Y2K Bibliography of Experimental Economics and Social Science
Auction Experiments

updated December 29, 1999
Charles A. Holt, cah2k@virginia.edu, suggestions and corrections welcome
(for online and personal use only)



Alsemgeest, P., Charles Noussair, and Mark Olson (1998) “Experimental Comparisons of Auctions Under Single- and Multi-Unit Demand,” Economic Inquiry, 36:1 (January), 87-97. Keywords: experiments, auctions, multi-unit demand. Email Contact: noussair@mgmt.purdue.deu

Amihud, Yakov, ed. (1976) Bidding and Auctioning for Procurement and Allocation: Proceedings of a Conference at the Center for Applied Economics, New York University, New York: New York University Press. Keywords: experiments, auctions, procurement.

Andreoni, James, and John H. Miller (1995) “Auctions with Artificial Adaptive Agents,” Games and Economic Behavior, 1039-51. Keywords: experiments, auctions, evolution, simulation. Email Contact: andreoni@facstaff.wisc.edu

Avery, Christopher, and John H. Kagel (1997) “Second-Price Auctions with Asymmetric Payoffs: An Experimental Investigation,” Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 6:3 (Fall), 573-603. Keywords: experiments, auctions, two-person second-price common value auctions, private value advantage, asymmetric values. Abstract: The paper reports second-price auctions in which each bidder draws a value component, and the common value is the sum of the components. This symmetric "shoe box" design is modified by giving one of the bidders an additional value increment, K, that is known to both bidders. The disadvantaged bidders in the experiment tend to bid much to aggressively and earn negative profits, whereas the advantaged bidder is close to making best response bids.

Ball, Sheryl B., Max H. Bazerman, and John S. Caroll (1990) “An Evaluation of Learning in the Bilateral Winner's Curse,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 481-22. Keywords: experiments, auctions, bilateral auction, information, bilateral winner's curse. Abstract: The setup begins with a random draw that determines the value of an object to the current owner. The value to the prospective buyer is 1.5 times the value to the seller, but only the seller knows the actual value. The buyer makes a single bid, and observed bids typically result in a losses for buyers, since they do not realize that acceptance is an informative event that places an upper limit on the object's value (the "winner's curse"). Email Contact: sball@vt.edu

Battalio, Raymond C., Carl A. Kogut, and Jack Meyer (1990) “The Effect of Varying Number of Bidders in First Price Private Values Auctions: An Application of a Dual Market Bidding Technique,” in Advances in Behavioral Economics, Vol. 2, edited by L. Green and J. H. Kagel, Norwood, N.J.: Ablex Publishing, 95-125. Keywords: experiments, auctions, private values, numbers effects. Email Contact: rcb@esl1.tamu.edu

Bazerman, Max H., and William F. Samuelson (1983) “I Won the Auction But Don't Want the Prize,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 27618-634. Keywords: experiments, auctions, winner's curse. Email Contact: mbazer@nwu.edu

Belovicz, Meyer W. (1979) “Sealed-Bid Auctions: Experimental Results and Applications,” in Research in Experimental Economics, Vol. 1, edited by V. L. Smith, Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 279-338. Keywords: experiments, auctions, sealed-bid auctions. Email

Bernard, John C., Ray Zimmerman, William Schulze, Robert Thomas, Tim Mount, and Richard Schuler (1998) “Alternative Auction Mechanisms for Electric Power,” Cornell University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1998 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, auctions, electric power. Email Contact: wds3@cornell.edu

Boyes, W. J., and S. K. Happel (1989) “Auctions as Allocation Mechanism in Academia: The Case of Faculty Offices,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 3:3 (Summer), 37-40. Keywords: experiments, auctions.

Brown, K. C. (1986) “In Search of the Winner's Curse: Comment,” Economic Inquiry, 24:3 (July), 513-516*. Keywords: experiments, auctions, winner's curse.

Burns, Penny (1985) “Market Structure and Behavior: Price Adjustment in a Multi-Object Progressive Oral Auction,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 6(September), 275-300. Keywords: experiments, auctions, price adjustment.

Campbell, C. M., John H. Kagel, and Dan Levin (1999) “The Winner's Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions: Reply,” American Economic Review, 89:1 (March), 325-334. Keywords: experiments, auctions, common values, public information, winner's curse. Email Contact: levin.36@osu.edu

Cech, Paula Ann, David Conn, James C. Cox, and R. Mark Isaac (1996) “Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection in Procurement Contracting,” Games and Economic Behavior, 17(December), ***. Keywords: experiments, auctions, procurement, incentive contracts, moral hazard, adverse selection. Email Contact: jcox@bpa.arizona.edu

Chen, Kay-Yut, and Charles R. Plott (1998) “Nonlinear Behavior in Sealed Bid First Price Auctions,” Games and Economic Behavior, 2534-78. Keywords: experiments, auctions, first-price auctions, nonlinear bidding strategies. Email Contact: cplott@hss.caltech.edu

Coppinger, Vicki M., Vernon L. Smith, and Jon A. Titus (1980) “Incentives and Behavior in English, Dutch and Sealed-Bid Auctions,” Economic Inquiry, 18:1 (January), 1-22. Keywords: experiments, auctions, English auctions, Dutch auctions, first-price sealed bid auctions. Email Contact: vls@econlab.arizona.edu

