tionary idealism. Mao's confessions of responsibility at the Lushan Conference in 1959 and also at the January 30, 1962 working conference for some of the excesses of the Great Leap Forward help explain his passivity and permissiveness in the years of recovery.

The Cultural Revolution was certainly the main event of the phase of socialist correction. The elements of personal power struggle and ideological struggle are inseparable in both the causes and the results of the Cultural Revolution. The relative success of the post-Great Leap Forward Party leadership in insulating themselves from Mao's intervention backfired when Mao mobilized the masses outside the Party for an attack on "the headquarters." The policy vacillation of support for the left and attempts to restore order are indicative of Mao's continued ambivalence between revolutionary ideals and materials welfare. After the fall of Lin Piao, these two poles separated more distinctly into an emphasis on economic modernization championed by Chou En-lai and finally the hypercritical idealism of the Gang of Four.

The small corrections of the economic repair periods are less ambitious and controversial than the big corrections of the periods of critical innovation. The Western evaluation of the Great Leap Forward has shifted somewhat from the scorn of early judgments. Not only were other causes quite significant for the ensuing bad years, but many of its policy aspirations toward the devolution of economic decision-making, local industry, and commune structure can be viewed as first attempt inadequacies rather than as nonsensical. The evaluation of the Cultural Revolution is more controversial, and it is a synecdoche for judging the phase of socialist correction as a whole.

The accomplishments of the Cultural Revolution are not easy to perceive because of their predominantly critical character. It is however precisely this attitude of principled critique which accounts for its popularity among leftists, from Maoist groups in Western industrialized countries to the more radical students of Georg Lukacs in Eastern Europe. The Cultural Revolution represented one of the few instances of post-modern critical idealism in action. The evils attacked were the modern sins of positional hierarchy—bureaucracy, official complacency, and elite self-preservation—and the means were a refreshing reliance on mass spontaneity. For people the world over who feel themselves the impotent consumers of an increasingly banal and powerful societal order, this was a new event. The short reign of the Gang of Four was an absolutization of critical idealism made possible by isolation from a mass base and from the responsibilities of promoting material welfare. This situation of estrangement from the masses was fundamentally un-Maoist, however revolutionary the slogans.

For Chinese internal political modernization, three major accomplishments can be attributed to the Cultural Revolution, although their roots are in the phase of socialist correction as a whole. The first and most important is that the acceptance of the Chinese Communist Party as the unquestioned monolith of Chinese political culture has been shaken. The repeated attempts since 1967 to improve the prestige of the Party are evidence enough of the effect of the
Cultural Revolution. Two levels of exposure of the CCP can be distinguished. First, the Cultural Revolution legitimated the critique of Party members as individuals rather than as representatives of the Party (the latter attitude necessarily made critics anti-Party). The big character poster is the major vehicle and proof of the relative impunity with which cadres can be criticized. On the more general level, the experience of a series of contradictory claims and explications of two-line struggles within the Party has undoubtedly sensitized the political public to divergences within the leadership and has rendered commitment to a particular policy direction less automatic. Both of these developments can be viewed as destructive to the Party only if the role of the Party in Chinese politics is absolutized; otherwise the encouragement of a more critical and politically sophisticated public should be viewed as progress. A second accomplishment of the Cultural Revolution was not as intentional: it destroyed ideological naivete. Over the course of the phase of socialist correction, a number of key political concepts, particularly negative ones like "counterrevolutionary" and "capitalist," lost any consistent content. At the end the Chinese public was treated to the idiosyncracies of the "criticize Confucius, criticize Lin Piao" campaign, in which ideology and history were reduced to metaphorical battle-grounds—an offence for which Yao Wen-yuan once criticized Wu Han. The resilience which the official press displayed in ideological rebirths was undoubtedly beyond the capacities of any reader. A different type of loss of ideological innocence resulted from disillusionment with the rule of the Gang of Four. The ineffectiveness of critical idealism in command has undoubtedly contributed to a general disillusionment with politics by principle. The loss of ideological naivete is not a regression for Chinese politics because naivete is inevitably lost, but China will be fortunate if the ideological effects of the phase of socialist correction are as positive as its political effects. The split between ideology and practice can survive a reversal of polarity; the theory of practically-minded leadership can become as wooden and uncreative as the practice of dogmatic leadership. The third accomplishment of the Cultural Revolution was that it destroyed, weakened or exposed numerous inflexibilities in China's political economy, thereby raising social consciousness. Without this consciousness the "creativity of the masses" is an empty phrase, although with it the cadre is forced to earn his higher salary. In a grand and excessively vague sense, the lasting effect of the last twenty years of Chinese politics has been the challenging of inflexibilities, political, ideological, and societal.

