are likely to rely more heavily than larger states on cultural and educational policy both internally and externally.

In German schools (in both East and West) it was often said that Germany used to be called 'das Land der Dichter und Denker' ('the country of poets and thinkers'). This conscious emphasis on the importance of culture and ideas to the German identity helps to explain why the SED made such strenuous efforts to control the flow of information inside the GDR. In terms of this comparative study, East Germany is a particularly interesting case because of the division of the German nation. The GDR was the weaker of the two German states created in 1949, and never succeeded in generating substantial democratic or national legitimacy.

The SED was thus in the unique position amongst ruling communist parties in industrialized and literate societies in the communist world – with the possible exception of Estonia – in that it had to operate in what was effectively a pluralistic information environment. Although the SED made strenuous efforts to control the media and the arts, it was unable to prevent the ‘penetration’ of East German society by West German radio and television. With détente and the steady improvement in German–German relations, the GDR authorities also had to deal with the high level of travel and personal contacts between their citizens and West Germans.

Not only did the SED have to develop cultural and communications policies which could contain – if not counter – these persistent and irresistible pressures from the ‘capitalist West’, from the mid-1980s onwards they also had to respond to the challenges posed by glasnost in the Soviet Union. The reform programme of Mikhail Gorbachev, with its call for more openness and democratization, struck at the very heart of the SED’s system of political and ideological control. Ultimately the collapse of the GDR and Hungarian communist states as viable entities was the result of the Party’s inability to contain the twin pressures arising from ‘double penetration’ – namely, the increasingly more visible example of a functioning pluralist democracy in West Germany, and the pressure for radical reform emanating from the very heart of the ‘world socialist community’, the Soviet Union. What was left as communist states were Asian regimes that made their own revolutions – China and Vietnam. As the Soviet Union abandoned Communist Party rule, what became clear was that states find their own paths to reform in that large measure reflect their own political, economic, military and social culture.

FOREIGN POLICY IDEOLOGY

Judy Batt, Margot Light, Adrian Hyde-Price, Gerald Segal and Brantly Womack

Ideology is an imprecise word. It is often used to refer to both the intellectual framework in which reality is interpreted and the official explanation or justification given for behaviour. Of course, an explanation of behaviour itself presents an interpretation of reality, and in an ideal world the official, public view of reality and the ‘real’ view of reality would coincide. Public justifications would match private thoughts. But even among individuals, and certainly among nations, the correspondence between intellectual framework and official explanation is often less than complete.

In an attempt to introduce more precision in the use of the word, one might reserve the term ‘ideology’ for the general intellectual frame of reference, and use the term ‘orthodoxy’ for the official explanation or justification of policy. Psychological explanations, rational actor models, Zeitgeist, and so forth all attempt to establish the intellectual orientations of actors. Orthodoxy can be considered a part of ideology, and official texts are an important source of information concerning ideological orientation, but for the understanding of orthodoxy, the interpretation of official texts is the principal methodology. In practice, however, the term ideology is not so narrowly defined. Ideology is often used to refer to general philosophical assumptions as well as doctrine guiding specific policies. In short, ideology has a philosophical, programmatic and behavioural function. The central problem is the relationship between theory and practice, as Stalin noted, ‘theory, comrades, is lagging behind practice’. In the analysis that follows we have found it impossible to impose a simple definition of ideology. As we are essentially interested in the relationship between changing theory and changing practice, we have little choice but to use the term in a flexible way. In any case, ideology never has been static, and in an analysis of reform such as we are undertaking, it is precisely this process of change which lies at the heart of our study.

We have chosen to assess the reform of ideology at the end of this study, when it is common practice to do so much earlier in a work of this kind.
Our choice was in part determined by the fact that in so many of the reforms we assessed, theory usually followed practice. Thus, by taking ideology at the end, it is also possible to use this section as a form of conclusion that pulls together many of the economic, security and cultural aspects of reform. Because ideology became so closely intertwined with practice, the final two sections reviewing the role of domestic factors and the international system serve as a sort of conclusion to the entire study and therefore tend to stray quite often from more narrow definitions of ideology.

Many methodologies can be used to interpret ideology. For example, the problem of analysing Vietnamese foreign policy ideology in terms of openness is perhaps best illustrated by the first few lines of the Declaration of Independence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, proclaimed by Ho Chi Minh in Hanoi on 2 September, 1945: 'All men are created equal. They are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights; among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.' Of course, Ho attributes these lines to the American Declaration of Independence, and goes on to quote the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen. The structure of the Declaration is modelled on the American one, with the major part being the detailing of the 'Tran of Abuses. The language is not always Jeffersonian ('They have made it impossible for our national bourgeoisie to prosper; they have mercilessly exploited our workers'), but the concept of the document is more American than it is Russian, Chinese or Vietnamese.

The distinction between ideology and orthodoxy is especially useful in analysing the behaviour of communist regimes. The official commitment to Marxism–Leninism in general, and to a current vocabulary of accepted arguments, cliches and terminology, means that the official explanation of foreign policy is constrained in its articulation. Given the state monopoly of media, orthodoxy dominates the public discussion of foreign policy. Changes in orthodoxy may seem minute or tedious to the external observer, and breakthroughs in orthodoxy might not occur at the same time as significant policy changes.

Due to Lenin's famous distinction between strategy and tactics, Marxism–Leninism is especially flexible as an orthodoxy. In his work *Left-Wing Communism, An Infantile Disorder*, Lenin rejects criticism that he has been too 'unprincipled' in compromising with enemies, and argues that anyone who shrank from necessary compromises was deficient in their courage and commitment to Marxism. In an impressive dialectical leap, total strategic commitment justified total tactical flexibility.

Flexibility of official behaviour and justifications is especially evident in foreign policy, with perhaps the most famous case being the Hitler–Stalin pact. Moreover, many tactical manoeuvres or inconvenient aspects of foreign policy are often simply not officially acknowledged, for instance, party-to-party relations which may be at cross purposes with state-to-state relations. Duplicity and hypocrisy are hardly the monopoly of communist governments, but their orthodoxy has often been a bewildering mixture of doctrinaire strategy and pragmatic tactics, loosely tethered to reality by taut assumptions.

Despite its instrumental flexibility, Marxism–Leninism as an orthodoxy sets a pattern of public discourse which predisposes policy toward those options which conform to the orthodoxy. Orthodoxy is not a straitjacket for policy because there are always a variety of possible interpretations of official doctrine. The process of bending and stretching the orthodoxy to fit a new policy direction is an important part of policy development and consolidation. This process of orthodoxy adjustment is particularly evident in domestic policy, but it can be seen in foreign policy as well.3

In the case of the East European states, the role of orthodoxy was usually also crucially involved with the maintenance of their subordination to the Soviet Union, although precisely the opposite was true in the case of Romania. In these circumstances, it is much easier to distinguish between an orthodoxy and some alternative 'real' definition of the national interest, historical-cultural traditions or free choice of the people than, for example, in the Soviet Union, China or even Vietnam. In the Soviet, Chinese and Vietnamese cases, Marxist–Leninist ideology was intermingled with indigenous factors and the revolutions certainly seemed to be more home-grown than in Eastern Europe, or even to some extent North Korea. Until recently the Communist Party could, with some credibility, claim responsibility for the achievements of the country since the revolutions. In other words, the suggestions of artificiality, irrationality and coercion implicit in the definition of ideological orthodoxy used here come through much more clearly in the East European context.

If the role of orthodoxy thus has some different dimensions in Eastern Europe, the content of ideology also has a specific emphasis, especially in the field of foreign policy. The key ideological issue in foreign policy from the point of view of the East European communist regimes except the GDR was not so much the nature of 'imperialism' and the global class conflict; these elements were present, but had little significance other than as ritualistic signals of obedience to the Soviet leadership. The only really living issue in foreign policy ideology for most East European regimes (with the notable exception of the GDR and Czechoslovakia after 1969) was the question of the regimes' latitude for pursuing autonomous policy objectives, whether in the domestic or in the foreign field, independently of the Soviet Union and diverging from the Soviet 'model'. East European communist regimes were driven by two incompatible objectives, the tension between which lay behind every major crisis in the post-war period and was eventually only resolved by their collapse. On the one hand, the imperative of conformity to the orthodoxy as defined and imposed by the Soviet Union (which was required as much for their own survival as for the maintenance of Soviet
control) and, on the other hand, the imperative of maximizing their room for manoeuvre by adapting or evading the dictates of that orthodoxy in order to win some credibility with their own populations and to mitigate the costs of implementing the grossly inefficient and inappropriate Soviet political and economic ‘model’. The peculiarities of the position of ideology in this situation has been captured by Maria Markus, who made the distinction between ‘overt’ and ‘covert’ modes of legitimation in Eastern Europe. The formal tenets of Marxist-Leninist ideology played no real role in the domestic legitimation of the regime, but their ritualistic regurgitation at public events served to remind everyone of ‘geopolitical reality’, i.e. the supposedly immutable fact of the country’s subordination to the Soviet Union. On the other hand, by demonstrating some autonomy from Moscow, the regimes could hope to win some sort of popular support or approval as practitioners of the ‘art of the possible’ or ‘pragmatic realists’. This ‘covert’ legitimation strategy is most closely associated with the Kadar regime in Hungary, although in the early 1980s, Honecker toyed with a similar course for the GDR.

Of course, the ideological environment of communism in China and Vietnam has been radically different from that of European communism from its beginnings. None of the East Asian communist states suffered from the same tensions that the East Europeans endured. Certainly after the Sino-Soviet split China emerged as a more independent ideological pole which gave the North Koreans and the Vietnamese both problems and possibilities in manoeuvring between their great power allies. The comparison between the East European and East Asian experiences reveals so many differences that it is striking that Marxism-Leninism could appeal to political forces in such different contexts. Part of the explanation, of course, is that the focus of Marxism-Leninism was shifted in each environment.

European Marxism was the product of an indigenous intellectual and political heritage. It considered itself the culmination as well as the rejection of European capitalism. Russia was half in and half out of the European world, both intellectually and culturally, but there too a sense of European consanguinity pervaded Leninist ideology, if not Stalinist practice. By contrast, the indigenous cultures and ideologies of China and Vietnam were ratted by contact with the West, and the appeal of communism in Asia relied on its anti-imperialism, its proven effectiveness in the October Revolution, and the Comintern’s willingness to support indigenous radicals. The critique of capitalism was largely irrelevant, but the support of a worldwide, both intellectually and culturally, but there too a sense of European consanguinity pervaded Leninist ideology, if not Stalinist practice. By contrast, the indigenous cultures and ideologies of China and Vietnam were ratted by contact with the West, and the appeal of communism in Asia relied on its anti-imperialism, its proven effectiveness in the October Revolution, and the Comintern’s willingness to support indigenous radicals. The critique of capitalism was largely irrelevant, but the support of a worldwide movement was vital. As Clifford Geertz has observed, in times of cultural upheaval, ideology replaces accepted traditions as a framework of significance for social action. In the intellectual and political rubble of failed Confucianism, Asia needed an ‘ism’, not just pragmatic politics.

As a result, for China (and to a lesser extent for Vietnam) it was the self-confidence of Marxism as a science and the effectiveness of Party organization that mattered, not the dogmatic details. Ideological factionalism was much less prevalent than in Europe. Compared to Lenin, the writings of Mao Zedong and Ho Chi Minh are relatively free of intra-revolutionary polemics. Communism provided a focus for heroism and self-sacrifice, a new spiritual centre for a world turned upside down. Marxism-Leninism was more important in the total orientation it provided than in its doctrinal specifics.

The best example of doctrinal flexibility in Asian communism was also its defining experience, namely rural revolution. It would not be too extreme to say that rural revolution—the surrounding of the city by the countryside—was antithetical to Marx’s idea of the purpose of a Communist Party. It is explicable in Marxist-Leninist categories, but it arose from the practical needs of survival. Practice came before theory, but practice required the ideological certainty of the science of Marxism-Leninism, however irrelevant its details, and the heroic, mass-oriented elitism of the revolutionary party, however weak its proletarian consciousness. The eventual revolutionary victories were, of course, attributed to the correctness of communist ideology and Party leadership. But the reality of why the revolution succeeded was more complex. More importantly, the assumption of ideological and organizational correctness misled the post-revolutionary regimes into adopting Stalinist policy goals and a totalitarian Party-state structure. Because the revolutions were incommensurately more complete in China and Vietnam than in Eastern Europe, Stalinism was applied more effectively, in both its strengths and its weaknesses. Because the revolutions were more rooted in popular struggle, the inevitable problems of Stalinism led to more internal ferment within the Party-state, even though the party and its orthodoxy could not be questioned.

There are also subtle but basic differences between the world outlook and subsequent foreign policy ideology of China and Vietnam compared to that of the Soviet Union. Before the October Revolution Lenin assumed that revolution in the era of imperialism was necessarily world revolution. As the reality of ‘socialism in one country’ became apparent, the tasks of foreign policy became those of coping with the capitalist world and fostering revolutionary movements. The centrality and world-historical significance of the Soviet Union was clear, and the world to be dealt with was unexpectedly familiar.

By contrast, the world consciousness of the Chinese and Vietnamese Communist Parties was formed while they were children of the Comintern. They had a stronger spirit of teamwork within the socialist camp and a more problematic sense of their own individual world-historical identity and significance. Unlike Lenin, Mao and Ho did not expect capitalism to
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collapse at their success, but they did anticipate that their victories would represent major changes in the balance of forces between capitalism and socialism, and that the socialist world would hold together under Soviet leadership. International disillusionment and searching for new world roles seems to be a larger part of the Asian experience than it was for the Soviet Union, at least until recently.