Corns, Allan (1998) “An Experimental Comparison of Affirmative Action Based Auction Mechanisms: Price Preference vs. Bidding Credits Auctions,” New York University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1998 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, auctions, affirmative action. Email Contact: cornsa@fasecon.econ.nyu.edu

Corriveau, Marie, Claude Montemarquette, and Jacques Robert (1998) “Multiple-unit Demand Auctions: Theory and Experimental Evidences,” University of Montreal and CIRANO, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, auctions, multi-unit demand, sequential auctions. Abstract: The paper reports theoretical and experimental results for several auction institutions in which bidders have demands for multiple units, and units are sold in sequence. Email Contact: robertj@cirano.umontreal.ca

Cox, James C., Bruce Roberson, and Vernon L. Smith (1982) “Theory and Behavior of Single Object Auctions,” in Research in Experimental Economics, Vol. 2, edited by V. L. Smith, Greenwich, Conn: JAI Press, 1-43. Keywords: experiments, auctions, single unit auctions, risk aversion. Email Contact: jcox@bpa.arizona.edu

Cox, James C., Vernon L. Smith, and James M. Walker (1982) “Auction Market Theory of Heterogeneous Bidders,” Economics Letters, 9:4 319-325. Keywords: experiments, auctions, risk aversion, constant relative risk aversion, heterogeneity. Email Contact: jcox@bpa.arizona.edu

Cox, James C., Vernon L. Smith, and James M. Walker (1983) “A Test That Discriminates Between Two Models of the Dutch-First Auction Non-Isomorphism,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 4(June-September), 205-219. Keywords: experiments, auctions, Dutch auction, first price auction, institutions. Email Contact: jcox@bpa.arizona.edu

Cox, James C., Vernon L. Smith, and James M. Walker (1983) “Theory and Behavior of Heterogeneous Bidders in Multiple Unit Auction,” Economics Letters, 12207-212. Keywords: experiments, auctions, multiple unit auction, constant relative risk aversion, heterogeneity. Email Contact: jcox@bpa.arizona.edu

Cox, James C., Vernon L. Smith, and James Walker (1983) “Tests of a Heterogeneous Bidder's Theory of First Price Auctions,” Economics Letters, 12:3-4 207-212. Keywords: experiments, auctions, first price auctions, heterogeneous bidders, risk aversion. Email Contact: jcox@bpa.arizona.edu

Cox, James C., Vernon L. Smith, and James M. Walker (1984) “The Theory and Behavior of Multiple Unit Discriminative Auction*,” Journal of Finance, 39(September), 983-1010. Keywords: experiments, auctions, discriminative auction, multiple unit auction. Email Contact: jcox@bpa.arizona.edu

Cox, James C., and R. Mark Isaac (1984) “In Search of the Winner's Curse,” Economic Inquiry, (October), 579-592.
Keywords: experiments, auctions, winner's curse. Email Contact: jcox@bpa.arizona.edu

Cox, James C., Vernon L. Smith, and James M. Walker (1985) “Experimental Development of Sealed-Bid Auction Theory; Calibrating Controls for Risk Aversion,” American Economic Review, 75(May), 160-165. Keywords: experiments, auctions, risk aversion, binary lottery method. Email Contact: jcox@bpa.arizona.edu

Cox, James C., Vernon L. Smith, and James M. Walker (1985) “Expected Revenue in Discriminative and Uniform Price Sealed-Bid Auctions,” in Research in Experimental Economics, Vol. 3, edited by V. L. Smith, Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 183-232. Keywords: experiments, auctions, discriminative auction, uniform sealed bid auction, revenue comparisons. Email Contact: jcox@bpa.arizona.edu

Cox, James C., and R. Mark Isaac (1986) “In Search of the Winner's Curse: Reply,” Economic Inquiry, 24:3 (July), 517-520. Keywords: experiments, auctions, winner's curse. Email Contact: jcox@bpa.arizona.edu

Cox, James C., Vernon L. Smith, and James M. Walker (1988) “Theory and Individual Behavior of First-Price Auctions,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 1:1 (March), 61-99. Keywords: experiments, auctions, first price auction, risk aversion. Email Contact: jcox@bpa.arizona.edu

Cox, James C., Vernon L. Smith, and James M. Walker (1992) “Theory and Misbehavior of First-Price Auctions: Comment,” American Economic Review, 82:5 (December), 1392-1412. Keywords: experiments, auctions, first-price auctions, risk aversion, errors, incentives. Email Contact: jcox@bpa.arizona.edu

Cox, James C., and Ronald L. Oaxaca (1995) “Is Bidding Theory Consistent with Bidding Behavior for Private Value Auctions?,” in Research in Experimental Economics, Vol. 6, edited by R. M. Isaac, Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, ***. Keywords: experiments, auctions, private value auctions. Email Contact: jcox@bpa.arizona.edu

Cox, James C., and Stephen C. Hayne (1999) “Group vs. Individual Decision Making in Strategic Market Games,” University of Arizona, Discussion Paper, presented at the Spring 1999 Public Choice Meetings. Keywords: experiments, auctions, methodology, group decisions, information, winner's curse, curse of information. Abstract: The experiments show that both group decision-making units and individuals are subject to the winner's curse, but that the bias is more severe with with groups than with individuals, when both are experienced and groups have more information. Additional signals causes both individuals and groups to deviate more from rational bidding, but the effect is worse for groups. Email Contact: JCox@bpa.arizona.edu

