Y2K Bibliography of Experimental Economics and Social Science
Double Auction Markets

updated December 29, 1999
Charles A. Holt, cah2k@virginia.edu, suggestions and corrections welcome
(for online and personal use only)


Biais, Bruno, and Sébastien Pouget (1999) “Learning Equilibrium in Experimental Financial Markets: Does Microstructure Matter?,” University of Toulouse, Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1999 European Regional ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, markets, asset markets, double auction, call market, differential information. Abstract: Asset market experiments with differential information about dividend payments are conducted under three institutions: double auction, call market, and "a preopening period" followed by a call market and then a double auction. The focus is on learning and information aggregation. Email Contact: pouget@gremaq.univ-tlse1.fr

Brewer, Paul J. (1999) “Autocorrelation of Transactions Prices and Return in CRSD Double Auction Markets: Humans vs. Trading Robots,” Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, presented at the Fall 1999 European Regional ESA Meeting, Keywords: experiments, markets, double auction, zero intelligence traders, simulation, continuously refreshed supply and demand, convergence. Abstract: This paper is a study of the price autocorrelations in markets with continuously refreshed supply and demand, an environment in which zero intelligence traders do not converge to competitive outcomes, but humans and some other types of simulated traders do converge. Email Contact: pjbrewer@ust.hk

Burton, F. Greg, and Brad Tuttle (1999) “Market Behavior Under Information Overload Conditions,” University of South Carolina, Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1999 European Regional ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, markets, asset markets, double auction, information. Abstract: Information cues were provided about the values of assets being traded in double auction experiments. The effect of increasing the number of information cues (information overload) is investigated. Email Contact: tuttle@darla.badm.sc.edu

Cason, Timothy N., and Dan Friedman (1993) “An Empirical Analysis of Price Formation in Double Auction Markets,” in The Double Auction Market: Institutions, Theories, and Evidence, edited by D. Friedman and J. Rust, Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 253-283. Keywords: experiments, markets, double auctions. Email Contact: cason@mgmt.purdue.edu

Cason, Timothy N., and Daniel Friedman (1996) “Price Formation in Double Auction Markets,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 20:8 (August), 1307-1337. Keywords: experiments, markets, double auctions, learning. Email Contact: cason@mgmt.purdue.edu

Cason, Timothy N., Steven R. Elliott, and Mark Van Boening (1999) “Speculation in Experimental Markets for Emission Permits,” in Research in Experimental Economics, Volume 7, Emissions Permit Experiments, edited by R. M. Isaac and C. A. Holt, Stamford, Conn.: JAI Press, 95-119. Keywords: experiments, markets, double auction, sealed bid auction, emissions permits, pollution permits, public goods, externalities, speculation, bubbles. Email Contact: cason@mgmt.purdue.edu

Clauser, Laura, and Charles R. Plott (1993) “On the Anatomy of the 'Nonfacilitating' Features of the Double Auction Institution in Conspiratorial Markets,” in The Double Auction Market: Institutions, Theories, and Laboratory Evidence, edited by D. Friedman and J. Rust, Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 333-353. Keywords: experiments, markets, double auction, collusion, facilitating practices. Email

Davis, Douglas D., and Arlington W. Williams (1991) “The Hayek Hypothesis in Experimental Auctions: Institutional Effects and Market Power,” Economic Inquiry, 29:2 (April), 261-274. Keywords: experiments, markets, posted offer, double auctions, market power. Abstract: The effect of seller market power is to raise prices in laboratory posted offer markets. This effect is much less pronounced in double auctions. Email Contact: ddavis@busnet.bus.vcu.edu

Davis, Douglas D., Glenn W. Harrison, and Arlington W. Williams (1993) “Convergence to Nonstationary Competitive Equilibria: An Experimental Analysis,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 22:3 (December), 305-326. Keywords: experiments, markets, double auctions, posted offer, demand shifts, price adjustment. Email Contact: ddavis@busnet.bus.vcu.edu

Davis, Douglas D., and Charles A. Holt (1996) “Price Rigidities and Institutional Variations in Markets with Posted Prices,” Economic Theory, 9:1 63-80. Keywords: experiments, markets, posted offer, double auctions, discounts, demand shifts, market institutions. Email Contact: ddavis@busnet.bus.vcu.edu