V. THE 'NEW AGE' OF CHINESE MODERNIZATION

The new phase of China's socialist modernization was initiated by "the smashing of the Gang of Four and with it the successful conclusion of the first Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution." (Peking Review, no. 20, 1978, p.6) Its hallmark is the "four modernizations" of industry, agriculture, military and science, a clear reversal of direction from the phase of socialist correction toward practical economic development. At least as important to the establishment of the new age in my opinion was the death of Mao Tse-tung,
because his death made possible the thorough defeat of the Gang of Four and left an extraordinary ideological and leadership vacuum. China now has a collective leadership held together by its political, practical, and ideological rejection of the Gang of Four. As new decision-points emerge and the more extreme positions within the leadership differentiate themselves, collective leadership will either erode or it will require some special measures for its preservation.

The ideological spectrum of China's current leadership ranges from Cultural Revolution Maoism to a pragmatic managerial economism, but there do seem to be some common features in the new approach. Most important is the recognition of an urgent need to realize the four modernizations, which is based in part on a desire to emerge from the relative stagnation of the economy during the phase of socialist correction (according to Hu Ch'iao-mu, China's per capita grain production in 1977 was only equal to that of 1955), and in part on the necessity to prepare for the gloomy strategic forecast of war with the Soviet Union. A second essential common ground of the current leadership is the importance of Marxism-Leninism Mao Tse-tung Thought in providing the explanation and justification of new measures. There is by no means unanimity on the content of economic policy or the role of ideology-- and there is obviously a fair amount of pushing and shoving going on--but it appears most unlikely that the debate will include positions basically critical of economic modernization or that it will break out of the Chinese Marxist arena.

The specific features of this latest phase of Chinese modernization can perhaps be distinguished more clearly through a comparison with each of the preceding phases. After this comparison of content, we can conclude with an analysis of the dynamic effect of previous modernization on the new age.

For Western observers, the most striking (and profitable) aspects of the new period are those which recall the first phase of modernization. Numerous specific policies--sending 40,000 students overseas to non-Communist countries, accepting foreign credit, etc.--are making their first appearance since 1949. These seem to be a part of a general attitude of self-conscious Westernization in which microlevel capitalist economic rationality is being emphasized and the old slogan of "using things foreign for China" has reappeared as an official justification for change. But the limits--or at least the intended limits--of Westernization are also evident. In his October 6, 1978 essay, Hu Ch'iao-mu justifies studying Western techniques of economic management at the enterprise level because of advanced Western experience, but maintains the superiority at the macro-level of socialist planning. Of course, in the early twentieth century China experienced the difficulty of keeping separate t'i and yung, substance and utility, and openness toward the West will probably produce more problems than currently imagined. But China is now much more substantial and self-confident politically and culturally, and Westernization lacks the push of imperialism.

In my opinion a more important similarity between the first and present
phases of Chinese modernization is the current enhanced role of intellectuals and specialists, and the confidence that science and technology can transform China. The belief that knowledge is power—complete with quotations from Francis Bacon (Guangming Ribao, Sept. 19, 1978)—was a basic constituent of Western and early Chinese modernization, but in China it didn't prove true. The four modernizations intend to revivify "Mr. Science," and some calls for "Mr. Democracy" can also be heard, but most likely the political impact of the mobilization of the intellectuals will be similar in form but opposite in content to the 1966 mobilization of extra-Party forces.

