authority structure became corrupt. The post-revolutionary syndrome creates a profound
popular and elite alienation which makes a graceful transition of power difficult.

The second theme is the pressure of modern complexity. Even if a centralized
apparatus succeeds in the basic modernization of an economy, it creates a complex situation
in which it will be increasingly ineffective. This leads to the illegal and eventually legal
growth of market-oriented entrepreneurship, solving the micro-level problems of socialist
society while undermining its official structure. The political adjustment to a mixed
economy requires the regime to acknowledge more autonomy in society, which in turn leads
to more overt and challenging demands. The general societal demand in response to
complexity is for citizen rights, especially for the rule of law (to control the authorities and
their corruption) and individual rights. The third theme is the open door, and the effect of
international realignments, competition, investment and debt on domestic reform processes.

The fourth theme is the tension between the habits and symbols of revolutionary
politics, which has a "winner-take-all" logic, and the path of compromise and gradual
reform. Both the revolutionary old guard and the oppositionalist forces tend to reach for the
banner and to charge the negotiating table. Moreover, the strong regimes like China, which
would have the best chance of surviving a transition to democracy, tend to be least willing to
take the risk. A further complication is that none of these countries has an indigenous
experience of functioning parliamentary democracy to fall back on, and non-communist
democratic models in Asia seem to presume harmony.
The Post-Revolutionary Syndrome

The communist party-state was not intended to be a Leviathan, an artificial organism of power serving the present interests of its members for the indefinite future. It was intended to be a pilgrim army, an Augustinian *civitas peregrinans*, struggling forward toward an earthly salvation which would mean its own withering away.46 It was a dictatorship, if not by the proletariat, then for the proletariat, exercised by a party distinguished by its success, its scientific knowledge of history and its total commitment to revolution. Its mission was its legitimacy.47

The last dramatic attempts in the communist world to lift society bodily beyond the capitalist present were the Cultural Revolution and the Khmer Rouge "year zero" in Democratic Kampuchea.48 The last attempt to achieve economic modernization through the thorough socialization of the means of production was Vietnam’s attempt to collectivize the south in the late 1970s.49 In the 1980s communist countries became reconciled to moving backwards in history, towards a "primary stage of socialism" characterized by a mixed economy. The communist future was postponed one century by Zhao Ziyang in 1987, and the returning conservatives in China have not brought it forward.50 Vanguard communism, communism as it had imagined itself on the eve of victory, is dead.

The unadmitted loss of revolutionary legitimacy leads to a complex of problems which I call the "post-revolutionary syndrome." First, the party loses the capacity to attract and inspire society’s idealists and risk-takers, or disillusions and alienates them if they do participate. These people are concentrated among the educated youth and formed the core of the party during its revolutionary days. The convenient recruit and reliable subordinate is a
cautious and compliant activist, not a critical thinker. It is hard to imagine the young Mao Zedong—or the young Deng Xiaoping—as a leader in today’s Communist Youth League.

Secondly, the failure of ideology to deliver the promised future cannot be admitted, so the same ideology that was hypercritical of the previous government becomes hypocritical about its own shortcomings. Problems are discovered and scapegoats are found, but the orthodoxy and current central leadership cannot be criticized. As ideology ceases to serve as a blueprint for action it becomes a credo used and enforced as a test of loyalty. A good example is the “dictatorship of the proletariat,” the third of the “four fundamental principles” which must be affirmed in China. This term acquired special importance for China in the polemic with Khrushchev in the early 1960s over his proposed “state of the whole people.” But Deng Xiaoping himself adopted the essence of Khrushchev’s argument (that society had evolved into a society of working people) in 1977 when he asserted that intellectuals were now part of the working people, and with the virtual abolition of class labels in 1979. The words, however, had already been sanctified, and all must bow to them. Such an empty orthodoxy becomes an easy target for anyone who is critically disposed, and since it cannot be challenged publicly, its defenses are not credible.

Thirdly, corruption becomes a characteristic problem, not simply because power corrupts, but because purpose of power has become disoriented. Indeed, the actual amount of corruption or the private advantage of the official might be small by the standards of other countries, but the public posture of the official is one of revolutionary dedication and service, so the discrepancy is felt acutely. Since the regime assumes solidarity between itself and the
people, there are few defenses against the abuse of power. The stable structure of power and its personalistic rather than legalistic definition create pervasive networks of clientelism.

