Y2K Bibliography of Experimental Economics and Social Science
Sequential (Extensive Form) Games

Charles A. Holt, cah2k@virginia.edu, suggestions and corrections welcome
(for online and personal use only)


Andreoni, Janes, Paul Brown, and Lise Vesterlund (1999) “What Produces Fairness? Some Experimental Evidence,” Iowa State University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1999 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, public goods, fairness, Nash equilibrium, best shot game, sequential public goods game, punishments. Abstract: The experiment compares behavior in related two-person public goods games: one with simultaneous play and summation-based payoffs, one with sequential play and summation-based payoffs, and one with sequential play and maximum (best shot) payoffs. All three have a subgame perfect equilibrium where one player contributes and the other doesn't. In the experiment, cooperation is highest in the simultaneous game and lowest in the best-shot game. In the sequential games, selfish initial choices are not punished as much in the best-shot game. Email Contact: andreoni@facstaff.wisc.edu

Beard, T. Randolph, and Richard O. Beil Jr. (1994) “Do People Rely on the Self-Interested Utility Maximization of Others? An Experimental Test,” Management Science, 40252-262. Keywords: experiments, game theory, sequential games, two-stage games, bounded rationality, errors. Abstract: The experiments involve two stage games in which one player chooses between a safe (punishment proof) and a risky strategy. The second player sees the decision and decides whether to deliver a costly punishment. The frequency of the subgame perfect equilibrium (risky, not punish) depends on changes in payoff parameters that do not alter the equilibrium. Email Contact: rbeard@business.auburn.edu

Belda, Carles Sola (1999) “Punishment in Sequential Games: Experimental Evidence,” in , Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, . Keywords: experiments, game theory, punishments, sequential games. Email

Brandts, Jordi, and Carles Sola (1998) “Reference Points and Negative Reciprocity in Simple Sequential Games,” University of Barcelona, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, game theory, sequential games, reference points, reciprocity. Abstract: The exeriments involves sequential two-person with ultimatum and best-shot structures. Punishments in the experiments seem to be explained in terms of fairness relative to reference points. Email Contact: csola@idea.uab.es

Burnham, Terence C., Kevin A. McCabe, and Vernon L. Smith (2000) “Friend-or-Foe: Intentionality Priming in an Extensive Form Trust Game,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, forthcoming. Keywords: experiments, game theory, extensive form game, trust, intentionality. Email Contact: terence_burnham@harvard.edu

Camerer, Colin F., and Keith Weigelt (1988) “Experimental Tests of a Sequential Equilibrium Reputation Model,” Econometrica, 56:1 (January), 1-36. Keywords: experiments, game theory, sequential games, reputation. Email Contact: camerer@hss.caltech.edu

Capra, C. Monica, Rosario Gómez, and Susana Cabrera-Yeto (1999) “A Bunch of Deviating Choices in Common Pool Resource Games with Sequential Decisions,” University of Málaga, Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1999 European Regional ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, public, common pool resource, sequential game. Abstract: Two individuals make alternating decisions in a common pool resource game. The remaining stock grows at a fixed rate for a finite number of periods. Consistent deviations from the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium are observed. Email Contact: rosgomez@uma.es

Cason, Timothy N., and Vai-Lam Mui (1998) “Fairness and Sharing in Innovation Games: A Laboratory Study,” University of Southern California, Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1998 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, game theory, sequential games, fairness. Email Contact: cason@mgmt.purdue.edu

Cooper, Russell, Douglas V. DeJong, Robert Forsythe, and Thomas W. Ross (1992) “Forward Induction in Coordination Games,” Economic Letters, 40:2 (October), 167-172. Keywords: experiments, game theory, sequential games, coordination, forward induction. Email Contact: rcooper@bu.edu

Davis, Douglas D. (1994) “Equilibrium Cooperation in Three-Person, Choice-of-Partners Games,” Games and Economic Behavior, 739-53. Keywords: experiments, game theory, sequential games, cooperation. Abstract: The game begins with a buyer choosing to purchase from one of the two sellers, who can then either deliver high quality or low quality (at a lower cost to the seller). Longer repetitions of this game with the same three subjects results in a higher incidence of cooperative, high-quality outcomes, supported by buyer switching as a punishment for the delivery of low quality. Email Contact: ddavis@busnet.bus.vcu.edu