In sum, when it came time for various communist states to reform their foreign policy ideology, they did so in distinctive ways in keeping with their particular conditions. And yet, given what lies at the core of their shared ideology, it was also reasonable to suppose that at least some features of the reform process might also be shared. An ideology that focused on class struggle and a hostile view of the capitalist world, might well be expected to undergo reform that included less class struggle. As a result, war between the opposing ideologies would not necessarily be inevitable and there might then be less reason to support struggles for national liberation. The reform of ideology might also include a greater acceptance of international interdependence both in the realms of security and economics. Of the six countries identified in our study, five (all except North Korea) underwent at least a degree of reform of ideology. The specific nature and pace of those reforms depended both on national distinctiveness and reactions to trends in the international system.

THE COURSE OF REFORM

The beginning of the reform of Soviet foreign policy ideology was amongst the earliest of the changes that took place after Mikhail Gorbatchev became general secretary of the CPSU. It soon gathered pace and became known universally as the "new political thinking". Some aspects of new thinking pre-date the Gorbatchev reforms and can even be traced to the limited reform of the Khrushchev era. With regard to the Third World, for example, the new political thinking subsumed work that Soviet theorists had already begun to do in the 1970s, questioning previous assumptions about the nature of underdevelopment and the prospects for socialist development in the Third World. Other aspects of the new thinking could also be traced back to the late 1970s and early 1980s, if not earlier. It can be argued that the process of formulating the new political thinking turned out to be merely a transition to a complete abandonment of 'socialist foreign policy'. Nonetheless, it remains important to trace how the new theory made its impact on the conduct and content of Soviet policy in the late 1980s.

By 1987 it had become clear that Soviet foreign policy ideology had grown more open to the influence of ideas from other schools of thought, although Soviet theorists did not always acknowledge the extent of this influence. Moreover, the frequency with which Marxist-Leninist classics

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were cited in support of new concepts suggested, at least initially, a more closed system of thought than the ideas themselves convey. Ideological reform was phased in, or in another metaphor, when you learn to swim you begin by holding on to the sides of the pool.

Similarly, Chinese foreign policy reform has roots well before the 'official' date of reform in 1978. In its first two decades after 1949, Chinese foreign policy contained a number of divergent initiatives, some of which, under different circumstances, might conceivably have led to a more open international policy. But as it happened, the change in Chinese foreign policy towards openness occurred in two long, overlapping phases, the first lasting from 1970 to 1982, and the second beginning in 1978 and lasting to the present.

The first phase was based on a tacit and pragmatic rejection of the leftist dogmatism and idealism that had briefly held sway in the Cultural Revolution. The basic tenets of China's orthodoxy were that the back of American imperialism had been broken by the war in Vietnam, that the social imperialism of the Soviet Union therefore became the principal contradiction of Chinese foreign policy, and that China should form a broad united front as possible against the Soviet Union. Behind the orthodoxy lay the realizations that China's new world revolution of leftist was stillborn, that the Soviet Union posed a real threat to Chinese security, especially if it could collaborate with the United States, that Japan could also pose a major problem, and that the Vietnam War had for the first time created the opportunity for a non-hostile relationship with the United States.

The second phase grew out of the tactical successes of the first. Initially more of an attitude than an ideology, it wanted to grasp the opportunities for making China rich and powerful presented by increasing openness. Given the general relaxation of orthodox tension after the death of Mao, considerable pragmatic experimentation was allowed. The eventual orthodoxy was that modernization and openness are linked, and that China should pursue its national interests in an essentially peaceful world environment. Despite the strains of the June 1989 massacre, this is still China's foreign policy orthodoxy.

The smaller states also reformed their foreign policy ideology (except North Korea) but they did so in very different ways. Hungary, which undoubtedly explored the possibilities of reform well before anyone else, always remained haunted by the lessons of 1956 and the knowledge that there were limits to any reform that could be imposed from Moscow if they were not self-imposed first. And yet, Hungary did find some room for a new openness in foreign policy ideology. Even the GDR found some space of its own, only to decide for its own reasons to close down as the risks to the system from openness became too great. Vietnam, which learned its reform of foreign policy ideology from both China and the Soviet Union, had more freedom of manoeuvre than the East Europeans, but adopted reform much
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later. After the revolutionary events of 1989 in Eastern Europe, the perils of ideological reform appeared all the more stark to those communist regimes which clung to power.

National security

Criticism of the old and formulation of new concepts of national security are amongst the most far-reaching of the changes in foreign policy ideology. Since time immemorial, according to a prominent Soviet foreign policy official, most countries have defined national security in terms of territorial integrity and the inviolability of the state. Under the 'old' thinking in the Soviet Union, however, national security was also interpreted as the defence of the 'achievements of socialism'. What this really meant was defence of the Stalinist model of socialism. And far from enhancing Soviet national security, it undermined it. A dichotomous view of a world divided into two opposing camps prevailed, helping to cause dangerous confrontation. Once the two superpowers acquired vast arsenals of nuclear weapons, conflict between the two camps became potentially catastrophic. But even when the arms control process began, the principle of parity dominated the policy of both superpowers because neither could conceive of security in anything other than military and technical terms.19

According to the new political thinking in all reforming states, security could not be assured by military means alone. Nor could it be achieved by individual states. In the nuclear age, the national security of individual states depended upon international security. Since security was indivisible and interdependent, it either applied to all states or to none. In essence, it was a political problem, requiring political solutions. It therefore demanded some understanding of the interests of other states, mutual trust, flexible foreign policies and the recognition that conflict and tension were caused by economic, political and humanitarian disagreements as well as by military confrontation. The number of nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction must urgently be reduced.13 From the Soviet perspective it was also important to de-ideologize international relations, although China and Vietnam took this reform much less far. Yet all reformers could agree that more attention must be paid to the cooperative aspects of peaceful coexistence and less to the competition between social and political systems.14

In the process of working out the meaning of security in a nuclear age, and the means by which it can be achieved, Soviet and Chinese policymakers re-evaluated their acceptance of Lenin's theory that war was inevitable and of the Clausewitzian dictum that war was the continuation of politics by other means. Lenin and succeeding generations of political theorists believed that just wars (for example, wars in defence of socialism or wars of national liberation) should be distinguished from unjust wars (fought in pursuance of aggressive aims). The former were deserving of support, the latter were sometimes to be resisted and always to be condemned. But the logic of nuclear weapons and the risks of nuclear war between the superpowers led the Soviet Union, first under Khrushchev, and more clearly under Brezhnev, to reject the idea that war was inevitable and to sever the connection between war and politics. The Sino-Soviet split was in part because Peking disagreed with the comrades in the Kremlin about this subject, although by the early 1980s China also came to the same conclusion. When China finally changed its official view (its actual policy on nuclear weapons was always more circumspect than its declaratory policy), there was general agreement amongst Soviet and Chinese policymakers and analysts that the huge destructive power of nuclear weapons made it impossible to consider military force the continuation of politics. Nuclear war could not be a rational means of policy since there was no political aim that could justify the use of nuclear weapons. Moreover, the distinction between just and unjust wars no longer had any meaning.15

As we will see later, this aspect of the new political thinking had a profound impact on Soviet relations with Third World regimes which were engaged in fighting insurgencies. But a more immediate effect concerned the Soviet determination to retain nuclear parity and the belief in the efficacy of stockpiling nuclear weapons. The new thinkers maintained that the sheer number of nuclear weapons owned by both sides in the nuclear balance undermined international security. Although the threat of a pre-mediated nuclear attack abated, there was an increasing danger that nuclear war could become the terrible consequence of an escalating crisis or, worse still, the unintended outcome of an accident.16 At first Soviet policymakers and theorists called for a reduction in the level of military confrontation between the two superpowers and their respective military alliances, while 'preserving the principle of military and strategic parity at all stages'.17 Gradually, however, the idea of war prevention (rather than preparation for possible war) began to dominate Soviet thinking. Soviet strategists began to formulate new strategic doctrines based on the concepts of 'reasonable sufficiency' (that is, sufficient arms for the purposes of defence, but insufficient to permit an offensive attack) and 'defensive defence'. Although civilian analysts and military strategists disagreed about the details of what this meant,18 the seriousness of Soviet intentions was reflected in the progress made in nuclear and conventional arms control negotiations, as well as in the unilateral cuts in soldiers and arms announced by Gorbachev at the United Nations in December 1988.19

The new thinking about security influenced Soviet attitudes to regional conflicts. Classical Marxist-Leninist theory held that conflict was endemic in class society. Once socialist states came into existence, the antagonism between classes was transposed to conflict between the states that represented those classes. It was historically determined that the conflict
between classes within societies would lead to socialist revolution. Conflicts between national liberation movements and colonial powers were also inevitable and socialists should support national liberation movements in their just struggle against their colonial occupying powers. There was, it was thought, a 'natural' alliance between national liberation and socialism.

After decolonization, Soviet policy-makers tended to support both Third World governments fighting separatist movements and the socialist-oriented governments that had opted for non-capitalist development. The conflicts in which these governments were involved were considered to be part of the national liberation struggle. It was taken for granted that if the United States was involved in the conflict, the Soviet Union should support the other side. Soviet policy-makers and theorists came to to classify national liberation struggles as regional conflicts. They recognized that regional conflicts were potentially very dangerous. One reason for this was that they frequently occurred between factions that were allied to different superpowers. As a result, the superpowers could easily be drawn in. There was always the danger, therefore, that they would escalate into indirect or even direct superpower conflict. At times of East-West tension, any conflict between the superpowers could turn into nuclear confrontation and become very dangerous. Another reason why regional conflicts were hazardous was their propensity to spread. Local conflicts not only had a tendency to spill over from one issue to another (economic conflict can easily escalate to military confrontation, for example) but they were also inclined to spread geographically. They were therefore unlikely to remain local.

These inherent dangers made it essential that regional conflicts were resolved before they became violent. And where violence has already erupted, every effort must be made to find a political resolution acceptable to the disputing parties that will end the violence. Political settlements entailed patient negotiation to achieve national reconciliation, the formation of coalition governments and, if necessary, international guarantees to prevent external intervention. Because of their status and power, according to proponents of the new political thinking, the great powers had a combined responsibility to cooperate in the search for durable political solutions to regional conflicts.

It is clear that Soviet experience of involvement in Third World conflicts was a major reason for the new thinking about how to resolve them. By 1985 Soviet aims in Afghanistan were no closer to being achieved than they had been immediately after the intervention in 1979. Moreover, there were still armed conflicts in Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Cambodia and Nicaragua. The new Soviet leadership realized that Third World socialist-oriented governments could not defeat domestic insurgencies by military means. In fact, the Reagan Doctrine (the promise by the Reagan adminis-
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The next 50 to 100 years or so, beginning from now, will be a greater era of radical change in the social system throughout the world, an earth-shaking era without equal in any previous historical period. Living in such an era, we must be prepared to engage in great struggles which will have many features different in form from those of the past.27 World upheaval without leftist transformation inspired by China was a more sober prospect. Although US imperialism had 'tumbled down from its zenith' and Soviet social imperialism was 'heading for total bankruptcy at an accelerated pace', China still considered war a realistic possibility in January 1970 and pledged that China and the PLA would do their part.

On 20 May 1970 Chairman Mao himself struck a more optimistic note in a statement supporting Norodom Sihanouk against the recently established Lon Nol regime. 'The danger of a new world war still exists, and the people of all countries must get prepared. But revolution is the main trend in the world today.'28 Along with Mao's remark that 'a weak nation can defeat a strong, a small nation can defeat a big',29 the message was that pragmatism rather than paranoia would govern China's adjustment to the post-Cultural Revolutionary world, and that its continued support of revolutionary movements would be tempered by the convenient optimism that they could and should win their own revolutions. Mao's statement was constantly quoted over the next few years to justify pragmatic policy moves which repaired and greatly extended China's official and unofficial contact with the rest of the world.

It is clear that China's change in foreign policy ideology in the early 1970s was motivated by a sense of danger. The border skirmishes with the Soviet Union were the most obvious sign, but they also highlighted the more serious danger of a superpower alliance to contain China. Moreover, the possibility of a remilitarization of Japan in alliance with the United States was of itself a sufficient inducement to diplomatic activity. Given China's judgement that the United States had lost the war in Vietnam, it was dangerous for China if the United States premised its post-Vietnam diplomacy on hostility toward China. Fortunately, the imaginative opportunism of Nixon and Kissinger met the apprehensive pragmatism of Mao and Zhou.

Although the shift in foreign policy ideology which lay behind the new openness in the 1970s was based on the tacit acknowledgement of the failure of the Cultural Revolution, it remained premised on the eventual success of Third World revolutionary movements and on the ultimate failure of imperialisms and hegemonisms of all sorts. Although one might not expect the notion that small countries can defeat big ones to be comforting to the largest country in the world, it justified a new world role for China as leader of the Third World. Certainly China had made impressive efforts in this direction before the Cultural Revolution, most notably at

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the Bandung Conference in 1955, but by the 1970s China was 'within the system' at the UN, China still had friends and enemies, but it had relations with its enemies.

The major statement of the new orthodoxy of this first phase of reform was Deng Xiaoping's speech at the UN in 1974 on the 'theory of the three worlds'. In contrast to Lin Biao's 1965 speech on people's war,30 it was a theory of world alignment, but not a call for world revolution. China now saw itself as part of the Third World which, in cooperation with the developed world of Europe (minus the Soviet Union) and Japan could take on the First World of the two superpowers. Indeed, the Albanians later cited this speech as a prime example of Chinese revisionism which caused their break from China. In this framework China became a model Third World country struggling against the hegemonism of the superpowers (and also against regional hegemonists like India and later Vietnam) while uniting with the middle range countries such as in Europe.