Davis, Douglas D. (1998) “The Effects of Collusion in Laboratory Experiments,” in Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, edited by C.R. Plott and V.L. Smith, New York: Elsevier Press, forthcoming. Keywords: experiments, markets, posted offer, double auction, survey, collusion, discounts. Email Contact: ddavis@busnet.bus.vcu.edu

DeJong, Douglas V., Robert Forsythe, Russell Ludholm, and Susan Watts (1992) “Do Prices Convey Information? Further Empirical Evidence,” in Research in Experimental Economics, Vol. 5, edited by R. M. Isaac, Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 61-79. Keywords: experiments, markets, asset markets, information, methodology, computerization, oral double auction, computerized double auction, rational expectations. Abstract This paper examines the extent to which prices convey information to uninformed traders in a rational expectations equilibrium. The rational expectations predictions were reasonable accurate relative to some alternatives, although convergence was slower in computerized markets that conceal information about traders' identities, etc. Email Contact: dejong@blue.weeg.uiowa.edu

Easley, David, and John O. Ledyard (1993) “Theories of Price Formation and Exchange in Double Oral Auctions,” in The Double Auction Market: Institutions, Theories, and Evidence, edited by D. Friedman and J. Rust, Reading Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 253-283. Keywords: experiments, markets, double auction, price formation. Email Contact: jledyard@hss.caltech.edu

Fischbacher, Urs (1998) “Z-Tree: A Tool for Readymade Economic Experiment,” University of Zurich, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, methodology, software. Abstract: The paper describes a new package of software routines and modules that can be used by novice programmers to contruct computerized laboratory experiments. Examples include double auctions, bargaining and public goods games. Email Contact: fiba@iew.unizh.ch

Flood, M., R. Huisman, K. Koedijk, and R. Mahieu (1999) “Quote Disclosure and Price Discovery in Multiple Dealer Financial Markets,” Review of Financial Studies, 1237-59. Keywords: experiments, markets, asset markets, continuous double auctions, quote information, transparency, dealers, professionals as subjects, methodology.

Forsythe, Robert, Robert Nelson, George Neumann, and Jack Wright (1991) “The Iowa Presidential Stock Market: A Field Experiment,” in Research in Experimental Economics, Vol. 4, edited by R. M. Isaac, Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1-43. Keywords: experiments, markets, asset markets, double auction, political stock market, Iowa Presidential Stock Market, polls, efficiency, information. Abstract This paper describes the 1988 Iowa Presidential Stock Market. Price movements are compared with shifts in the polls. The stock prices "called" the outcome relatively early and showed less volatility than the major polls. Markets seemed to be relatively efficient mechanisms for aggregating information. Email Contact: robert_forsythe@uiowa.edu

Friedman, Daniel (1982) “Price Formation in Double Auction Markets,” University of California, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, markets, double auction, price formation. Email Contact: dan@cats.ucsc.edu

Friedman, Daniel (1984) “On the Efficiency of Experimental Double Auction Markets,” American Economic Review, 74:1 (March), 60-72. Keywords: experiments, markets, double auction, efficiency, price formation. Email Contact: dan@cats.ucsc.edu

Friedman, Daniel (1991) “A Simple Testable Model of Double Auction Markets,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 15*:1 (January), 47-70. Keywords: experiments, markets, double auction, price formation. Email Contact: dan@cats.ucsc.edu

Friedman, Daniel, and John Rust, eds. (1993) The Double Auction Market: Institutions, Theories, and Evidence, Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley. Keywords: experiments, markets, double auctions. Email Contact: dan@cats.ucsc.edu

Gillette, Anne B., Douglas E. Stevens, Susan G. Watts, and Williams Arlington W. (1999) “Price and Volume Reactions to Public Information Releases: An Experimental Approach Incorporating Traders' Subjective Beliefs,” ***, forthcoming. Keywords: experiments, markets, asset markets, information, price formation, public information, call markets, double auction markets, rational expectations, elicitation, forecasts, no-trade theorem. Abstract: Call market and double auctions with long-lived assets are used to study individual forecast and trading decisions. Each asset share paid a dividend at the end of period 15 that was the sum of five random draws that are publicly revealed at pre-announced intervals between trading periods. Trade seems to be motivated by differential processing of public information and by short term speculation.` Email Contact: agillette@gsu.edu

