1. THE PHASES OF CHINESE MODERNIZATION

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ALTHOUGH CHINA is unquestionably among the "Late starters" in modernization and her present leadership confesses that she is still among the world's backward nations in terms of labor productivity, her experience with regards to modernization has been unique and her world role reflects that uniqueness. In the Third World China occupies the ambiguous position of fellow sufferer, fellow student, but also model, and in relations with industrialized nations the ever-recurring phrase, yang wei chung yung, use things foreign for China, expresses an unusual confidence in the possibility of openness without exposure.

One essential aspect of China's modernization process which is likely to remain important for the foreseeable future is the role of ideological politics. Ideology almost necessarily plays a larger role in the modernization process of later starters because the presence of targets, models and threats from advanced countries invites prescriptive, transformative politics. Moreover, China as a Communist country is convinced of the superiority of socialist planning over capitalist market chaos (at least at the level of the national economy), and planning sharpens the effect of politics on economics. But more important than these generic factors, China has hitherto developed under a uniquely consolidated ideological-political leadership in the person of Mao Tse-tung and in the organization of the Chinese Communist Party. The experience of both Mao and the CCP have spanned the entire course of Chinese modernization, and this legacy is a constituent part of the People's Republic of China.

The relative autonomy of China's process of modernization can be attributed to her massiveness as a nation and as a culture and the absence of a consolidated colonial past. These factors are a necessary aspect of China's modernization process, but they are not sufficient to account for the course which China actually took. Among the givens of their 20th century political economy, the Chinese fashioned a zigzag path in which imitative and creative aspects, substantive and moral commitments were in constant tension.

The interplay of these tensions, sometimes in harmony, sometimes in opposition, has produced a pattern of phases in Chinese modernization which I will attempt to describe in this paper. These phases are not really developmental stages because they lack the continuity and cumulation which the word "stages" connotes. Each phase of Chinese modernization is typically in great contrast with preceding and succeeding ones, and gives the impression of being an autonomous--although imbalanced--surge of societal changes. In fact, however, the phases have a basic dialectical interdependence which is essential to the dynamics and significance of each individual phase. To some extent this interdependence is expressed in a temporal interpenetration of
phases, which raises endless problems of diminishing interest concerning proper dating. But this task is more properly the business of professional historians, and my suggestions concerning periodization are willing targets for their improvements. Certainly a basic object of this paper is to characterize each of a series of time periods in Chinese history, but an equally important object is to interpret the interdependence of phases and the general pattern of development.

The phases of Chinese modernization which I will discuss are as follows.

1. Compressed intellectual modernization from 1898 to 1927, which is characterized by an extremely rapid and Western-oriented ideological development. The rapidity and foreign orientation of this phase led to severe psychological and political crises of appropriateness for Chinese conditions, a situation in which the very different contribution of the succeeding phases was essential.

2. Protracted development of political institutions and policies corresponding to the revolutionary potential and practical needs of the peasantry characterize the second phase, 1927-1949. Mao Tze-tung's leadership in this phase was his first major contribution to Chinese history and perhaps his preeminent one, although in contrast to the previous phase this one is characterized by the relatively cumulative growth of a leadership organization, the Chinese Communist Party, and by direct rather than sentimental responsiveness to the masses. Mao's contribution was not primarily individual or intellectual, although those dimensions of his accomplishment are awesome. He guided the solution in practice of the political bottleneck created by the earlier phases of precocious development.

3. The third phase, 1949 to 1956, was the first one to be consciously entered into by the Chinese leadership. The period of learning from the Soviet Union's experience in socialist construction was quite different from the earlier phase of foreign orientation because it was basically an attempt to transfer practical knowledge and techniques. This phase led rather quickly to its own sort of crisis of appropriateness.

