


EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS

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PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS ISBN 0-691-04317-5

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Preface

This book provides a comprehensive treatment of the major areas of experimental economics. Although we present some new material, the emphasis is on organizing and evaluating existing results. The book can serve both as a teaching device and as an introduction to laboratory methods for professional economists who wish to find out about this relatively new area of research. Moreover, methodological and procedural issues are covered in detail, and there are a number of instructional appendices.

The book can be used as an anchoring device for a graduate course, which would be supplemented with journal articles, working papers, and detailed surveys. A topics course for advanced undergraduates can be structured around the first four chapters, selected readings from later chapters, and less technical published papers.