Fourthly, because the dictatorship of the proletariat was expected to be a brief transitional regime, the problem of leadership succession creates profound difficulties, especially when it involves the transfer of power from the revolutionary generation to a post-revolutionary cohort of leaders. China and North Korea still face this generational watershed, and the apex of central power depends on some old biological clocks and the vagaries of palace politics.

The pressure of modern complexity

Even in the relatively less developed socio-economies of Asian communism, the incompatibility between the centralization and restrictiveness of the party-state and the entrepreneurial opportunities perceived and exploited at the grassroots level are a major engine of reform. Indeed, only the strongest party-states are able to restructure the economy down to the grassroots level: North Vietnam was able to collectivize in 1956-1960, but there was backtracking in the north after 1965 and the collectivization in the south so harshly attempted after reunification was never thoroughly implemented. Pastoral collectivization in Mongolia occurred only in 1956-1963, 35 years after the revolution. In Cambodia the harsh measures of the Khmer Rouge were reversed, and, except for the prohibition on land sales, collectivization had made little progress before the policy was reversed.52

The regimes that do establish thorough state control of the economy on the Stalinist model pay for their success in the decline of services and commerce, and in the general
decline of consumer options. And eventually the restoration of the fine texture of local market supply becomes more important as the state economy lifts the focus of economic activity from the basic vital concerns of food and health to more complex issues of quality of life. Moreover, to the extent that the regime can ease shortages simply by permitting private activity, it is spared the budgetary strain and bureaucratic infighting of a new state program. Thus, for instance, the percentage of government-owned new housing in Vietnam declined from 50% in 1976-1980 to 10% in 1986-1989.\textsuperscript{53} In China, the share of state-owned enterprises in retail sales went from 90% in 1975 to 40% in 1985.\textsuperscript{54} As the state economy slows from its own weight and obsolescence, an increasingly important non-state economy, market-driven and informal, develops at its margins and crevices.

The growth of the informal economy undermines the state's economic control at the macro level and changes the attractiveness of state employment at the micro level. For a number of reasons the state's fiscal control of the informal economy is weak, and the state budget faces a declining percentage revenue as economic growth shifts toward the informal economy. Moreover, the state enterprises are losing profitable monopoly advantages as the economy becomes mixed, and this increases their burden on the state. Meanwhile, the value of the fixed salary and comprehensive benefits available to the worker in the "work unit socialism" of the individual enterprise are undermined by the sight of rich and successful private entrepreneurs and the inflationary pressures of market prices and deficit budgeting. So the best workers are tempted to leave the state enterprise, leaving those whose chances on the outside are worth less than their security on the inside, in other words, the older and less productive workers.
Because of the post-revolutionary syndrome the state is not in the position to force society back in a socialist direction. The complexity of society is acknowledged, a "socialist mixed economy" is declared, and the monolithic character of the earlier vanguard politics begins to fade. As the regime acknowledges the importance of professionalism, expertise, law, international openness and so forth, and tries to include them in an expanded elite, an inevitable tension emerges between the habits of dictatorship of the old party elite and the pressure for autonomy of the new expert elite. For the university students, it is clear that the future lies with the experts, and the future means far more to a twenty-year-old than the past. Moreover, the general public perceives that the new market prosperity is not caused by the state, but merely permitted by it, and that the state's capacity to control the economic and social situation is slipping. There is inadequate regulation of informal activities, increasing crime, increasing official corruption, inadequate public services, and increasing inflation. The complexity of society confronts the public with greater risks as well as greater opportunities, and the cityfolk, the shimin, become critical and restless. The common ground of the political pressures from the elite, students and the public can be described as a desire to constitutionalize the state. The state would provide a defined framework for societal activity rather than being the undefined leader/organizer of everything, and the public would become a collection of citizens, with rights enforced by the state as well as rights protecting them from the state. Western capitalism provides a model for a modern state of this sort, but its historical development was far different from the process at work in communist states.
The open door