4. The period of socialist correction, 1957 to 1967, is characterized by Mao's interventions into relatively spontaneous process of PRC political life in order to achieve simultaneously material and political transformation. These attempts were based in part on successful experience in agricultural transformation, but also to a great extent they were based on nostalgic reminiscences of pre-1949 experience, rendered of PRC politics. The characteristically Maoist emphasis on the inseparability of mass revolution and promoting people's livelihood was rarely realized in practice, and the phases tends to fall apart into hostile sub-phases of production and revolution. Mao's ultimate leadership and his apparent ambivalence between the two goals supply a thin but basic thread of unity to this phase.

5. The present phase of Chinese modernization, the "new age" of col-
lective leadership, seeking truth from facts, and the four modernizations, seems so transparently technological and "Western" that it seems to stand apart from previous phases and to need not historical or cultural framework of interpretation. Upon reflection, this self-evidence (optimistic from a Western standpoint) is questionable, if only because the sole unchanging aspect of Chinese politics is the surprise and embarrassment of Western experts at each new turn of events. Of course the future of Chinese politics is not determined by the preceding phases of development, just as those phases were not predictable from their predecessors. But we can go beyond the alternatives of a naive confidence in the eternal present or a fear of the dark unknown by considering the structural pressures and historical referents which the pattern of Chinese modernization hitherto has provided. It is evident that the current phase is a reaction not only to the Gang of Four but also to the entire preceding phase of socialist correction, and that its practical commitment to economic modernization is not simply the demand of one faction of the current leadership. On the other hand, the death of Mao Tse-tung presents the post-Mao phase with a vacuum of leadership structure and ideological guidance which has not yet been decisively filled.

I. COMPRESSED INTELLECTUAL MODERNIZATION, 1898-1927

The conviction, rooted in China's experience with imperialism and the decline of central government control, that China was a backward and threatened nation vis-a-vis the modern world developed unevenly, and so to date its beginning from the 100 Days Reform of 1898 is more arbitrary than not. Hu Shih, for instance, in his The Chinese Renaissance sees a sudden Westernizing influence in Chinese life from 1900. I would begin with the 100 Days Reform as much for its symbolic as for its historic significance since it was the first major victory over traditional modes of thought of new ideas heavily influenced by the West. Aspects of the Reform recur many times in the early twentieth century: brief brilliance and heroism, the challenge of cosmopolitan youth to an antiquity which had grown particular and defensive, and the expression of ideals which proved unrealistic for the present but prophetic for the future.

Early progressives responded to the simultaneous mortal threat and unparalleled opportunity posed by the West with a euphoria of introducing a new age shadowed by the fear of extinction and a hatred for China's inertia. This phase of modernization can by no means be equated with Westernization, because the early twentieth century also saw the revivification of many aspects of the Chinese intellectual heritage, and, more importantly, the orientation toward the West was not merely a transfer of ideas and institutions. The social thought of the West was to a great extent descriptive reflection of indigenous social processes. Even if we ignore problems of translation, the same ideas in the very different context of China necessarily became external, entirely prescriptive, and radical. Correspondingly, the role and self-image of the foreign-oriented intellectual was not one of mere transmission. As Benjamin Schwartz and Li Tse-hou have shown, Yen Fu gave even the enterprise of translation an
individuality of political thought and synthesis. Whether expressed as the heroic personae of the new knights-errant or the paranoic isolation of Lu Hsun's madman, there was a sense of personally mediating China's historic predicament.