Cox, James C., Samuel H. Dinkin, and Vernon L. Smith (1999) “The Winner's Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions: Comment,” American Economic Review, 89:1 (March), 319-324. Keywords: experiments, auctions, common value auctions, winner's curse, public information. Abstract: The authors report an error in the Kagel and Levin (1986) analysis of the Nash equilibrium for a common value auction with additional public information. Email Contact: jcox@bpa.arizona.edu

DeMartini, Christine, Anthony M. Kwasnica, and John O. Ledyard (1998) “A New and Improved Design for Multi-Object Interactive Auctions,” California Institute of Technology, Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1998 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, auctions, multi-unit auctions. Email Contact: jledyard@hss.caltech.edu

Dickhaut, John, Ann Martin, David Senkow, and Galen Sevick (1993) “The Price/Quantity Sealed Bid/Offer Auction with Pro-Rata Rationing: Experimental Evidence,” Economic Journal, 103:418 (May), 547-569. Keywords: experiments, auctions, sealed bid/offer auction, multi-unit auctions. Email Contact: jdickhaut@csom.umn.edu

Dorsey, Rober E., and Laura Razzolini (1998) “Auctions versus Lotteries: Do Institutions Matter?,” University of Mississippi, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, auctions, lotteries, institutions, risk aversion. Abstract: The experiment compares individual behavior in two theoretically equivalent institutions, a first-price auction and a lottery. Although subjects face the same probability/payoff tradeoffs, they tend to behave in a more risk averse fashion in the auction. This overbidding is particularly strong for those with high values, which may explain the common use of auctions for fundraising purposes. Email Contact: dorsey@bus.olemiss.edu, laura@bus,olemiss.edu

Dyer, Douglas, John H. Kagel, and Dan Levin (1989) “A Comparison of Naive and Experienced Bidders in Common Value Offer Auctions: A Laboratory Analysis,” Economic Journal, 99:394 (March), 108-115. Keywords: experiments, auctions, common value, experience effects, methodology, winner's curse, risk aversion, expert subjects, subject pool effects. Abstract: The first price common value auctions were structured so that the low bidder wins the prize (e.g. construction contract). Overbidding and the winner's curse effect was observed for both student participants and in a session with experts from the construction industry. Differences behavior were attributed to risk aversion among the students and more risk neutral behavior fo the executives. Email Contact: levin.36@osu.edu

Dyer, Douglas, John H. Kagel, and Dan Levin (1989) “Resolving Uncertainty About the Number of Bidders in Independent Private-Value Auctions: An Experimental Analysis,” Rand Journal of Economics, 20:2 (Summer), 268-279. Keywords: experiments, auctions, private value auctions.

Dyer, Douglas, and John H. Kagel (1996) “Bidding in Common Value Auctions: How the Commercial Construction Industry Corrects for the Winner's Curse,” Management Science, 42:10 (October), 1463-1475. Keywords: experiments, auctions, field data, construction industry, methodology, winner's curse. Abstract: This paper considers why construction industry executives fall prey to the winner's curse in the laboratory and avoid it in the field. Industry-specific bidding characteristics are identified. Implications for experimental economics are discussed.

Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard, John List, and David Lucking-Reiley (1999) “Demand Reduction in Multi-Unit Auctions with Varying Numbers of Bidders: Theory and Field Experiments,” Vanderbilt University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1999 European Regional ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, auctions, multi-unit auctions, uniform-price auctions, numbers effects, field experiment, market power. Abstract: The paper uses a field experiment with sports card sales to assess the extent to which buyers withhold demand in multi-unit, uniform-price auctions. The theoretical prediction is that demand reduction is greater with fewer bidders. Some support for theoretical predictions is reported. Email Contact: reiley@vanderbilt.edu

Fehl, U., and Werner Güth (1987) “Internal and External Stability of Bidder Cartels in Auctions and Public Tenders: A Comparison of Pricing Rules,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 5:3 (September), 303-313. Keywords: experiments, auctions, collusion, pricing rules.

Frahm, D., and L. F. Schrader (1969) “An Experimental Comparison of Pricing in Two Auction Systems,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 52(November), 528-534. Keywords: experiments, auctions, institutions.

Friedman, Daniel (1992) “Theory and Misbehavior of First-Price Auctions: Comment,” American Economic Review, 82:5 (December), 1374-1378. Keywords: experiments, auctions, first-price auctions, risk aversion, noisy behavior. Email Contact: dan@cats.ucsc.edu

Fullerton, Richard L., Bruce G. Linster, Michael McKee, and Stephen Slate (1999) “Using Auctions to Reward Tournament Winners: Theory and Experimental Investigations,” USAF Academy, Keywords: experiments, auctions, tournaments, research and development. Abstract: The experiments involve a game in which competitors in a research quality tournament decide on research intensity. In this context, a fixed-prize tournament results in higher net procurement costs than a system where the competitors are in a post-development auction bidding for the right to provide the innovation. Email Contact: fullertonrl.dfeg@ysafa,af,mil

Garvin, Susan, and John H. Kagel (1994) “Learning in Common Value Auctions: Some Initial Observations,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 25:3 (December), 351-372. Keywords: experiments, auctions, common value auctions, learning.

