Evidence,” University of Amsterdam, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, coalitions, social exclusion, fairness, efficiency. Abstract: The proposer in the experiment may make an ultimatum demand to one or both of two others. A responder who receives no offer earns zero, and all responders who do receive offers must agree, or the payoffs are zero for all. The pie size is largest when both others are included, so an offer to only one responder is inefficient, and it is unfair in the sense that earnings are zero for the excluded person. The perponderance of offers are directed to only one responder, and hence are unfair and inefficient. Email Contact: riedl@fee.uva.nl

Roth, Alvin E. (1995) “Bargaining Experiments,” in The Handbook of Experimental Economics, edited by J. H. Kagel and A. E. Roth, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 253-348. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum game, dictator game, fairness, negotiation. Abstract This paper surveys the extensive literature on behavior in bargaining experiments. Email Contact: aroth@hbs.edu

Ruffle, Bradley J. (1998) “More is Better, but Fair is Fair: Tipping in Dictator and Ultimatum Games,” Games and Economic Behavior, 23:2 (May), 247-265. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, dictator games, ultimatum games, fairness. Email Contact: bradley@bgumail.bgu.ac.il

Schotter, Andrew, Avi Weiss, and Inigo Zapater (1996) “Fairness and Survival in Ultimatum and Dictatorship Games,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 31:1 (October), 37-56. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum game, dictator game, fairness. Email Contact: schotter@fasecon.econ.nyu.edu

Shogren, Jason F. (1989) “Fairness in Bargaining Requires a Context: An Experimental Examination of Loyalty,” Economic Letters, 31:4 (December), 319-323. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, fairness, context, loyalty. Email Contact: jramses@uwyo.edu

Slembeck, Tilman (1998) “As If Playing Fair -- Experimental Evidence on the Role of Information in Ultimatum Bargaining,” University College London, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum game, fairness, information, aspiration levels. Abstract: If rejections in ultimatum games are due to fairness, then providing responders with less information about the pie size may reduce this incentive to reject. The experiment produces a high number of rejections in ultimatum games even under low information conditions, suggesting the importance of other factors like aspiration levels. Email Contact: slembeck@ucl.ac.uk

Straub, Paul G., and J. Keith Murnighan (1995) “An Experimental Investigation of Ultimatum Games: Information, Fairness, Expectations, and Lowest Acceptable Offers,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 27:3 (August), 345-364. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum game, information, fairness, expectations. Email Contact: keithm@nwu.edu

Suleiman, Ramzi (1996) “Expectations and Fairness in a Modified Ultimatum Game,” Journal of Economic Psychology, 17:5 (November), 531-554. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum game, fairness, expectations.

Thaler, Richard (1989) “Anomalies: The Ultimatum Game,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2195-206. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum game, dictator game, anomalies. Abstract: This paper reviews the ultimatum game in particular and fairness issues more generally, with an eye to explaining anomalies in observed behavior. Email Contact: richard.thaler@gsbsun.uchicago.edu