The individualism of the phase of compressed intellectual modernization is related to the extraordinary rapidity of intellectual change. As the case of K'ang Yu-wei demonstrates, by simply maintaining ones viewpoint it was possible to slide from being scandalously revolutionary to being scandalously reactionary within 20 years. With such a rate of change there could be little effective institutionalization of particular viewpoints, hence the traditional habits and roles of scholars tended to persist despite a new content. But the rate of change and foreign orientation did produce major changes in the social and political identities of the new intellectuals. The new culture's resources were in the cities, and the pursuit of things progressive directed attention away from the countryside. According to Chou En-lai, even Mao was affected in his youth by the one-sided emphasis on cities. Concomitant with the progressive urban orientation was an isolation from China's political elite. The deterioration of the traditional scholar-official alliance in the warlord period faced the intellectuals with a new problem of social identity, and in the 1920's this led to sentimental identifications with either the proletariat or the peasant. Professional identification and institutionalization also began to spread, but this tendency was considerably less successful than its Western model because of its extrinsic social role. The acuteness of the problem of intellectual identity resulted from the tension between an abstract self-consciousness of importance for China coupled with the concrete experience of inaptness and failure. For both the Chinese Communist Party and the Left Kuomintang, the collapse of the first KMT-CCP united front in 1927 was a focal point of this contradiction.

II. PROTRACTED POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, 1927-1949

The Chinese Communist Party was originally an expression of urban radical cosmopolitanism, but from 1927 Mao Tse-tung was inspired by the necessities of survival to develop a political line and concrete policies for the situation of rural revolution, and from 1935 his rural revolutionary paradigm became increasingly dominant in the CCP.

Of course, the Communist policy developments on the countryside would not be accepted by everyone as a phase of modernization. For many Chinese intellectuals, Chinese politics has been a constant embarrassment from 1900 to the present. It is common to blame the Anti-Japanese War for the abortion of KMT political development and to view the success of peasant revolution as a war-produced atavism. In a short, essay persuasion is not really possible, but it seems to me that the criteria for judging political modernization in China should be political innovations which provide policies appropriate for China's twentieth-century existence rather than an agenda of expectations formed by the Western experience of modernization. It is not surprising that
an apt Chinese political paradigm would be rural-oriented, nor that it would be revolutionary since it involved a primary political mobilization of oppressed classes. The rural revolutionary roots of the People's Republic of China provided the characteristic shape of later Chinese modernization. All economic modernization entails the relative deprivation of the agricultural population, and hitherto China has not been an exception. But China's relatively rapid and effective responses to the rural-urban imbalances of economic growth are undoubtedly related to a political style and values which were forged in fighting a peasant war. This is an experience which only China and Vietnam have had, and although it is related to the peculiarities of their national situations, in my opinion it is not a detour from modernization but a part of a new path.

Fifty years ago this month Mao Tse-tung wrote "Why is it the Red power can survive in China?" The title reflects the desperate situation at Ching-kangshan, and Mao's answer was the beginning of his rural revolutionary strategy. But despite the seminal brilliance of Mao's theoretical analyses of peasant revolution, the major source of new and successful policies was not theoretical deduction but practical investigation and experimentation. Mao's political thought not only reflected his practical experience, it also emphasized the predominant role of practice in political leadership and cor-relatively the importance of investigation, experience, and flexibility. In arguing for an emphatically practical world-view in "On Practice" and "On Contradiction" Mao merely preached what he had long practiced.

The basic principles of Mao's political paradigm emerged at Chingkangshan and Kiangsi before the Long March, but it was only in Yenan in the forties that they were applied self-confidently and on large scale. The basic task was to mobilize effectively overwhelming mass support for military, political, and economic tasks. The principles for accomplishing this task were developed at Chingkangshan, and the problem of implementation in a large governmental structure was solved in principle in Kiangsi. The military principles included a pyramid structure of military tasks with the largest possible participation at the non-professional levels, guerrilla tactics of dispersion and surprise, and a perversely flexible approach to territorial defense. Political policy in the base areas centered on the rapid institution of mass-based local government under local and central Party leadership. The primary economic policy before 1935 was land redistribution, although prototypes of the later Yenan policies of cooperatization, reducing the maintanence costs of public organizations, and prestige awards for unusual productivity were also in evidence in Kiangsi. But the overarching principles essential to the viability of particular goals were two-fold: thorough integration of the various tasks and responsibilities, and avoiding estrangement from the masses (t'ou-li ch'un-chung). If the Party, or government, or army, became isolated from the masses, they would lose both their revolutionary legitimacy and the chief source of their strength. But the effective utilization of mass support required flexible channeling of enthusiasm to the most urgent tasks of the moment, and this required the second fundamental principle of policy and task integration. In Chingkangshan leadership fluidity was quite natural,
but in the much larger and more formal setting of the Kiangsi Soviet it proved impossible to require intermediate leadership to be flexible. To cope with this problem Mao devised a careful process of initiating and managing large-scale, comprehensive, but single-focus campaigns. The first of these was the Land Investigation Movement of 1933, but the Yenan campaigns of the 1940's are the classic examples.