As Teng Hsiao-p'ing knows well, the political legitimacy of the present practical reorientation derives from the 1927-1949 phase of political modernization. Teng was first removed from office for rightist tendencies in 1933 by the 28 Bolsheviks, and at that time the leader of the "empiricists" was Mao Tse-tung. "Seek truth from facts" is not only a phrase once uttered by Mao, it expresses a fundamental aspect of his creative reorientation of Marxism to suit the conditions of peasant war. Thus Teng can claim a meta-fidelity in using the same principle to reorient Maoism for the new age. Other evident similarities include the numerous current efforts to improve Party-mass relations and the domestic and international usage of united front tactics. (Peking Review, no. 1, 1978) The major difference between the practicality of the two phases is that Mao's pragmatism was directed toward winning a rural revolution based on class struggle, and thus his efforts has a more definite goal and a more populist foundation.

In many respects the most interesting similarities are with the phase of learning from the Soviet Union. It is obvious from Hu Ch'iao-mu's essay that pre-1958 experience provides a positive reference-point for current policy. More importantly, state proportional planning is emphasized as the main objective economic law to be observed, with the law of value playing a secondary but essential role. Also of great interest are the number of positive references to Stalin with regards to economics. The praise of Stalin is not necessarily anti-Maosit: Hu was the chief drafter of the Chinese reevaluation of Stalin in 1956 with which Mao expressed his complete agreement. (MacFarquhar, p.43) But the tone of Hu's praise differs considerably from Yu Ch'iu-li's earlier, more Cultural Revolution remark that "during the First Five-Year Plan we mechanically copied the Soviet practices such as the system of placing responsibility solely on the factory director, material incentives and reliance on specialists in running factories, and worshipped the "Charter of the Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Combine?" (Peking Review, no. 22, 1977) But now the technical measures stressed are Western (or perhaps Yugoslavian), and moreover hostility between the Soviet Union and China provides part of the motivation for modernization. The Soviet Union is no longer China's paradigm of modernization; what remains from the fifties are mid-level institutions of planning and management and mid-range Leninist-Stalinist justifications of practical economic measures. Western orientation and alliance with intellectuals and specialists already gives an Eastern European flavor to these similarities and might in time eclipse them altogether.
The relationship of the post-Mao phase with the phase of socialist correction is of course the most problematic and tense. The inadequacies of economic development from 1957 to 1976 make the phase a "teacher by negative example" for the major tasks of the moment. Autochthonic policies conceived in the spirit of self-reliance are now criticized, with the new emphasis being on specialized industries and cooperation through contracts. In policy implementation the emphasis seems to have shifted from studying models to learning techniques. However the political legacies of the preceding phase still remain strong. The response to the weakening of the Party's position has been to extend the avenues of criticism (for instance, the recent emphasis on letters to the editor), to promise the enforcement of socialist legality, and to make Mao's 1962 speech on democratic centralism the basis of rectification discussions within the Party. The renewal of the "100 Flowers" policy is also an important related development. The reaction to the ideological hypertension of the preceding phase has been a general secularization and loss of interest in ideology. Attention has turned to practical matters, with a resulting tendency (sometimes criticized, sometimes defended) to replace talk about politics with talk about production. The ideological reflection of this secularization is the theory that "practice is the only criteria for judging truth," which emerged via a Guangming Ribao special commentator last May. This is a basic repudiation of the approach of the Gang of Four, and its implications for continued ideological development remain to be seen.

In contrast to the Soviet model, the present economic policy seems very sensitive to inflexibilities and material welfare. Some of the credit for this progress should go to the phase of socialist correction.

There is no way to predict future developments in Chinese politics from the dynamics of earlier phases; nevertheless a consideration of the dialectics of phases is good preparation for the intelligent observation of events as they unfold. The new age of Chinese modernization involves responses to both the entire phase of socialist correction and to its last, most extreme subphase, the Gang of Four. More importantly, the death of Mao, which in my opinion provides the essential demarcation of the new age, requires a redefinition of the structure of political leadership and of the content and active role of ideology.