Goeree, Jacob K., Charles A. Holt, and Thomas R. Palfrey (1999) “Quantal Response Equilibrium and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions,” California Institute of Technology, Keywords: experiments, auctions. private values, logit equilibrium, risk aversion. Abstract: This paper reports the results of a private-values auction experiment in which the expected costs of deviating from the Nash equilibrium bidding function are asymmetric, with more upside risk in one treatment and more downside risk in the other. Overbidding relative to Nash is observed in both treatments, but is more severe in the treatment with lower costs of overbidding. A two-parameter model of constant relative risk aversion and noisy (logit equilibrium) behavior provides a tight fit of bid distributions, and estimates are stable across treatments. Email Contact: jg2n@virginia.edu

Goswani, G., T. H. Noe, and M. J. Rebello (1996) “Collusion in Uniform-Price Auctions: Experimental Evidence and Implications for Treasury Auctions,” Review of Financial Studies, 9:3 (Fall), 757-785. Keywords: experiments, auctions, uniform price auctions, collusion, markets.

Guler, Kemal, Charles R. Plott, and Quang H. Vuong (1994) “A Study of Zero-Out Auctions: Experimental Analysis of a Process of Allocating Private Rights to the Use of Public Property,” Economic Theory, 467-104. Keywords: experiments, auctions, zero-out auctions.

Güth, Werner, Rolf Schmittberger, and Bernd Schwarze (1983) “A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Bidding Behavior in Vickrey-Auction Games,” Zeitschrift fur die gesamte Staatswissenchaft, 139:2 (June), 269-88. Keywords: experiments, auctions, Vickrey auctions. Email Contact: gueth@wiwi.hu-berlin.de

Güth, Werner, and Eric van Damme (1986) “A Comparison of Pricing Rules for Auctions and Fair Division Games,” Social Choice and Welfare, 3:3 177-198. Keywords: experiments, auctions, bargaining, institutions, pricing rules. Email Contact: gueth@wiwi.hu-berlin.de

Hansen, Robert, and John R. Lott (1991) “The Winner's Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions: Comment,” American Economic Review, 81:1 (March), 347-361. Keywords: experiments, auctions, common value auctions, winner's curse, information.

Hansen, R. G., and John R. Lott Jr. (1991) “The Winner's Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions: Comment,” American Economic Review, 81347-361. Keywords: experiments, auctions, winner's curse, public information, rationality.

Harrison, Glenn W. (1989) “Theory and Misbehavior of First-Price Auctions,” American Economic Review, 79:4 (September), 749-762. Keywords: experiments, auctions, methodology, incentive effects, decision costs, bounded rationality, payoff dominance, incentives. Email Contact: harrison@darla.badm.sc.edu

Harrison, Glenn W. (1990) “Risk Attitudes in First-Price Auction Experiments: A Bayesian Analysis,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 72:3 (August), 541-546*. Keywords: experiments, auctions, first-price auctions, risk aversion. Email Contact: harrison@darla.badm.sc.edu

Harrison, Glenn W. (1992) “Theory and Misbehavior of First-Price Auctions: Reply,” American Economic Review, 82:5 (December), 1426-1443. Keywords: experiments, auctions, first-price auctions, risk aversion, incentives, errors, payoff dominance. Email Contact: harrison@darla.badm.sc.edu

Harstad, Ronald M. (1991) “Asymmetric Bidding in Second-Price, Common-Value Auctions,” Economic Letters, 35:3 (March), 249-252. Keywords: experiments, auctions, second-price auctions, common value, asymmetry. Email Contact: harstad@rutcor.rutgers.edu

Harstad, Ronald M. (1999) “Dominant Strategy Adoption and Bidders' Experience with Pricing Rules,” Rutgers University, Keywords: experiments, auctions, second-price auctions, English auctions, dominant strategies. Abstract: The paper offers explanations for why prior experience in an English auction leads to less overbidding in a second-price auction than would otherwise be observed. The English auction teaches bidders to consider prices one by one, and to the realization that overbidding causes losses. Email Contact: harstad@rutcor.rutgers.edu

Hoffman, Elizabeth, and James R. Marsden (1986) “Empirical Evidence on Competitive Bidding: Some Surprising Results,” Economics Letters, 2215-21. Keywords: experiments, auctions. Email Contact: ehoffman@uic.edu

Hoffman, Elizabeth, James R. Marsden, and Reza Saidibaghgandomi (1987) “Testing the Continuity of Individual Bid Density Functions,” Economics Letters, 24117-120. Keywords: experiments, auctions. Email Contact: ehoffman@uic.edu

Hoffman, E., D. J. Menkhaus, D. Chakravarti, R.A. Field, and G. D. Whipple (1993) “Using Laboratory Experimental Auctions in Marketing Research: A Case Study of New Packaging for Fresh Beef,” Marketing Science, 12318-338. Keywords: experiments, auctions, marketing. Email Contact: ehoffman@uic.edu

Holt, Charles A., and Roger Sherman (1995) “Naive Bidding and the Winner's Curse in Auctions with Independent Common Value Components,” University of Virginia, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, auctions, common value, winner's curse, error, risk aversion, naive bidding. Abstract: This paper considers a two-person, common value auction in which the rational bid is independent of risk attitudes. The observed overbidding is attributed to a combination of the winner's curse and risk aversion, which is both inferred from the bidding and measured independently. Email Contact: holt@virginia.edu

Isaac, R. Mark, and James M. Walker (1985) “Information and Conspiracy in Sealed Bid Auctions,” Journal of
Economic Behavior and Organization, 6(June), 139-159. Keywords: experiments, auctions, conspiracy, information. Email Contact: misaac@bpa.arizona.edu