Gjerstad, Steven, and Jason Shachat (1996) “`Zero-Intelligence Traders' and Individual Rationality,” UCSD, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, markets, double auction, zero-intelligence traders, ZI, efficiency, computer simulation. Abstract: The paper shows that efficient outcomes in simulated double auctions with `zero-intelligence' traders are due to a rationality constraint that is typically imposed in the simulations. Email Contact: gjerstad@us.ibm.com

Gjerstad, Steven, and John Dickhaut (1998) “Price Formation in Double Auctions,” Games and Economic Behavior, 22:1 (January), 1-29. Keywords: experiments, markets, double auction, price formation. Email Contact: gjerstad@us.ibm.com

Gjerstad, Steven, Arlington W. Williams, Vernon L. Smith, and John Ledyard (2000) “Concurrent Trading in Two Concurrent Markets with Demand Interdependence,” Economic Theory, forthcoming. Keywords: experiments, markets, double auction, multiple markets. Email Contact: gjerstad@us.ibm.com

Godby, Robert (1999) “Market Power in Emission Permit Double Auctions,” in Research in Experimental Economics, Volume 7, Emission Permit Experiments, edited by R. M. Isaac and C. A. Holt, Stamford, Conn.: JAI Press, 121-162. Keywords: experiments, markets, market power, emissions permits, pollution permits, externalities, double auctions, counterspeculation, efficiency. Email Contact: rgodby@uwyo.edu

Godby, Robert, Stuart Mestelman, and R. Andrew Muller (1999) “Can Auctions Control Market Power?,” University of Wyoming, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1999 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, markets, double auction, market power, trading institutions, uniform price sealed bid call auction, emissions trading. Email Contact: rgodby@uwyo.edu

Gode, Dhananjay K., and Shyam Sunder (1993) “Lower Bounds for Efficiency of Surplus Extraction in Double Auctions,” in The Double Auction Market: Institutions, Theories, and Evidence, edited by D. Friedman and J. Rust, New York: Addison-Wesley, 199-219. Keywords: experiments, markets, double auctions, efficiency. Email Contact: gode@mail.ssb.rochester.edu

Gode, Dhananjay K., and Shyam Sunder (1994) “Human and Artificially Intelligent Traders in a Double Auction Market: Experimental Evidence,” in Computational Organization Theory, edited by Kathleen Carley and Michael Prietula, Hillside, N. J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 241-262. Keywords: experiments, markets, double auctions, efficiency, zero intelligence traders, simulations. Email Contact: gode@mail.ssb.rochester.edu

Gode, Dhananjay K., and Shyam Sunder (1997) “Double Auction Dynamics: Structural Consequences of Non-Binding Price Controls,” Carnegie-Mellon University, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, markets, non-binding price controls, zero-intelligent traders, computer simulations. Email Contact: gode@mail.ssb.rochester.edu

Goodfellow, Jessica, and Charles R. Plott (1990) “An Experimental Examination of the Simultaneous Determination of Input Prices and Output Prices,” Southern Economic Journal, 56:4 (April), 969-983. Keywords: experiments, markets, double auction, vertical relationship. Email Contact: cplott@hss.caltech.edu

Gray, Peter, and Charles R. Plott (1990) “The Multiple Unit Double Auction,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 13245-258. Keywords: experiments, markets, double auction, MUDA, computerized trading, software. Email Contact: cplott@hss.caltech.edu

Hey, John D., and Daniela di Cagno (1998) “Sequential Markets: An Experimental Investigation of Clower's Dual-Decision Hypothesis,” Experimental Economics, 1:1 63-85. Keywords: experiments, macroeconomics, multiple markets, sequential trade, unemployment, double auction. Email Contact: jdh1@york.ac.uk