However, even as early as 1979 the three world framework did not really fit Chinese foreign policy. China had decided that the Soviet Union was the real threat, the principal contradiction, because the United States had broken its teeth on Vietnam while Soviet social imperialism was still expanding. This justified seizing whatever opportunities presented themselves for expanding relations with the West and gave China a special link with anti-communist right-wing elements. The anti-Soviet excitement reached its height in 1978 when China felt itself encircled by the Soviet Union on one side and Vietnam on the other. Xu Xiangqian's Army Day speech of 1978 was perhaps the strongest statement of the anti-Soviet position.31 He claimed that war with the Soviet Union was inevitable, the only question was when and under what circumstances. Anyone hoping for world peace was simply deluding themselves. Therefore it was necessary to organize an alliance of all possible forces against the Soviet Union.

The idea of an anti-Soviet world united front was an outcome of complex ideological strands. First, it was consistent with the attitude of world tension and struggle characteristic of the Cultural Revolution. The revisionist enemy remained the same. Second, the border clashes of 1969 were a sobering experience, and it was a realistic assessment that, given the United States' failure in Vietnam, the Soviet Union was the more likely threat. Third, it gave a much brighter green light to collaboration with the United States than did the three worlds theory by itself. United front logic casts its net as wide as possibly and mutes its criticism of allies.

By 1982 China had adjusted its international ideology to one based on national competition within a stable international framework and to an equidistant relationship with the superpowers. Openness, both domestic and foreign, is much more comfortable with the assumption of peace than it is with the assumption of war. War requires mobilization and centralization, and its logic of alliances is a narrow one. Were it not for the
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Revitalisation of the image of Soviet imperialism by the invasion of Afghanistan, the orthodoxy of the anti-Soviet alliance would have undoubtedly faded much faster. As it was, Sino-Soviet normalization was held up until 1989 by the ‘three obstacles’ but the shift to a foreign policy based on effective neutrality between the superpowers was completed by 1982. By the time Deng Xiaoping coined the term ‘China’s second revolution’ in 1986, China’s wealth and power was supposed to contribute to world peace rather than world victory.

The strength to check war will increase greatly if China attains its development target by the end of the century. When, in another 50 to 50 years, China approaches the standard of the developed countries, it will be more difficult for war to break out: Not, of course, quite impossible, but more difficult. . . . China, pursuing an independent foreign policy, is unattached to any group and unlinked strategically with any country. Chinese development helps the people of the world.

Although Deng’s smugness is almost as disquieting as the content of his message is reassuring. It had come a long way from 1978 condemnations of the dream of world peace. In the 1980s even disarmament became a major aspect of Chinese foreign policy.

The key characteristic of the reform of Chinese foreign policy ideology was non-alignment. Equidistance with the superpowers is the most important corollary, but non-alignment also implies that China does not build regional blocs of allies. China’s pattern of alliances is an interesting one, and it certainly includes a number of old friends and old enemies. But in general China has not used its increasing clout to deal ever more punishing blows to its enemies. To take the most difficult example, although Vietnam was threatened with ‘a second lesson’ and China supported the Khmer Rouge, its hostile activities were usually linked to Vietnamese actions, and in recent years relations have improved significantly.

Indeed, China and the Soviet Union have not been alone in having to reform their ideology dealing with smaller states. Vietnam stands out as a special case of a smaller communist state which had occupied a neighbour partly in pursuit of national security. As Vietnam reformed its foreign policy ideology, as in the case of the Soviet Union, it reassessed key elements of security. The result was a more open Vietnamese ideology, but one that was open in distinctive ways.

Vietnam backed into reform in 1986 by learning, slowly and painfully, the limits of victory in both domestic and international realms. The domestic process of decontrol and state retreat began in necessity in 1980 and proceeded in a zigzag until the Sixth Party Congress in 1986. In foreign policy, the announcement of unilateral withdrawal from Cambodia was a decisive step, but it could still have led to a different outcome until Vietnam

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decided that it must rely on a foreign policy of peace and openness, a decision that can be dated from 1986. Vietnam was no longer insistent on setting its own terms for openness. Increasingly, it began to search for terms acceptable to a hostile and rather uninterested world. Vietnam’s self-consciousness gradually descended from that of revolutionary victor to that of a poor, isolated nation in need of peace, friends and help. It gradually realized that it had become ‘independent, all too independent.’

At the global level, Vietnam’s foreign policy ideology had to adjust from revolutionary optimism to post-revolutionary realism. The defeat of the United States did not mean a victory for socialism. Siding with the Soviet Union had the effect of putting Vietnam in an isolated, hostile and dependent situation. And with the change in Soviet global ideology announced at Vladivostok on 28 July 1986, the Vietnamese had no choice but to praise the Soviet peace initiative and to adjust their own policies accordingly. The unadmitted but evident tensions between the Soviet Union and Vietnam concerning Cambodian policy and the utilization of Soviet aid to Vietnam must have been sobering for Vietnam’s world perspective. On the brighter side, Soviet peace efforts lowered the derivative hostility of the US and China toward Vietnam as a Soviet client.

For other smaller communist states, the pressures for reform also had a great deal to do with changes in pressure from the great powers. Hungary had perhaps the longest experience of any smaller state in seeking reforms of ideology. After 1956, for six years the key aim of Hungarian foreign policy was to ‘normalize’ its international position by getting the Hungarian question removed from the UN agenda and by gaining readmission to UN membership. This was achieved in 1962, a year which in many respects was a watershed in Hungarian politics, arguably the starting point of ‘Kadarism’ proper. Up to that time, Hungarian politics were totally dominated by the Soviet Union, with Soviet ‘advisers’ running the apparatus of Party and state, the Party itself having collapsed in 1956 and having to be slowly and painfully rebuilt thereafter from a base comprising less than 5 per cent of the original membership, most of whom inevitably were rigid Stalinists. But by 1962, the domestic situation was deemed to have been ‘consolidated.’ Khrushchev gave his backing to Kadar for a change of tack. The change was summed up by Kadar’s well-known slogan, enunciated at the VIII Congress of the HSWP in that year, ‘He who is not against us is with us.’ The conciliatory tone of this had implications both for domestic and international policy. ‘Peaceful coexistence’ of the Hungarian communist regime with its own population and with the wider international society was the order of the day. The concept of ‘peaceful coexistence’ was characteristically Khrushchevite. Kadar was thus in the fortunate position at this time of being able to harmonize his preferred flexible, pragmatic reformist course in domestic politics with loyalty to the international line set by the Soviet Union.
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After the removal of Khrushchev, this juggling act became more complicated, but until 1968, the absorption of the Soviet Union in its own internal political struggles allowed enough room for manoeuvre in Eastern Europe. Yet when the Czech Communist Party thought it was enough simply to assure the Soviet Union of the dominant position of the Party, in fact they were taking ideology too seriously in dealing with the Soviet Union. As Kadar asked Dubcek in exasperation immediately before the Soviet intervention in August 1968: "Do you really not know the kind of people you’re dealing with?" Ultimately, it was not the overt tenets of socialist ideology that guided Soviet policy but great power interests.

Kadar appreciated this not only because of his own country’s bitterly illuminating experience, but also because of his own mental make-up, which was profoundly un-ideological in the sense that he was completely immune to the type of intellectual enthusiasm which had spawned both the Stalinist fanaticism of Rakosi and the naive socialist revivalism of both Imre Nagy and the Czech reform communists. He accepted the basic tenets of Soviet orthodoxy without question, and was simply not interested in developing or ‘renewing’ them, nor was he troubled by their internal inconsistencies. There is no reason to doubt the sincerity of Kadar’s commitment to ‘socialism’, but his understanding of the content of this concept seems to have been very broad and general. On the one hand, it meant for him the realization of material welfare, security and a steadily rising level of consumption for the mass of the people. On the other, as he frequently repeated, it was inseparable from loyalty to the Soviet Union. The characterization of Kadar as the quintessential ‘Khruzhchevite’ is thus very appropriate.36 It is not the case that policy-making under Kadar abandoned ideology and became guided by wholly pragmatic considerations — the limits of Kadar’s own pragmatism and ideological flexibility were fully exposed in the 1980s. In fact, remarkably little development of the content of the ideology took place under Kadar. What did occur was the unspoken shift of ideological orthodoxy from centre stage. It was something that could be, if not dropped, at least laid aside when the occasion demanded, and when this served some practical benefit.

The ‘natural’ or logical foreign policy ideology of Kadarism seems to have been ‘peaceful coexistence’ and later détente. But until the beginning of the 1980s, when Kadar’s grip on the HSWP, and the whole edifice of the ‘Kadar compromise’ in Hungarian politics, began to come adrift, this policy was never pursued in opposition to the prevailing foreign policy line of the Soviet Union. Although clearly there are parallels and connections between the reformism of domestic policy and the pursuit of international détente, it would be misleading in the Hungarian case to explain the coincidence of the two in the 1970s in terms of a profound and coherent ideological linkage. Foreign policy ideology, at least in its orthodox sense under Kadar, was merely the reflection of Soviet foreign policy ideology at any given time, and had no genuine life or role of its own. In fact, the dissonance between the relatively imaginative domestic course and the subservience of foreign policy was frequently remarked in the 1970s. The contrast was often made with Romania, which combined the most primitive form of ‘personality cult’ with the most adventurous and independent foreign policy.37 The implication was that absolute external conformity was the price to be paid for the domestic reformism. In fact, it was not such a high price, since it is not clear either that Kadar wanted to break out in a different direction in foreign policy anyway, or that there was much that could have been gained for Hungary had he done so.

By the early 1980s, and following changes in middle-level leadership, there were real signs of a radical break from the past Kadarist position rather than a linear development of it. As outlined by the new leader of the HSWP Central Committee for International Affairs, Matyas Szuros, the profile of ideology was raised and it ceased to be a mere passive copying of the Soviet line. It was not just a matter of a further shift in the balance between ideology and pragmatism, but an attempt to change the content of the ideology itself. Szuros revived the notion, buried since 1956, of ‘national interest’ as a factor in foreign policy making.38 Despite the Brezhnev doctrine, practical considerations had forced the grudging acceptance that ‘national specifics’ had to be taken into account in ‘building socialism’, i.e. in domestic policy (which had allowed scope for the partial survival of the Hungarian economic reform), but the assertion of differing interests among socialist countries in their dealings with the outside world was a bold new departure. In defining Hungary’s ‘specific interests’, Szuros in fact referred to factors which hitherto had been passed over as not relevant or at most secondary and derivative in significance in Marxist-Leninist ideology: history, size and geography.

The terms in which Szuros discussed these factors implied not only that Hungary might have enduring interests in relations with states outside the socialist bloc, but also that there could be a real conflict of interests in foreign policy among socialist states. The key factor for Hungary was not so much its ‘class position’ as its small size and Central European position: in a time of increasing international tension, ‘the peoples of small countries feel increasingly at the mercy of enormous, destructive forces [implying the Soviet Union, as much as the ‘imperialists’] that are beyond their control’.39 Such countries as Hungary, Szuros argued, had a particular mission in contemporary world affairs:

Concurrently with the decisive weight of the Great Powers the role of small countries is growing in the bridging over of differences, in the bringing about of rational, mutually acceptable compromises, and in general, in ensuring the continuity of the East-West dialogue which is of vital importance to everybody.40

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The hierarchical subordination of the international over the national, characteristic of the Cold War period of the 1950s, had to give way to a new understanding of the international interest as 'a sort of common denominator of the national interests, which necessarily includes also the fundamental interests of the participating socialist countries'. This ideological revision parallels in an interesting way the revision of the ideological concept of the 'social interest' in socialism which took place in Hungary and Czechoslovakia in the 1960s to accompany and legitimate market-type reforms. In both cases, what has taken place is a replacement of the collectivist notion of the common (social or socialist bloc) interest as something separate from and superior to individual/national interests with a more liberal or pluralistic notion of the common interest as little more than the sum of the parts or the lowest common denominator.

Szuró's attempt to exploit the inherent ambiguity of the Marxist-Leninist position on the national/international question sought space within the rigid limits of bloc politics in the era of Soviet gerontocracy for the pursuit of reform and the continuation of relations with the West, which had become identified in Hungary with the 'national interest'. In the process, the aim was also to build genuine legitimacy for the regime and thus enhance the power and authority of the state at a time of acute and deepening economic and political crisis. The ideological revisions undertaken bear many parallels with the general drift of Imre Nagy's own thinking in 1955, when he wrote 'In Defence of the New Course'. They contain the same inherent contradiction of trying to reconcile Hungarian national interests with its continued membership of the socialist bloc, which implied a limit on free choice by the people of both the domestic regime and international commitments.

Perhaps the most difficult case of reform in foreign policy ideology was that of the GDR. As an 'unnatural' state its dependence on the Soviet Union was greater than most. But particularly because it was on the front line with NATO, it felt particularly sensitive when détente was either suddenly encouraged or reversed. To that extent it had a tacit alliance with Hungary, especially in 1983–4, favouring a less hostile relationship with the West. Of course, Hungary and the GDR had different motives for their views, even though the stated ideology tended, at least for a time, to look similar.

The process of rethinking the foreign policy strategy and ideology of the SED began around 1981–3. This was an arduous and complicated task, and in this period, East German foreign policy ideology was fraught with contradictions. By 1983, however, it was clear that the SED was articulating a set of foreign policy themes which were at variance with official thinking in Moscow. Many of these themes – such as the emphasis on the role of dialogue in the face of the threat of nuclear annihilation – were subsequently to figure prominently in Mikhail Gorbachev's 'new political thinking'. In this remarkable period from the early to mid-1980s, therefore, the

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East Germans played a pioneering role in the reform of foreign policy ideology within the Warsaw Pact.