Current Chinese political leadership would have had a practice economic orientation even without the Gang of Four because of the imbalanced stress on politics and ideology in the socialist correction phase. But with the critique of the Gang of Four as its starting point, the practicality and commitment to economic progress of the present phase is much intensified. It is unclear whether the present degree of emphasis on non-political economics is a subphase or a phase, in other words, whether effective counter-currents will emerge to reassert the leading role of the Party and the occasional precedence of political concerns. But in any case the zigzags within this phase should occur within the horizons of a general commitment to the priority of economic development. Given the urgency, popularity, and extent of the new tasks, the practical successor phase to socialist critique will probably last a long time. After the ideological challenge to inflexibilities, the agenda is occupied by the task of the material establishment of guarantees.
Whereas the economic orientation of the present leadership is to a certain extent pre-determined by the respective deficiencies of the previous phase, the questions of post-Mao leadership structure and ideology are relatively open. Tensions between the traditions of collegiality in the CCP, the more recent bare-fisted factionalism of the Cultural Revolution, and the centrifugal tendency toward protected institutionalization will undoubtedly help shape the eventual leadership structure. In addition the new forces of intellectuals and specialists encouraged and multiplied by the four modernizations will add a new dimension to Party-non-Party relations. This latter factor will also seriously affect the resolution of the ideological predicament of maintaining revolutionary identity while adjusting to new tasks.

The present leadership in China has in common a record of relative opposition to the Gang of Four, but they have various sorts of legitimacy for their own positions and cover a wide ideological spectrum. To the extent that a political consolidation with a specific content is attempted, this backward-looking unity will prove inadequate, resistance and opposition will emerge, and the response to this will determine the next subphase of the leadership structure. The positive consolidation of leadership is already in progress under the banner of the third campaign to criticize the Gang of Four, resistance has emerged, although not openly, and the resistance has been challenged as support for the Gang of Four’s way of thinking. I doubt if the current absence of a crisis indicates the absence of a problem, and the next step in leadership consolidation might well be of a different order from that preceding it. As in the Cultural Revolution, it may be expected that power politics, group interests and ideological differences will be intertwined. The mobilization of intellectuals and specialists provides a rapidly growing and powerful base for the general de-emphasis of ideology. Simultaneously this poses a threat to the position, power and identity of the Party. Continuing modernization will inevitably produce a kind of pluralism, but the amount of peaceful coexistence or hostile competition could vary considerably and take a number of different forms.

Typically in Chinese Communist ideology, theoretical differences are not in terms of professed allegiances—everyone follows Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Mao Tse-tung. Serious ideological differences occur in the selection of principles to be emphasized. I doubt if the present phase will diverge from this pattern. Criticisms of the "mystification" of Mao by the Gang of Four, and the thesis that previous Marxist thinkers including Mao are only partially applicable to present conditions are not in my opinion preparation for an official thorough criticism of Mao, but are in themselves positions which any realistic post-Mao government would eventually take. The question which divides the ideological stream into left and right is to what extent are minds freed from the shackles of Gang of Four dogmatism and able to pursue effective policy—or, the same question from the opposite side, at what point does flexibility become revisionism. True to another tradition of CCP politics, the question is only discussed from the perspective of the dominant side. But numerous shifts in Chinese politics have demonstrated that unexpressed viewpoints con-
Chinese politics can be unpredictably calm as well as unpredictably volatile, and my concluding analysis isn't intended to encourage already excessive tendencies toward political seismology among China watchers. The major objective of this paper has been to put current developments in perspective, to recall the variety of modernization efforts which China has already experienced, with the hope that the patterns of the past will be of heuristic value in understanding the dynamic structure of the present.
MODERNIZATION IN CHINA

Selected Seminar Papers
on Contemporary China, III

edited by
STEVE S. K. CHIN

Centre of Asian Studies
UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG
1979
Centre of Asian Studies Occasional Papers and Monographs, No. 35
HK$ 50.00

General Editor: Frank H. H. King

The Centre of Asian Studies is established to provide a focal point for the activities of the University of Hong Kong in the areas of East and Southeast Asia, research assistance to scholars in these fields and with special reference to Hong Kong, and physical and administrative facilities for research, seminars, and conferences dealing with both traditional and modern aspects of Asian Studies.