Holt, Charles A., Loren Langan, and Anne Villamil (1986) “Market Power in Oral Double Auctions,” Economic Inquiry, 24(January), 107-123. Keywords: experiments, markets, double auction, market power, price formation. Abstract: Asymmetric market power drives prices away from Walrasian predictions in about half of the double auction markets, but prices converged to competitive predictions despite the market power in the other markets. Email Contact: holt@virginia.edu, avillamil@uiuc.edu

Holt, Charles A. (1995) “Industrial Organization: A Survey of Laboratory Results,” in Handbook of Experimental Economics, edited by J. Kagel and A. Roth, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 349-443. Keywords: experiments, markets, industrial organization, Cournot, double auction, posted offer auction, quality, market power, asymmetric information, survey. Abstract This paper surveys the large literature on industrial organization experiments. Email Contact: holt@virginia.edu

Howitt, Richard, and James J. Murphy (1998) “The Role of Experimental Demands in a Water Market; Using Experimental Economics to Address Environmental Issues,” University of California at Davis, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, markets, water rights, environmental economics, uniform price double auction. Abstract: The paper uses experiments to evaluate the effects of alternative trading institutions on allocations of water rights. A computer assisted uniform-price double auction provided efficient allocations in the settings considered. Email Contact: murphy@econlab.arizona.edu

Isaac, R. Mark, and Charles R. Plott (1981) “The Opportunity for Conspiracy in Restraint of Trade,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 21-30. Keywords: experiments, markets, double auction, conspiracy. Email Contact: misaac@bpa.arizona.edu

Isaac, R. Mark, and Charles R. Plott (1981) “Price Controls and the Behavior of Auction Markets: An Experimental Examination,” American Economic Review, 71:3 (June), 448-459. Keywords: experiments, markets, double auctions, price controls, non-binding price controls. Email Contact: misaac@bpa.arizona.edu

Isaac, R. Mark, Valerie Ramey, and Arlington W. Williams (1984) “The Effects of Market Organization on Conspiracies in Restraint of Trade,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 5191-222. Keywords: experiments, markets, double auction, posted offer, conspiracy, institutions. Email Contact: misaac@bpa.arizona.edu

Jamal, Karim, and Shyam Sunder (1996) “Bayesian Equilibrium in Double Auctions Populated by Biased Heuristic Traders,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 31:2 (November), 273-291. Keywords: experiments, markets, double auctions, simulated traders, biases, heuristics. Email Contact: kjamal@gpu.srv.ualberta.ca

Jamison, Julian C., and Charles R. Plott (1997) “Costly Offers and the Equilibration Properties of the Multiple Unit Double Auction Under Conditions of Unpredictable Shifts of Demand and Supply,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 32:4 (April), 591-612. Keywords: experiments, markets, double auctions, MUDA, multiple unit double auction, transactions costs. Email Contact: cplott@hss.caltech.edu

Johnson, Alonzo, Hsing-Yang Lee, and Charles R. Plott (1988) “Multiple Unit Double Auction User's Manual,” California Institute of Technology, Discussion Paper 676. Keywords: experiments, markets, double auction, MUDA, multiple unit double auction, software.

Jullien, Celine, and Bernard Ruffieux (1998) “Incentives to Innovate, Property Rights, and Dynamic Efficiency in Experimental Markets,” National School of Industrial Engineering, Grenoble, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, markets, innovation, externalities, property rights, double auctions. Abstract: Prior to double auction trading, the producers make an innovation decision that provides a (random) cost reduction, which is cumulative across periods. Markets are generally efficient, and innovation is pervasive, with the only profitable producers being the ones that innovate. Competition to innovate overpowers the incentive to free ride on the spillovers from others' innovations. Email Contact: Celine.Jullien@ensgi.inpg.fr

Kagel, John, and W. Vogt (1993) “The Buyers Bid Double Auction: Preliminary Experimental Results,” in The Double Auction Market; Institutions, Theories and Evidence, edited by D. Friedman and J. Rust, Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 285-305. Keywords: experiments, markets, buyers' bid double auction. Email Contact: kagel+@pitt.edu

Ketcham, Jon, Vernon L. Smith, and Arlington W. Williams (1984) “A Comparison of Posted-Offer and Double-Auction Pricing Institutions,” Review of Economic Studies, 51:4 (October), 595-614. Keywords: experiments, markets, posted offer, double auction, institutions, efficiency.