The external catalyst for this unexpected ideological innovation by the SED was the deteriorating security situation in Europe in the early 1980s, and the consequent increase in fears of war – especially nuclear war. At the Tenth SED Party Congress in 1981, it was merely noted that in the face of growing East-West conflict, 'new, additional efforts are required'. By 1982, it was the view of Honecker that the existence of nuclear weapons had effectively negated Clausewitz's axiom that 'war was a continuation of politics by other means'. The concern with the implications of nuclear weapons became the 'conceptual anchor of [the SED's] foreign-policy reorientation, and it gave expression to this in its readiness to adopt the "new thinking"'.

This also led to the most significant divergence with Soviet foreign policy, certainly in the Honecker period, if not in the whole history of the GDR. Following the INF deployments, the SED leadership outlined a policy of 'damage-limitation' (Schadensbegrenzung) at the Seventh Plenary Session of the Central Committee in November 1983. Honecker made clear East Germany's displeasure at the Soviet 'counter-deployments' in both the GDR and Czechoslovakia, which he declared 'were unavoidable if we wish to prevent the USA acquiring strategic military superiority', but which 'are no great cause for jubilation in our country'. He also made an implicit criticism of the Soviet walk-out from the Geneva INF talks by insisting that, 'We support the exploitation of all negotiating opportunities that may lead to the halting of the arms race and to the transition to disarmament, particularly in the nuclear field'. The SED's disquiet with the course of Soviet foreign policy in the 'Second Cold War' led the East German leadership to formulate – for the first time – the specific security interests of the GDR, and to undertake a significant (albeit ambiguous and at times contradictory) process of ideological reform in the foreign policy sphere.

The heart of the SED's reform was a reconsideration of the relationship between class and 'all-human' interests. The SED had long argued that the fundamental division in world politics was between the peace-loving socialist camp and the aggressive imperialist countries. At the same time, the East German leadership throughout the 1970s insisted that strengthening the military power of the Warsaw Pact was the only secure way to prevent war. In 1984, there were growing indications that the SED was willing to accept the notion of 'common security', which was formally endorsed by the Party in 1985. This in turn led to a reconsideration of the notion of 'parity' and 'military force'. Whereas the GDR military and political establishment had previously rejected the notion of 'parity' as an imperialist deceit, by the mid-1980s the political leadership had firmly endorsed the notion of combining parity with disarmament (although the GDR military establishment fought a rearguard action against the more radical
implications of this change of perception, arguing that the military strength of the Warsaw Pact was an ‘indispensable precondition for any future deflection of imperialist wars of aggression’. The re-evaluation of the question of nuclear weapons and the risk of atomic annihilation which the SED undertook between 1981 and 1983 implied that the key assumption underpinning the ‘peaceful coexistence’ of the 1970s – namely that the imperialist powers could be coerced into peaceful behaviour only by the growing military might of the socialist community and the changing international correlation of forces – was no longer valid. Instead, it was suggested that there was a common, all-human interest in preventing nuclear war which transcended class interests. It also implied a widening of the gap between the struggle for peace and the struggle for socialism – particularly as the ‘imperialist class enemy’ was now a potential candidate for ‘security partnership’ in a ‘Coalition for Common Sense and Realism’ with the SED. This, of course, was difficult for some in the SED leadership to accept, because it struck at the very self-identity and ideological justification of the East German state – a state which was lacking in national or democratic legitimacy, and which could only justify its existence by reference to the tenets of Marxism–Leninism and the needs of the international class struggle.

The SED in the early 1980s, along with Hungary, began to argue that small- and medium-sized states like the GDR had a particular role to play in facilitating East–West dialogue at a time of superpower tension. In a much-publicized dispute in 1983–4, the GDR found itself in the unfamiliar role of being in a tacit alliance with Hungary against the Soviet Union, which was supported by Czechoslovakia and Poland. The background to this dispute was the desire by Erich Honecker to visit the FRG in 1984, as part of the SED’s policy of encouraging East–West dialogue. Although the GDR was forced to cancel the visit, this was not before East German ideologues had stressed the distinctive role that small states could and should make to ‘peaceful coexistence’ in Europe. This was linked to another theoretical innovation in the mid-1980s – the new emphasis on the dialectic between national and international interests in the socialist community.

A great deal of energy was expended at East German foreign policy think-tanks trying to put flesh on the bones of the concept of the ‘Common European Home’. Eventually the East Germans used the concept to reinforce their calls for nuclear disarmament, international dialogue and East–West cooperation. Nevertheless, East German concepts of the ‘Common European Home’ faced a major problem in terms of the ideological coherence of Marxism–Leninism. The stress on a common pan-European identity and common European interests weakened the political and theoretical credibility of the SED’s pan-European view of a bipolar Europe riven by irreconcilable class differences. Similarly, calls for ‘system-crossing cooperation’ lacked credibility given the SED’s oft-repeated insistence on

the necessity for the Berlin Wall and the continued physical division of Europe.

And yet, on balance and particularly between 1983 and 1985, the SED found itself, along with Hungary, in the unexpected position of being in the vanguard of the ‘new thinking’ that was gaining ground in the Soviet Union and other parts of the ‘world socialist community’. With Gorbachev’s accession to power in March 1985 and the subsequent adoption by the CPSU leadership of the ‘new political thinking’, there was a period from about 1985 to 1987 where Soviet and East German foreign policy thinking converged on several issues – around positions formerly propounded by the SED. This happy convergence of Soviet and GDR interests – especially in terms of Europapolitik – reached its apogee in September 1987 with Honecker’s long-awaited visit to the FRG. At the same time, the reform of East German foreign policy ideology reached its high point in August 1987, with the publication of the Joint SPD–SED Paper, ‘Conflicting Ideologies and Common Security’.

Of great significance were the two statements that both systems were (a) ‘capable of reform’ (reformfähig), and (b) ‘capable of peace’ (friedensfähig). The second claim had all sorts of implications for the traditional communist notion of class struggle and the nature of ‘monopoly capitalism’. The second struck at the very core of Lenin’s theory of imperialism, which was seen as inherently aggressive, militaristic and expansionist. It is therefore not surprising that shortly after the publication of this Joint Paper, a series of counter-attacks began, culminating in a conservative retreatment which was formally endorsed by the leadership at the fateful Seventh Central Committee Plenum in November 1988.

In November 1988, the Central Committee at its Seventh Plenum declared in favour of the traditional conception of foreign policy ideology. This maintained the centrality of the class struggle in international politics. In his report from the Politburo to the Central Committee, General-Secretary Honecker declared that the SED was guided exclusively by the ‘socialist class standpoint’ in both external and internal matters. Moreover, the ‘class content’ of peaceful co-existence remained as valid as before, and illusions to the contrary were not only foolish but dangerous: ‘Anyone hollowing himself into this dream will one day be rudely awakened’. With these comments, Honecker on behalf of the Central Committee rejected one of the central tenets of the ‘new political thinking’ which was now being enthusiastically championed by the Gorbachev–Shevardnadze team in Moscow. By according such priority to the class struggle as the ‘main driving-force of world events’, Honecker was reversing much of the thrust of the SED’s ideological innovations in the early and mid-1980s.

And yet this reversal in the GDR, when reform of the foreign policy ideology of national security was still developing in the Soviet Union, Hungary, China and Vietnam, merely highlighted the isolation of the GDR.
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Indeed, it was a key commonality in the reform of foreign policy ideology that there be a move away from a narrow concern with class struggle and a wider acceptance of the need for international security. Of course, the GDR’s change, as was the case of the policy of no reform in North Korea, had most to do with the division of Germany and Korea which set them apart as special states. To that extent at least it is important to note that even those states that continued to reform their foreign policy ideology, did so in distinctive ways. Much the same can be said for the ‘pattern’ of reform of foreign policy ideology in the sphere of development and economic interdependence.

Development and interdependence

The acceptance of the interdependence of security seemed to have some connection to the acceptance of the interdependence of economic prosperity. Such was the nature of ideology that reform was ‘contagious’. And yet the specific way in which this ideology was reformed depended to a large extent on the distinctive features of the states concerned. For example, the difficulty of defeating insurgencies by military means and the cost of arming socialist-oriented governments partly explain the new political thinking in the Soviet Union about the Third World. The economic predicament of Soviet Third World clients was another important reason for redefining their conflicts as regional conflicts rather than examples of the national liberation and anti-imperialist struggle. For even if the conflicts could be won, their economic and political development from socialist orientation to socialism seemed increasingly unlikely. Indeed, some Soviet academics began reassessing the economic situation of Soviet Third World allies long before the new political thinking came into practice.

By the end of the 1970s the economic situation of socialist-oriented states was, in many cases, a great deal worse than that of capitalist Third World states. Moreover, the declining Soviet economy was in no condition to offer the kind of aid that would make the establishment of full socialism possible. Soviet theorists became rather stern in their advice that economic development had to depend more upon local policies and efforts than upon aid. But capitalism was still blamed by many for the economic plight of the developing countries. In other words, most theorists still believed that capitalist exploitation exacerbated underdevelopment and that properly applied socialist policies would foster economic development.

But eventually, however, Soviet theorists changed their minds and said that they had been deceived by their excessive optimism that the socialist model of development would spread throughout the developing countries and their overestimation of their ability to make progress on a non-capitalist path. Previous work on socialist orientation was criticized. The new thinkers came to believe that socialist orientation was probably not universally applicable to Third World states. The possibility that developing states could avoid the capitalist stage of development if they received sufficient socialist aid was then discounted. Modernization and economic development were recognized to be complex global problems defying doctrinaire solutions.

Soviet policy makers wanted to extend their economic relations with Third World states irrespective of which path of development they had chosen. But the main criterion, they maintained, should be that those relations are mutually advantageous and that required, ‘first and foremost, solvent partners or partners that have resources and products we need’. The prerequisite was an improvement in the quality of Soviet Third World studies.

The recognition of the complexity of economic development in the Third World coincided with a new preoccupation with the concept of interdependence and the global predicaments that face all humankind. The concept of interdependence was one of the major innovations of the new political thinking (although it has a long history in Western international relations theory). It was used by Soviet policy-makers and theorists to cover a number of separate phenomena. It was, for example, one of the terms employed to describe the tendency both of local conflict to spread geographically and of problems in one sphere to spill over into other spheres. It was also used to characterize the indivisibility of security.

With regard to economics, interdependence referred to the connections between national economies. But economic connections across national borders occurred not only between states within the same social-economic system. They also increasingly tended to occur across the divide between the two systems. And that meant that interdependence was a general phenomenon of the modern world economy. Most Soviet economists, therefore, came to question whether two separate international economic systems existed. Most favoured the idea that there was one international economic system to which socialist, capitalist, and socialist-oriented states, developed and developing, all belonged, whatever the differences between them.

Finally, interdependence was the term used to explain the way many domestic problems extended beyond national frontiers and became international or global. The idea that there can be no victor in nuclear war, and that the consequences will be equally horrendous irrespective of the system in which they occur, can be traced back to Khrushchev. But the recognition that there are global problems which affect all social and political systems and, moreover, which can be caused by either system was relatively new in the Soviet Union. Until the new thinking, it was always assumed that capitalism was the cause of the major ills in the world, whether they were local or global.

The emphasis on the other kinds of global problems that confront
humankind and the recognition that individual states or groups of states cannot cope with them alone became particularly evident in Soviet writing after the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power station began to emerge. One of the major challenges of our time, according to the new thinkers, was the 'internationalization or globalization' that has occurred in the life of society, requiring the discovery of the means to retain self-determination while at the same time 'integrating and uniting forces to resolve global problems'. Other global problems which threatened 'the immediate or gradual physical destruction of nations were pollution, ecological degradation and war (conventional as well as nuclear). Soviet theorists recognized that the concept of interdependence has long existed in Western political science and that it is reflected in the political and economic practices of the capitalist world. But capitalist interdependence was said to be caused by the international division of labour. It was uncontrolled, asymmetric and it could lead to a type of 'ultra-imperialism'. The new political thinkers asserted that if their version of the concept were the starting point, interdependence would be based on the recognition that all participants in international life were completely equal. It would result in a conscious attempt to 'coordinate the efforts of all humankind to prevent nuclear war (and conventional war as well), to eliminate hunger, disease and ignorance, and to maintain a dynamic balance between the biosphere and the technosphere'.

Notable amongst the many concrete plans Soviet policy-makers and theorists proposed to realize their aims of peaceful cooperation to resolve global problems was a reinvigoration of the United Nations, the formation of an international system of economic security, regular multilateral and bilateral summit meetings, an extension of the institutions and functions of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the setting up of a similar set of institutions to deal with problems in the Asia-Pacific area. The much publicized concept of a Common European Home was largely based on the new political thinking about global problems and interdependence. The assumption behind all the proposals was that there were common human interests which facilitate the necessary cooperation.

The idea that there are all-human interests that transcend all other interests and which must perforce take precedence meshed uneasily with the Marxist-Leninist theory of class struggle and class interests. It was clear that even in 1991 some theorists still had difficulty in rejecting the conventional view that interests were determined by class membership. Traditionally it was the conflict between class interests that was used to explain the ideological struggle in international relations. It was also why past theorists defined peaceful coexistence as a particular form of class struggle. Most new thinkers rejected the idea that the antagonistic relations between the two systems (which give rise to class struggle) can be separated from inter-state relations based on an acceptance of the inevitability of peaceful coexistence (for the sake of survival). They pointed out that the formula that peaceful coexistence is a form of class struggle was both theoretically flawed and politically foolish (since it confirmed all the worst suspicions of Western politicians about the insincerity of Soviet policy).