The general international pressures on Asian communism should perhaps begin with the open window. China did not become a media society until the completion of the wired radio system in the early 1960s. Before that time were not direct participants in a national information network. The international window did not begin to open until the Deng era, when there was no longer a sense of risk in listening to BBC World Service and Voice of America and the quality of China’s international news reporting improved. Since that time the public response to international news has become a significant aspect of politics. This is evident in the scapegoating of Voice of America for its coverage of Tiananmen and in the tension in China when Ceausescu fell. More generally, it is clear that the politics of all Asian communist regimes since 1989 is reacting not only to the changes in international alignments, but also to the effects of events in Europe on their self-understanding and perception of alternatives.

As important as the informational window is, the relational door has required reorientation. A specific relational dependency was a cornerstone of all Asian communist regimes except China—Mongolia, North Korea and Vietnam on the Soviet Union, and Laos and Cambodia on Vietnam. In each case the dependency has not turned into an antagonism, but it is no longer a dependency. Indeed, in the cases of dependencies on the Soviet Union, there is now barely a relationship. The collapse of the Soviet Union creates a cruel contradiction for its former Asian clients. On the one hand, the collapse demonstrates the dangers of political transformation; on the other, the economic consequences of collapsed dependency force rapid reorientation toward the West in economics and politics. For
Vietnam, the reorientation toward China is more compatible with its party-state structure, but the traditional Vietnamese fear of China makes dependency difficult.

The pressure of the non-communist world on Asian communism has moved from the latent pressure of competition in the 1970s to a desire to emulate the NICs by attracting capitalist investment and participating in the world consumer market. The policy effects of this ambition have already been profound. Special economic zones (SEZ) have been created; the first Chinese SEZs are now more than a decade old. Foreign investment has already become an important part of the Chinese modern economy, and it promises to become even more important for the other Asian communist countries. It may provide welcome relief from the problems caused by the collapse of Soviet dependency. Increases in trade and investment should have a diversifying and moderating effect on regional relations. The new dependency created by openness appears reassuringly diffuse, and in Asia there are models at hand of economic miracles produced by openness—indeed, some of the prominent investors at hand are these nouveaux arrivés. More generally, such economic interdependence increases the cost of domestic suppression; even without interdependence Vietnam was severely hampered by international isolation after the occupation of Cambodia. Openness aids economic and societal diversification, and international attention to specific issues such as human rights plays a direct role in domestic politics.

Not all of the effects of the open door are pleasant. The rosy future is predicated on an expanding world consumer economy in the 1990s, and the effects of a downturn or collapse are usually harshest at the periphery. If the world economy declines then these countries could be stepping onto the treadmill of hard currency debt similar to the one that
Eastern Europe stepped on just before the first oil shock. Moreover, there is a plethora of opportunities for speculative investment in post-communist and developing economies at the moment. China will remain attractive to investment, in part because its major investors include Hong Kong and Taiwan. Even with a favorable investment climate, Vietnam is likely to be cross-pressured in its economic relations, with the north more closely tied to China and the south to Southeast Asia, the NICs and Japan. In the case of the imbalanced and non-competitive economies of North Korea and Mongolia, it is hard to imagine profitable areas of economic investment which would at the same time support existing economic structures.

The fine line between slippery slopes

The implication of the post-revolutionary syndrome and societal complexity is that Asian communist regimes, like their European communist brethren, ineluctably face a challenge of democratizing structural change. Cambodia and Mongolia have already launched themselves into the stream, and their regimes are now at the mercy of popular currents. The now voluminous literature on transitions to democracy is largely irrelevant to Asian communism because it assumes a starting point of generic authoritarianism rather than the much more monistic institution of the party-state, and it assumes a Western goal of multi-party competition rather than an Asian model of constitutional party dominance. The politics of transition in Asian communism has to negotiate a path between four contradictions: first, between the institutional capacity of the party-state and its willingness to take risks; second, between compromise politics and revolutionary politics; third, between the centrality of the
party-state and the vitality of the market; and fourth, between the constitutional equality and political stratification of Asian models.