Kagel, John H., and Dan Levin (1985) “Individual Bidder Behavior in First-Price Private Value Auctions,” Economics Letters, 19125-128. Keywords: experiments, auctions, first-price auctions, private value auctions, individual bidder behavior. Email Contact: kagel+@pitt.edu

Kagel, John H., and Dan Levin (1986) “The Winner's Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions,” American Economic Review, 76:5 (December), 894-920. Keywords: experiments, auctions, common value, first price, winner's curse, public information, numbers effects. Abstract: The paper constrasts the predictions of a strategic model of common value bidding, where an incresase in the number of bidders calls for lower bids to avoid the winner's curse, with a naive model in which ignoring the adverse selection factor calls form higher, more aggressive bids as the number of bidders increases. The winner's curse and consequent losses is more prevalent in auctions with larger numbers of bidders than was the case with 3-5 bidders. Contrary to risk neutral Nash predictions, the provision of public information in auctions with 6-7 bidders reduced seller revenue. Also, see the comment in Cox, Dinkin, and Smith (1999) and the authors' reply. Email Contact: kagel+@pitt.edu

Kagel, John H., Ronald M. Harstad, and Dan Levin (1987) “Information Impact and Allocation Rules in Auctions with Affiliated Private Values: A Laboratory Study,” Econometrica, 55:6 (November), 1275-1304. Keywords: experiments, auctions, affiliated private values, English auction, second price auction, first price auction, information. Abstract: The paper reports experiments with affiliated private values, in which own private value is correlated with other's values. The Nash model outperforms two ad hoc models in organizing data from first price and English auctions, but overbidding is observed in second price auctions. This overbidding is attributed to the fact that bidding errors are less transparent than in English auctions. Email Contact: kagel+@pitt.edu

Kagel, John H., and Douglas Dyer (1988) “Learning in Common Value Auctions,” in Experimental Games and Markets,
edited by R. Tietz, W. Albers and R. Selten, Berlin: Springer-Verlag, . Keywords: experiments, auctions, common value auctions, learning. Email Contact: kagel+@pitt.edu

Kagel, John H., Dan Levin, Raymond C. Battalio, and Donald J. Meyer (1989) “First-Price Common Value Auctions: Bidder Behavior and the "Winner's Curse",” Economic Inquiry, 27:2 (April), 241-258. Keywords: experiments, auctions, common value, winner's curse, experience, bankruptcy. Abstract: Subjects in first-price common value auctions consistently bid above expected value, conditional on winning. The effects of experience and high losses are to reduce bids, payoffs remain below those predicted in a Nash equilibrium. Email Contact: kagel+@pitt.edu

Kagel, John H., and Dan Levin (1991) “The Winner's Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions: Reply,” American Economic Review, 81:1 (March), 362-369. Keywords: experiments, auctions, common value, winner's curse, public information. Email Contact: kagel+@pitt.edu

Kagel, John H., and Alvin E. Roth (1992) “Theory and Misbehavior in First-Price Auctions: Comment*,” American Economic Review, 82:5 (December), 1379-1391. Keywords: experiments, auctions, first price auctions, risk aversion. Email Contact: kagel+@pitt.edu

Kagel, John H., and Dan Levin (1993) “Independent Private Value Auctions: Bidder Behavior in First-, Second-, and Third-Price Auctions with Varying Numbers of Bidders,” Economic Journal, 103:419 (July), 868-879. Keywords: experiments, auctions, independent private values, first-price auctions, second-price auctions, third-price auctions, numbers effects, risk aversion. Email Contact: kagel+@pitt.edu

Kagel, John H., Dan Levin, and Ronold M. Harstad (1994) “Comparative Static Effects of Number of Bidders and Public Information on Behavior in Second-Price Common Value Auctions,” International Journal of Game Theory, 23***. Keywords: experiments, auctions, second price, common value, numbers effects, public information. Email Contact: harstad@rutcor.rutgers.edu

Kagel, John H. (1995) “Cross-Game Learning: Experimental Evidence from First-Price and English Common Value Auctions,” Economic Letters, 49:2 (August), 163-170. Keywords: experiments, auctions, common value, sequence effects, learning, first-price auctions, English auctions. Email Contact: kagel+@pitt.edu

Kagel, John H., Dan Levin, and Ronald M. Harstad (1995) “Comparative Static Effects of Number of Bidders and Public Information on Behavior in Second-Price Common Value Auction,” International Journal of Game Theory, 24:3 293-319. Keywords: experiments, auctions, common value, second-price auctions, public information. Abstract: The experiment implements a second price, common value auction in order to test the comparative statics result that Nash equilibrium bids should be decreasing in the number of bidders, regardless of risk attitudes. The failure of subjects to behave in this manner indicates that overbidding must be largely due to the winner's curse effect and cannot be explained only as an artifact of risk aversion. Email Contact: kagel+@pitt.edu

Kagel, John H. (1995) “Auctions: A Survey of Experimental Research,” in The Handbook of Experimental Economics, edited by J. H. Kagel and A. E. Roth, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 501-585. Keywords: experiments, auctions, private value, common value, institutions, risk aversion, survey, English auctions, Dutch auctions, collusion. Abstract This handbook chapter surveys all aspects of the large literature on auction experiments. Email Contact: kagel+@pitt.edu