The concept of a balance of interests was applied by Soviet theorists both to relations across the ideological divide and to those between states belonging to the same social and economic system. The 'old' political thinking about relations between socialist states was based on the idea that a new type of international relations had come to be established after 1945. The principle of proletarian internationalism (which determined the relations between socialist parties) had been extended to the inter-state level in the form of socialist internationalism. Socialist internationalism was defined as respect for equality, territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, combined with fraternal mutual aid. Since all socialist states belonged to the same class, it was held that there could be no antagonistic conflict between them. And because their class interests coincided, it was assumed that their national interests would quite easily and naturally be subjugated to the international interests of the socialist system as a whole. On the occasions when this failed to occur, for example, in 1956 and 1968, it was taken for granted that domestic or foreign counter-revolution was to blame.

By 1985, however, some Soviet theorists began to admit that there was a certain tension between the prevailing practice of democratic centralism within the socialist commonwealth, which implied hierarchical relations, and the principles of equality and sovereignty. In the past, it was admitted, respect for sovereignty had all too often been sacrificed to the need for unity. In his speech on the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution Gorbachev defined socialist internationalism as 'unconditional and total equality, the responsibility of the ruling party for affairs in its state... concern for the general cause of socialism, respect for one another, a serious attitude toward what has been achieved and tried out by friends, and the strict observance by all of the principles of peaceful coexistence.' This implied the primacy of equality over fraternal unity and also suggested a step back from the Brezhnev doctrine.

By then Soviet theorists were prepared to recognize that conflicts of interests could occur between states belonging to the same class, although they still called them non-antagonistic conflicts. Soon it was acknowledged that inter-socialist conflict could be so antagonistic as to cause violence.
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State with the interest of the whole system? How to integrate the different interests of separate socialist states? His answer, like that of Gorbachev in his anniversary speech, and as we have seen in the cases of the GDR, Hungary and eventually Vietnam, was that the principles of peaceful co-existence must prevail in relations between socialist states. Of course, as we shall see even more clearly in the case of China, there was no sense in which relations between socialist states should be, or were in fact, special.

It had become clear in the first couple of years of perestroika that although he advised reform to the leaders of the other East European countries, Gorbachev was not prepared to insist that they should adopt the Soviet programme. What this meant was that, in practice at least, the universality of the Soviet model was called into question (and the existence of a model was explicitly rejected by the members of the Warsaw Pact in 1989). On the other hand, the claim that inter-socialist relations were different in type from other international relations became debatable. The absorption of the Central Committee Department for Liaison with Communist and Workers Parties of Socialist Countries into the International Department in September 1988 seemed symbolic of the fact that Soviet relations with socialist states would now be based on the same principles as relations with other kinds of state. The events of 1989, and their acceptance by the Soviet Union, confirmed that this was, indeed, the case.

In the Chinese case, the recognition of the new interdependence, especially in economic terms, came much earlier and evolved in a distinctive manner. There was an almost fourfold increase in China's foreign trade between 1988 and 1987, roughly the same percentage increase as between 1978 and 1987. But beginning in 1978 there was a new confidence about the process of openness to the international system and the need to become interdependent with the international economy, especially but not exclusively, towards the market economies of the West. The world market and the international community began to be considered a vital part of China's plans for modernization. China's chief task. Modernization and openness were linked in spirit and in the stream of political consciousness in 1978, and they came to be linked in orthodoxy. The usefulness of the West to China's search for wealth and power as well as the threat posed by Western influence to China's cultural and political identity displaced the Maoist concern with the struggle against imperialism and the isolation of the key enemy. China's concerns shifted from world revolutionary struggle to the problem of how to use foreign things for their utility while preserving the 'Chinese essence'.

The gradual development of the new economic openness as orthodoxy was due primarily to two factors. First, the overwhelmingly practical and economic character of the reforms avoided reorientations of orthodoxy under the slogan, 'shishi gfu shi' (seek truth from facts). The slogan is an old one, and used by Mao at one time, but Deng Xiaoping reintroduced it in June 1978 to criticize the dead hand of dogmatism. Dogmatism would be a dead hand because many of the domestic and International policies with which the reformers were experimenting could not easily be explained in Marxism-Leninist terms, much less Maoist practice.

Secondly, there was a great complementarity between the orientations of the 1970s and 1980s phases of Chinese reform of foreign policy ideology. China's anti-Soviet posture made normalization with the United States easier, and a more wealthy and prosperous China would be more effective in leading the world crusade against social imperialism. Normalization with the United States in December 1978 was a victory from both perspectives. In the context of the conflict with Vietnam, which was essentially an anti-Soviet crisis in China's view, it helped isolate Vietnam and strengthen China. In the context of global openness, it broke the remaining logjam hampering China's interchange with the non-communist world.

The chief characteristic of the new phase of openness for foreign policy ideology in the mid-1980s was economic opportunism. Although considerations of budget and balance of trade have led to cycles of growth followed by restraint, the basic pattern of development of China's participation in the world economy consistently increased in scope, complexity and sophistication. At no point was a dogmatic line drawn and an opportunity for openness foregone. Moreover, participation in the world economy became an integral part of China's overall plans for development, a fact perhaps best illustrated by the coastal cities plan of Zhao Ziyang. Unlike the Soviet case where we have seen careful and cautious debates about openness and the relationship to the international market economy preceding any change in policy, China moved much more swiftly and easily to embrace economic interdependence. To be sure, China remained careful about safeguarding its national interest, but it never confused that with the interests of socialist states and certainly not with a so-called socialist community.

A related characteristic of Chinese reform of foreign policy ideology was the persistent attempt to claim Third World leadership. As Deng put it in 1984, 'China will always belong to the Third World, which is the foundation of our foreign policy.' Of course, as Lowell Dittmer demonstrates, the claim to Third World leadership is as old as the People's Republic of China. The current form of this claim is not revolutionary, but it does pose some challenges to the superpowers and it suggests that China is not simply prepared to accept the international economy as it is without making changes. The new international economic order proposed by Zhao Ziyang in 1981 is based on the thesis that the prosperity of the developed world was founded on the past impoverishment of the underdeveloped world. However, he did not argue for international class struggle or assume that the developed world could not redress the imbalance. The five principles for the new international economic order were designed to be feasible for existing governments and international organi-
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izations. They presumed peace rather than revolution. Similarly, the new international political order was essentially a reiteration of the ‘five principles of peaceful coexistence’ first proposed at the Bandung Conference of 1955.

As Zhao indicated in November 1988, ‘reform and opening up to the outside world’ are general and long-term principles that will last for dozens or even a hundred years. These policies and principles will never alter because of partial and temporary political and economic changes. The commitment to openness was reaffirmed by Deng Xiaoping in his post Tiananmen speech of 9 June 1989, and by Chinese foreign policy since then.

While Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy remained the fundamental limit to openness in the first phase of reform, the fundamental constraint of the second phase has been the fear that openness would lead to the Westernization of China and the loss of China’s specific character. Deng Xiaoping’s statement on foreign relations at the Twelfth National Congress of the CCP in 1982 well expresses the policy tension which has characterized the 1980s.

In carrying out our modernization program we must proceed from Chinese realities. Both in revolution and in construction, we should also learn from foreign countries and draw on their experience. But the mechanical copying of foreign experiences and models will get us nowhere... China’s affairs should be run according to China’s specific conditions and by the Chinese people themselves. Independence and self-reliance have always been and will always be our basic stand. While we Chinese people value our friendship and cooperation with other countries and other peoples, we value even more our hard-won independence and sovereign rights. No foreign country should expect China to be its vassal, nor should it expect China to accept anything harmful to China’s interests. We will unwaveringly follow a policy of opening to the outside world and actively increase exchanges with foreign countries on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. At the same time, we will keep clear heads, firmly resist corruption by decadent ideas from abroad and never permit the bourgeois way of life to spread in our country.

In this passage Deng expresses the tension between international openness and national identity, but in a framework closely analogous to Zhang Zidong’s formulation of a hundred years earlier, ‘things Chinese for essence, things foreign for utility’. It is a very commonsensical position between two extremes; it would be strange to want Chinese culture to be overwhelmed by foreign things, or to shun useful things simply because they are foreign. But there is also something self-contradictory and unstable in the formula, somewhat analogous to Mao’s old leftist formula of ‘grasp revolution and promote production’. The formula does not give clear guidance about how to cope with the innumerable trade-offs encountered in practical life, and it reserves for the party the possibility of a redefinition or reversal of line. In other words, it is a restrictive and yet pragmatic formula which leads to restricted and yet pragmatic openness.

In a similar way, although at a different time than in China, the shift in Vietnamese foreign policy was driven by practical necessity rather than by ideology, and therefore the orthodoxy provides a poor record or explanation of the change. For example, the possibility of joint ventures with foreign companies was approved as early as 1974, while the old-style analysis of the global situation in terms of the struggle against imperialism continues to this day. Indeed, the strength of the old ideology is best shown in Vietnam’s shock at developments in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in 1989. In theory, and with some degree of sincerity, Vietnam has always been in favour of peace and international cooperation. The door may not have been open, but it has never been locked from the Vietnamese side as it had been in China during the Cultural Revolution. But in the 1980s the Vietnamese increasingly felt the need to push the door open by making concessions and initiatives intended to remove the hostilities, doubts and hesitations of potential partners.

Since the Sixth Party Congress in 1986 Vietnam has committed itself to overcoming the isolation imposed by the West. Besides adjusting its policy towards Cambodia, Vietnam has tried hard to attract foreign investment and to work with international organizations in restructuring its national economy. The Foreign Investment Law of 1989 was written by Nguyen Xuan Oanh, a Harvard-trained economist and former minister in the Saigon regime, and it was designed to be the most liberal investment law in South-East Asia. Studies by the World Bank and Asian Development Bank gave Vietnam high marks for its efforts, and all this at a time when the sharp reduction in Soviet aid made Hanoi’s task all the more difficult. Hungary, with its longer history of opening to the international economy, suggests even more vividly the strict limits on the freedom of manoeuvre of smaller states seeking to reform their foreign policy ideology. In the Hungarian case, the reforms of ideology began much earlier and although in Kadar’s earlier years in power, a pragmatic attitude to economic interdependence was adopted, Kadar was perfectly able to appreciate that politicians representing different social systems might do business with each other, notwithstanding their ideological differences, if only good sense and reasonableness were present. It is thus not so much that Kadar was a non-ideological pragmatist as that he had an incoherent, inconsistent, essentially ad hoc combination of ideology and pragmatism.

The 1970s were the decade of détente, which suited Hungarian interests very well, as it did most of the rest of Eastern Europe. The stabilization of East-West relations increased the East Europeans’ room for manoeuvre and opened up advantageous economic opportunities, with access to Western technology and credits. The breakdown of détente with the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan at the end of 1979 and the Polish crisis of 1980–1 coincided, for Hungary, with the economic crisis and the dawning recognition of the disastrous cost of halting the economic reform in the mid-1970s. For the first time there emerged a clear and unavoidable conflict between following the Soviet line in international affairs, that is, ideological loyalty, and the Hungarian national economic interest, which by now consisted above all in maintaining good relations with the West, to which the country was earlier indebted, on a per capita basis, than Poland. The Hungarian decision in 1981 to apply for membership in the IMF and the World Bank signalled the importance of the latter, and the entry into full IMF membership in 1982, after martial law in Poland, was the first sign of Hungarian willingness to pursue this interest even against the prevailing ideology and tendencies in bloc foreign policy. That this move would require serious reconsideration of foreign policy ideology and the application of some intellectual effort in this hitherto neglected field was obvious. Hungary’s economic weakness, indebtedness and heavy dependence on imports of energy and raw materials gave it an additional interest in maintaining contacts with the West even in a time of East-West tension. The unstated point was that the Soviet Union, which in 1982 had cut back energy deliveries to Eastern Europe by 10 per cent, could no longer be relied on to cover all the country’s needs. But specific historical factors were also brought into play, most notably the sense of a thousand years of Hungary’s struggle to survive and the legacy of “specific historic bonds and family relations” with countries such as Austria, Turkey, Poland, both Germanies and Finland. By contrast, references to Hungary’s membership of the socialist bloc as the ‘cornerstone’ of its foreign policy had the familiar, dead ring of ritual repetition.

Moreover, in 1983 it was argued that in weighing up the ‘national’ against the ‘international’ in intra-bloc relations, national specifics had become more potent in the recent period, and especially in intra-CMEA economic relations, differences in interest had become more acute as a result of the economic difficulties, and interest reconciliation had been impeded. Divergent solutions had been adopted, but any attempt to set up one particular solution as ‘some sort of exclusive model’ would only increase tensions between countries.

Certainly the GDR did not look to the Hungarian model although it too had reforms of its own very distinctive kind. The unique character of the GDR in Eastern Europe – indeed, within the broader ‘world socialist community’ – has already been mentioned. The GDR is in many respects a sui generis case in that it was a modern industrial state, but within a divided nation. This means that in analysing the interaction of domestic and international factors in the reform of East German foreign policy ideology, a third category – alongside the domestic and the international – is needed, namely the national. East Germany found itself on the front-line of the Cold War in Europe, facing a stronger and politically more self-confident West German state across the Elbe river. As in the relatively unreformed North Korea, without the Marxist–Leninist ideology with which the ruling party justified its monopoly of power, the state itself lacked legitimacy. This was not the case in countries such as Poland, Czechoslovakia or Hungary, where the states themselves enjoyed national legitimacy, even if their democratic credentials were rather more dubious.