The first problem is that regimes that are most likely to survive a transition from revolutionary legitimation to democratic legitimation with their structures, policies and leadership basically intact also tend to be most complacent about the status quo. If China in 1987 had not removed Hu Yaobang, but instead launched a gradual but credible program of democratization, I think that the ensuing effective politics of the elite, students and citizens would have presumed party leadership. Perhaps the nature of bureaucratic decision making postpones structural change until there is no incremental alternative, because a structural change faces each official with a greater personal risk. In any case, by the time the demonstrators are at the door and there are no incremental alternatives (because the alternatives become either massive suppression or negotiation) it is difficult to obtain a vote of confidence. The success of the MPRP in Mongolia was impressive, and if the party acts inclusively towards its minority opposition as promised then it might well survive as a one-party post-communist democratic state. In my opinion China and Vietnam still have the capacity to survive a party-led democratic transition, but it will only become more difficult if they wait for a crisis. And the regime strong enough to survive democratization may well be complacent enough to suppress the crisis.

The second contradiction is between the compromise politics which characterizes modern democracy and the revolutionary politics which provides the immediate political culture of both the regime and its challengers. As Tang Tsou argues, revolutionary politics is a winner-take-all game, in which "serious conflicts over the inseparable questions of power
and policy lead to confrontations and, sooner or later, to an outcome in which one side wins, retaining all real power to make decisions, whereas the other side is totally defeated.\textsuperscript{58}

This is a pattern of conflict in which the minimum acceptable concession involves, or is perceived to involve, the virtual surrender of the other side. In the context of regime reform, it was played out most dramatically and tragically at Tiananmen. Revolutionary politics is not only familiar to both the party-state leadership and to potential opposition, it is attractive to each group for different reasons. To the center, it is a familiar game played well, and the toleration of challenge becomes a matter of strategic discretion rather than of rules. The crucial distinction between "contradictions among the people" and "drawing the line between ourselves and the enemy" lies in the hand of the leader. To potential opposition, revolutionary politics is attractive first because the enemy is so powerful and does not allow partial victories, and secondly, given the inevitable lack of organizational discipline, the mass following is attracted by the most extreme spokesperson. Both sides act on the belief that "a single spark can start a prairie fire." Even reform-minded leaders worry that political reform will lead to a conflagration that will not only bring down themselves and the party, but basic political order as well. IN times of crisis even fairly sober oppositionalists will leap to the firey slogan in order to keep in front of the flames.

Modern democracy, however, allows sparks and yet does not become a prairie fire. The political reforms adopted in China and Vietnam in the 1980s have marked modest progress in citizen rights and representative institutions, but not enough to approach democratic legitimation.\textsuperscript{59} The further development of representative institutions, democratization within the party and at the local level of government, and perhaps the adroit
use of plebiscites would be methods of approaching the transition, but these require a strategic determination to democratize.

The third contradiction is between the centrality of the party-state and the vitality of the market. In the 1980s Asian party-states such as China and Vietnam have generated their dynamic by permitting more activity at the periphery and the local level of the economy. To the extent that these policies are successful (as in China especially) they strengthen the regime, and yet they also demonstrate the sluggishness of the state economy. The party-state resembles a feudal monarchy in its relationship to the economy as a whole in that it relies primarily on the earnings of its directly-managed domains (the state economy) and secondarily on its political power to secure contributions from the rest. The market periphery experiences the center as a dead weight and an intervening hand (usually palm up) in its activities, but to some extent it is also a free rider on the socio-economic order created by the center. Under these circumstances an all-periphery economy would produce chaos rather greater efficiency. Without a reliable framework values would be absolutized rather than optimized. It is not easy to create a new center, and the existing center if destroyed is gone forever. The Confederation of Independent States stands as a warning. The problem, then, is not simply to encourage the market economy but to integrate it into a public structure, including regulation and taxation. In a post-communist situation the problem would be to maintain or create central services.