Kagel, John H. (1995) “Cross-Game Learning: Experimental Evidence from First-Price and English Common Value Auctions,” Economics Letters, 49163-170. Keywords: experiments, auctions, common value auctions, first-price auctions, English auctions, cross-game learning. Abstract: Prior experience in an English common value auction has no effect on reducing overbidding in a first-price common value auction, whereas prior experience in the first-price auction reduces the incidence of overbidding in first-price auctions. Email Contact: kagel+@pitt.edu

Kagel, John H., and Jean-Francois Richard (1997) “Super-Experienced Bidders in First-Price Common Value Auctions: Rules-of-Thumb, Nash Equilibrium Bidding and the Winner's Curse,” University of Pittsburgh, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, auctions, experience effects, methodology, first-price common value auctions, rules of thumb, heuristics, winner's curse. Email Contact: kagel+@pitt.edu

Kagel, John H., and Dan Levin (1998) “Independent Private Value Multi-Unit Demand Auctions: An Experiment Comparing Uniform Price and Vickrey Auctions,” Ohio State University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, auctions, multi-unit auctions, independent private values, uniform price auctions, Vickrey auctions, dynamic auctions, numbers effects, learning. Abstract: Subjects engage in strategic demand reduction in uniform-price auctions, a behavior that is largely eliminated with the Vickrey auction. The sealed-bid uniform price auction generates more revenue but is less efficient than the Vickrey auction in this context. Email Contact: levin.36@osu.edu

Kagel, John H., and Dan Levin (1999) “Multi-Unit Demand Auctions with Synergies: Some Initial Experimental Results,” Ohio State University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1999 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, auctions, multi-unit demand. Email Contact: levin.36@osu.edu

Kagel, John H. (1999) Common Value Auctions and the Winner's Curse, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press (under review). Keywords: experiments, auctions, common value auctions, winner's curse, survey, first-price common value auctions, second-price common value auctions, public information, numbers effects, affiliated private values, English common value auctions, learning, cross game learning, naive bidding, experience effects, commercial construction industry. Abstract: This manuscript contains an introductory survey and a detailed analysis of common value auction experiments of all types. There is a detailed coverage of the winner's curse, of naive bidding models that generate it, and of the extent to which it is affected by learning. Email Contact: kagel+@pitt.edu

Kagel, John H., and Dan Levin (1999) “Common Value Auctions with Insider Information,” Econometrica, forthcoming. Keywords: experiments, auctions, common value auctions, insider information, winner's curse. Abstract: The experiments involve an insider who has better information than other bidders in a first price common value auction. The winner's curse is observed with inexperienced bidders. In sessions with experienced bidders who have largely overcome the winner's curse, the insider earns more profits, conditional on winning, and the insider increases bids in response to an increase in the number of bidders. Email Contact: levin.36@osu.edu

Kamecke, Ulrich (1998) “Competition, Cooperation, and Envy in a Simple English Auction,” Humboldt University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, auctions, auctions, envy, Nash equilibrium, common knowledge of "private value". Abstract: Subjects in an English auction are told in advance who has the highest willingness to pay. Some bidding above value is attributed to envy or inequality aversion. Email Contact: kamecke@wiwi.hu-berlin.de

Karni, Edi, and Zvi Safra (1985) “Vickrey Auctions in the Theory of Expected Utility, with Rank Dependent Probability,” Economics Letters, 2015-18*. Keywords: experiments, auctions, rank dependent probability.

Levin, Dan, and Ronald M. Harstad (1986) “Symmetric Bidding in Second Price Common Value Auctions,” Economics Letters, 20315-319. Keywords: experiments, auctions, second price, common value. Email Contact: levin.36@osu.edu

Levin, Dan, and J. L. Smith (1991) “Some Evidence on the Winner's Curse: Comment,” American Economic Review, 81:1 (March), 370-375. Keywords: experiments, auctions, common value, winner's curse. Email Contact: levin.36@osu.edu

Levin, Dan, John H. Kagel, and J.-F. Richard (1996) “Revenue Effects and Information Processing in English Common Value Auctions,” American Economic Review, 86:3 (June), 442-460. Keywords: experiments, auctions, English auctions, common value, revenue effects. Email Contact: levin.36@osu.edu

Lind, Barry, and Charles R. Plott (1991) “The Winner's Curse: Experiments with Buyers and with Sellers,” American Economic Review, 81:1 (March), 335-346. Keywords: experiments, auctions, winner's curse, risk aversion. Abstract: Note: As a side comment, the authors conjecture that risk aversion be part of the explanation of overbidding in first price common value auctions, but risk aversion cannot account for overbidding in second price common value auctions.

Linden, Jordan, Anders Lunander, and Jan-Eric Nilsson (1998) “Revenues in Multi-Unit Common Value Auctions - An Experimental Study of Three Sealed-Bid and Three Open-Bid Mechanisms,” University College of South Stockholm, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, auctions, multi-unit demand, revenue comparisons, alternative auctions. Abstract: Four auction institutions are compared in a common-value setting with variable numbers of bidders who each demand two units. Revenues are higher in the uniform-price auction than is the case with discriminatory and Vickrey auctions. Email Contact: johan.linden@sh.se

List, John A., and Lucking-Reiley (1999) “Bidding Behavior and Decision Costs in Field Experiments,” Vanderbilt University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Spring 1999 Public Choice Meetings. Keywords: experiments, field experiments, auctions, decision costs. Email Contact: John.List@bus.ucf.edu

List, John A., and Jason Shogren (1999) “Price Signals and Bidding Behavior in Second-Price Auctions with Repeated Trials,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, forthcoming. Keywords: experiments, auctions, second price auctions, price signals. Email Contact: John.List@bus.ucf.edu