The evolution of Mao's revolutionary paradigm required time for policy experiences to mature and to become habits of leadership style and organizational structure. The ultimate practical result of the creation of an appropriate rural revolutionary politics was national liberation after 22 years of base area experience. Unlike the Russian October Revolution, national success built on local successes which in turn were achieved by experienced leadership with proven policies. From this perspective, the impression of inevitability of success given by Jack Belden in *China Shakes the World* is correct. Although China's cosmopolitan intellectuals could not see their own image in the success, many recognized the achievement as the fulfillment of their patriotic political aspirations for a strong, progressive social order built on liberation from feudalism. What Mao has created--and the CCP embodied--was an indigenous political solution to the crisis of appropriateness suffered by the florescence of intellectual modernization.

III. LEARNING FROM THE SOVIET UNION

True to the fickle nature of Hegel's dialectic, the achievement of liberation was at the same time the *Aufhebung* (annulment through fulfilment) of the revolutionary expertise which made success possible. What is amazing about the CCP's early post-Liberation policy is that another of Hegel's adages, "the lesson of history is that people never learn the lesson of history," did not prove correct. Mao showed the depths of his lessons from experience by realizing the limits of their applicability. The Soviet paradigm of socialist transformation was adopted because it represented over 30 years of Marxist-Leninist experience with post-liberation tasks. The phase of learning from the Soviet Union was not simply the domestic corollary of China's foreign policy of learning toward the Soviet side; more importantly, it stemmed from a confidence in the "universal truths of Marxism-Leninism" and a respect for the Soviet Union's accomplishments.

This second period of "using things foreign for China" is similar to the phase of learning from the West in its orientation toward studying foreign models, but the content of interest in the Soviet model was quite different. It was primarily a period of practical utilization of policies and techniques, and it was a governmental rather than an individual relation. The large-scale practical borrowing rested on the assumption that the governmental structures and values of the Soviet Union and China were basically the same and that the Soviet Union had been successful in its socialist transformation. Within a common Marxist-Leninist framework, the more backward and more recently liberated country could use the experience and friendly assistance of the more advanced.
Despite the general positing of a linear theory of socialist development, the Chinese did not blindly imitate every aspect of the Russian pattern. In areas where they had considerable policy experience of their own, for instance in handling the national bourgeoisie and in agriculture, continued policy development was less affected by the Russian model. Also on more general planes of policy preferences, the Chinese showed an independent emphasis on regional balance and local adjustment. The publication in the early 1950's of Mao's essays "On Practice" and "On Contradiction" is an indication of the self-assurance of the Chinese leadership about the autonomous value of its own revolutionary experience and theory. Indeed, considering the bad advice the Russians had given the CCP throughout its history, it would be surprising to see reenter a role of blind discipleship. But by and large the Soviet experience was viewed as successful Marxism in action, a practice whose universal aspect could be applied to Chinese conditions.

The process of transition from the Soviet paradigm is expertly described in Roderick MacFarquhar's book, Contradictions Among the People, 1956-1957. In the years he analyses, several factors combined to convince the Chinese leadership of the necessity and possibility of autonomous development. First in time and probably in importance of Mao was the completion of agricultural collectivization. Not only did the success of the cooperatization movement mark the final stage of establishing a socialist economic base, but the speed of the movement was a remarkable success for Mao's personal leadership and for policies relying on popular mobilization. China was entering the same Marxist historical plane as the Soviet Union on the basis of relatively autonomous policy breakthroughs. This success and and the consequent eclipse of the more timid central planners led to the short "leap forward" of 1956.