The fourth contradiction lies within the model of Asian democracy as presented by Japan especially. On the one hand, any citizen can organize a political party, and any citizen can win an election. In Przeworski's operationalization of democracy mentioned earlier, any
party can lose. But in fact one party always wins, and the same is true in Taiwan and Singapore. Przeworski bites the logical bullet, and goes on to say that "no country in which a party wins 60 percent of the vote twice in a row is a democracy."\textsuperscript{60} This view is perhaps excessively eurocentric, but it does highlight the fact that the political dynamics of a dominant party system are different from those of a pluralistic system. The formal risk is present, but in fact the system's equilibrium does not lie between two very similar parties, as in the United States, but within the ruling party at some point in policy and personnel that optimizes a comfortable victory. Public opinion and elections still play decisive roles, but indirectly rather than directly. Since the ruling party is expected to organize politics, the structure of its support is different from the support of other parties. Such a model would of course be more reassuring to a communist party facing transition, and it would also correspond to the disparity in structural inclusiveness between a party like the Chinese Communist Party and any imaginable opponent. It is likely that many reformers in Asian communist states would be happy to cross the threshold of constitutional democracy if they were confident that they would be introducing an Asian rather than a Przeworskian democracy.

It is difficult, however, to know whether Asian party-states can get there from here. As T. J. Pempel describes constitutional one-party dominant regimes: "Politics is an ongoing game, and any successful political party constantly eyes the interplay of many mutually reinforcing goals. The dominant party is the one that plays this game well enough to keep itself in power long enough so that it can continue enacting and implementing policies that reinforce its power base."\textsuperscript{61}
The problem for even the strongest party-states is that their hegemony is based on precluding other political alternatives. They are dominant, but they have not yet played the game. The immediate effect and most obvious beneficiary of constitutional reform is the opposition, and the communist party has only to lose once to a revolutionary-minded opposition and it suffers the fate of Humpty-Dumpty. The goal of becoming the establishment democratic party might be attractive enough to party reformers, but the path appears risky. Indefinite liberalization may therefore be more attractive to reformers than democratization. As Gorbachev discovered, the goal lies on the other side of a transitional river whose currents are strong and unpredictable.

Looking back at the underlying problems of Asian communism discussed in this section, the post-revolutionary syndrome, pressures of societal complexity, the open door, and problems of transition, Asian communism looks closer to the situation of the late European communism than the earlier discussion of their economic, international and cultural differences in the first section might suggest. And indeed, the entire communist world is reacting to the same basic problem, namely, that the revolutionary romanticism of Marx, Lenin and their followers prevented an appreciation of the essential diversity and complexity of modern society. Where societies were less modern the problem was less evident, and many societies had problems other than diversity and complexity, for instance, oppression and survival, which were more amenable to revolutionary mobilization. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Leninist revolutionary era is already over for Asia as well as for Europe. Marxism-Leninism no longer functions as a political-historical teleology, and the assumption of economic progress through greater socialization has been abandoned. The revolutionary
vanguard is now the post-revolutionary rearguard, and it is in need of either re legitimation or abandonment.

Conclusion: The Unknowable Future and Knowable Features

Returning to the general questions concerning the fate of Asian communism raised at the beginning of this paper, the argument presented here implies that there is no easy answer or most likely scenario for the future. The regional differences between European and Asian communism discussed in the first section suggest that there is more than simply a difference of lag time between the two. The country variations discussed in the second section evidence a variety of regime capacities and situations, and make impossible a single answer to the question, "what about Asia?" On the other hand, the typology of revolutions suggests that each country is not merely ideosyncratic, and the common challenges explored in the third section imply that Asian communism suffers from the same fermentations that have sprung European communism.

If this is not sufficient discouragement for simple answers, the role of historical conjuncture should be recalled. Europe has already demonstrated that in the case of structural reform of communist regimes unpredictable interactions can be particularly complex. There is a three-ring circus of major actors: the existing leadership, the potential opposition, and the external context. Each of these is different in each country, each changes over time--sometimes abruptly--and each could play an agenda-setting role. The "what if?" game can be played endlessly. What if there had been a successful conservative coup against Gorbachev in January 1991? What if Deng Xiaoping had died on 15 April 1989 instead of Hu Yaobang? What if he had died the week after Ceausescu was deposed? Such questions
illustrate the importance of contingency in history, and the answers as to which contingencies will actually occur do not lie in the tea leaves of structural analysis.