Marxism–Leninism was therefore vital to both the North Korean and the East German states’ self-identity in a way that it was not in reforming communist states. The SED’s need to emphasize what it saw as the GDR’s essential class difference from the Federal Republic meant that for much of the time the Party was seeking to widen the distance between the GDR and its stronger Western sibling. Thus for much of the 1970s, the East German leadership strove to place inner-German relations on a state-to-state basis – in other words, to make relations with the FRG an issue of foreign policy, rather than German–German policy. The North Koreans, by contrast, were more bold in trying to claim rightful leadership of all Koreans and stood opposed to a two-Korean solution. It was clear that the ideology of North Korea had far more to do with what was effectively Kimilsungism – a form of communist nationalism based on the notion of Juche which stressed self-reliance. The reasons for the contrasts between these two divided states say more about the distinctive features of each state, and reminds us of the range of policies available, even to rulers of communist states.

Of course, North Korea remains resolutely unreformed in its foreign policy ideology, but the Communist Party at least remains in power. We now know that in the SED case, the brief attempt at reform, followed by retreatment, was perhaps a fatal error in raising popular expectations and it certainly confused the case for the legitimacy of the GDR. The SED in the 1970s pursued a policy of ‘Abgrenzung’ (‘delimitation’) with the West, and ‘Annäherung’ (‘integration’) with the ‘socialist community’. To this end, the party leadership attempted to undermine the popular perception of the ‘Germanness’ of the GDR by deleting passages from the 1968 Constitution which drew attention to the German character of the country. For example, Article 1, which described the GDR as ‘a socialist state of the German nation’, was amended to ‘a socialist state of workers and farmers’.

Nevertheless, whilst seeking to hold its powerful and attractive West German neighbour at arms’ length in the 1970s, the GDR also began to relish the perks of its unique – and in many ways, privileged – position. Its ‘special relationship’ with the Federal Republic meant that the GDR soon profited – economically and politically – from improved East–West relations in Europe. The German–German link was a source of considerable economic advantage, and gave the GDR access to hard currency and Western technology not so readily available to its CMEA partners. A strong case can therefore be made for arguing that it is East Germany which was
the main beneficiary within the WTO/CMEA of 'peaceful coexistence' with the West—certainly in economic and diplomatic terms, and perhaps also in political and security terms too.

One important result of détente in the 1970s, therefore, was the gradual creation of a network of growing interdependence between the two Germanies. This interdependence was clearly not symmetrical: the GDR, as the weaker of the two, was more dependent on the FRG. Many of the developments and changes in the country's ideological conceptions were tied to the requirements of the SED's 'Deutschlandpolitik'. Erich Honecker's September 1987 visit to Bonn was the highpoint of East German foreign policy in the 1980s. It represented the culmination of one of Honecker's main foreign policy aspirations—namely, to be received with full honours as a visiting head of state in Bonn. Whatever the diplomatic niceties and the nuances of protocol, this is effectively what happened in September 1987.

It also coincided with the most 'openness' in East German society and in the political system (opportunities for GDR citizens, cultural 'glasnost', a prison amnesty), as well as ideological innovation (the 1987 SPD-SED Joint Paper). And yet the retrenchment that followed meant that in the end the GDR had to surrender to the most extreme version of interdependence—to overcome the West.

The fate of the GDR was a case of deep concern to conservative ideologues in the Soviet Union, China, Vietnam and North Korea. While interdependence was never likely to mean the same for these states, it remained true that in the wake of the 1989-90 revolutions, the reform of foreign policy ideology was restrained, at least for a time. In the Soviet Union, the 1989 shock led those who favoured reform of foreign policy ideology to move even further from old orthodoxies but the ideologues lashed back. For a time the result was polarization of positions, but there was evidence that by mid-1991 the march of reform was resumed. In China, the events of 1989 produced some polarization, but nothing like the Soviet case. In part because 1989 in China meant restraint on domestic pluralism, it was easier to impose a firmer line. But that line was one that stressed the Open Door should remain open, despite a mild campaign against 'bourgeois pollution'. In effect, China's foreign policy ideology stood still, but this was still a position that allowed for much openness to the outside world. Despite its alliance with the Soviet Union, Vietnam followed the Chinese model much more than the Soviet one. Like China, Vietnam was then viewed warily by the international market economy. But because Vietnam was far less important to that market economy, the international system has been slower to respond to its overtures. In sum, as befitted the local conditions in each state, each one chose a distinctive form of limited reform.

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THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC FACTORS

The reforms in foreign policy ideology, as we have seen in the other aspects of reform, were caused by a variety of domestic and external factors. In these final parts of this study, we attempt to assess the importance of pressures from domestic politics and the international system that helped shape the reforms. As we have seen throughout this study, the interconnections are complex. This is especially true of an analysis of ideology that tries to pull together the various types of idea that linked reform in economics, security and culture. The analysis that follows often strays between reforms in policy and reforms in ideology, but it is a convenient way to help sum up some of the major trends identified in the study as a whole.

In the Soviet case, and to some extent in the Chinese case as well, the very speed with which the ideology changed indicates an important extent that the major, but far from exclusive, impetus came from the domestic reform programme. In other words, as soon as it was realized how perilous the domestic situation was, it also became obvious that a new approach to foreign policy was essential. In some cases, such as the Soviet Union, the ideological changes provided the blueprint for policy changes. In the rest of this section we will attempt to 'slice' the question of reform of foreign policy ideology in another way—one that stresses the commonalities and differences in domestic factors shaping reform. The subsequent section will do the same for the role of the international system in moulding the reform of foreign policy ideology.

There were a number of key ways in which domestic economic reform demanded a new foreign policy in all reforming states. The cure that was prescribed almost immediately for the ailing domestic economy, for example, in the Soviet case, was 'shock therapy' (acceleration) by switching from extensive to intensive industrial modernization. China recognized this fact very soon after the end of the Cultural Revolution and was quick to see the need to import sophisticated Western technology. But technology could only be imported if states in the international market economy would ease their suspicions and lift economic sanctions. As the list of goods prohibited by COCOM was reduced first in the case of China, and then in the Soviet case (and not yet for Vietnam), it was possible to expand foreign trade. This strategy worked for China which obtained Most Favoured Nation trading status from the United States, but worked far less well for the Soviet Union which was a greater adversary of the West and less competent in its reform.

There were other, more direct economic reasons for reforming foreign policy. Although the absence of a proper pricing system made it difficult to quantify the exact level of military expenditure, the new leadership in reforming states knew that the armed forces took up too much of the budget. The reform of civilian industries required more capital investment and the capital would have to come from the defence sector. As long as
there was confrontation with other states, and in the Soviet case this meant confrontation with the West, there would be an arms race. However, for both China and Vietnam, the main part of defence spending was designed to deal with threats from other communist states, and so it was more possible to reform attitudes to the West without immediately tackling the question of reductions in the military sector.

In the Soviet case, as Shevardnadze argued, Soviet foreign policy itself had been too expensive. It should be more cost effective, take economic methods into account and ‘increase the profitability’ of Soviet foreign policy. At the simplest level he implied that the overmanning, duplication of responsibility and waste that were criticized in other government and party bodies were also characteristic of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the two foreign policy departments of the Central Committee. But there was a further implication: Soviet policy had to be less prone to risk-taking, costly aid programmes had to be reduced and Soviet relations with Third World states of all kinds had to be extended, but on the basis of mutual advantage.

In contrast, for both China and to some extent Vietnam, the reform had the opposite effect of taking the country from relative isolation to openness which required far more spending on the foreign policy apparatus. Costly aid programmes were cut back, but the needs of effective management of relations with the international market economy meant growth for the foreign policy establishment.

In fact, the Soviet Union seemed to face a very different set of problems in reforming foreign policy ideology because its domestic economy was treated so differently during the early stages of reform. Due to the failure to reform the economy fundamentally, Soviet foreign trade remained dependent on raw material exports. Soon after perestroika began world energy prices fell. As a result, Soviet oil and gas revenues diminished, reducing the foreign reserves available to pay for imports. Western credits would facilitate the modernization programme, but they were unlikely to be available unless Soviet relations with the West improved. Moreover, an important element of the reform programme involved encouraging foreign investment in the Soviet Union through joint ventures. But the willingness of foreign business to risk capital in the Soviet Union depended upon a better international climate. China found that international climate much easier to construct and its far more successful domestic economic reforms made the attractions of doing business with China much greater. Vietnam, like the Soviet Union, had a more difficult task in changing the international environment, but at least its economic reforms were more akin to those in China in terms of their effectiveness.

The interrelationship between domestic reform and the restructuring of foreign policy ideology was not confined to the economic costs and consequences. There was and still is considerable domestic opposition to reform in the Soviet Union, China and Vietnam. It can be assumed that in all three cases the reformers hoped that a successful foreign policy might assuage the concerns of more conservative colleagues. But the corollary was the risk that a dramatic foreign policy failure might jeopardize domestic reform by increasing the pressure to move back from the entire programme of openness. The events of 1989 demonstrated both the opportunities and risks for all three states and helps explain the subsequent pattern of polarization amidst pluralism, particularly in the case of the Soviet Union.

It is not difficult to suggest what role domestic factors played in the changes in foreign policy. It is far harder, however, to establish a specific connection between domestic factors and foreign policy ideology. Earlier it was suggested that the new political thinking acted as a blueprint, especially in the Soviet Union. Given the early appearance, especially in the Soviet Union, of many aspects of the new political thinking on foreign policy relative to the other aspects of the reform programme, it seems safe to assume that the new ideological principles were initially intended to serve notice to both domestic and foreign audiences that policy changes would follow and to suggest the lines that the changes would take. The most important domestic audience was probably the foreign policy establishment itself, since it would have to implement the new policies. To judge from the persistent urging of Gorbachev, Shevardnadze, Primakov, Yakovlev and others, however, mezhdukavoditeli and the academics who trained Soviet diplomats were an important part of the audience: the task was to indicate the expanding parameters of Soviet theory, remove the siege mentality, and to encourage them to engage in the new political thinking.

In China and Vietnam the reform of foreign policy ideology seemed far more simple and did not require a coterie of ‘new thinkers’. The leaders themselves, very much in keeping with the inheritance of Zhou Enlai, had realized that there was much that could be derived from a more open attitude to the international system. Deng Xiaoping in particular, described by David Goodman as pragmatic but not a pragmatist, realized that basic ideological objectives such as socialism could be obtained while the capitalist system was seen as a partner that could be kept at arms length. Perhaps it was the experience of other East Asian states, most notably Japan, that demonstrated just how much national characteristics could be retained while some degree of openness was developed. Vietnam has not yet gone as far as China in such a reform of foreign policy ideology, but then the revolutionary experience may be too fresh for the current leadership.

But one certainly is struck by the pragmatic way in which China sought to find the best way to retain ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ in foreign policy. Pragmatism after 1969 was justified by the failure of the Cultural Revolution to inspire similar movements elsewhere and by the obvious international dangers which China faced. Fortunately, Mao Zedong was personally involved in the foreign policy reorientation. This
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both facilitated policy change and reduced the potential for open factional struggle over foreign policy ideology. As the policies proved successful and the old cadres patronized by Zhou Enlai felt more secure, the prospects of more extensive reform improved.

The Chinese, and to some extent Vietnamese cases of reform of foreign policy ideology were also special in the sense that they had very different attitudes to the notion of socialist internationalism than the Soviet Union or the East Europeans. As the two other communist parties who made their own revolutions, they naturally took very seriously the matter of independence from appeals to socialist unity. For China especially, the problems surrounding the linkage of domestic politics and the Sino-Soviet split, and the similar linkage of ‘revisionism’ at home and abroad during the Cultural Revolution, meant it was harder to revise the ideological perspective on the Soviet Union in the 1970s. Geopolitical concerns about Soviet policy were paramount for China, but ideology was always a part of the tense Sino-Soviet relationship. Thus the horizons of economic contacts were initially with the West, albeit limited by domestic commitments to a centrally controlled socialist system. The staple contacts of the early 1970s were such relatively neutral transactions as grain imports or turnkey factory projects, financed with a minimum of credit.

After Mao’s death in 1976 Deng’s personal and highly visible involvement in the foreign policy of openness clearly facilitated and stabilized its development. Not only has Deng been involved in major initiatives toward the West, but he personally enunciated the changes in policies toward Taiwan and Hong Kong. But because Deng was so personally involved in the original Sino-Soviet split, it was also harder for him to normalize relations with the Soviet Union. Even during the early days of reform Deng spoke of the Sino-Soviet split lasting a thousand years. Yet by the mid-1980s it was even evident to Deng that the Soviet Union was far less of a threat than originally thought, and the Soviet Union’s reforms opened possibilities for cooperation on the basis of reformed socialism.

As far as Vietnam was concerned, it was precisely this ideological and strategic rapprochement between the two communist rivals which squeezed its room for manoeuvre and forced the pace of reform. Although that reform received a strong push from the evident falling of the internal economy, it seems that unlike the Soviet Union and China, domestic forces were less crucial as a source of reform for foreign policy ideology. During the long struggle for national liberation, the defining domestic problem was a war against foreign countries as well as against another Vietnamese state on Vietnamese territory. With this understood, it can be said that domestic factors played an essential but subordinate role in shaping the ideology of the national liberation and national assertion phases, and the key role in the emergence of a reform ideology.

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Even though rural revolution played a central role in the success of the Vietnamese Communist Party against the French and the Americans, foreign policy ideology remained dominated by the international dimensions of national liberation. Indeed, even rural revolution was not simply a domestic factor, given the influence of the ‘Chinese model.’ The domestic situation defined the current constraints of policy and tactics, but the ideological problems of direction were oriented primarily at international events affecting Vietnam and were articulated in an international socialist orthodoxy.