Kirchsteiger, Georg, Muriel Niederl, and Jan Potters (1998) “An Experimental Study on the Endogenous Evolution of Market Institutions,” Tilburg University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, markets, institutions, endogenous institutions. Abstract: Elements of the market trading institution are made endogenous by having traders decide on price quotes and on the subset of other traders who will recieve the bid or offer. Subjects typically inform all traders on the other side of the market, but none of the traders on their own side. Although the resulting information setting is less open than in a double auction, the efficiency is as high as in a double auction. Email Contact: j.j.m. potters@kub.nl

Knez, Marc, and Vernon L. Smith (1987) “Hypothetical Valuations and Preference Reversals in the Context of Asset Trading,” in Laboratory Experimentation in Economics, Six Points of View, edited by A. E.. Roth, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 131-154. Keywords: experiments, decisions, incentives, preference reversals, willingness to pay, willingness to accept, markets, asset markets, double auctions, rationality, hypothetical valuations, dominance. Email

McCabe, Kevin A., Stephen J. Rassenti, and Vernon L. Smith (1993) “Designing a Uniform Price Double Auction: An Experimental Evaluation,” in The Double Auction Market: Institutions, Theories and Evidence, edited by D. Friedman and J. Rust, Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 307-332. Keywords: experiments, auctions, uniform price double auction. Email Contact: kmcabe@econlab.arizona.edu

Mestelman, Stuart, and Douglas Welland (1987) “Advance Production in Oral Double Auction Markets,” Economics Letters, 2343-48. Keywords: experiments, markets, double auction, advance production. Email Contact: mestelma@mcmaster.ca

Mestelman, Stuart, and Douglas Welland (1991) “The Effects of Rent Asymmetries in Markets Characterized by Advance Production: A Comparison of Trading Institutions,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 15:3 (May), 387-405. Keywords: experiments, markets, posted offer, double auction, advance production, rent asymmetries. Email Contact: mestelma@mcmaster.ca

Mestelman, Stuart, and Douglas Welland (1995) “Experience and Inventory Management in Double-Auction Markets,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 26:1 (January), 35-48. Keywords: experiments, markets, double auction, inventories, inventory carryover. Email Contact: mestelma@mcmaster.ca

Noussair, Charles, Stephane Robin, and Bernard Ruffieux (1998) “The Effect of Transactions Costs on Double Auction Markets,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 36:2 (August), 221-233. Keywords: experiments, markets, double auction, transactions costs. Abstract: When subjects incur a monetary cost in placing bid and ask orders, the prices converge to competitive levels, but quantities and efficiencies are reduced. Email Contact: noussair@mgmt.purdue.edu

O'Brien, John, and Sanjay Srivastava (1991) “Liquidity and Persistance of Arbitrage in Experimental Options Markets,” in The Double Auction Market; Institutions, Theories, and Evidence, edited by D. Friedman and J. Rust, New York: Addison-Wesley, . Keywords: experiments, markets, asset markets, liquidity, arbitrage. Email

Phillips, Owen R., Dale J. Menkhaus, and Joseph L. Krogmeier (1999) “Laboratory Behavior in Spot and Forward Markets,” University of Wyoming, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, markets, double auctions, inventories, adavance production, spot markets, forward markets, convergence. Abstract: Prices are higher and quantities are lower in double auctions where production must be completed in advance (spot markets). Sellers seek higher prices and have higher earnings in spot markets than in forward markets where production is ex post to match actual sales. Email Contact: owenphil@uwyo.edu

Plott, Charles R., and Peter Gray (1990) “The Multiple Unit Double Auction,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 13:2 (March), 245-258. Keywords: experiments, markets, double auction, multiple unit double auction, MUDA, software. Email Contact: cplott@hss.caltech.edu

Plott, Charles R. (1991) “A Computerized Laboratory Market System and Research Support Systems for the Multiple Unit Double Auction,” California Institute of Technology, Discussion Paper: Social Science Working Paper 783. Keywords: experiments, markets, double auction, multiple unit double auction, MUDA, software. Email Contact: cplott@hss.caltech.edu

Rust, John, John. H. Miller, and Richard Palmer (1994) “Characterizing Effective Trading Strategies: Insights from a Computerized Double Auction Tournament,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 18:1 (January), 61-96. Keywords: experiments, markets, double auction, trading strategies.