The most important contingency for China and North Korea is that of leadership succession. The timing and circumstances of the deaths, incapacitations or removals of Deng Xiaoping and Kim Il Sung are not of themselves all-determining events, but they will set the timing for decisive political action, and bring into play forces not active in normal politics. Succession scenarios are complicated enough at the level of the individual country, but they become impossibly complex at the regional level. Developments in China would have an immediate impact on its neighbors. It is hard to imagine communist regimes persisting in North Korea or Vietnam if China made a post-communist transition.

Succession is only the most prominent case of the vulnerability of these regimes to political crisis. A sudden confrontation with opposition groups might face any of them with a non-incremental choice of suppression or negotiation, the consequences of which would be profound. Moreover, the strategic alternatives of liberalization or repression change the terms of crisis, but do not eliminate the possibility. Gorbachev and Ceausescu came to the same ashheap by different trajectories.

I can therefore say, with some relief, that the future is unknowable. But it is not random, and the features of Asian communism discussed in this paper will remain important influences and parameters of future developments, whatever direction they might take.

Starting with the economic characteristics of Asian communism, it can be anticipated that rural-urban differences and the magnitude of the rural population lessens popular pressure for participatory politics and raises the salience of maintaining stability and order.
This is a particular advantage for the communist parties of China and Vietnam because of their extensive rural organization. On the other hand, rural attitudes are premised on the lack of effective rural participation, and therefore national politics is likely to be determined in the cities. In nineteenth century France, as Marx noted in the *Eighth Brumaire*, the rural-urban difference led to an oscillation between radical urban republicanism and conservative authoritarian plebiscitarianism.

The prominence of vital issues over quality of life issues suggests that ideologically driven politics should be less influential in Asia. Ironically, this favors the communist parties because they are the establishment; the proponents of Western-style democracy provide the ideological politics of the nineties. But in Mongolia and Cambodia international pressures make it practical for communist parties to become democratic, and the same may well happen in Laos and North Korea.

Stagnation has not been a regional problem in Asia, and economic prosperity strengthens the credibility of the Beijing leadership. However, prosperity has shifted the playing field between center and provinces and between the state and market economies. Like the sorcerer’s apprentice, the forces that Deng Xiaoping brought to life in order to modernize China may prove to be overwhelming. Meanwhile, the economies of Mongolia and North Korea have collapsed as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the politics of both countries are being driven by the scramble for new benefactors. Vietnam is also seriously affected by Soviet collapse, but it is not as destabilized because reforms had been underway since 1986 and economic ties had already been improving with China and with non-communist countries. However, economic prosperity in the nineties might
exacerbate differences between north and south. Cambodia will move from being a pariah economy to an international charity, and one can hope that it will benefit from the transition. Laos faces a milder version of such opportunities as well as the economic attentions of Thailand.

Summarizing the economic situation, all of the Asian communist economies are already in the process of being transformed, whether by prosperity, crisis, or external opportunity. The bottom-line political question whether the existing political and institutional structures can cope with these changes.

The major divide in political viability lies between China and Vietnam on the one hand and Cambodia, Laos, Mongolia, and North Korea on the other. Without reprising the different developments and prospects in each country, the latter group is disadvantaged both by less broadly-based party-states and by the sudden collapse of Soviet aid and trade. Preservation of the current regimes, in whole or in part, will depend on their political luck and skill in dealing with domestic opposition and international pressures. Since there are no well articulated and organized oppositional political forces (the Khmer Rouge being the exception the proves the rule), the non-communist alternative would probably result in a weakening of central government rather than effective leadership in a different direction. Perhaps these countries will be more successful than their European counterparts in maintaining control through transitional politics, but they will have to face responsibility for deep domestic crisis as well as pent up hostility from the authoritarian past.