In the phase of national assertion, 1975–86, the domestic situation became the primary concern of national leadership, but policy changes were practical, stopgap measures rather than ideological realignments. It was the clear failure of Stalinist ideology during this period which led to the definitive victory of reform at the Sixth Party Congress in 1986. By 1979 the economy was in worse shape than it had been during the war. Rice rations were one-third less than in wartime. Deteriorating relations with China contributed to the emergency, but the pressure to socialize the economy had to be relaxed. This was done unwillingly, under duress, and the screws were tightened and loosened several times in the early 1980s as different situations and different factions permitted. But the economy remained in deep crisis, pressing the question of famine and survival, and blasting the optimistic assumptions concerning victory and socialism which underpinned the regime’s ideology. Nevertheless, foreign policy ideology during this period was driven by regional events in Cambodia, growing hostility with China, and growing dependence on the Soviet Union.

From 1986 until 1990 Vietnam pursued a very forward policy of foreign policy reform with rather slow and meagre results, and the political strength and ideological conviction necessary for such persistence came from the general acknowledgement that there was no real alternative. Despite severe disappointments in the international response to Vietnamese initiatives, most prominently the Vietnamese military withdrawal from Cambodia in September 1989, the direction of foreign policy did not change. The limits of victory had been felt most intensely in domestic policy, and reform in foreign policy ideology was based primarily on the acknowledgement of the limits of victory.

Hungary, like Vietnam, demonstrated the clear pre-eminence of external factors and the lesser role of domestic issues. Of course, it was true that there were clear parallels in the basic features of the ideological underpinnings of domestic reform, on the one hand, and of ‘peaceful coexistence’ and international relations based on mutual interest not class criteria on the other. But this linkage was not the main reason for the coincidence of these respective policies under Kadar in the 1960s and 1970s. The key determinant of foreign policy at this time was the Soviet...
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line; Kadar appeared to use absolute submissiveness to the Soviet Union in external policy as a means of minimizing conflict with it over domestic reforms after the 1968 Czechoslovak crisis. Kadar avoided explicit ideological reform in any sphere as far as possible.

It is true that an important internal factor, reform of foreign policy ideology in Hungary was the impending domestic crisis. This was undoubtedly an important factor promoting the break in foreign policy and the accompanying ideological revisions of the early 1980s. The political elite were well aware that a rupture with the West was economically impossible, and that the Soviet Union simply did not have the resources to step in to fill the gap that would have been left. The economic crisis raised profound fears of mass violent revolt in the minds of elite members. '1956' was burnt into the collective memory of the older generation, and this explains the consistent sensitivity of the Kadar regime to the political impact of economic 'difficulties'. The Polish crisis of 1980–1 reinforced this lesson in a timely way. They were thus prepared to take the risks of breaking away from Moscow, and sought thereby to enhance their domestic credibility.

Our final case, the GDR, is in some senses the most unusual because it is impossible to properly distinguish between domestic and international factors in the reform of foreign policy ideology. There were three main sets of domestic factors which either contributed to the reform of East German foreign policy ideology in the 1980s, or set the limits to such reform in the GDR. First, the SED, as we have already seen in the case of Hungary, realized that if détente evaporated, and German-German relations were consequently impaired, then the GDR would lose valuable financial credits, hidden subsidies, trade advantages, and technological 'know-how' from the West in general and in the GDR case, from the FRG in particular. Second, in the GDR in the early 1980s, as in the rest of Germany and in much of Central Europe, the question of peace and the new 'Euro-Russian' deployments became the focus of major public concern. In East Germany, this led to the growth of a small but politically significant independent peace movement, centred on the Protestant Church. This presented the SED with both a challenge and an opportunity. The challenge was to the SED's monopoly of power — the foundation upon which the whole of the East German political system was built. The opportunity was to reinforce its shaky political legitimacy by taking up and championing the issue of peace.

Third, the limited extent of the ideological reform in foreign policy can be attributed to two main domestic factors, both of which are unique to the GDR case: the centrality of Orthodox Marxism-Leninism to the political rationale of the East German state, and the continuity of Honecker's leadership from 1971 to 1989. As we have already seen, the GDR was a state which lacked national as well as democratic legitimacy. Its raison d'être was therefore grounded in the Marxist-Leninist concept of history and class struggle. It was for this reason that the SED had so much difficulty in accepting the more radical implications of the 'new political thinking', particularly as regards minimizing the centrality of class struggle within the contemporary international system, and the reputed 'peaceful' character of modern-day imperialism.

The very continuity of the Honecker regime provided another impediment to a more unambiguous and ambitious process of foreign policy ideology reform in the 1980s. This prevented the sort of extensive rethink of foreign policy aims and objectives which took place, for example, in the Soviet Union after 1985. In China, and to a lesser extent Vietnam as well, a change of leadership was also critical to making reform of foreign policy ideology possible. But as important as the specific qualities of individual leaders might be, it seems fair to conclude that only in the cases of the larger communist states — the Soviet Union and China — were domestic factors the major factors fueling reform of foreign policy ideology.

THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

As has already been made clear in the previous section, it is difficult to distinguish between pressures for reform that come from domestic politics or the international system. The danger of analytical confusion is all the greater when assessing a subject as ambiguous as ideology. And yet at least some factors can be identified as having encouraged or hindered reform from outside the state. The case of the Soviet Union is perhaps most difficult to assess if only because as a superpower it played a far greater role in international affairs than any of the other states under consideration.

But in all the cases of reform of foreign policy ideology, it can be said that influences from the international system played an important part. For example, the decay of the economy, especially in the Soviet Union, China and Vietnam may have been a fact in its own right, but it was when citizens of these states could compare their own condition with that of their rivals in the capitalist market economies (and even rivals in the communist world), that they could see they were rapidly falling behind. The Soviet Union and Vietnam had the particularly sour experience of seeing China make rapid economic progress, but at least the Chinese case demonstrated that some reforms of a socialist economy were feasible. Especially for the Soviet Union, the relevance of China might well have been greater than the less comparable Hungarian case.

The shock to the psyche of the Soviet Union was sharp. In the 1960s Japan became the world's second largest economy and challenged at least part of the Soviet Union's superpower status. China had traditionally viewed Japan as a 'younger brother' so it was all the more galling when Japan came to dominate the economies of East Asia. West Europeans and Americans had long been growing far richer than the Soviet Union, despite the rhetoric and false figures that suggested the opposite. But for China
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and Vietnam, even to some extent the Soviet Union, it was the NICs of East Asia which were making the most striking progress. The NICs also demonstrated, as Japan had done before them, how it was possible to find the greater prosperity of closer integration with the international capitalist system, without losing important national characteristics or even important features of a command economy.

Of course, the move to reform foreign policy ideology in the Soviet Union and Vietnam were not merely due to the positive examples from the outside world. There was also a degree of hostile pressure from the international system that raised the cost of maintaining an unreformed system. It is a matter of great debate whether the United States 'forced' the Soviet Union or China into perestroika, or the Soviet Union and the West forced Vietnam into reform. This line of argument suggests that, for example, the American military build-up under President Reagan made it far more difficult to sustain the Soviet war economy and the search for greater efficiency in the Soviet Union eventually led the Kremlin to 'seek for peace'.

The SDI programme, the tough line on INF weapons, support for Afghan rebels and other anti-communist struggles around the world all made the Soviet position of an unreformed superpower unsustainable even in the medium term.

Few can doubt that such pressures from the international system had an impact, but it is far from clear that they speeded the process of perestroika and the subsequent East-West détente or Vietnamese reform. Indeed, the precise opposite can also be argued persuasively. Particularly in the Soviet case, the key is in an understanding of Soviet domestic politics and when it was ready for perestroika. When the Reagan administration began its hard line in the early 1980s, the Soviet Union was in the last months of the Brezhnev administration. But even in the so-called 'years of stagnation' under Brezhnev, there were clear signs of reform of Soviet national security policy. The harder American line can be said to have slowed the process of East-West arms control by harming the case of those in the Soviet Union who argued there was a reasonable basis for détente. The brief Andropov era was clearly one step on a road to reform and it was not only the fading health of the Soviet leader that slowed and eventually stalled the reform of ideology. The uncompromising reaction from the outside world had more than a little to do with the limits to Soviet reforms at the time and the subsequent appointment of Chernenko as successor.

The Chinese opening to the West, of course, took place in the early 1970s, but had far more to do with the fact that the West wooed China than the other way around. China was not nearly the strategic rival that the Soviet Union appeared to be, and in any case the timing of the change of American policy in particular had a great deal to do with the election of a new administration and the need to get out of Vietnam. It was China's reform of its attitude towards the Soviet Union in the 1980s that was much more akin to East-West relations in the linkage between domestic and foreign policy. China changed its view of the Soviet Union when China itself became 'revisionist' and then eventually saw that the Soviet Union was serious about détente. The reforms in the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev clearly followed the crisis at home. The causes of that crisis had relatively little to do with outside pressure, although the problems in supporting perestroika had a great deal to do with the perception of a hostile external world. It was only a series of persistent concessions to common sense by the Gorbachev administration that eventually convinced the United States that they could do business with this real reformer in the Kremlin. The American unwillingness to abandon SDI, for example, can be seen as a brake on perestroika in foreign policy ideology and not a cause of East-West détente.

By the late 1980s when the West welcomed Soviet reforms in less ambiguous terms, it became clear that the international system could have a positive effect in helping to shape Soviet reforms. Summits that were seen to succeed strengthened the reformer's hand. Promises of aid and trade did much the same, as did arms control agreements. In the jargon of social scientists, 'feedback loops' supported reform. Similar trends were evident much earlier in the Chinese relationship with the market economies of the West. Although the basic reason for the increased growth in China was internal reforms, foreign trade and investment were clearly part of the process. Reformers were boosted by China's improved standing in the world and even the normalization of relations with the Soviet Union demonstrated that the leadership could provide China with its most peaceful international environment for centuries.

When reforms in the Soviet Union were seen to be in danger in 1990–1, and in China after the Peking massacre of June 1989, the feedback turned negative as aid dried up and anti-Soviet and anti-Chinese rhetoric increased. The Gulf war served both as a reason for greater retrenchment in the Soviet Union and China because of worries over American triumphalism, and as a way to enhance the image of the Soviet Union and China as more cooperative actors in managing international security. In sum, the international system neither supported nor hindered openness as a general rule. The outside world did both, and sometimes at the same time on different issues. Although states like to believe that they can construct a coherent package of rewards and punishments that can send clear messages to other states, the reality is far more messy.

The difficulty of calculating the impact of international factors seems especially evident in the curious case of Vietnam. One rather perverse factor encouraging Vietnam's international openness may have been the relatively sluggish world response to its earlier initiatives. Vietnam put itself into the position of pushing so hard on the door to have it swing open that its policies were designed to be internationally attractive rather than

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more commercial.
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internally defensive. As trade increased in 1989, imports flooded Vietnamese markets and Vietnamese domestic production declined. It might be anticipated that Vietnam will adopt somewhat more protectionist policies when international openness is assured. In addition, the level of anxiety in Vietnamese foreign policy ideology was heightened enormously by events in China in 1989 and changes in European communism. These illustrated the danger of mis-steps, the futility of repression, and the possibility of snowballing political change.

As in Vietnam, in Hungary it is clear that international factors, and especially the policies of the Soviet Union, played a vital part in the cause of the reform. The breakdown of détente at the end of the 1970s confronted Hungary for the first time with a real conflict between loyalty to Moscow and the pursuit of domestic stability through reform. The attempt by the Soviet Union to increase bloc cohesion and discipline threatened Hungary’s vital interests as perceived by the Hungarian leadership.

The sensibility of the Soviet leadership under Brezhnev and the prolonged succession crisis created conditions for bad decision-making (such as the invasion of Afghanistan) with which Hungary was in disagreement or the mishandling or avoidance of necessary decisions. In these circumstances, the smaller East European countries were bound to try to escape Soviet domination as far as possible. With the arrival of Gorbachev (after some initial setbacks in bloc relations), ‘new thinking’ became legitimate in international relations. Hungarian representatives were even able to claim that their own foreign policy thinking had, for once, influenced the Soviet Union’s foreign policy and ‘modified the Soviet image of the world’.

Very similar features also applied in the East German case, but ultimately it was the GDR’s unique international position which both helped to provoke and to limit its reform of foreign policy ideology. There were four main factors from the international system which contributed to the revisions to the Marxist–Leninist concept of international relations in the GDR. First, the deterioration in East–West relations in the early 1980s raised the spectre of the GDR becoming the principal battlefield of a future conventional and nuclear conflict in Europe. Second, the fact that NATO – and the FRG in particular – was willing to counter the Soviet and Warsaw Pact military build-up challenged some of the key assumptions underlying East German military security thinking. It demonstrated the limits of a concept of ‘one-sided’ security, and showed that a continued military build-up did not necessarily bring more security. Third, the GDR found that its stress on the unity of the socialist community was seen to be misplaced when the Polish crisis of 1980–1 wrecked the Warsaw Pact and the CMEA. The GDR therefore began defining and articulating their own specific foreign policy interests, as we have already seen. Fourth, and on top of these other problems in the international arena, there was the deepening political and economic stagnation in the USSR. This was undoubtedly the major external impetus behind the East German revision of their foreign policy ideology.

The growing paralysis and stagnation of the USSR in this period led to a weakening of Soviet authority in Eastern Europe, and consequently to a growing divergence between the foreign and domestic policies of the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies. Although the GDR and even Hungary remained loyal allies of Moscow and defenders of bloc unity, Hungary, and even to some extent the GDR also began to assert their own specific interests more robustly. Both publicly resisted the Soviet Union’s policy of confrontation with the West and with the FRG in particular. Frustration with the immobility of Soviet foreign policy during the early 1980s thus led some East European states to define their own specific foreign policy interests, and to articulate them with more concern.