List, John A., and David Lucking-Reilly (1999) “Demand Reduction in Multi-Unit Auctions: Evidence from a Sportscard Field Experiment,” American Economic Review, forthcoming. Keywords: experiments, auctions, multi-unit auctions, field experiment, demand reduction. Email Contact: John.List@bus.ucf.edu

McCabe, Kevin A., Stephen J. Rassenti, and Vernon L. Smith (1990) “Auction Institutional Design: Theory and Behavior of Simultaneous Multiple Unit Generalizations of the Dutch and English Auctions,” American Economic Review, 80:5 (December), 1276-1283. Keywords: experiments, auctions, multiple-unit auctions, Dutch auctions, English auctions. Email Contact: kmcabe@econlab.arizona.edu

McCabe, Kevin A., Steven J. Rassenti, and Vernon L. Smith (1990) “Auction Design for Composite Goods: The Natural Gas Industry,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 14**:3 (June), 127-149. Keywords: experiments, auctions, regulation. Email Contact: kmcabe@econlab.arizona.edu

McCabe, Kevin A., Stephen J. Rassenti, and Vernon L. Smith (1991) “Testing Vickrey's and Other Simultaneous Multiple Unit Versions of the English Auction,” in Research in Experimental Economics, Vol. 4, edited by R. M. Isaac, Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 45-79. Keywords: experiments, auctions, multiple unit auctions, independent private values, English Clock auction. Abstract This paper reports tests of a large number of multiple-unit auctions under alternative institutional rules, in an independent private values environment. Progressive auctions performed better than uniform-price, sealed-bid auctions, indicating the advantage of providing feedback. In particular, the English Clock auction produced highly efficient allocations. Email Contact: kmcabe@econlab.arizona.edu

McCabe, Kevin A., Stephen J. Rassenti, and Vernon L. Smith (1992) “Designing Call Auction Institutions: Is Double Dutch the Best?,” Economic Journal, 102:410 (January), 9-23. Keywords: experiments, auctions, call markets, double Dutch, two sided auctions. Email Contact: kmcabe@econlab.arizona.edu

McCabe, Kevin A., Stephen J. Rassenti, and Vernon L. Smith (1993) “Designing a Uniform Price Double Auction: An Experimental Evaluation,” in The Double Auction Market: Institutions, Theories and Evidence, edited by D. Friedman and J. Rust, Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 307-332. Keywords: experiments, auctions, uniform price double auction. Email Contact: kmcabe@econlab.arizona.edu

McCabe, Kevin A., Stephen J. Rassenti, and Vernon L. Smith (1999) “Designing Auction Institutions for Exchange,” IIE Transactions, 31:9 (September), 803-811. Keywords: experiments, auctions, institutions, computerization. Email Contact: kmcabe@econlab.arizona.edu

Merlo, A., and Andrew Schotter (1992) “Theory and Misbehavior of First-Price auctions: Comment,” American Economic Review, 82:5 (December), 1413-1425. Keywords: experiments, auctions, risk aversion, incentives.

Meyer, D. J. (1993) “First Price Auctions with Entry: An Experimental Investigation,” Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 33:2 (Summer), 107-122. Keywords: experiments, auctions, first-price auctions, entry.

Miller, Gary J., and Charles R. Plott (1985) “Revenue Generating Properties of Sealed-Bid Auctions; An Experimental Analysis of One-Price and Discriminative Processes,” in Research in Experimental Economics, Vol. 3, edited by V. L. Smith, Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 159-181. Keywords: experiments, auctions, revenue, sealed bid auctions, discriminative auctions, uniform price auctions. Email

Moldovanu, Benny, and Oliver Kirchkamp (1999) “An Experimental Analysis of Auctions with Interdependent Valuations,” University of Mannheim, Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1999 European Regional ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, auctions, interdependent values, efficiency, English auction, second-price auction. Abstract: Bidders in this experiment receive private signals. Valuations differ across bidders and depend asymmetrically on own and others' signals. English auctions are more efficient than second-price auctions in this setting. Email Contact: oliver@kirchkamp.de

Noussair, Charles, and David Porter (1992) “Allocating Priority with Auctions: An Experimental Analysis,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 19:2 (October), 169-195. Keywords: experiments, auctions, priority. Email Contact: noussair@mgmt.purdue.edu

Noussair, Charles (1995) “Equilibria in a Multi-object Uniform Price Seald Bid Auction with Multi-unit Demands,” Economic Theory, 5:2 (March), 337-351. Keywords: experiments, auctions, multi-unit auctions, uniform price auctions, sealed bids. Email Contact: noussair@mgmt.purdue.edu

Offerman, Theo, and Jan Potters (1999) “Does Auctioning Entry Licenses Affect Market Prices,” University of Amsterdam, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1999 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, auctions, markets, entry licenses, psychology. Email Contact: theoo@fee.uva.nl

Phillips, Owen R., Raymond C. Battalio, and Carl A. Kogut (1991) “Sunk Opportunity Costs in Valuation and Bidding,” Southern Economic Journal, 58:1 (July), 112-128. Keywords: experiments, auctions, sunk costs, opportunity costs. Email Contact: owenphil@uwyo.edu

Pitchik, Carolyn, and Andrew Schotter (1988) “Perfect Equilibria in Budget-Constrained Sequential Auctions: An Experimental Study,” RAND Journal of Economics, 19362-388. Keywords: experiments, auctions, budget constraints, sequential auctions. Email Contact: schotter@fasecon.econ.nyu.edu

Plott, Charles R. (1997) “Laboratory Experimental Testbeds: Application to the PCS Auction,” Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 6:3 (Fall), 605-638. Keywords: experiments, auctions, PCS auction. Email Contact: cplott@hss.caltech.edu

Radner, Roy, and Andrew Schotter (1989) “The Sealed-Bid Mechanism: An Experimental Study,” Journal of Economic Theory, 48:1 (June), 179-220. Keywords: experiments, auctions**, sealed bids.