The current regimes of China and Vietnam are far less likely to be replaced in the foreseeable future. The regimes are stronger, they have been more successful, and it is hard
to imagine what the alternative could be. If they are not replaced, the regimes are likely to
continue their successful strategies of economic and societal liberalization. The question is
whether a generic party authoritarianism dedicated to economic modernization can avoid the
general collapse associated with post-communism, or whether it is simply postponing the
inevitable. The vulnerability of China and Vietnam is twofold. First, can pragmatic party-
states cope with the structural tensions produced by modernization? They will have to coopt
emerging societal and regional forces into the central leadership and provide a new and
credible guiding ideology. Secondly, can the regimes cope with political crisis? Societal
complexity, internationalization, and the looming succession crisis in China create a continual
potential for disturbances, and the nationwide involvement in the Tiananmen demonstrations
shows the wildfire potential of crisis.

If the party-states of China and Vietnam do fall, how far would they fall? On the one
hand, the entire public structure of society, including the existence of a central government,
could be at risk if the communist past were totally rejected. The European post-communist
crisis would indicate that the bigger party-states are, the harder they fall. On the other hand,
in China the focus of post-communism would be on reform in Beijing, and this might give an
initial advantage to regionalism over centralism. In the short term this might be compatible
with continued prosperity, but it might also open up a broad and unexplored field for
domestic uncertainty. In Vietnam, the conflation of northern and national interests that
incites southern regionalism and possibly separatism implies that national disintegration is not
likely to occur without a civil war. The examples of European communism convincingly
illustrate the risks of post-communist collapse, and the specter of collapse should temper the
optimism of reformers within the leadership and of radical critics. Perhaps Asian models of constitutional party-dominant states will begin to play a greater role in the political theory of both reformers and critics.

Returning to the regional perspective, the Eurocentric prejudice that lumps "Asian communism" together does perform a service. Asian party-states have already established a certain distance from their European mentors by proving more durable, but more importantly, the death of "world communism" and of Marxist-Leninist ideology has already made Asian communism less communist and, by default, more Asian. The unique economic, regional and cultural environments of Asian communist countries, their pragmatic leaderships, and their Asian referents and models can be expected to enhance the divergence from Europe, whatever direction the future takes.
Endnotes


2. The unweighted GNP comparison simply averages the figures for each group of countries, while the weighted comparison averages the national figures multiplied by their respective populations and then divided by the group population, thus giving much more weight to the figures for China, the Soviet Union, and Vietnam. These figures are calculated from *The World Fact Book 1990* of the Central Intelligence Agency (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1989), with the per capita GNPs of China and Laos from the World Bank, *World Development Report* (WDR) 1991 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991). The differences among these estimates is enormous. The 1989 per capita GNP for Bulgaria is listed as US$5710 in the *Fact Book*, US$2320 in the WDR, and US$7096 in *PC Globe*4 (Tempe, AZ: PC Globe, Inc., 1990), a popular software database. It is unfortunate that the *Fact Book* did not include an estimate of China's GNP because its estimates are generally much higher than those of the WDR and so the difference alluded to here is exaggerated to an unknown degree by statistical incompatibility. Nevertheless, the figures for European and Asian communism are so disparate that they cannot be explained by incompatibilities or errors of estimate.


8. *WDR 1991*, pp. 258-9. In the same period the daily calory supply of the United Kingdom decreased slightly to 3252 calories without stirring fears of starvation, or even of continental breakfasts.

10. As the World Bank put it on the basis of research in 1980, "China's most remarkable achievement during the past three decades has been to make low-income groups far better off in terms of basic needs than their counterparts in most other poor countries." World Bank, *China: Socialist Economic Development* vol I, p. 11.


13. Mongolia is close to being an exception since it was subject to Soviet political direction from 1921, but the major threat to Mongolia was China, and the reliance on the Soviet Union did not derive from a Cold War environment.


15. For the pleasure of the leisurely reader I quote at length "The Former Age," a little-known poem by Geoffrey Chaucer written in the 1380s, as an eloquent example of the anti-commercial outcries of Western culture:

    A blissful lyf, a paisible and a swete
    Ledden the peples in the former age;...
    Yit nas the ground nat wounded with the plough,
    But corn upspring, unsowe of mannens hond,
    The which they gnoode and eete nat half y-nough;...
    No coyn ne knew man which was fals or trewe;
    No ship yit karf the wawes grene and blewe;...
    Ther lay no profit, ther was no richesse;
    But cursed was the tyme, I dar sel seye,
    That men first dide hir swety besynesse
    To grobbe up metal lurkyng in darknesse,
    And in the ryveres fyrst gemmes soughte;
    Allas! than sprong up al the cursednesse
    Of covetyse that fyrst our sorwe broughte!