Dorsey, Robert E. (1992) “The Voluntary Contributions Mechanism with Real Time Revisions,” Public Choice, 73:3 (April), 261-282. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, sequential game, real time. Email Contact: dorsey@bus.olemiss.edu

Dufwenberg, Martin, and Georg Kirchsteiger (1998) “A Theory of Sequential Reciprocity,” Tilburg University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, game theory, reciprocity, extensive form games, intentions, psychological game theory. Email Contact: g.kirchsteiger@kub.nl

Eckel, Catherine C., and Rick K. Wilson (1999) “The Human Face of Game Theory: Trust and Reciprocity in Sequential Games,” Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1997 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, game theory, sequential games, trust, reciprocity. Email Contact: eckelc@vt.edu

Falk, Armin, and Urs Fischbacher (1998) “Kindness is the Parent of Kindness: A Model of Reciprocity,” University of Zurich, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, reciprocity, psychological game theory. Abstract: The framework of psychological game theory is extended to extensive-form games. Reciprocity is used to explain behavior in a variety of sequential games. Email Contact: falk@iew.unizh.ch

Fudenberg, Drew, and David K. Levine (1995*) “How Irrational Are Subjects in Extensive-Form Games?,” American Economic Review, 85****. Keywords: experiments, game theory, extensive form games. Email Contact: dlevine@ucla.edu, fudenber@husc.harvard.edu

Goeree, Jacob K., and Charles A. Holt (1999) “Ten Little Treasures of Game Theory, and Ten Intuitive Contradictions,” University of Virginia, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, game theory, bargaining, matching pennies, traveler's dilemma, coordination, Kreps game, auctions, signaling, extensive form games, backward induction, Nash equilibrium, logit equilibrium, introspection, one shot games. Abstract: The "treasures" are ten static and dynamic games where behavior matches the Nash equilibrium or relevant refinement, and the contradictions are variations of the same game that produces anomalous behavior patterns. In some games, Nash seems to work only by coincidence, e.g. if deviation losses are symmetric or very high. In other games the data are repelled from the Nash prediction and pile up on the opposite side of the set of feasible decisions. Email Contact: jg2n@virginia.edu

Grobelnik, Marko, Vesna Prasnikar, and Charles A. Holt (1999) “Classroom Games: Strategic Interaction on the Internet,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 13:2 (Spring), 211-220. Keywords: experiments, classroom games, game theory, extensive form games, common pool resources.

Harless, David W., and Colin F. Camerer (1995) “An Error Rate Analysis of Experimental Data Testing Nash Refinements,” European Economic Review, 39:3-4 (April), 649-660. Keywords: experiments, game theory, sequential games, Nash refinements, error rates, bounded rationality. Email Contact: dwharless@vcu.edu

Harrison, Glenn W., and Jack Hirshleifer (1989) “An Experimental Evaluation of Weakest Link/Best Shot Models of Public Goods,” Journal of Political Economy, 97:1 (February), 201-225. Keywords: experiments, public, voluntary contributions, game theory, best shot game, sequential games. Email Contact: harrison@darla.badm.sc.edu

Hoffman, Elizabeth, Kevin A. McCabe, and Vernon L. Smith (1998) “Behavioral Foundations of Reciprocity: Experimental Economics and Evolutionary Psychology,” Economic Inquiry, 36:3 (July), 335-352. Keywords: experiments, game theory, sequential games, reciprocity, psychology. Email Contact: ehoffman@uic.edu

Hoffman, Elizabeth, Kevin A. McCabe, and Vernon L. Smith (1999) “What Makes Trade Possible?,” University of Arizona, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, game theory, sequential games, reciprocity, psychology, trust, exchange. Email Contact: ehoffman@uic.edu