From 1987 onwards, however, the GDR and Vietnam found themselves increasingly under threat – not from the immobility of Soviet foreign policy – but from the accelerating dynamism of the Soviet domestic reform process. Of course it was these very policies which so pleased the Hungarians and the Chinese, although Peking was far less approving of glasnost’ than of perestroika. Gorbachev’s policies encouraged like-minded reformers nearly everywhere where communist parties ruled, and provided further ammunition for dissident groups in East Europe and even East Asia. The Honecker leadership found itself more on the defensive than any other communist state and a counter-offensive was launched by theSED’s old guard. This was aimed at countering reformist currents within the GDR, and as we have seen, the ideological counter-offensive embraced foreign policy ideology as well as domestic policy concerns. But by then the swirling currents of reformist ideology were too diffused in the socialist community.

PERESTROIKA and glasnost’ were to tumble through Eastern Europe, knocking over regimes in their path. But in East Asia, the outcome was very different. China’s perestroika was already much further advanced and the march of glasnost’ was blasted on the streets of Peking in June 1989. Vietnam suffered no bloodshed in defence of Communist Party rule as in China, but the outcome was the same. By early 1990 it was more clear than ever before that East Asian communism was very different from that in Europe.

CONCLUSIONS

In sum, even if theory has not been the basis of day-to-day decision making in the communist states, it has played an important role in the setting of long term objectives and it has performed other important functions.

Ideology has always been used, for example, to legitimize foreign policy (arguably it performs that function in all societies). The recourse by reformers to the early writings of Lenin and to Marx and Engels to support their arguments suggests that this function is still important in China and
Vietnam, and of course not at all in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. However, as is already clear in the Chinese and Vietnamese cases, as the reforms develop, orthodoxy will be eroded and it will almost inevitably lose some of its power of legitimation. In other words, as it became more possible to criticize the founders of Marxism-Leninism (much more so in the Soviet Union than in China or Vietnam), and as plural and conflicting views were encouraged, so the stage of ‘new political thinking’ ended with the revolution in August 1991 and the foreign policy ceased to be a closed system of conventional ideas and wisdoms.

In those states in East Asia that still retained a link to the ideology, the openness also meant that it began to lose another of its important functions. In the past, Marxism-Leninism provided the language, concepts and theoretical categories for thinking and talking about politics and international relations. It was the very means of cognition. As such, it exerted an enormous indirect effect on policy by influencing perceptions, expectations and interpretations. But where a plurality of views prevailed, there came to be multiple perceptions, many possible interpretations and a variety of desirable outcomes.

Another function of foreign policy ideology has been to engender support at home and abroad and to serve as a cohesive device. In the recent past it has performed this service in the Soviet alliance as a whole, although this was far less true for the East Asian communists. Before the days of polycentrism this function extended to the whole international communist movement. It was also used to intimate policy changes and to indicate the limits of innovation in both theory and policy. In the case of the new political thinking in the Soviet Union, many of the ideological formulations predated the policy changes they portended. In the first instance, the intention was probably to alert foreign and domestic audiences to the forthcoming policy reforms. Once the reforms had begun the new political thinking was used in an obvious attempt to engender support for perestroika in each one of the reforming communist states and for the leadership’s vision of a new international order. But far from demarcating limits, Soviet theorists, like those in China before them, were instructed to innovate and in the more liberal atmosphere of glasnost’ they were increasingly invited to ignore most previous ideological boundaries. This made it possible for the new political thinkers to debate with one another, to borrow from other theories. In other words, the theory became far more flexible, open to outside influences and it even changed. But such transformations clearly detracted from the function of ideology as a cohesive device. On balance, both Deng and Gorbachev seemed to have gone a long way in the endeavour of de-ideologization of foreign policy.

What is more certain is that in all the communist states under analysis, except North Korea, it has been possible for some foreign policy ideology to be reformed in a significant way. But there have been major variations in the nature, pace and longevity of such reform. The causes of such variation are complex, and have already been discussed in greater detail in earlier chapters. Suffice it to say that the size of the state, its place in the international system, its specific domestic politics and the reactions of outside states have all been different for each country.

Thus it does seem, as Stalin admitted, that theory tends to lag behind practice, although in the Soviet case the theory of reform sometimes seems to outpace the practice. Hungary had the longest experience with the challenge of such reform, although like East Germany it was always aware of the limits imposed by the Soviet Union. The GDR also managed a brief episode of reform against the Soviet grain, but it was such a unique case that it merely highlighted the extent to which the particular national characteristics of the GDR made any far-reaching reform unsustainable.

China has so far been the example of the most far-reaching and sustained reform of foreign policy, although not of foreign policy ideology. Before August 1991, the Soviet Union reformed its foreign policy ideology more completely than any other state except the transformed East Europeans. But until August 1991 in the Soviet case some aspects of practice lagged behind theory. In China, even after the unrest of 1989, the strategy of opening to the outside world was maintained, despite a brief suggestion by conservatives that the doors be swung shut. To be sure, China continues to be uncertain about how far the doors should be open, but its spirit of experimentation clearly extends to the ideology of the open door strategy.

It can also be said that Vietnam has persisted in its ideology of opening to the outside world, although it has done so for less time than any of the other communist states in this analysis apart from North Korea. As a smaller state, it has been subject to powerful pressures from the Soviet Union and China and its room for manoeuvre is far smaller than that in China. The division of the country with a more cosmopolitan south has been a special opportunity and problem. But like China, Vietnam seems determined to experiment with ideologies that support some openness to the outside world, while preserving the rule of its Communist Party.

Finally, and as has already be suggested, the case of the Soviet Union seems hardest to categorize. Few can doubt the depths of its reform of foreign policy ideology before August 1991, even with the uncertainties of the conservative backlash in 1990-1. In the Soviet case, the influence of domestic factors may well have been relatively greater in determining the pace and path of reform, but as with all the others, there was an important role for outside actors in influencing the nature of change. Yet in neither the Soviet Union, China or Vietnam, could foreign policy be said to have been fully de-ideologized. China and Vietnam seemed more certain about their ‘socialist characteristics’, even though many doubt they can be retained for much longer. The case of the Soviet Union was perhaps the most difficult to judge because it seemed so much more uncertain about its
future shape, let alone whether it will have a socialist character. In the end, and in the most unusual of circumstances, the Soviet Union joined its former East European comrades in abandoning Communist Party rule, leaving international communism as virtually an Asian phenomenon.

NOTES


2 A number of these have been published in the Chatham House Papers series: Judy Batt, East Central Europe from Reform to Transformation (London: RIIA/Pinter, 1991); Christoph Bluth, New Thinking in Soviet Military Policy (London: RIIA/Pinter, 1990); Christopher Culic, Remaking the Balkans (London: RIIA/Pinter, 1991); Leonard Gerson, Soviet Foreign Economic Policy under Perestoka (London: RIIA/Pinter, 1990); J.M.C. Rolfe et al., The New Eastern Europe: Eastern Responses (London: RIIA/Pinter, 1990); and Michael Williams, Vietnam (London: RIIA/Pinter, 1992). See also Adrian Hyde-Price, European Security beyond the Cold War: Four Scenarios for the Year 2010 (London: Sage for the RIA, 1991), and Gerald Segal and Akihiko Tanaka, China's Reforms in Crisis (London: RIIA, 1989).

INTRODUCTION: DEFINING REFORM AS OPENNESS

1 We are aware that there is a vast literature in the field of comparative communist politics dealing with aspects of reform. We are not about to engage in the usual academic exercise of citing all that has gone before, largely because this study focuses on the most recent period of reform when so much has been transformed beyond recognition. We believe that our particular emphasis on, and understanding of, the term 'openness' will provide students of both international relations and comparative politics with some fresh insights. This is not to claim, however, that there are no other recent studies that focus on aspects of openness. In the Soviet field, one can cite Jerry Hough, Opening the Soviet Economy (Washington: Brookings, 1988) and Ed Hewett, Open for Business (Washington: Brookings, 1991); and in the China field, there is Robert Kleinberg, China's "Opening" to the Outside World (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990).
80 Neues Deutschland, 3 February 1988, p. 2.
82 Murray Hiebert, 'People’s Art Comes Closer to the People', Far Eastern Economic Review, 10 September 1987, pp. 49-51.
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87 Interview with M. W. Kohlhammer, deputy chairperson of the Council of Religious Affairs, in Argumenty i fakty, 11-17 August 1990.
91 Bruce Clark and Michael Theodoulou, 'Links Broken Off by Stalin are Restored', The Times, 18 September 1990.
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100 There is no time period linked to this statement, but it probably refers to the year 1989. 'Soviet Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Consular Service', Soviet News, 25 July 1989, p. 247.
103 Julia Wushensky and John Stavis, 'Emigration from the Soviet Union', RFE Report on Eastern Europe, special issue 'The New Migration', 1 December 1989, p. 34.
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106 Xue Muqiao, Almanac of China’s Economy, p. 677ff; Beijing Review, 22 August 1988, p. 27.
112 China Daily, 17 June 1990; Beijing Review, 10 October 1988, p. 27.

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114 Beijing Review, vol. 31, no. 46, p. 34 and vol. 35, no. 22. See also China Daily, 15 June 1990.
116 See, for example, S. R. Schram, Ideology and Policy in China since the Third Piarenm 1978-84 (London: Contemporary China Institute, 1984).
120 Der Spiegel, 23 March 1987, p. 17.
121 Der Spiegel, 31 August 1987, p. 33.
126 Sovietkaya Rossiya, 21 June 1990.
129 Mikhail Gorbachev’s Address to the UN General Assembly, Soviet News, 14 December 1988, pp. 459-65.
133 For example: China Daily, 7 July 1990, p. 1.

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20 writers considered a significant influence on sociopolitical thought in the Soviet Union and beyond. Their works continue to be studied and debated today.

For a more detailed analysis of their impact, see [specific references].
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27 The original is from a 1962 speech.
29 Ibid., p. 9.
31 Xu Xiangjun, Renmin Ribao, 31 July 1978.
32 Soviet pullout from Afghanistan, Vietnamese pullout from Cambodia, and reduction of troops on the Chinese border.
34 Deng: Reform is "Second Revolution" (remarks made 28 March to visiting Japanese LDP Vice-President Susumu Nikaido), Reiting Review, no. 14, 8 April 1985, p. 6.
44 New Deutschland, 26/27 November 1985, p. 5.

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51 See, for example, Andre Brie, Europa: Wieso Waffen reichen aus? (Berlin, DDR: Staatsverlag der DDR, 1988); and Gerhard Pofik, Militärstrategische Parität – Gleich Nutzbarkeits Abwechslung? (Berlin, DDR: Dilet Verlag, 1987).
55 For example, on his state visit to France in January 1986, Erich Honecker declared that, ‘We wish to continue joining others in building the common house of Europe’, Neues Deutschland, 8 January 1988.
56 'Der Streit der Ideologien und die gemeinsame Sicherheit', Neues Deutschland, 28 August 1987, p. 3. For a commentary, see Barbara Donovan, 'An SED-SPD Statement on Ideological Disputes', Radio Free Europe, Background Report 155, 8 September 1987.
57 The most innovative ‘new thinkers’ in East Germany at this time include Dieter Klein, Lutz Maier and Andre Brie. In some of Dieter Klein’s articles, he tries to develop a new paradigm for proving the potential for a ‘peaceful capitalism’, rooted in a study of contemporary political economy; for example, see his article, ‘Politikökonomische Grundlage für einen friedlichen Kapitalismus’, PFW Berichte, no. 2, 1988, pp. 1–9. Similarly, see Lutz Maier, ‘Disharmoniopathie und der Friedensfrage’, in Max Schmidt (ed.) Sicherheit und Friedliche Koexistenz (Berlin, DDR: SED, 1987), pp. 161–83; and Andre Brie, Intelligente Waffen oder intelligente Politik? Abwehrung – die Chance der Vernunft (Berlin, DDR: Verlag Neues Leben, 1988).
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60 See, for example, Klässy u klassowej bari o razowywuchshchke stram, Moscow, 1956; K. Brutents, 'O nekotorykh osobennostyakh sovremennogo natsional’nno-oswoboditelnogo chizhenija', Voprosy filosofii, no. 6, 1965, pp. 27–28.
65 Kolosovskiy, 'Regional Conflicts', p. 506. A. Kiva points out (A. Kiva, National’noswoboditel’nnoe dvizhenie, Moscow: Nauka, 1989, p. 517) that the Soviet Union is itself, according to most of its social and economic indices, a developing country. Soviet aspirations in the Third World should be tempered to reflect this.
92. Ibid., p. 17.
106. On the unofficial East German peace movement, see John Sandford, The


108 Indeed, Article 6 of the 1968 Constitution (as amended in 1974) states categorically that "the all-round strengthening of the socialist community gathered around the Soviet Union is the foremost foreign policy objective of the Socialist Unity Party".


112 This is not to suggest that the new political thinking was invented by policymakers. Aganbegyan once maintained that Gorbachev has a history of surrounding himself with a small group of specialists and borrowing and learning from the ideas and concepts that fit with his views. As far as foreign policy is concerned, he was probably close to Yakovlev (it has been rumoured that he was instrumental in getting Yakovlev back from Canada and he certainly promoted him very quickly) even before he became general secretary. And Yakovlev both had ideas himself and was in a position to 'take a look' in IMEMO.

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Gerald Segal

With Judy Batt, Barry Buzan, Peter J.S. Duncan, David S.G. Goodman, Adrian Hyde-Price, Margot Light, John Phipps, Michael C. Williams and Brantly Womack

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