    Unforsed was the hauberke and the plate;
    The lambish peple, voyded of alle vyce,
    Hadden no fantasye to debate,
    But ech of hem wolde other wel cheryce;
    No pryde, non envye, non avaryce,
    No lord, no taylage by no tyranye,
    Humblesse, and pes, good feith, the emperice,...
    Allas! Allas! now may men wepe and crye!
For in our dayes nis but covetyse,
And dowlbesse, and tresoun, and envye,
Poysoun, manslaughtyre, and mordre in sondry wyse.


17.This situation is well described by Wolfgang Bauer, China und die Hoffnung auf Glück (Munich: Hanser, 1971), pp. 453-533.


25.The first free parliamentary election in Poland in more than fifty years was held in October 1991. Only 40% of the electorate voted, and the leading party received only 12% of the vote. The party of the prime minister received only 7%, and the leftist party (with communist roots) 12%. Not only is a ruling coalition difficult to build for technical reasons, but, "most of the representatives were elected because of their illusionary promises, not because of their ability to compromise in practical matters. A neurotic desire for public


27. The policies of the PRK government are best described by Michael Vickery, Kampuchea: Politics, Economics and Society (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1986).


30. Inner Mongolia, whose population of 22 million is ten times that of (Outer) Mongolia, is still a province of China.


33. Calculated from Sanders, p. 94.


35. This account of developments is based on Heaton, "Mongolia," pp. 51-56.


37. To quote an American scholar, "[Hon-yong] Pak's anti-colonial communism [primarily in the South] can probably be called the most balanced attempt so far to found a Korean political movement with both high support and strong local roots." Gregory Henderson, Korea: The Politics of the Vortex (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 323.


43. It should be noted that rural areas have fared much better in the 1980s than grain production would indicate because of the expansion of rural industries and crop diversification.

44. China became a grain-importing country in 1961 in response to famine, when its net imports were three percent of production. Since that time net imports have ranged between one and four percent. There has been considerable fluctuation of net grain imports in the 1980s, with both the largest net imports and two years (1985-86) when exports exceeded imports. Calculated from Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian 1984; 1985; 1987; 1988; 1990.


47. Revolutionary legitimacy was least important for Cambodia (after all, it replaced a communist regime that had attempted to achieve communism) and Mongolia, and most important for China. See Brantly Womack, "The Chinese Party-State," Problems of Communism 1990, no. 5 (September-October), pp. 84-92.

48. The leftist of the Cultural Revolution and the activities of the Khmer Rouge from 1975-1979 were fundamentally different in ideology, methods and effects. However, they were similar in their assumption that concerted action led by the party could make possible a leap into a new and different social world.

49. Whether for political or for economic reasons, Nicaragua was much more cautious in its efforts to centralize its economy in the 1980s.

50. Zhao Ziyang, "Advance Along the Road of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics," Beijing Review 30, no. 45 (November 9-15, 1987), pp. 12-49. This was Zhao's report to the 13th Party Congress.

52. Michael Vickery, Kampuchea, pp. 137-146.


55. The tensions of this sort in Europe are well described by Ken Jowitt, "Inclusion and Mobilization in European Leninist Regimes," World Politics 38, no. 1 (October 1975), pp. 69-97.

56. See Womack, ed., Media and the Chinese Public (Armonk: ME Sharpe, 1986). Newspaper circulation increased enormously during the 1950s, but a good part of the population was still illiterate.

57. As a colony of France, Indochina was severely impacted by the economic collapse of the 1930s.


60. Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market, p. 95.


62. Consider the case of Hungary. According to a survey in 1985, 57.3% of the Hungarian population declared themselves fully confident in the national leadership and 30.4 to a great degree. Five years later the reform wing of that leadership did not achieve 10% of the vote, and the more conservative fraction received less than 5%. Janina Frenzel-Zagorska, "Civil Society in Poland and Hungary," Soviet Studies 42:4 (October 1990), 759-777.