Sadrieh, Abdolkarim (1998) “The Alternating Double Aucion Market - A Game Theoretic and Experimental Investigation,” University of Bonn, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, markets, double auction. Email Contact: sadrieh@lab.econ1.uni-bonn.de

Satterthwaite, M. A., and S. R. Williams (1993) “Theories of Price Formation and Exchange in k-Double Auctions,” in The Double Auction Market: Institutions, Theories, and Evidence, edited by D. Friedman and J. Rust, Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, . Keywords: experiments, markets, call markets, k-double auctions. Email

Schnitzlein, C. (1996) “Call and Continuous Trading Mechanisms under Asymmetric Information: An Experimental Investigation,” Journal of Finance, 51:613-636 . Keywords: experiments, markets, asset markets, call markets, double auctions, asymmetric information.

Smith, Vernon L. (1962) “An Experimental Study of Competitive Market Behavior,” Journal of Political Economy, 70:3 (June*), 111-137. Keywords: experiments, markets, double auction, efficiency. Email Contact: vls@econlab.arizona.edu

Smith, Vernon L. (1964) “The Effect of Market Organization on Competitive Equilibrium,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 78:2 (May), 181-201. Keywords: experiments, markets, double auction, efficiency. Email Contact: vls@econlab.arizona.edu

Smith, Vernon L. (1965) “Experimental Auction Markets and the Walrasian Hypothesis,” Journal of Political Economy, 73:4 (August), 387-393. Keywords: experiments, markets, double auction, efficiency. Email Contact: vls@econlab.arizona.edu

Smith, Vernon L., and Arlington W. Williams (1981) “On Nonbinding Price Controls in a Comprehensive Market,” American Economic Review, 71:3 (June), 467-474. Keywords: experiments, markets, double auction, price controls, nonbinding price controls, price formation. Email Contact: vls@econlab.arizona.edu

Smith, Vernon L. (1982) “Markets as Economizers of Information: Experimental Examination of the 'Hayek Hypothesis',” Economic Inquiry, 20165-179. Keywords: experiments, markets, double auction, efficiency, Hayek hypothesis, information. Email Contact: vls@econlab.arizona.edu

Smith, Vernon L., and Arlington W. Williams (1982) “The Effects of Rent Asymmetries in Experimental Auction Markets,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 3(March), 99-116. Keywords: experiments, markets, double auction, rent asymmetries. Email Contact: vls@econlab.arizona.edu

Smith, Vernon L., Arlington W. Williams, W. Kenneth Bratton, and Michael G. Vannoni (1982) “Competitive Market Institutions: Double Auction Versus Sealed Bid-Offer Auctions,” American Economic Review, 72:1 (March), 58-77. Keywords: experiments, markets, double auction, sealed bid-offer auction, call market. Email Contact: vls@econlab.arizona.edu

Van Boening, Mark V., and Nathaniel T. Wilcox (1996) “Avoidable Cost: Ride a Double Auction Rollercoaster,” American Economic Review, 86:3 (June), 461-477. Keywords: experiments, markets, double auction, sunk cost, convergence. Email Contact: vanboen@bus.olemiss.edu

Walker, James M., and Arlington W. Williams (1988) “Market Behavior in Bid, Offer, and Double Auctions: A Reexamination,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 9:3 (April), 301-314. Keywords: experiments, markets, double auctions, bid auctions, offer auctions, institutions. Email Contact: walkerj@indiana.edu

Williams, Arlington W. (1980) “Computerized Double-Auction Markets: Some Initial Experimental Results,” Journal of Business, 53(July), 235-258. Keywords: experiments, markets, double auction, computerization, methodology, software. Email Contact: williama@indiana.edu

Williams, Arlington W., and Vernon L. Smith (1984) “Cyclical Double-Auction Markets With and Without Speculators,” Journal of Business, 57(January), 1-33. Keywords: experiments, markets, double auction, cyclical shocks, speculators, multiple markets. Email Contact: williama@indiana.edu