The second major development of 1956 was Khrushchev's attack on Stalin at the 20th Congress of the CPSU. This in itself would have induced major theoretical developments in China, but the immediate influence of international Communist politics was greatly heightened by the Polish riots and the Hungarian Revolution later in 1956. Destalinization had several very important specific effects in China, but the basic impact was a theoretical and procedural scandalizing of the CCP leadership. This led to a serious reconsideration of the role of Stalin and also private criticism of the current Soviet leadership. Mao did not avoid the basic question that this raised: "Is the October Revolution still valid? Can it still be the example for all countries? Khrushchev's report at the 20th Congress of the CPSU says it is possible to gain political power by the parliamentary road, that is to say, it is no longer necessary for all countries to learn from the October Revolution. Once this gate is opened, Leninism by and large is thrown out." (Peking Review no. 17, 1970; p.6). Mao was thus prepared to view the later disturbances in Eastern Europe as serious rifts between people and government under socialism, and to move in a path-breaking way to prevent similar rifts from developing in China. The 100 Flowers Campaign of emphasizing Party rectification and allowing external criticism of the Party was based on Mao's new analysis of how to handle contradictions among the people.
The course of the 100 Flowers Campaign and its embarrassing (for Mao) failure develops the third element of transition to the next phase, namely increasing factionalism among the top leadership. MacFarguhar convincingly documents the determined opposition of Liu Shao-ch'i and P'eng Chen to the 100 Flowers Campaign and the overtones critical of Mao in the Anti-Rightist Campaign. The loyalties drawn or confirmed at this time remained substantially the same a decade later, with Teng Hsiac-p'ing being the major exception. China emerged in 1957 with her own socialist economic base, the necessity of basic ideological autonomy, and an ambiguously consolidated leadership.

IV. SOCIALIST CORRECTION, 1957-1976

In the euphoria of criticizing the Gang of Four it is tempting to see contemporary Chinese politics as a return to 1957 and the intervening period as a nightmarish derailment of normal development. Moreover it seems that many Chinese cadres do demonstrate an impulse to return to the golden age of the late fifties, with a consequent ignoring or rejection of later developments. But for all its tumultuous interplay of theoretical critique and economic repair, the phase of socialist criticism does have achievements as well as scars to its credit. The present political liveliness and relative institutional pluralism owe much to developments from 1957 to 1976.

Another problem with the phase of socialist correction is that its sub-phases are so diametrically opposed to one another that it appears to be a collection of phases. In my opinion the overarching unity of this phase is established by two related factors, Mao's leadership throughout the phase and his assumption that socialist construction and ideological revolution were not in basic conflict. The first factor, which led Professor James Townsend to designate this phase as "the Maoist period" in a recent talk, is obscured by Mao's active intervention in the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution was compared to his passive to frustrated role in the economic recoveries of the early sixties and seventies. But this oscillation is more fruitfully explained by the ambiguities of Mao's own political values than by a simplistic "in power/out of power" hypothesis. Mao's political career was founded on the complementarity of the revolutionary energy of the masses and economic prosperity. He was never willing to give up one for the other, and as a particular policy direction approached one extreme of the unadmitted dichotomy there was increasing likelihood of a shift of sides by Mao.

The unity of Mao's "grasp revolution, promote production" approach is most evident in the Great Leap Forward. The spectacular material gains imagined by its proponents were founded on the presumed ideological consolidation of the Anti-Rightist campaign and the socialist education campaign of 1957, the movement's new socialist institutions, and the effectiveness of Yenan-style mass campaigns. The Great Leap Forward achieved a number of political and economic successes, but it was more significant as a failure of Maoist intervention and as a partial cause of ensuing economic hardships. In this situation it is not surprising that material welfare would take precedence over revolu-