Rassenti, Stephen J., Vernon L. Smith, and Bulfin R. L. (1982) “A Combinatorial Auction Mechanism for Airport Time Slot Allocation,” Bell Journal of Economics, 13(Autumn), 402-417. Keywords: experiments, auctions, airport landing slots. Email Contact: rassenti@econlab.arizona.edu

Rutström, E. Elisabet (1998) “Home-Grown Values and Incentive Compatible Auction Design,” International Journal of Game Theory, 27:3 (October), 427-441. Keywords: experiments, auctions, home-grown values, incentive compatibility. Email Contact: lisar@darla.badm.sc.edu

Schotter, Andrew (1990) “Bad and Good News about the Sealed-Bid Mechanism: Some Experimental Results,” American Economic Review, 80:2 (May), 220-226. Keywords: experiments, auctions, sealed bids. Email Contact: schotter@fasecon.econ.nyu.edu

Shogren, Jason F. (1994) “Bid Sensitivity and the Structure of Vickrey Auction,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 76:5 (December), 1089-1095. Keywords: experiments, auctions, Vickrey auction, institutions. Email Contact: jramses@uwyo.edu

Shogren, Jason F., John A. List, and Dermot Hayes (1999) “Bidding Behavior in Consecutive Experimental Auctions,” University of Central Florida, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, auctions, sequential auctions. Email Contact: John.List@bus.ucf.edu

Shubik, Martin (1971) “The Dollar Auction Game: A Paradox in Non-Cooperative Behavior and Escalation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 15109-111. Keywords: experiments, auctions, all-pay auction. Email Contact: martin.shubik@yale.edu

Smith, Vernon L. (1967) “Experimental Studies of Discrimination Versus Competition in Sealed-Bid Auction Markets,” Journal of Business, 40:1 (January), 56-84. Keywords: experiments, auctions, sealed-bid auctions, competitive auction, uniform price auction, discriminatory auction. Email Contact: vls@econlab.arizona.edu

Smith, Vernon L. (1976) “Bidding and Auctioning Institutions: Experimental Results,” in Bidding and Auctioning for Procurement and Allocation, edited by Y. Amihud, New York: New York University Press, 43-64. Keywords: experiments, auctions. Email Contact: vls@econlab.arizona.edu

Smith, Vernon. L., and James M. Walker (1993) “Rewards, Experience and Decision Costs in First Price Auctions,” Economic Inquiry, 31:2 (April), 237-245*. Keywords: experiments, auctions, methodology, incentives, first-price auctions, noisy behavior, risk aversion. Abstract: In the reported experiment, individual subjects were placed in a private-values, first-price auction, bidding against a known number of computerized bidders programmed to bid a fixed fraction of their random value draws. All earnings were multiplied by a constant that was varied from 1 to 20. Bidding was "as if risk averse," and this overbidding relative to the risk-neutral prediction was positively correlated with increases in the incentive multiplier, holding experience constant. High incentives did reduce measures of noise in bidding. Email Contact: vls@econlab.arizona.edu

Tenorio, R. (1997) “Some Evidence on Strategic Quantity Reduction in Multiple Unit Auctions.,” Economics Letters, 55:2 (August), 209-213. Keywords: experiments, auctions, market power, strategic quantity reduction, demand withholding.

Thaler, Richard H. (1988) “Anomalies: The Winner's Curse,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2:1 (Winter), 191-202.
Keywords: experiments, auctions, bargaining, winner's curse, anomalies, biases. Email Contact: richard.thaler@gsbsun.uchicago.edu

Van Boening, Mark V., Stephen J. Rassenti, and Vernon L. Smith (1998) “Numerical Computation of Equilibrium Bid Functions in a First-Price Auction with Heterogeneous Risk Attitudes,” Experimental Economics, 1:2 147-159. Keywords: experiments, auctions, Nash equilibrium, risk aversion, bid functions, numerical methods. Email Contact: vanboen@bus.olemiss.edu

van Damme, Eric (1998) “Auctioning Dutch Airwaves,” Tilburg University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, auctions, PCS auctions. Abstract: The Ductch bandwidth auction is discussed, in terms of how the rules differed from those used earlier in the U.S. FCC auctions, and of why the Dutch authorities decided not to use a combinatorial auction. The role of experimental economics in the auction design decision is also discussed. Email Contact: eric.vandamme@kub.nl

Walker, James M., Vernon L. Smith, and James C. Cox (1987) “Bidding Behavior in First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions: Use of Computerized Nash Competitors,” Economics Letters, 23:3 239-244. Keywords: experiments, auctions, first-price, sealed-bid, computerized competitors. Email Contact: walkerj@indiana.edu

Wilson, Robert (1992) “Strategic Analysis of Auctions,” in Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edited by R. J. Aumann and S. Hart, Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers, . Keywords: experiments, auctions, winner's curse.