Huck, Steffen, and Wieland Mueller (1998) “Perfect versus Imperfect Observability -- An Experimental Test of Bagwell's Result,” Humboldt University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, game theory, two-stage game, sequential game, imperfectly observed first move. Abstract: The experiment provides little support for Bagwell's claim that the first-mover advantage vanishes if this action is only imperfectly observed by the second-mover. The first-mover advantage is not always fully exploited when it is perfectly observable, and the Stackelberg outcome has a lot of drawing power even when the first move is not perfectly observed. Email Contact: wmueller@wiwi.hu-berlin.de

McCabe, Kevin A., Stephen J. Rassenti, and Vernon L. Smith (1996) “Game Theory and Reciprocity in Some Extensive Form Experimental Games,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 9313421-13428. Keywords: experiments, game theory, reciprocity, trust, extensive form game. Email Contact: kmcabe@econlab.arizona.edu

McCabe, Kevin A., Stephen J. Rassenti, and Vernon L. Smith (1998) “Reciprocity, Trust, and Payoff Privacy in Extensive Form Bargaining,” Games and Economic Behavior, 24:1-2 (July-August), 10-24. Keywords: experiments, game theory, reciprocity, trust, extensive form game, payoff privacy, methodology. Email Contact: kmcabe@econlab.arizona.edu

McCabe, Kevin A., and Vernon L. Smith (1999) “Goodwill Accounting in Economic Exchange,” in The Adaptive Toolbox, edited by G. Gigerenzer and R. Selten, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 305-326. Keywords: experiments, game theory, reciprocity, trust, extensive form game, good will. Email Contact: kmcabe@econlab.arizona.edu

McKelvey, Richard D., and Thomas R. Palfrey (1998) “Quantal Response Equilibria for Extensive Form Games,” Experimental Economics, 1:1 9-41. Keywords: experiments, game theory, backward induction, extensive form, quantal response, logit equilibrium, bounded rationality. Email Contact: rdm@hss.caltech.edu

Mitropoulos, A., Joachim Weimann, and Chun-Lei Yang (1998) “Rent-Seeking Experiments,” Magdeburg University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, game theory, rent seeking, first-mover advantage, best shot game, sequential games, fairness. Abstract: The experiments implement a sequential rent-seeking game. The first-mover advantage predicted in theory is not observed in the data, due to the "revealed toughness" of the second mover. Also discusssed are best-shot, ultimatum, trust, and dictator games. Email Contact: joachim.weimann@ww.uni-magdeburg.de

Muller, Andrew, and Asha Sadanand (1998) “Virtual Observability in Two Player Games,” University of Guelph, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, game theory. Abstract: "Virtual observability" is the principle that players in sequential games with imperfect information act as if they observed earlier player's choices. Several standard games are played under three conditions: simultaneous play, sequential play with others' moves being observed, and seqential play with others' prior moves being unobserved. An analysis of individual decisions shows a tendency for decisions to shift in the direction predicted by virtual observability. Email Contact: asha@css.uoguelph.ca

Prasnikar, Vesna, and Alvin E. Roth (1992) “Considerations of Fairness and Strategy: Experimental Data From Sequential Games,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107:3 (August), 865-888. Keywords: experiments, game theory, best shot games, multi-proposer bargaining games. Email Contact: aroth@hbs.edu

Rapoport, Amnon (1997) “Order of Play in Strategically Equivalent Games in Extensive Form,” International Journal of Game Theory, 26:1 113-136. Keywords: experiments, game theory, order of play, extensive form. Email Contact: arapoport@bpa.arizona.edu

Rapoport, Amnon, and James A. Sundali (1997) “Induction vs. Deterrence in the Chain Store Game: How Many Potential Entrants Are Needed to Deter Entry?,” in Understanding Strategic Behavior: Essays in Honor of Reinhard Selten, edited by W. Albers, Werner Gu*th, P. Hammerstein, B. Moldovanu and E. van Damme, Berlin: Springer-Verlag, . Keywords: experiments, game theory, sequential games, entry, chain store paradox. Email Contact: arapoport@bpa.arizona.edu

Schotter, Andrew, Keith Weigelt, and Charles Wilson (1994) “A Laboratory Investigation of Multiperson Rationality and Presentation Effects,” Games and Economic Behavior, 6:3 (May), 445-468. Keywords: experiments, game theory, extensive form, presentation effects. Email Contact: schotter@fasecon.econ.nyu.edu